


















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


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
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*J. Thomas Dorman*

## DEDICATION TO THE VERY REVEREND THOMAS PLASSMANN, O. F. M.

The work of the scholar-priest is always dual: he teaches and he writes. It is perhaps regrettable that outside the sphere of personal contact his fame as a rule must depend largely upon his published works. The arduous and time-consuming duties of his priesthood very often restrict the quantity of his scholarly output, whereas the influence of his personality and erudition in the classroom and elsewhere may have a greater and more lasting effect than any of his most learned writings.

Since 1910 Father Thomas Plassmann has been a brilliant expounder of Sacred Scripture, dogmatic theology, and other sacred sciences to endless hundreds of young men at Christ the King Seminary. For over forty years (double the time usually allotted to any professor) he has poured out for them the treasures of his vast and profound learning - the fruit of his own years of study at the Catholic University of America, the Apollinaris, Sapienza (Rome), Louvain, and the Holy Land itself - and he has always done so with a casual charm and simplicity that bears lightly the ponderous weight of his many academic degrees.

Besides the burden of teaching throughout these forty-odd years, Father Thomas has also been laden with heavy administrative responsibilities. He was president of Saint Bonaventure University (then College) from 1920 to 1949; and during that period he also served as guardian, definitor, and provincial secretary, and was appointed visitator general to Canada, Saxonia, and Ireland. From 1949 to 1952 he filled the office of minister provincial for Holy Name Province, and since 1952 he has been rector of the new Christ the King Seminary, which he himself built as provincial.

Because Father Thomas has always been the priest's priest rather than the scholar's priest, the list of his learned writings is all too brief: *The Signification of "Beraka"*, *The Study of the Root d-b-r*, *Baronius*, *Bartholomaeus Anglicus*, besides contributions to the various learned journals in Biblical studies, history, theology, and related fields. But



if his actual scholarly production has been relatively small, his influence on Franciscan scholarship in America has been very great. He founded *The Franciscan Educational Conference* in 1919, serving as president until 1946, and *Franciscan Studies*, of which he is currently the editor; the existence of The Franciscan Institute is due largely to his efforts and farsighted cooperation; and as president or officer of such learned societies as The National Catholic Education Association, The Catholic Biblical Association, The Catholic Historical Association and The Association of Colleges and Universities of New York State, he has made his influence felt over a wide and important area of American culture.

In these latter years of his full and fruitful life, Father Thomas has directed his energies more and more toward the education of priests. His more recent publications bear such titles as: *The Book Called Holy*, *The Priest's Way to God*, *From Sunday to Sunday*; and his latest work (now in press) is entitled *The Upper Room* — a collection of retreat conferences for priests based on the lives of the Apostles.

On March 19, 1954, seventy-five years will have passed since Thomas Bernard Plassmann was born in the little Westphalian town of Avenwedde, and more than fifty years since he cast his lot, as a boy of nineteen, with the Franciscan Fathers of Holy Name (New York) Province. It has therefore seemed most fitting that the editorial staff dedicate this number of *Franciscan Studies* to our beloved founder and editor. The dedication is made in a spirit of sincere respect for Father Thomas as a most worthy son of Our Seraphic Father Francis and as a scholar whose personal influence has been wide and varied, whose knowledge has always been dedicated to the promotion of true Franciscan piety and learning.

## THE EDITORIAL BOARD

## TRENT AND AURICULAR CONFESSION

An impartial and searching study of the primitive Church penitential system by such eminent scholars as Boudinhon, Battifol, Kirsch, Watkins, Amann and Poschmann (to mention only several), has made invaluable contributions to the realm of the theology of the sacraments and the evolution of dogmas. It has given us a fairly detailed knowledge of the apparatus of sacramental penance that existed during the first four centuries. But most of all it has rendered the following propositions acceptable to many Catholic scholars of high renown. One, during the first four centuries there was no private penance, or auricular confession, such as we know it today. Two, there was no confession of devotion, the pious custom so strongly recommended by Pope Pius XII in the encyclical *Mystici Corporis*. And three, the public form of penance was sacramental in character.<sup>1</sup>

Within the last sixty years these propositions have held their own in successfully resisting the attacks of conservative students of the problem. They continue to gain more and more adherents every day; but opposition to them still persists in some quarters. There are several reasons that seem to constrain some theologians to reject these points apriori, but only one need concern us here.

The main objection to these three conclusions is to be found in the interpretation these theologians deduce from the infallible declarations of the Council of Trent, which has solemnly defined Catholic doctrine relative to the sacrament of penance in the fourteenth session. They are agreed in their historical insouciance that because it is impossible to reconcile the assertions of the abovementioned scholars with the canons of Trent, it is imperative to reject them apriori. Of the fifteen

<sup>1</sup> A. Boudinhon, "Sur l'histoire de la pénitence à propos d'un livre récent", *Revue d'histoire et de littérature religieuse*, II (1897), 306—344, 496—524; P. Battifol, *Études d'histoire et de théologie positive* (1 ed.; Paris: J. Gabalda, 1902), I Série, 200 ff.; J. P. Kirsch, *Kirchengeschichte*, Vol. I, *Die Kirche in der antiken griechisch-römischen Kulturwelt* (Freiburg: 1930), 251 ff.; O. D. Watkins, *A History of Penance* (London: Longmans, 1920), 2 Vols., passim; E. Amann, "Pénitence-Sacrement", *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, XII (1933), 837; B. Poschmann, *Die abendländische Kirchenbuße im Ausgang des christlichen Altertums* (Munich: Koesel and Pustet, 1928), 15; E. Bourque, *Histoire de la pénitence-sacrement* ("Bibliothèque théologique de Laval"; Quebec: 1947), 8.



penitential canons of Trent, canon six, which envisages secret, or auricular confession, serves as grist to their mills. And they grind away. Since Trent has declared in this canon that auricular confession was always employed from the beginning of Christianity, how can anyone maintain that during the first four centuries there was only the public form of penance? It is quite obvious, they argue, that Trent demands that we recognize the existence of secret confession from apostolic times.<sup>2</sup>

The charge is indeed serious and cannot be so lightly dismissed. The object of the present study is to test the validity of this thesis in the light of historical facts. At the same time it seeks to reexamine some of the problems interwoven with the evolution of the dogma of the sacrament of penance.

In canon six<sup>3</sup> the Council of Trent has declared irrevocably that

"If anyone denies that sacramental confession was instituted by divine law or is necessary to salvation; or says that the manner of confessing secretly to a priest alone, which the Catholic Church has always observed from the beginning and still observes, is at variance with the institution and command of Christ and is a human contrivance, let him be anathema."

"Si quis negaverit, confessionem sacramentalem vel institutam vel ad salutem necessariam esse jure divino; aut dixerit, modum secrete confitendi soli sacerdoti, quem Ecclesia catholica ab initio semper observavit et observat, alienum esse ab institutione et mandato Christi, et inventum esse humanum: A. S."

Here two parts are clearly distinguished. In part one, Trent speaks of sacramental confession in general, which is *de fide*; in part two, it refers to the antiquity of auricular confession, which is not an article of faith.

### I. Sacramental Confession:

#### Its Divine Institution and Necessity for Salvation.

In the first section of this very important canon Trent has defined two articles of faith: one, that sacramental confession is of divine origin; and two, that it is necessary for salvation by divine law.

The doctrine of the divine institution of sacramental confession offers no difficulties from the historical standpoint. It is evident that

<sup>2</sup> Most theological manuals are guilty of historical insouciance in regard to the evolution of penance. One notable exception is the eminent B. H. Merkelbach, *Summa Theologiae Moralis* (3d ed.; Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1939), III, 369 f., note 2 and pp. 454—457.

<sup>3</sup> In H. J. Schroeder, *Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent*, (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1941, 102 f.

confession was the motor which set the penitential process in motion, a fact which even the two eminent Protestant scholars, Caspari and K. Mueller<sup>4</sup> recognize. In the public penance described graphically by Tertullian,<sup>5</sup> the ubiquitous presence of confession is unmistakable. When describing the burdensome public penance Tertullian employs a Greek word, *exomologesis*. Now, *exomologesis*, which very often is used to designate the whole apparatus of penance, means first of all, a confession of sin to the Lord. In Tertullian's day people referred to penance simply as *exomologesis*, even as people today identify that sacrament with confession. In our own day they speak of "going to confession". Confession is so important for Tertullian that he can wax eloquent in encouraging the faithful to acknowledge their sins. He is just as forceful in refuting one by one the reasons which drive them away from confession. Is it better, he asks, to conceal our sin and be damned, or to confess it and be absolved?<sup>6</sup>

It is indeed true that the portrait of penance which history limes for us the early part of the third century does not bring into high relief the act of confession. But certainly it was regarded as of divine institution then as it is now. Confession was conspicuous for its informality, for its changeable and variable modes of expression. It can be depicted in the following manner.

The integral parts of the sacrament (confession, absolution, satisfaction) did not follow one after another in an uninterrupted sequence, as they do now. Absolution was conferred only after the completion of a long and burdensome satisfaction. In confession itself we discover two phases. In phase one, the penitent confessed his sins to the bishop, in person or through an intermediary, either spontaneously or otherwise. In the case of a notorious crime, the acquiescence of the culprit to the summons of the bishop was equivalent to a confession. After the avowal of guilt the bishop set the date for the liturgical ceremony which officially and publicly would usher the sinner into the order of penitents, where he began his irksome penances. In phase two, the sinner would on the appointed day confess again to the bishop seated on his throne in the midst of his court, but this time in general and before the whole community. Then he was expelled from the Church.

<sup>4</sup> Cited in P. Galtier, *Sin and Penance*, trans. B. Wall (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1932), 171.

<sup>5</sup> *De Paenitentia*, 7. Ed. Oehler I, 656—658.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 10. Oehler I, 661—662. R. C. Mortimer, *The Origins of Private Penance in the Western Church* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1939), 7, says: "Here is a clear statement of ecclesiastical absolution."



The acknowledgement of sin in both cases could be quite informal and variable.<sup>7</sup>

This fluidity and informality, so conspicuous in sacramental confession of the early centuries, will doubtless aid in explaining why the Fathers of the Church devote so little attention to it. The spectacular parts of the public penance were of greater interest to them: the expulsion from the Church, provoked by the confession of sins; the burdensome public expiation, which was the external manifestation of both contrition and satisfaction; and finally the solemn reconciliation, or absolution, by the bishop. A sincere and complete confession was absolutely demanded of the sinner, but the manner in which it was accomplished varied considerably. But whatever stature it assumed, exomologesis would never begin without it.

Much more engrossing from the scholar's viewpoint, is the history of the Catholic doctrine of the necessity of confession for salvation, which Trent has defined as an obligation imposed by divine law and an article of faith. It cannot be denied that the historical development in the understanding of the necessity of confession has had its fluctuations over the centuries. To deny that would be sadly out of proportion to the voluminous literature which unmistakably shows such evolution. The Church does not demand that Catholics hold that this dogma has at all times been professed and formulated as explicitly and as universally as it is today.

Even the definitions of the great Council of Trent do not insist on this time significance. True, Trent says that "from the institution of the sacrament of penance the universal Church has always understood that the integral confession of sins was instituted by Christ, and that it is by divine right necessary for all who have sinned after baptism". But it is no less true that one is not constrained to maintain that such has always been the explicit teaching. The facts of history corroborate this conclusion. This doctrine required centuries of evolution to attain the degree of clarity which now compels all to its unreserved acceptance. Until then some Catholic scholars could have, and in fact have, disputed and rejected the truth, as the subsequent paragraphs will show.<sup>8</sup>

In this discussion the pivotal point was the purely disciplinary decree on confession of the Fourth Lateran Council, held in the year 1215. It requires confession to one's own priest and the faithful performance

<sup>7</sup> E. Amann, *op. cit.*, 777—779; E. Bourque, *op. cit.*, 27 ff.

<sup>8</sup> Galtier, *op. cit.*, 205 ff.

of penance at least once a year. In the history of penance and in the realm of theology this decree had far-reaching consequences.

Before the Lateran Council there is among the schoolmen of the twelfth century, for example, a very wide divergence of opinion in regard to the doctrine of the divinely constituted obligation of submitting sins in confession. That century sparkles with the controversy. In the year 1140, that greatest of all canonists, Gratian, is remarkably frank in admitting that he himself is quite unable to take sides in this controversy, since the reasons for and against one and the other opinion seem to be equally convincing.<sup>9</sup> This should not shock or scandalize anyone, any more than it scandalized St. Thomas<sup>10</sup> Aquinas or St. Bonaventure,<sup>11</sup> both of whom are convinced that such an opinion could have been held in good faith before the Lateran decree. Abelard<sup>12</sup> considers confession as a practice highly useful and recommended, but one which hardly is absolutely necessary. And his illustrious disciple, Roland Bandinelli, who wore the papal tiara as Alexander III,<sup>13</sup> seems but to re-echo the opinion of his master.

If the period before the year 1215 is one in which theologians are divided on the question, the era which follows is conspicuous for its remarkable unanimity. Such theological giants as St. Bonaventure,<sup>14</sup> and St. Thomas<sup>15</sup> (not to mention other theologians) are agreed that

<sup>9</sup> *Decretum*, II, xxxiii, 3, can. 89; ed. E. Friedberg, *Corpus Juris Canonici*. (Leipzig: Bernh. Tauchnitz, 1879), I, 1189: "Quibus auctoritatibus, ve quibus rationum firmamentis utraque sententia confessionis et satisfactionis nitatur, in medium brevis proposuimus. Cui autem harum potius adherendum sit, lectoris judicio reservatur. Utraque enim fautores habet sapientes et religiosos viros." Cf. J. de Ghellinck, *Le mouvement théologique du XII<sup>e</sup> siècle*, (Brugghe: 1948), 348, 307, note 4; Amann, *op. cit.*, 934—935 and 901—902. But see Galtier, *De Paenitentia* (rev. ed.; Paris: G. Beauchesne, 1931), 266—277.

<sup>10</sup> *In IV Sententiarum*, Dist. XVII, *Expos. Textus; Opera Omnia*, VII (2) (Parmae: Fiaccadori, 1858), 804.

<sup>11</sup> Bonaventura, *In IV Sententiarum*, Dist. XVII, *Pars II, Dubium 1* (Quaracchi: 1889), IV, 448.

<sup>12</sup> *Sic et Non*, 151. Migne, *P. L.* 178, 1599—1600; *id.*, *Ethica seu Scito te Ipsum*, 24 and 25, *ibid.*, 668—673. Cf. Bourque, *op. cit.* 33; Amann, *op. cit.*, 936 f. For a different view, see Galtier, *op. cit.*, 269 f.

<sup>13</sup> *Die Sentenzen Rolands nachmals Papstes Alexander III*, ed. A. Gietl, Freiburg, 1891), 243—249. But see Galtier, *op. cit.*, 270.

<sup>14</sup> *Op. cit.*, Art. I, Qu. I (Quaracchi), 437; *ibid.*, Dist. XXII, Art. 2, Qu. 1; *ibid.*, Dist. XVII, Dub. 1 (Quaracchi), IV, 448: "Si quis esset modo hujus opinionis, esset haereticus reprobatus, quoniam in Concilio generali hoc determinatum est sub Innocentio tertio. Sed ante hanc determinationem hoc non erat haeresis."

<sup>15</sup> *Op. cit.*, Dist. XVII, Qu. 3, Art. 1 (Parmae), VII, (2), 793: "Confessio quae sacramentalem necessitatem habet, non est de jure naturali, sed divino." *Ibid.*, *Expos. Text.*, p. 804: "Sed nunc post determinationem Ecclesiae sub Innocentio III factam, haeresis reputanda est."



sacramental confession is obligatory by divine law, and that to repudiate it after the Lateran decree would be tantamount to heresy.

With this disciplinary decree on annual confession the long series of theological disputes on the nature of the obligation came to a close. The Lateran pronouncement was indeed a decisive one. No dissenting voice is raised against this position for all of three hundred years until the birth of Protestantism. The next step in the onward march of this doctrine is Trent with its solemn declaration and anathema.

This disciplinary decree had more far-reaching implications for theology than appears at first impression. With it there came into view a new perspective for the theologians who maintained the divinely instituted obligation of submitting one's sins to the power of the keys. In view of these considerations, the question can be raised: Why was the practical decree of 1215 so effective in creating unanimity among the schoolmen?

This important decree served the purpose of opening the eyes of the theologians to the precept of Christ in regard to submitting sins to the keys in confession. In the Church there was always the consciousness, not necessarily an explicit one at all times, that the sacrament of penance and confession was of divine origin. There was also the conviction that the faithful must submit their sins to the keys which Christ conferred upon the Church. But this obligation was never urged: it remained for a long time vague, illdefined, and indefinite. The Church had never pronounced officially upon the extension and the practical obligation for all the faithful. Now, every precept that remains indeterminate, one whose execution is left to the discretion of the subjects, runs the grave risk of being neglected or forgotten altogether.<sup>16</sup>

The precept of annual confession therefore determined this vague and ill-defined obligation with clear-cut precision. It presupposed that the obligation to confess is imposed by divine law, for when Christ declared that it was absolutely necessary for sinners to receive the sacrament of penance, He also implied confession to the priest. The necessity stems from a divine source. By this precept the Church is emphatic in imposing upon the faithful the obligation to recognize and accept it. It was Christ who imposed the obligation to seek remission of sin; but it was the Church, with its authoritative interpretation of the intentions of Christ, that determined for the faithful the extent of this divine obligation. After the Lateran decree theo-

<sup>16</sup> Bourque, *op. cit.*, 34; Galtier, *Sin and Penance*, 204 f.

logians are unanimous in asserting that the decree specified the time when the faithful are obliged to obey the divine precept of confession.

Even though the decree was purely disciplinary in nature, it was an obvious thermometer of the *mens Ecclesiae*. From that very moment the difference of opinion among the scholastics ceases. Because of this monumental pronouncement, the swing is to unanimity among theologians that confession is divinely ordained. In his ingenuity St. Thomas demonstrates the perfect harmony that exists between these two truths, namely, the efficacy of perfect contrition and the necessity of confession of sins. The polar principle for Thomas is the proposition that perfect contrition, to remit sin, must include the so-called *votum confessionis*.<sup>17</sup> In his usual limpid manner he brings out in very bold relief the efficacy of the virtue of penance in the sacrament itself,<sup>18</sup> and its necessity *semper et pro semper* for the remission of sins.<sup>19</sup>

Before bringing this portion of the inquiry to a close there are yet a few questions that are probably in the minds of many readers. If it is true that the Church was always conscious of the divine obligation to confess sins, how can one account for the so-called reserved cases during the first four centuries? Is it not inconsistent with the divine mission of the Church to refuse absolution to sinners in the hour of death?

As for the first question, the so-called reserved cases<sup>20</sup> do not militate against the Catholic doctrine of sacramental confession. The term reserved cases refers to the condition of lapsed penitents, those who, having once been reconciled after the completion of their satisfaction,

<sup>17</sup> *Summa, Supplem., Qu. 1, Art. 1; ibid., Pars III, Qu. 86, Art. 6; id., In IV Sent., Dist. XVII, Qu. 3, Art. 1, Quaestiuncula 5 (Parmae), VII, 793: "Ideo ad culpae remissionem et actualis et originalis requiritur sacramentum Ecclesiae, vel actu susceptum vel saltem voto, quando articulus necessitatis, non contemptus, sacramentum excludit."*

<sup>18</sup> *Summa, III Pars, Qu. 86, Art. 6: "Remissio culpae est effectus poenitentiae, principalius quidem ex virtute clavium quas habent ministri, ex quorum parte accipitur id quod est formale in hoc sacramento; secundario autem ex vi actuum poenitentis pertinentium ad virtutem poenitentiae, tamen prout hi actus aliququaliter ordinantur ad claves Ecclesiae. Et sic patet quod remissio culpae est effectus poenitentiae secundum quod est virtus; principalius tamen secundum quod est sacramentum." Ibid., Qu. 84, Art. 5.*

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid., Qu. 86, Art. 2: "Impossibile est peccatum actuale mortale sine poenitentia remitti, loquendo de poenitentia quae est virtus . . . Sacramentum autem poenitentiae perficitur per officium sacerdotis ligantis et solventis. Sine quo potest Deus peccatum remittere . . . Quibus tamen non remisit peccata sine virtute poenitentiae."*

<sup>20</sup> It should be stressed that there is no question here of a reservation of sins to higher power, which always ceases in danger of death, as Trent teaches, Session 14, vii (Schroeder, *op. cit.*, 96): ". . . ut nulla sit reservatio in articulo mortis." Nor is it a question of a dispensation in the obligation of submitting sins to the keys; for there can be no such dispensation, since



had fallen again into heinous crimes.<sup>21</sup> It also includes those who in the fifty year period between 170 and 220 fell into one of the triad of sins (apostasy, homicide, adultery), whose forgiveness was reserved to God alone; sins called by some, the irremissibles.<sup>22</sup> These two categories of sinners were denied absolution even at the hour of death<sup>23</sup>.

confession is obligatory by divine law, as Thomas says: "Et ideo sicut Papa non potest dispensare ut aliquis sine baptismo salvetur, ita nec quod salvetur sine confessione, secundum quod obligat ex ipsa vi sacramenti . . . Non potest dispensare in jure naturali, ita nec in jure positivo divino." *Summa, Suppl., Qu. 6, Art. 6*: In this case the Church applied the *ius ligandi*. See Thomas, *ibid.*, *Qu. 18, Art. 3* and 4. The words of Batiffol are pertinent: "Il faut admettre, que l'Église, économe de ce pouvoir divin des clefs, peut la prodiguer ou le réserver. Elle peut le réserver parce que, aussi bien l'absolution n'est pas l'unique issue que Dieu ait laissée au pécheur pénitent. La contrition parfaite ne réconcilie-t-elle pas le pénitent à Dieu?" *Op. cit.*, 202.

<sup>21</sup> Penance was allowed only once in a lifetime. The lapsed sinners were the recidivists. See *Pastor Hermae*, Command. IV, 3. ed. Funk, I, 478 ff.; St. Ambrose, *De Paenitentiae*, II, x, 95. Migne, *P. L.*, 16, 520: "Sicut unum baptisma, ita una paenitentia quae tamen publice agitur." Tertullian, *De Paenitentia*, 10. Oehler I, 657; St. Augustine, *Epist.* 153, 7. Migne *P. L.*, 33, 656: "Quamvis ergo caute salubriterque provisum sit ut locus illius humillimae paenitentiae semel in Ecclesia concedatur, ne medicina vilis minus utilis esset aegrotis, quae tanto magis salubris est, quanto minus contemptibilis fuerit, quis tamen audeat dicere Deo: Quare huic homini, qui post primam paenitentiam rursus se laqueis iniquitatis obstringit, adhuc iterum parcis?"

<sup>22</sup> Tertullian, *De Pudicitia* 2. Oehler I, 796 f.; Pope Callistus, his so-called edict, in *De Pudicitia* 1. Oehler I, 792; *Pastor Hermae*, Similit. VIII, vi, 6. Funk I, 568. For a clear presentation of the problem, see Bourque, *op. cit.*, 83 ff.; Mortimer, *op. cit.*, 16 ff.; Amann, *op. cit.*, 779, 784.

<sup>23</sup> Tertullian, *De Pudicitia* 1. Oehler I, 792, refers to such a tradition. See St. Cyprian, *Epist.* LV, 21. ed. Hartel III, 638 f.: "Et quidem apud antecessores nostros quidam de episcopis istic in provincia nostra dandam pacem moechis non putaverunt et in totum paenitentiae locum contra adulteria clausurunt. Non tamen a coepiscoporum suorum collegio recesserunt, aut catholicae Ecclesiae unitatem vel duritiae vel censurae suae obstinatione ruperunt, ut, quia apud alios adulteris pax dabatur, qui non dabat de Ecclesia separaretur. Manente concordiae vinculo et perseverante Ecclesiae individuo sacramento, actum suum disponit et dirigit unusquisque episcopus rationem propositi sui Domino redditurus." It is clear that in some churches of Africa, prior to St. Cyprian, adultery was considered an irremissible sin. Whether it was a new discipline or the old usage, is an open question.—In regard to apostasy, rigorism prevailed, as Cyprian informs us in his *Testimonia*, III, 28. Hartel, 142: "Non posse in Ecclesia remitti ei qui in Deum deliquerit." But the Decian persecution forces basic modifications in this rigid attitude; and finally apostasy is remitted. See Cyprian, *Epist.* LV, 6. Homicide remained, after the year 252, as the sole sin reserved to God. It is difficult to determine the exact date when it ceased to be so classified. What is certain, is the fact that it does not possess this characteristic toward the end of the third century. The ultra-rigoristic Council of Elvira does not place it in this category. Furthermore, even Cyprian himself does not refer to the irremissible nature of homicide. The Council of Ancyra (314), in canons 16, 21, and 22. Mansi II, 518—521, offers unequivocal vestiges of the ancient penitential discipline in regard to the irremissibles. See Amann, *op. cit.*, 789; Bourque, *op. cit.*, 87; Amann, "Novatien", *Dict. Théol. Cath.* XI (1931), 832 ff.

This poses a problem, but surely not an unsolvable one. According to the law of that epoch such sinners were obliged *a fortiori* to submit their sins to the keys, even though they were to do penance for the rest of their lives, without ever receiving absolution. Such a procedure may seem shocking to us in the twentieth century, but it must be remembered that the Church in refusing absolution under such circumstances was merely exercising, for a variety of reasons, that other God-given power, the counterpart of the power to loose,— the *jus ligandi*. The peculiar case of major clerics who were exempted by Pope Callistus in the year 220 from public penance for reasons of prestige and discipline, can be explained in pretty much the same way.<sup>24</sup> In all these circumstances the bishop demanded an act of contrition after hearing the confession of the sinner, and this sufficed to obtain divine pardon, when it contained at least implicitly what Trent demands,<sup>25</sup> “the desire to perform the other things that are required to receive this sacrament in the proper manner.”

In regard to the second question, the objection is often raised that such a procedure on the part of the Church would be incompatible with the divine law, since penance is a means necessary for salvation, and the power of the keys was conferred for the benefit of sinners. But it is idle to argue against historical facts, as the great contemporary theologian, Father Merkelbach, very readily admits. There is no conflict with divine law, he writes, and for several reasons. One, Christ conferred upon the Church the duty to regulate the exercise of the keys for the greater good of the whole Church. Two, the Church has the power to lay down conditions which it deems necessary for the validity of this sacrament, even as She had legislated for matrimony. Three, the obligation to confess urges in danger of death; in the course of a lifetime such a determination is left to the judgment of the Church. Four, the sacrament of penance is not indispensable, since sin can be remitted through an act of charity or contrition. Finally, he writes, there is no inconsistency when the Church permits a particular sinner to die in excommunication, deprived of the sacraments, as a punishment for his sins. It is not incongruous that the Church should, as in the

<sup>24</sup> See Hippolytus, *Philosophumena* IX, 12. ed. P. Wendland, *Hippolytus Werke*, Vol. III, *Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte* (Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1899), 249 f. See E. F. Latko, *Origen's Concept of Penance* (Quebec, 1949), 61 ff.; Bourque, *op. cit.*, 93 ff.; Amann, “Pénitence-Sacrement”, *Dict. Théol. Cathol.*, XII, 836.

<sup>25</sup> Session XIV, iv, Contrition. ed. Schroeder, p. 91. See Bourque, *op. cit.*, 49.



cases mentioned above, refuse absolution to the sinner in the hour of death and relinquish him to the judgment of God, all the while praying for his salvation.<sup>26</sup>

## II. Auricular Confession or Private Penance.

In the preceding pages we discussed some of the historical problems linked with the doctrine of the divine institution and the necessity of sacramental confession. Our present task is to determine the actual background of the words of Trent in regard to secret or auricular confession, the private penance as we know it today. Trent has declared that the "manner of confessing secretly to a priest alone", which the Catholic Church always observed from the beginning and still observed, is not at variance with the institution and the command of Christ, nor a human contrivance.

In this descriptive definition of auricular confession, Trent emphatically reiterates the concept of other councils and canonizes the new mode of penance which is a legitimate development of the older system. This new system was first worked out and spread by the Celtic monks who invaded the continent as missionaries early in the sixth century,<sup>27</sup> at least. That the phraseology of Trent, cited above, is similar to, and suggests the influence of, other councils becomes evident when compared with the language of the decree of the Fourth Lateran Council, which in 1215 demanded that all the faithful of both sexes, having reached the age of discretion, faithfully confess all their sins at least once a year to their own priest, and perform to the best of their ability the penance imposed as a preparation for the reception of the Holy Eucharist. It enjoins the priest, furthermore, under pain of deposition and perpetual penance in a monastery, never to reveal confession by word or sign.<sup>28</sup> The similarity is further manifest in the language of the first national Council of Chalon-sur-Saône,<sup>29</sup> held in the year 650, which in canon eight (actually cited in a reference by Trent) approved the private mode of penance popularized by the Celtic monks in the words that "in regard to the penance for sins, which is the cure for

<sup>26</sup> *Op. cit.*, 369—370, note 2.

<sup>27</sup> B. Poschmann, *Die abendländische Kirchenbuße im frühen Mittelalter* ("Breslauer Studien", XVI; Breslau: Mueller and Seiffert, 1930), 58 ff.

<sup>28</sup> H. J. Schroeder, *Disciplinary Decrees of the General Councils* (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1937), 259 f.

<sup>29</sup> Variations of this name appear in publications. See John Cabassutius (Jean Cabbasut), *Notitia Ecclesiastica* (3d ed.; Lugduni: Offic. Anissoniana, Joannis Posuel and Claudii Rigaud, 1690), 287, and the *Index*, under *Cabilo*.

the soul, we say it is useful to men; and the practice on the part of the priests in indicating the penance to the penitents is known to have the consent of all the priests."<sup>30</sup> This was indeed a very wide approval of the new mode of penance,<sup>31</sup> one that was not recognized by the national Council of Toledo, held in 589.

The words of Trent furthermore canonize the new mode of penance legitimately developed and popularized by the great Celtic missionaries who invaded the continent before the second half of the sixth century. The new and easier system was received with loud acclaim by the people. It grew popular wherever it was introduced. But it met with opposition on the part of ecclesiastical authorities in Spain, as is apparent from the severe language of the reactionary Council of Toledo, held in the year 589, which wrathfully denounces it in the words of canon eleven,<sup>32</sup> given here in translation.

"Where as we have found in certain Spanish churches that men are doing penance for their sins in an uncanonical and most disgraceful manner, namely that they ask for priestly absolution just so often as they care to sin, now therefore, in order to check so detestable a presumption the holy council orders that penance be administered in accordance with the form of the ancient canons. That is, he who is repentant for his sin should be first of all prohibited from the Eucharist, and having taken his place among the other penitents, he ought to have recourse frequently to the imposition of hands. Once the time of satisfaction is accomplished, if the bishop after due consideration should judge him worthy, let him be admitted to Communion. As for those who either during the time of penance or after reconciliation shall fall into sins again, they shall be condemned according to the rigors of the ancient canons."

This famous canon is very illuminating, for it presents in contraposition two different modes of penance, the older, canonical form, and its legitimate reform introduced on the continent by the Celts. What were the chief characteristics of both forms?

The primal characteristics of the public penitential system in vogue in the primitive Church were the following. Through a confession which could have been either spontaneous or provoked, the sinner manifested his sins to the bishop, the ordinary minister, and begged to be admitted to the order of penitents. When the bishop granted

<sup>30</sup> "De paenitentia peccatorum, quae est medela animae, utilem hominibus esse censemus; et ut paenitentibus a sacerdotibus data confessione indicatur paenitentia, universitas sacerdotum noscitur consentire." Mansi X, 1191; *Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Leg.*, III, 1, p. 197. But John Cabassutius, the French Oratorian, gives the following lection: "*universitas Patrum noscitur consentire*". *Op. cit.*, 288.

<sup>31</sup> Poschmann, *op. cit.*, 75 ff.; Amann, *op. cit.*, 848; Boudinhon, *op. cit.*, 502.

<sup>32</sup> Mansi IX, 995. Cf. Amann, *op. cit.*, 840; Watkins, *op. cit.*, II, 557 ff.; Poschmann, *op. cit.*, 159 ff.



his request, he was clothed in the so-called *cilicium*, the special penitential garment, and joined the other penitents, in public worship, in a reserved part of the church. Here, together with the others of his rank, the sinner received an imposition of hands from the bishop during divine services. The period of penance or satisfaction varied from the usual forty days of Lent to a procrastinated period of several years. During this time the penitent was required to observe strict continence, to pray very frequently and to devote himself to almsgiving.<sup>33</sup> The words of Tertullian, that "exomologesis is a discipline for man's prostration and humiliation, which commands a man to lie in sackcloth and ashes, to feed prayers in fastings, to groan, weep and to make outcries unto the Lord God",<sup>34</sup> while no doubt quite exaggerated, show that the system was both rigorous and very burdensome.<sup>35</sup>

By enrolling in the order of penitents, the culprit furthermore was excommunicated. It should be emphasized that in the early Church the excommunication did not entail the terrible penalties of our own day. The penitent in the primitive Church was permitted a restricted participation in the liturgical life of the community: he occupied a reserved place in the church, where the whole congregation officially prayed for him. Special liturgical functions were prescribed to the end that his penance might be sanctified in the sight of God. His position was similar to that of the catechumen, with this signal difference,

<sup>33</sup> J. P. Kirsch, *op. cit.*, 251 ff. and 342 ff.; Amann, *op. cit.*, 802 f.; J. Morin, *Commentarius Historicus de Disciplina in Administratione Sacramenti Paenitentiae* (Antwerp: 1682), *passim*; Denis Petau, *De Vetere in Ecclesia Paenitentiae Ratione Diatriba*, Vol. VIII, *Dogmatica Theologica* (new ed.; Paris: Vivès, 1867), 177—275; J. Sirmond, *Historia Paenitentiae Publicae* (Paris: Cramoisy, 1651), 1—9.

<sup>34</sup> *De Paenitentia* 9. Oehler I, 669—671.

<sup>35</sup> In certain areas, in the Eastern Church, during the third and fourth centuries, there were stations of penitents. By this arrangement penitents were divided into four stations, and to each was assigned a special position in church. There were: 1) the mourners, whose station was outside the door of the actual building, in what would nowadays be called the churchyard; 2) the hearers, who were allowed to stay within the sacred building, near the door, in the narthex of the church; 3) the kneelers, who remained within the door of the church, up to the offertory; 4) the standers, whose station was with the faithful, above the lectern, in the rear of the actual communicants, who remained until the close of the services. In the West such stations were unknown. The Council of Nicaea, in canon 11, mentions three of the four stations; cf. Schroeder, *op. cit.*, 39. As early as 314, the Council of Ancyra, in canon 25, mentions them; cf. Mansi II, 521. But even before this date St. Gregory Thaumaturgus, who died about 270, presents the germ of the stations; see *Canonical Epistles*, can. 11, even can. 7, 8, 9, refer to the categories. In Migne, P. G., 10, 1019, ff. See R. S. T. Haselhurst, *Some Account of the Penitential Discipline of the Early Church in the First Four Centuries* (London: Macmillan, 1921), 83—91; Amann, *op. cit.*, 804.

that now his noviceship of Christian living was more difficult. Briefly, excommunication in the early Church meant a separation or exclusion of the sinner from the community in general, and from the Eucharist in particular. Only the reconciliation at the hands of the bishop, which was never granted before the conclusion of the prescribed penance, permitted him to receive Holy Communion.<sup>36</sup>

Even more burdensome and more terrible were the lifelong sequels which public penance entailed. The Council of Toledo, cited above, summarizes them in the single phrase,—the rigors of the ancient canons. These were the permanent obligations or disabilities which the public or canonical penance imposed upon the sinner, and consisted of the following. One, no one was ever allowed to do penance twice.<sup>37</sup> If the Christian had the misfortune to fall again into grievous sin, there was no second reconciliation for him. Pope Siricius ordered that, even though the sinner remain excommunicated all his life, he might be allowed the viaticum on his deathbed.<sup>38</sup> Two, the penitent was not allowed to marry.<sup>39</sup> Three, if already married he had to observe continence not only for the period of his public penance, but for all the rest of his life.<sup>40</sup> Four, he was debarred from military service.<sup>41</sup>

<sup>36</sup> Origen, *In Judices Homilia II*, 5; ed. W. Baehens, *Origenes Werke*, Vol. VII, *Die griechischen*, etc., 478—479; St. Cyprian, *Epist.* LV, 6, 17, 20—22, and 52; *Epist.* IV; *Epist.* XVI; *id.*, *De Lapsis*, ed. Hartel, pp. 237—264; St. Methodius of Olympus, *To Sisteilus on Leprosy*; ed. N. Bonwetsch, pp. 458 ff.; *Didascalia et Constitutiones Apostolorum*, v—vii; ed. Funk (Paderborn, 1905), I, 42 ff.; canon 2 of Council of Laodicea (ca. 380), *Mansi II*, 572. See Kirsch, *op. cit.*, 342 ff.; Bourque, *op. cit.*, 110 ff.; Amann, *op. cit.*, 769.

<sup>37</sup> See note 21.

<sup>38</sup> *Epistola I ad Himerium* v, 6. Migne, *P. L.*, 13, 1137: "De quibus, quia jam suffugium non habent poenitendi . . . ut sola intra ecclesiam fidelibus oratione jungantur, sacrae mysteriorum celebritati, quamvis non mereantur, intersint; a Dominicæ autem mensæ convivio segregentur . . . Quos tamen, quoniam fragilitate ceciderunt, viatico munere, cum ad Dominum coeperint proficisci, per communionis gratiam volumus sublevari."

<sup>39</sup> Pope Siricius, *ibid.*, *loc. cit.*: "Qui acta paenitentia, tamquam canes ac sues ad vomitus pristinos et volutabra redeunt, et militiae cingulum, et ludicras voluptates, et nova conjugia, et inhibitos denuo appetivere concubitus quorum professam incontinentiam generati post absolutionem filii prodiderunt."

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.* But Pope St. Leo the Great, in his letter to the bishop Rusticus of Narbonne, introduces a certain mitigation: "In adolescentia constitutus, si urgente aut metu mortis aut captivitatis periculo, poenitentiam gessit, et postea timens lapsum incontinentiæ juvenilis, copulam uxoris elegit, ne crimen fornicationis incurreret, rem videtur fecisse venialem, si præter conjugem nullam omnino cognoverit. In quo tamen non regulam constituimus, sed quid sit tolerabilius aestimamus." *Epist.* 167, xiii. Migne, *P. L.*, 54, 1207. See Mortimer, *op. cit.*, 118 f.

<sup>41</sup> Pope Siricius, *op. cit.*, *loc. cit.* St. Leo, *op. cit.*, 1206: "Contrarium est omnino ecclesiasticis regulis, post paenitentiae actionem redire ad militiam saecularem."

Five, he was forever incapable of holy orders.<sup>42</sup> And six, he was debarred from most forms of commercial activity.<sup>43</sup> Thus the penitent lived the life of a monk, "in the world, yet not of it", as Mortimer<sup>44</sup> puts it, "wholly devoted to pious exercises and charitable works". The reason for such permanent disqualifications was that, because there was no second opportunity for penance, the life of the reconciled penitent was to be shielded from the ordinary sources of temptation. The canonical obligations were not punitive, but rather preventive.<sup>45</sup>

The case of sinful clerics was remarkable. Major clerics were forbidden from submitting to the canonical penance by Pope Callistus,<sup>46</sup> in 220, who sought to preserve the prestige and the dignity of the hierarchy. He wanted to spare the clerics the humiliations of the public *exomologesis*. Sinful clerics were instead deposed and placed among the laity in the event of heinous crimes. That was the extent of their punishment. No further penalty was exacted for the first offense. Here was applied the juridical axiom: "non bis in idem". Pope St. Leo the Great gives us the reasons why clerics were not allowed to submit to the canonical penance. He said that it was alien to ecclesiastical custom, that such as have been ordained priests or deacons should receive the remedy of penance for their crime. "This", he adds, "comes from apostolic tradition."<sup>47</sup>

The substitute then, for penance in the case of the higher clergy was permanent degradation, without excommunication. Such a practice obtained not only in Rome, but also in Africa, as witness the words of canon 12, of the Council of Carthage of 401: "If any priest or deacon be convicted of a grave fault for which he must be removed from his ministry, he may not receive the imposition of hands, like a penitent or one of the faithful laity."<sup>48</sup> The culpable cleric withdrew quietly

<sup>42</sup> Pope Siricius, *op. cit.*, XIV, 18. Migne, *P. L.* 13, 1145: "Illud quoque nos par fuit providere, ut sicut poenitentiam agere cuiquam non conceditur clericorum, ita et post poenitudinem ac reconciliationem, nulli umquam laico liceat honorem clericatus adipisci: quia quamvis sint omnium peccatorum contagione mundati, nulla tamen debent gerendorum sacramentorum instrumenta suscipere, qui dudum fuerint vasa vitiorum."

<sup>43</sup> St. Leo, *op. cit.*, 1206: "Qualitas lucris negotiantem aut excusat aut arguit, quia est et honestus quaestus et turpis. Verumtamen poenitenti utilis est dispendia pati quam periculis negotiationis obstringi, quia difficile est inter ementis vendentisque commercium non intervenire peccatum."

<sup>44</sup> *Op. cit.*, 2.

<sup>45</sup> St. Leo, *op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

<sup>46</sup> See note 24.

<sup>47</sup> *Op. cit.*, 1203: "Alienum est a consuetudine ecclesiastica ut qui in presbyterali honore aut in diaconi gradu fuerint consecrati, ii pro crimine aliquo suo per manus impositionem remedium accipiant poenitendi: quo sine dubio ex apostolica traditione descendit." See also Siricius, *op. cit.*, 1145.

<sup>48</sup> As cited in Mortimer, *op. cit.*, 155.



and performed penitential works, a practice called the "privata secessio."<sup>49</sup> But in very grave cases he might be excommunicated as well.

These considerations suggest several conclusions. Public penance was executed, to use a legal phrase, *cum strepitu et forma iudicii*. Its chief characteristics were: enrollment in the order of penitents, lifelong canonical obligations which ensued, and the rule of one penance only.

The question may be asked: Is there any form of penance that marks a transition from the public mode to the private form of today? History records such a transitional form. It is the practice of death-bed penance that prepares the way indirectly for private penance, or auricular confession. It consists of a shortened form of penance in which the dying person is absolved quickly and quietly. No dying individual was ever denied such a penance, provided he was not a relapsed penitent, in which case he was ineligible.<sup>50</sup> But this shortened penance was not distinct from the public penance, but rather identified with it, for if the penitent recovered he assumed the canonical disabilities and was obliged to complete his penitential works, and to preserve lifelong continence.<sup>51</sup>

<sup>49</sup> St. Leo, *op. cit.*, 1203: "Unde hujusmodi lapsis, ad promerendam misericordiam Dei, privata est expetenda secessio, ubi illis satisfactio, si fuerit, digna sit etiam fructuosa." This is not private penance, as Galtier contends. See his, *L'Église et la rémission des péchés aux premiers siècles*, ("Bibliothèque de Théologie Historique"; Paris: Beauchesne, 1932), 460 ff. See Batiffol, *op. cit.* (8 ed.), 173 f.; Mortimer, *op. cit.*, 159 ff.; Poschmann, *Die abendländische Kirchenbuße im Ausgang des christlichen Altertums*, 186.

<sup>50</sup> St. Leo: "His qui in tempore necessitatis et in periculi urgentis instantia praesidium paenitentiae et mox reconciliationis implorant nec satisfactio interdicenda est nec reconciliatio deneganda." *Hispana*, Migne, *P. L.*, 84, 781. *Ibid.*, 206: "Is qui poenitentiam in infirmitate positus petit, si casu dum ad eum sacerdos invitatus venit, oppressus infirmitate obmutuerit vel in phrenesim versus, dent testimonium qui eum audierunt et accipiat poenitentiam; et si continuo creditur moriturus, reconcilietur per manus impositionem et infundantur ori ejus eucharistia".

St. Augustine recognized such a penance: "Agens paenitentiam ad ultimum et reconciliatus, si securus hinc exit, ego non sum securus." *Sermo* 393, Migne, *P. L.*, 39, 1914.

So also canon 13 of the first Council of Nicaea; see Schroeder, *Disciplinary Decrees*, 42; canon 3 of the Council of Orange (441), Mansi VI, 435.

<sup>51</sup> Canon 76, *Antiqua Ecclesiae Statuta*, Migne *P. L.*, 84, 206: "Si supervixerit, admoneatur a supradictis testibus petitioni suae satisfactum et subdatur statutis poenitentiae legibus, quamdiu sacerdos qui poenitentiam dedit probaverit."

Canon 3 of Council of Orange (441), Mansi VI, 435: "Quod si supervixerint, stent in ordine paenitentium, et ostensis necessariis paenitentiae fructibus, legitimam communionem, cum reconciliatoria manus impositione percipiant."

Pope St. Leo, *Epist.* 167, VII. Migne, *P. L.*, 54, 1205: "De his qui in aegritudine paenitentiam accipiunt, et cum revaluerint, agere eam nolunt. Culpana est talium negligentia, sed non penitus deserenda: ut crebris cohortationibus incitati, quod necessarie expetierunt, fideliter exsequantur."

In this usage the road was indirectly opened to the popularization of the secret penance by the Celtic monks. Here the people were accustomed to the idea of a secret confession and an immediate absolution in which the obvious fact of death precluded the usual penitential works. The authoritative prayer of the priest assured the forgiveness of sins. But there is no suggestion that absolution may be conferred more than once in a lifetime. There is no indication that once the penitent recovers he will escape the enrollment in the order of penitents: no hint that once the penance is completed it is possible to return to normal life devoid of the disabilities. But there is a new factor: this new mode of penance need not necessarily be administered by the bishop, nor does it involve a formal publicity. Any priest can and does accord absolution. "The bishop is not involved, unless the penitent recovers and has to fulfil the canonical penance. From this point of view the later practice will not seem at all odd. The practice of death-bed penance marks the rise of the parish priest, and so, indirectly, prepares for private penance."<sup>52</sup>

Because the reactionary Council of Toledo of 589 wrathfully denounces the new penitential discipline spread by the Celtic missionaries as both uncanonical and most disgraceful, it will prove worthwhile to investigate this decree in the light of the penitentials which played a momentous role in the popularization of private penance. A very important penitential, one which is allied with our inquiry, is the Penitential of Theodore, the Greek monk of Tarsus, appointed by Pope Vitalian in 668 as the archbishop of Canterbury.<sup>53</sup> The importance of this book is enhanced by the fact that it was employed by the Fathers of Trent in the preliminary discussions on the antiquity of secret, auricular confession.<sup>54</sup>

This penitential, as its preface clearly states, is not a direct work of Theodore, but the solutions proposed can be called those of Theodore.

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Nemo enim desperandus et dum in hoc corpore constitutus est: quia nonnumquam quod diffidentia aetatis differtur, consilio maturiore perficitur." See Mortimer, *op. cit.*, 141 f.; Amann, *op. cit.*, 835 f.; H. A. Wilson, *The Gelasian Sacramentary* (1894), 314 f.

<sup>52</sup> Mortimer, *op. cit.*, 153 f.; Bourque, *op. cit.*, 178 f.; Amann, *op. cit.*, 858 f.

<sup>53</sup> *Poenitentiale Theodori*, ed. John T. McNeill and Helena M. Gamer, *Medieval Handbooks of Penance* ("Columbia University Records of Civilization," XXIX, New York, 1938), 179—215.

<sup>54</sup> F. Cavallera, "Le décret du concile de Trente sur la pénitence et l'extrême-onction", *Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique*, XXIV (1923), 61 f.; Amann, *op. cit.*, 1080.

Several texts in the book are of utmost importance in that they furnish a limpid portrait of private penance. The following are the salient points:

"The reconciliation of the penitents in the Lord's Supper is by the bishops only — and the penance is ended.

If it is difficult for the bishop, he can, for sake of necessity, confer authority on a presbyter, to perform this.

Reconciliation is not publicly established in this province, for the reason that there is no public penance either."<sup>55</sup>

Elsewhere in book one, we find the following:

"Penitents according to the canons ought not to communicate before the conclusion of the penance; we, however, out of pity give permission after a year or six months."<sup>56</sup>

All these references combine to build a firm concept of private penance, whose chief characteristics can now be closely examined.

A very significant factor introduced by the private penance of the Irish and Anglo-Saxon monks is the disappearance of the order of penitents. There is no evidence of the penitential robe, the *cilicium*. There is no longer any public *exomologesis*. The new system is now private, in the sense that dissociated from the assembled congregation, it is conducted *sine strepitu et forma iudicii*. Neither is there the public and solemn reconciliation by the bishop which formerly focussed the attention of the whole community on the penitent, who stood out as the cynosure of all eyes. If the penance involved excommunication, as was sometimes the case, the reconciliation was privately accorded, either during, or at the close of, the period of penance.

With the disappearance of the order of penitents, the permanent disabilities also vanish. The principle that penance may take place whenever there are sins to be repented is now widely recognized. Once the imposed penance has been discharged and the sinner has been reconciled to the altar, no permanent mark remains and the penitent resumes his normal life, his Christian integrity fully restored. The penance prescribed in the penitentials is always available: the sinner may return to it again and again. "It now is designed as a habitually repeated practice of all the faithful, not as the resort of penitents who had been exceptionally wicked."<sup>57</sup>

<sup>55</sup> *Poenit. Theodori*, I, XIII, 2—4; ed. McNeill and Gamer, *op. cit.*, 195.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, I, XII, 4; McNeill and Gamer, *op. cit.*, 194.

<sup>57</sup> McNeill and Gamer, *op. cit.*, 29.



What is more important still, even clerics are allowed to do penance under the system. Because in this new usage there is no longer any publicity connected with the inception and termination of the penance, and no humiliating order of penitents, even clerics of the highest rank can expiate their sins in view of obtaining the priestly absolution. The Penitential of Theodore devotes a whole chapter to the penances to be meted out to clerics who can now expiate divers sins in a manner similar to that of the laity; — but with one restriction. In the case of the more grievous and heinous crimes they are to be deposed and degraded. "If any presbyter or deacon marries a strange woman, he shall be deposed before the people."<sup>58</sup>

It is now possible, furthermore, to receive the Eucharist even before the conclusion of the penances. In the old, canonical system no such possibility existed: no one was ever allowed to approach the Lord's Supper before the completion of the penance and the public reconciliation. The fact that even in this Celtic discipline the normal procedure for sinners was that they should come to confession in the beginning of Lent and return on Maundy Thursday for reconciliation (though he was meanwhile separated from the Eucharist) does not tell against this position.

For here there always existed the possibility of communicating before the end of the satisfaction. It is not the fact itself that should be underscored, but rather the possibility.<sup>59</sup>

In summary then, the salient features of the new discipline which is a legitimate development of the canonical system first worked out by the Celtic monks can now be emphasized. Penance is now to be administered privately at every stage, *sine strepitu et forma iudicii*. Confession is made secretly, to the qualified person, the priest, under

<sup>58</sup> I, IX, 4; McNeill and Gamer, 192.

<sup>59</sup> Amann, *op. cit.*, 849 f.; Poschmann, *Die abendländische Kirchenbuße im Ausgang des christlichen Altertums*, 208 ff.; but see P. Palmer, "Jean Morin and the Problem of Private Penance", *Theological Studies*, VI (1945), 355; Galtier, *op. cit.*, 226 ff. The principal contribution of Galtier to the realm of penance is his clarification of the terms of the problem of the existence of a private penitential system in the primitive Church. Public penance for Galtier means a discipline in which the sinner, after a private confession to the bishop, was relegated to the order of penitents, where he had to work out his exomologesis in the sight of the whole congregation. Even the eminent German scholar, B. Poschmann, yielded to Galtier's understanding of the problem; see Poschmann, *op. cit.*, 209 f. Cf. Bourque, who while severely criticizing Galtier's position, seems to agree with him; *op. cit.*, 5 ff., and 38 f., the note.

the seal of secrecy, the violation of which would entail serious consequences. Even penance for smaller sins is now permissible. The acts of satisfaction are ordinarily private, but it was not always possible for the penitent, in fulfilling them, to keep them secret. The person of the priest acquires boundless importance and prestige, for he is the ordinary minister under the new usage. Since confession is to be made with detailed exactness so often stressed by the penitentials, it is the duty of the priest to determine, almost mathematically, the means which would aid efficaciously in expiating sins.

This is not to insinuate that under the public system a detailed confession was never required. Far from it. In the canonical penance it was necessary to reveal all the circumstances of sin. In the third century, for example, St. Cyprian draws a sharp distinction between the various grades of culpability in the lapsed, the *lapsi*. He recognizes various degrees of blame in the different kinds of *thurificati*; and the *thurificati* as a whole are clearly distinguished from the *libellatici*. These latter are said to have acted, in some cases, in good faith, and a fear is expressed that harsh measures may lead to open schism.<sup>60</sup>

When therefore the Lateran disciplinary decree made confession once a year mandatory, it meant essentially that the mode of penance popularized by the Celtic monks had become, with some subsequent modifications, the typical penance in the Church, one canonized by the great Council of Trent. The result was not a new penance, but a reform of the old system. Neither the Fourth Lateran Council, nor still less the Irish missionaries, introduced secret confession into the Church. Contrition, confession, penances, absolution, these remained the essential elements of the Church's exercise of the power of the keys, in the old even as in the new usage. The Irish monks took the old public penance and adapted it to the requirements of their mission fields, adding some factors from the life of the cloister. The reason such a simpler mode of penance spread so quickly and so easily was that there were signs on the continent of a readiness for this private penitential system. Trent, therefore, conversant with the Lateran decree and with the many problems linked with the penitential dogmas, canonized the private system, and solemnly declaring that it is neither at variance with the divine institution and command, nor a human contrivance, pointed to the antiquity of auricular confession, which is the next point to be considered.

<sup>60</sup> *Epist.* LV, 11, 12, 14; *De Lapsis*, *passim*.

### III. Antiquity of Auricular Confession or Private Penance.

Perhaps no other problem in the realm of sacramental penance has so agitated theologians, especially in our own times, as the question concerning the antiquity of auricular confession, or private penance, as we know it today. Little did the Fathers of the great Council of Trent realize what confusion and disagreement would result among future generations of scholars when they declared solemnly that the "manner of confessing secretly to a priest alone, which the Catholic Church has always observed from the beginning and still observe", is not at variance with the institution and command of Christ, nor a human contrivance. Wide divergence of opinion and sharp controversy stem from the interpretation of the words mentioned above, in which the phrase, "from the beginning", is doubtless the polar one.

There is no denying that the Tridentine text does present serious difficulties at first blush. The important question to answer is: Must we interpret the words of the decree strictly, as do the many manuals of theology today? Or is it permissible to give them a wide interpretation? What is the precise significance of this text? Many authors of theological manuals argue that the words must be understood in the strictest sense, — that auricular confession was always practiced in the Church, even in apostolic times, since Trent obviously points to the inception of Christianity. The anatomy of this argument, for all its seeming cogency, is actually possessed of an Achilles' heel.

The language of the second part of canon six admits a broad interpretation for the following reasons. Indirectly, the highest Church authorities have accorded implicit approval for such a procedure in that they have never fulminated censures against such eminent Catholic scholars as Boudinhon, Batiffol, Vacandard, Rauschen, Amann, Poschmann, and P. A. Kirsch, who hold that there was no private penance, no auricular confession in the earliest centuries of Christianity. They have not levelled any strictures against the penitential opinions of the Father Merkelbach. The great latitude with which he has approached the question of early Church penance and the modern usage of auricular confession has never been suspect of heresy or temerity: never has he been called to task for his broad interpretation of the words of Trent. Msgr. J. P. Kirsch was personally commissioned by Pope Pius XI to found and direct a Pontifical Institute of Christian Archeology, because of his comprehensive knowledge of Christian



antiquity.<sup>61</sup> When a historian of the stature of Msgr. Kirsch, in describing the primordial penitential usage, repudiates the existence of secret, auricular confession in the first several centuries, despite the decree of Trent, his propositions merit great respect and prolonged consideration. These men (and there are others besides) have never felt constrained by the text of Trent to abandon their penitential opinions based upon the facts of history, facts which were not unknown to the Tridentine Fathers, as will be shown later in the article.

The words of P. Batiffol, who has done considerable research into the earliest aspects of ecclesiastical penance, are pertinent and merit our consideration. In one of his articles on penance, he maintains that it is necessary to interpret the General Councils, as well as the Fathers of the Church, with charity and indulgence. Trent, he writes, does not hold that the sacramental system of penance, such as is in vogue today, is the same one which was in usage from the very foundation of Christianity. The Council has defined in canon six, he continues, only what the Protestants had vilified and attacked, namely, the confession of sins by the sinner to the end that he might obtain absolution from the priest. It is this confession or avowal of sins that is not at variance with the institution and the command of Christ. The difficulty, as Batiffol sees it, lies in the significance of the word, "priest", which occurs in the phrase, "the manner of confessing secretly to a priest alone". In the writings of such Fathers of the Church as St. Cyprian, St. Ambrose, St. Augustine, and St. Jerome, and of other ecclesiastical writers up to the sixth century, (still Batiffol), by *sacerdos* is meant the bishop, and not the simple priest. History demonstrates that the priest-penitentiary does not appear on the scene until the third century. Trent, he concludes sagaciously, did not wish to enter into such fine distinctions and details. And there's the whole difficulty. To speak otherwise would be to add to canon six a nicety of distinction which only recent controversies have brought to light, and established beyond serious doubt.<sup>62</sup>

In the light of these considerations, the question arises: Have the Popes ever directly approved a liberal interpretation of canon six? Not in so many words. But it will not be presumptuous nor temerarious to assert that Pope Pius XII has accorded implicit approval, has in fact dropped what might be construed as a mild hint, in his encyclical

<sup>61</sup> Bourque, *op. cit.*, 10 f. We wish to acknowledge our indebtedness to the late Em. Bourque, our former professor, for many of the points which follow.

<sup>62</sup> Batiffol, *op. cit.* (ed. 1902), 204 ff.

*Mystici Corporis*. It is here that he speaks of frequent confession of venial sins in the following manner: "We wish the pious practice of frequent confession to be earnestly advocated. Not without the inspiration of the Holy Spirit was this practice introduced by the Church."<sup>63</sup> Do these words mean that auricular confession of devotion has its origin in apostolic times and has been in uninterrupted usage in the Church since those first centuries? Such a conclusion would hardly do justice to His words. It is quite legitimate to conclude that the Supreme Pontiff admits implicitly, that the penitential system of today had not existed in primitive Christendom, since sacramental confession of devotion actually became a part of the newer system and commences to be utilized more and more since the emergence of the method legitimately worked out and popularized by the Celtic monks.

Other decrees of the Council of Trent have for many years been in like manner interpreted too rigidly by Catholic scholars. There is the classic example of the rigid interpretation of Trent's pronouncement on the official stature of the Vulgate. Several Spanish authors, such as Leo de Casto, Bartholomew de Medina, and Louis de Tena, held that because of this decree the text of the Vulgate itself must be regarded as inspired by the Holy Ghost, and that it is imperative to correct the Greek and Hebrew codices according to the Vulgate.<sup>64</sup> In manifesting the true *mens Ecclesiae*, the supreme ecclesiastical authorities in this case proceeded gradually. Before the decisive document of Pope Pius XII, both Leo XIII and Benedict XV had at first permitted, then discreetly encouraged scholars to utilize the original texts. Finally Pope Pius XII, in his encyclical *Divino Afflante Spiritu*, interpreted the true significance of the Tridentine decree, when he declared once for all that the Vulgate enjoys juridical, not critical, authenticity. "The authenticity of the Vulgate", the Pope writes, "was not affirmed by the Council particularly for critical reasons, but rather because of its legitimate use in the Churches throughout so many centuries . . . And so its authenticity is not specified primarily as critical, but rather as juridical."<sup>65</sup>

<sup>63</sup> *Acta Apostolicae Sedis*, XXXV (1943), 235: "Sed ad alacriorem cotidie per virtutis iter progressionem faciendam maxime commendatum volumus pius illum, non sine Spiritus Sancti instinctu ab Ecclesia inductum, crebrae confessionis usum."

<sup>64</sup> As cited in H. Simon and J. Prado, *Propaedeutica Biblica* (3d rev. ed.; Torino: Marietti, 1938), 178.

<sup>65</sup> 30 Sept., 1943; transl. in *The Catholic Mind*, Vol. 42 (1944), 268 f.

In order to understand the text of Trent, that the "manner of confessing secretly to a priest alone, which the Catholic Church has always observed from the beginning and still observes", we must study it from a comprehensive viewpoint. The more knowledge we gain of the background of this decree, the better we are able to determine the official viewpoint of the Church. In historical criticism it is necessary to refer to the original document itself, and in our case to the Decree on Catholic Doctrine, for sake of easy reference called here, the *Prolegomena*. In order the more adequately to ascertain the intention and judgment of the legislator, and to corroborate a certain conclusion, the *mens legislatoris*, one must seek confirmation and enlightenment in the testimony of the author of the document. The fifteen penitential canons promulgated by Trent bear close relationship to the *Prolegomena*, composed of nine chapters, of which chapter five envisages sacramental confession.<sup>66</sup> It bears underscoring here that such a procedure in our case, while not to be condemned in itself, must nevertheless be undertaken with the greatest reserve and caution. The Church alone is possessed of the competence to determine definitive official pronouncements, simply because there exists no formal relationship between a conciliar definition and the historical antecedents or motives which determine an irrevocable doctrine. Mindful of such precautions let us examine canon six in the light of chapter five of the *Prolegomena*.

To demonstrate the antiquity of secret confession to a priest alone Trent advanced much documentary evidence. The Tridentine Fathers and theologians employed many dossiers calculated to give the lie to the Protestants, who asserted calumniously that before the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 there are no historical documents bearing witness to the existence of secret confession.<sup>67</sup> Trent reinforced Catholic doctrine on confession with textual evidence, such as the words of Tertullian in *De Baptismo*, those of Origen in his commentaries on Psalm 37, the letter of Pope St. Leo the Great to the bishops of Campania, the *Penitential of Theodoric*, and many others.<sup>68</sup>

The original document drawn up by Trent was quite diffuse, certainly much longer and prolix than the final draft which was promulgated

<sup>66</sup> Schroeder, *Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent*, 92—94.

<sup>67</sup> A. Theiner, *Acta Genuina SS. Oecumenici Concilii Tridentini* (Zagrabiae, Croatia: 1874), I, 572a. Here the bishop of Chioggia (Clodiensis) says: "Et ibi, neque apud antiquos, etc. Calvinus non ita loquitur, sed quod confessionis non inveniantur facta decreta ante Concilium Lateranense." See A. Michel, "La pénitence de la réforme à nos jours", *Dict. Théol. Cath.*, XII (1933), 1070; F. Cavallera, *op. cit.*, vol. 33 (1932), 224 ff.

<sup>68</sup> Theiner, *op. cit.*, 535—536.



as chapter five. A study of the initial draft and final edition in regard to auricular confession will show the intentions of the Council. The first draft appears in the column on the left, and the final edition on the right. Juxtaposed they indicate at a glance what parts were expurgated.<sup>69</sup>

Original Draft of the Decree  
on Auricular Confession . . .

Final Draft  
Promulgated.

"Ceterum delictorum confessio-  
nem secreto apud solum sacerdotem  
esse faciendam Christiani non ab  
ullo humano praecepto sed ab ipsa  
naturae lege atque adeo ab ipso  
Domino Christo sacramenti hujus  
auctore didicerunt. Nec enim fas  
sit vel cogitare Christum summam  
Dei sapientiam talem instituisse  
confessionem quae a juris naturalis  
ordine declinaret. At si delicta  
praesertim secreta publica essent  
confessione aperienda ingens inde  
profecto peccatoris infamia et peric-  
ulum, audientium autem gravissim-  
um scandalum plerumque oriri  
posse nemo est, qui rem pressius  
expendens, inficiari valeat. At vero  
etsi Christus non vetuerit quin ali-  
quis, consulto prius Domini sacer-  
dote in vindictam suorum scelerum  
et sui humiliationem delicta sua  
publice aliis detegere vel ab aliis  
retegi cum ab aliorum exemplum  
tum Ecclesiae offensae aedificatio-  
nem permittere possit, non est ta-  
men hoc divino praecepto manda-  
tum nec satis consulto humana ali-  
qua lege praeciperetur."

"Ceterum, quoad modum confi-  
tendi secreto apud solum sacerdo-  
tem, etsi Christus non vetuerit, quin  
aliquis in vindictam suorum scele-  
rum et sui humiliationem, cum ob  
aliorum exemplum tum ob Ecclesiae  
offensae aedificationem, delicta sua  
publice confiteri possit: non est  
tamen hoc divino praecepto manda-  
tum, nec satis consulte humana  
aliqua lege praeciperetur, ut delicta,  
praesertim secreta, publica essent  
confessione aperienda."

"Nam et Leonem Magnum simi-  
lem morem publice revelandi pec-  
cata tanquam contra apostolicam  
regulam minitantem [read: militan-  
tem] et per quem homines a salu-  
taribus paenitentiae remediis arce-

<sup>69</sup> Cavallera, *op. cit.*, vol. 34 (1933), pp. 79—84; Hefele-Leclercq, *Histoire des Conciles* (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1938), X (I Part), 337—343.

bantur in Campaniae Picenique Ecclesiis damnassee comperimus. A quo summo pontifice cum vehementer fuerit secreta confessio, qua nunc Ecclesia sancta utitur, commendata manifeste repellitur vane et imprudens calumnia eorum qui recens eam in Ecclesia Dei invectam a patribus in concilio Lateranensi congregatis traditam fuisse dicere non verentur. Confessionis profecto usus et exactae enumerationis peccatorum quam varia illa in veteri lege sacrificia adumbrarunt, quae ad diversa peccatorum genera expianda ex praecepto Domini adhibebantur non solum veteres fere omnes et clarissimi doctores Ecclesiae sive graeci sive latini tamquam rei necessariae et a Christo institutae meminerunt sed ea etiam initio nascentis Ecclesiae fideles fuisse usos apostolorum acta manifeste testantur in quibus legimus multos credentium ad Paulum venisse confitentes et annuntiantes actus suos. Quamobrem qui eam privatis episcoporum consultationibus in Ecclesiam introductam aut traditionem humanam esse a piis abolendam contendunt non debent a nobis alius audire nisi sathanam et ejus ministros hoc potius optare quam aliquando obtinere posse."

"Unde cum a sanctissimis et antiquissimis Patribus magno unanimique consensu secreta confessio sacramentalis, qua ab initio Ecclesia sancta usa est et modo etiam utitur, fuerit semper commendata, manifeste refellitur inanis eorum calumnia, qui eam a divino mandato alienam et inventum humanum esse, atque a Patribus in concilio Lateranensi congregatis initium habuisse, docere non verentur."

It is significant that the reference to Pope St. Leo the Great was deleted in the final draft, and the text cited above substituted. The text from Leo the Great is found in the famous letter to the bishops of Campania, written in the year 459, in which he condemns as contrary to the apostolic rule the revelation from the pulpit of sins accused in confession. The Pontiff was amazed at the presumption of demanding from the faithful a detailed public confession of their sins. While such a voluntary confession might in some cases be praiseworthy, he continues, it is by no means to be demanded or made a condition, because not all the sins of men are of such a kind that they can be published without fear of the consequences. Many would therefore be prevented from asking for penance either through shame or through

fear of being arrested for breaches of the civil law.<sup>70</sup> This passage, employed so freely and so maladroitly by many authors of theological manuals as apodictic proof of the existence of auricular confession in the earliest centuries, was inconclusive and unconvincing to a group of Tridentine Fathers, who won out. Tempting though it was, it was deleted and replaced by the allusion to the most holy and the most ancient Fathers. The judicious act of the Fathers in rejecting the text from Leo's letter ought to be a constant reminder to the writers who make so much of the quotation, to be just as discerning and prudent. The text which was finally approved by the Council is given here in the original Latin and in translation.

"Unde cum a sanctissimis et anti-quissimis Patribus magno unanimi-que consensu secreta confessio sacramentalis, qua ab initio Ecclesias sancta usa est et modo etiam utitur, fuerit semper commendata, manifeste refellitur inanis eorum calumnia, qui eam a divino mandato alienam et inventum humanum esse, atque a Patribus in concilio Lateranensi congregatis initium habuisse, docere non verentur."

"Wherefore, since secret sacramental confession, which holy Church has used from the beginning and still uses, has always been recommended by the most holy and most ancient Fathers with great and unanimous agreement, the empty calumny of those who do not fear to teach that it is foreign to the divine command, is of human origin and owes its existence to the Fathers assembled in the Lateran Council is convincingly disproved."

The very important question to answer is: To whom does the epithet, the most holy and most ancient Fathers, apply? Exactly who are the most holy and most ancient Fathers who recommend secret confession? Certainly not St. Leo the Great, for his text was expunged in the final decree. Whom then does the Council have in mind? The Council of Trent comes to our aid and answers that question for us. In a marginal reference (which appears in the earliest edition of the canons and decrees of the Council of Trent, by Christopher Le Plat, published in 1571, only eight years after the termination of the Council)

<sup>70</sup> *Epist.* 168, 2. Migne, *P. L.*, 54, 1210: "Illam etiam contra apostolicam regulam praesumptionem, quam nuper agnovi a quibusdam illicita usurpatione committi, modis omnibus constituo submoveri. De poenitentia scilicet quae a fidelibus postulatur, ne de singulorum peccatorum genere, libello scripta professio publice recitetur, cum reatus conscientiarum sufficiat solis sacerdotibus indicari confessione secreta. Quamvis enim plenitudo fidei videatur esse laudabilis, quae propter Dei timorem apud homines erubescere non veretur, tamen quia non omnium hujusmodi sunt peccata ut ea, quo poenitentiam poscunt, non timeant publicare, removeatur tam improbabilis consuetudo, ne multi a poenitentiae remediis arceantur, dum aut erubescunt aut metuunt inimicis suis sua facta reserari, quibus possint legum constitutione percelli."



there appears the citation of the famous canon 33 of the second national Council of Chalon-sur-Saône,<sup>71</sup> one of several Frankish councils which Charlemagne assembled in May and June of the year 813, for purposes of reform, especially of the penitential system. The decisions of these provincial councils on penance, especially those referring specifically to the penitentials, reveal the conflict between the advocates of the ancient penance and the priests who were employing the penitential manuals, introduced by the Celtic monks. This all-important canon 33 is here presented in Latin and in translation.<sup>72</sup>

"Quidam Deo solummodo confiteri debere peccata dicunt. Quidam vero sacerdotibus confitenda esse percensent. Quod utrumque non sine magno fructu intra sanctam fit Ecclesiam . . . Confessio itaque quae Deo fit purgat peccata; ea vero, quae sacerdoti fit, docet qualiter ipsa purgentur peccata. Deus namque salutis et sanitatis auctor et largitor plerumque hanc praebet suae potentiae invisibili administratione, plerumque medicorum operatione."

"Some say that sins ought to be confessed to God alone; others, however, hold that they should be confessed to priests; both of which are practiced within Holy Church, not without much fruit. (Ps. 31:5, 6, and James 5:16 are cited in support of each, respectively.) The confession, then, which is made to God purges away sins; that which is made to a priest teaches how these same sins may be purged away. For God the author and dispenser of salvation and health and of many things, supplies this by the invisible ministration of his power and by the work of many physicians."

<sup>71</sup> *Sacrosancti et Oecumenici Concilii Tridentini Canones et Decreta*, ed. Christophorus Plantinus (Antverpiae: Ex Officina Christophori Plantini, 1571), p. 93. The editor informs his readers on the title page in the following manner: "His nunc recens accesserunt duorum eruditissimorum virorum D. Johannis Sotealli, theologi, et Horatii Lutii, jurisconsulti, utilissimae ad marginem annotationes: quibus Sacrae Scripturae, Superiorum Conciliorum, Juris Pontificii, veterum Ecclesiae patrum, tum citata, tum consonantia, fideliter indicantur."—In Mansi XXXIII, 95, Alongside the words "*a sanctissimis et antiquissimis Patribus*", which Trent employed in the decree on confession, appears the reference to the Council of Chalon, canon 3. This could very easily be a typographical error, since canon 3 of the first or the second Council of Chalon-sur-Saône does not speak of penance at all. Perhaps the reference in the margin in Mansi should read canon 33 of Chalon-sur-Saône (813).

<sup>72</sup> Mansi XIV, 100. If in this 33 canon the Frankish Fathers seem to be led into error relative to the divinely instituted necessity of sacramental confession, it must be remembered that the Catholic truth had not yet been promulgated as such by the infallible Church. It appears that the framers of that canon, in their endeavor to defend the intrinsic efficacy of the virtue of penance, reacted maladroitly against the exaggerated theories of the first carolingian generation, which demanded as obligatory the confession of venial sins. The French scholar, E. Amann, however, suggests the opinion

The argument becomes clearer as it unfolds. In the *Prolegomena* under discussion there exists a striking parallelism, which reveals the relationship between two epochs fixed by Trent. The parallelism consists of the following: "secret sacramental confession which Holy Church has used from the beginning, and still uses, has always been recommended by the most holy and most ancient Fathers"; does not owe "its existence to the Fathers assembled in the Lateran Council". When Trent therefore declares that auricular confession was in use in the Church from the beginning, the phrase, from the beginning, ought to be construed in a very broad sense. It is certainly true that this beginning points to a period which falls long before the Lateran Council, held in the year 1215. But between the year 1215 and the year 100 there is a considerable distance of many centuries. In his history of the sacrament of penance, the late Father Emmanuel Bourque, of Laval University, claims that Trent determined the chronological minimum necessary to bear in mind as the year 813. In speaking of the most holy and most ancient Fathers who are in unanimous agreement as to secret, auricular confession, therefore, Trent cites in the marginal reference the famous canon 33 and points unmistakably to the Frankish Fathers, who framed that canon at the second national Council of Chalon-sur-Saône, held under Charlemagne, in the year 813.<sup>73</sup>

Searching investigation of the edition of the canons and decrees of Trent, mentioned above, makes it quite clear that a codicil to the conclusion of Bourque is necessary. On the basis of another reference, we may place this chronological minimum still further back. The Le Plat edition of the canons and decrees of Trent gives a citation alongside of canon six of Trent, a citation which indicates canon eight of the Council of Chalon.<sup>74</sup> This must apply to the first Council of Chalon held in the year 650, because canon eight of the second Council of Chalon (813) does not refer to penance. Canon eight reads as follows: "In regard to penance for sins, which is the cure for the soul, we say

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that in canon 33 the Council of Chalon retains the vestiges of the opposition to the doctrine of the necessity of ecclesiastical penance. Conciliatory in nature, the text sagaciously seeks to avoid taking sides in the controversy, in which one opinion envisages and commends confession to God alone, while the other insists upon the role of the spiritual physicians, the priests in the healing of sinners. Amann, *op. cit.*, 889.

<sup>73</sup> *Op. cit.*, 43 ff. But the late professor Bourque fails to cite his source. He does, however, say that another author gives a similar interpretation. See L. Honoré, *Le secret de la confession* ("Museum Lessianum"; Paris, 1924), 19-20.

<sup>74</sup> *Op. cit.*, 103.

that it is useful to men; and the practice on the part of the priests in indicating the penance to the penitents is known to have the consent of all priests."<sup>75</sup> Antithetic to the denunciatory canon of the Council of Toledo of 589, this text approves the new mode of penance which was brought to Eastern Gaul by St. Columban and his disciples. This canon was presented at one of the Tridentine sessions of the committees of theologians by the able Salmeron, as proof of the antiquity of auricular confession.<sup>76</sup> The same process of reasoning that originally led us to accept the year 813 as the date marking "the beginning", now urges us to place that date as far back as the year 650, as the chronological minimum indicated by the Council of Trent.

These considerations, based upon internal criticism of the actual text of Trent, are corroborated by the deliberations of the Fathers of Trent, on the sacrament of penance at the fourteenth session, which began on 15 October and terminated on 25 November, 1551. In regard to secret confession, the Fathers were divided into two groups. The first group, the more rigid of the two, insisted vigorously that secret confession was divinely instituted and based upon natural law, since it was inconceivable to their minds that Jesus Christ could have instituted confession in a manner which would be derogatory to natural law. But this formulary was strenuously challenged by the second group of Fathers. One among them, the bishop of Chioggia, declared that confession is of divine right, but that as far as the mode of confessing is concerned, it is not of divine right; that its determination is relegated to natural law and to the Church.<sup>77</sup> This wise judgment was finally accepted by the others. Confession was then declared to be of divine institution, but the mode of confessing, a human, an ecclesiastical determination. Both groups agreed in promulgating that the manner of confessing secretly to the priest alone, employed and commended from the beginning, was not at variance with the institution and the command of Christ, nor a human contrivance.<sup>78</sup>

We conclude this inquiry with a brief summary of the Tridentine discussions relative to canon six itself, which will prove interesting and illuminating as well. Very few of the penitential canons have undergone so many assaults as this one, and fewer still have been

<sup>75</sup> See note 30.

<sup>76</sup> Theiner, *op. cit.*, 536. Salmeron also refers to penitential canon 16 of the Carolingian Council of Rheims (813), *ibid.*

<sup>77</sup> Theiner, *op. cit.*, 572a.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, 598a, 599a, 600a.



submitted to less changes between the original and the final draft. In the first draft<sup>79</sup> canon six read as follows:

"Si quis negaverit, confessionem vocalem sacramentalem vel jure divino institutam, vel ad salutem necessariam esse; aut dixerit, modum secreta confitendi soli sacerdoti, quem Ecclesia catholica ab initio semper observavit et observat, alienum esse ab institutione et mandato Christi, et inventum esse humanum: A. S."

"If anyone denies that vocal sacramental confession was instituted by divine law, or is necessary to salvation; or says that the manner of confessing secretly to a priest alone, which the Catholic Church has always observed from the beginning and still observes, is at variance with the institution and command of Christ and is a human contrivance, let him be anathema."

Two important changes were affected. The first modification was the deletion of the epithet, *vocal*, *vocalem* which was wisely demanded by many bishops.<sup>80</sup> The second change was the transposition of the phrase, *by divine law*, *jure divino* into the position it occupies in the text promulgated.<sup>81</sup>

While subject to heated discussion on the floor during the fourteenth session, the second part of canon six, which emphasizes the antiquity of secret confession, was never modified. Several Fathers suggested some variations. There were bishops who considered the phraseology, *at variance with the institution and command of Christ*, sorely insufficient and in great need of amendment. They offered as a substitute what they considered a more apt expression, one which proclaimed that secret confession is a mode which has come to us through the institution and the mandate of Christ, *ex institutione et mandato Christi*.<sup>82</sup> Other bishops, the one from Syracuse and the other from the city of Oviedo, demanded the expurgation of the expression, *from the beginning, ab initio*, which was understood in a broad sense by the other Fathers.<sup>83</sup> They were informed that in employing such an expression the Council had no intention of excluding public confession, or of defining that secret confession to a priest alone was divinely instituted.<sup>84</sup>

In spite of the incisive opposition to its phraseology, the original text of this second part of canon six was accepted without any change whatever and promulgated. This formulary, judiciously edited in

<sup>79</sup> Hefele-Leclercq, *op. cit.*, 365 ff.; Michel, *op. cit.*, 1107.

<sup>80</sup> Theiner, *op. cit.*, 595—596.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, *loc. cit.*

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, 593b, 594b.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, 594a.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, 595. See Bourque, *op. cit.*, 45; Honoré, *op. cit.*, 20.

elastic language, had the double advantage of leaving open for future discussions among theologians and historians, the many historical problems inextricably connected with the dogma, and of manifesting the official and irrevocable definition of the Council upon confession in general, and not upon its different modes. It safeguards the Catholic doctrine of the divine institution of sacramental confession on the one hand; and permits historians the greatest freedom on the other hand, in tracing the evolution of the practice of secret confession in conformity with, and buttressed by, the facts of history. While rejecting the Protestant assertion that it was a human contrivance, the decree permits the possibility of an institution or determination of the Church in regard to the mode of confessing, a system altogether in conformity with the institution and the mandate of Christ.

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## ON THE TRINITARIAN DOCTRINE OF EUSEBIUS OF EMESA

The Eusebius with whom this article<sup>1</sup> deals was born in Edessa, Syria, around 300 A. D.<sup>2</sup> His mother-tongue was Syriac. While still a boy he studied the Bible, and his well-to-do Christian parents allowed him to attend a local school where he learned the then fashionable language, Greek. As a young man he furthered his study of Scripture under the direction of the Arian bishop Patrophilus of Scythopolis and the famous historian Eusebius of Cesarea. In 326 or 330,<sup>3</sup> at the moment when the patriarch Eustathius was deposed on the charge of Sabellianism, Eusebius was in Antioch. He remained there for several years, still, as it seems, pursuing his studies. Fearing the responsibilities of the priesthood, he at length left for Alexandria where he took courses in philosophy and the sciences.<sup>4</sup>

Upon his return to Antioch in 335 or shortly after that date, he was proposed by the less orthodox synod of 340 A. D. to succeed Saint Athanasius as patriarch of Alexandria. He wisely refused, but accepted the bishopric of Emesa, a Syrian town now called Homs. The Eme-

<sup>1</sup> A paper read before the *First International Conference on Patristic Studies*, Oxford, England, September 1951. Minor changes and additions were requested.

<sup>2</sup> For more details amplifying the short biographical note which introduces this article and which is intended to get the English-reading public acquainted with this rather unknown personality, see E. M. BUYTAERT, *L'Héritage littéraire d'Eusèbe d'Emèse. Etude critique et historique. Textes (Bibliothèque du Muséon, vol. 24, Louvain 1949) 43—96* (volume quoted from here on: *L'Héritage littéraire*) and *Eusèbe d'Emèse, Discours conservés en Latin, Textes en partie inédits, Tome Premier: La collection de Troyes* (Discours I à XVII), (*Spicilegium sacrum Lovaniense*, fasc. 26, Louvain 1953) XI—XII (volume quoted from here on: *La collection de Troyes*).

<sup>3</sup> The year 330 is the traditional date. If E. SCHWARTZ and H. CHADWICK (*The Fall of Eustathius of Antioch*, art. in *The Journal of Theol. Studies* XLIX, 1948, 27—35) are right, we shall have to admit that Eusebius had already come to Antioch in 326, since the sources of our biography simply say that he was there when the great Nicene champion had to quit his patriarchate. If the theory of Schwartz-Chadwick is correct, it strengthens our hypothesis that Eusebius was born before 300 A. D.; see *L'Héritage littéraire* 64.

<sup>4</sup> A successor of Eusebius, Nemeseus of Emesa, wrote around 400 a tract in psychology that is sometimes considered to be the first Christian work of that type. The alleged connection between this writing and the scientific studies or the works of Eusebius of Emesa is rather hypothetical.



senians did not relish having a scholarly bishop, and the newly-elected Eusebius soon had to quit his diocese. Through the intervention of Georges of Laodicea, who eventually became the first biographer of Eusebius, the patriarch of Antioch himself went down to Emesa and finally installed Eusebius, regardless of the Emeseniens' accusation of his being a Sabellianist.

The subsequent years of Eusebius' life are not too well known. An Armenian tradition, based on a still extant sermon of his, has it that at one time he was preaching in Jerusalem,<sup>5</sup> and two Syrian manuscripts of the Sixth Century contain four small fragments of a speech he delivered at Beirut.<sup>6</sup> We know with certainty too that he accompanied the emperor Constantius during the Roman expeditions against the Persians. Eusebius' presence at any of the synods held during these years is not attested to, but this fact cannot be taken as evidence that he abdicated as bishop of Emesa.

Eusebius died before the Council of Seleucia (September 359 A. D.), most probably in Antioch, since it was in this city that he was buried.

Some modern scholars tell us that Eusebius of Emesa is mentioned in certain ancient martyrologies. However, our research in Latin, Greek, and Oriental literature to find the sources for these statements has been without success. It is true that the Armenian copyists like to refer to Eusebius as "Surb" (Saint) or "Eraneli" (Blessed); and in medieval Latin writings he is quoted as "Beatus" or "Sanctus Eusebius Emisenus".<sup>7</sup> But that proves only, if anything, that the respective authors consider him, rightly or wrongly, an orthodox writer.

According to Fourth and Fifth Century sources, Eusebius of Emesa was a prolific writer, his specialty being discourses and biblical commen-

<sup>5</sup> *L'Héritage littéraire* 44\* (Armenian text), 79\* (our Latin translation of that text); for the authenticity of the sermon, see *ibid.* 117—120.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.* 33\*—34\* (Syriac texts), 71\* (our Latin version); description of the manuscripts *La collection de Troyes XXXI—XXXII and XXXVII*. For the authenticity of these fragments, see E. M. BUYTAERT, *L'Authenticité des dix-sept opuscules contenus dans le ms. T. 523 sous le nom d'Eusèbe d'Emèse* (*Revue d'Histoire eccl.* XLIII 1948) 82—84.

<sup>7</sup> Examples of the Armenian usage in *L'Héritage littéraire* 39\*, 44\*, 61\*; for the Latin rubric, see for instance GUITMOND OF AVERSA *De corpore et sanguine Domini libri tres*, Book III, P. L. 149 1484; and WILLIAM OCKHAM *De corpore Christi* c. 3 edit. T. BRUCE BIRCH (Burlington, Iowa, 1930) 172. In fact, the medieval Latin writers commit a double mistake: Eusebius of Emesa is not a saint, and the text quoted under his name does not belong to his authentic work; the facts are sufficiently proved (see e. g. *L'Héritage littéraire* 94—95 and 159—161); consequently, we find it rather strange that even very recent publications perpetuate that old error.

taries. Up to very recently, however, it was accepted among the better critics that almost everything he wrote was lost; but now we believe that much more is extant than was formerly thought. We still possess in the original Greek one sermon, "De poenitentia", formerly published among the apocrypha of Saint Basil the Great; an old Latin version of some twenty-nine discourses, fourteen of which have been published since the Seventeenth Century under the name of Eusebius of Cesarea<sup>8</sup>; one of these Latin sermons is partly preserved in Greek, another partly in Armenian, and still another partly in Syriac.<sup>9</sup> Moreover, there are some twenty-seven other fragments in Syriac translation, pieces taken from at least eight different sermons; and three fragmentary discourses in Armenian. We still have a great number of Greek fragments of Eusebius' biblical commentaries, and these are also partly preserved in an Armenian version.<sup>10</sup> His commentary in ten books on the Epistle to the Galatians seems to be lost, however, with the exception of a few fragments.<sup>11</sup> It is anticipated that the Armenian manuscripts will yield still more of his sermons,<sup>12</sup> and the Greek "Catenae" undoubtedly contain more unpublished fragments of his biblical commentaries.

In preparing the following notes on the Trinitarian doctrine of Eusebius of Emesa, — as far as writings of our author were used, — we have restricted ourselves to his discourses.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> *Eusebii Pamphili Caesareae in Palaestina Episcopi opuscula XIII nunc primum in lucem edita studio et opere Iacobi SIRMONDI S. I. Presbyteri*, Paris 1643; reprinted in *P. G.* 24 1047—1208; new edition, this time under the name of our author, in *La collection de Troyes* 79—127 (opusc. I and II of Sirmond), and in the 2d volume of the same work, *Spicilegium sacrum Lovaniense*, fasc. 27 (Louvain 1954) 1—239 (opusc. 3—14 of Sirmond).

<sup>9</sup> Respectively Discourses I, II and XXVI in our edition.

<sup>10</sup> For this entire paragraph, see *L'Héritage littéraire* 97—192; the reader will find there, too, sufficient evidence of the inauthenticity of some writings erroneously attributed to Eusebius by some manuscripts or authors.

<sup>11</sup> The 'ad Galatas' libri decem are attested by Jerome, *De viris illustribus*, c. 91, edit. C. HERDING (Leipzig 1924) 54. Some 19 fragments are preserved; edition in *L'Héritage littéraire* 145\*—151\*.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.* 162—168: analysis of ms. 110 of Djulfa, containing according to its title "Sermons of Eusebius, bishop of Emesa", some thirteen pieces in classical Armenian. The Armenian scholar of Vienna N. AKINIAN, *Das goldene Zeitalter der armenischen Literatur*, art. in *Handes Amsorya* XLVI (1932) 120—121, admits the authenticity of all these sermons. We are less optimistic, as we fear that the copyist of the manuscript made the mistake so common in Armenian codices, viz., the confusion of Eusebius of Emesa with Severian of Gabala, the latter frequently called in Armenian sources "Severian of Emesa". Actually, in contradiction to the general rubric of the collection, the sermons 9 and 12 of the Djulfa manuscript are individually attributed to Severian.

<sup>13</sup> Mainly the 29 Latin discourses now published in vol. 26—27 of the *Spicilegium sacrum Lovaniense*.

Upon analyzing the literature on the Christian doctrine of the Fourth Century, particularly on Eusebius of Emesa, we discovered that the more recent authors do not agree at all on placing Eusebius' trinitarian doctrine. The bishop of Emesa has been called a pure Arian, a Semi-Arian, a Macedonian,<sup>14</sup> an orthodox writer. Those considering him a Semi-Arian sometimes define their opinion saying that he was an Homoian, or close to the Homoiousians, or simply an Homoiousian. Some authors claim that he was teaching an antiquated Origenism, others that he was against the school of Origen. And, since during his lifetime Eusebius was accused of Sabellianism, his case presents about every tone of the doctrinal gamut of the Fourth Century. What then was Eusebius of Emesa in fact?

In answering this question we have to use at least three criteria: Eusebius' life, the opinion of the authors of Christian antiquity, and the writings of Eusebius himself. The conclusions obtained with the aid of one criterion have to be controlled by the others, the decisive criterion being an objective analysis of Eusebius' writings. This latter observation is most important, because it seems that the reason why the modern authors are so contradictory in explaining the doctrine of Eusebius, is exactly that they analyzed only some short fragments of his, or none of his writings at all.<sup>15</sup>

## 1. The Testimony of Antiquity.

Modern authors speaking about the trinitarian doctrine of Eusebius of Emesa usually mention only two texts: one from Saint Jerome's *Chronicon*<sup>16</sup> and another from Theodoret's *Eranistes*<sup>17</sup>. Jerome calls our author "a standard-bearer of the Arian faction", and according to the text of Theodoret the works of Eusebius are Arian or at least influenced by Arianism. We do not deny, of course, the existence of these texts, but the question is how to interpret them.

<sup>14</sup> This anachronistic theory was expounded by H. JORDAN, *Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur* (Leipzig 1911) 283 and 293. Since Eusebius died at the very latest in the spring of 359, he cannot have been a Macedonian.

<sup>15</sup> Of course, we cannot severely accuse the authors of modern times writing before 1920—1921, since they did not have too much to analyze.

<sup>16</sup> Edit. R. HELM (*Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte*, Eusebius VII 1), 236, lines 20—21: "Eusebius Emisenus Arrianæ signifer factionis multa et varia conscribit".—According to Helm Saint Jerome writes the name of the heretic "Arrius", and in consequence "Arrianus", etc.; that is the reason why the reader will find this orthography in our text.

<sup>17</sup> P. G. 83 312.



It is understood that Saint Jerome, in his judgment of authors more or less contemporaneous with him, is frequently rather severe and even unjust. In his *Chronicon*, for instance, we find a clear example in the passage where he speaks about Saint Basil the Great.<sup>18</sup> Jerome testifies that Basil, bishop of Cesarea in Cappadocia is, in 376 A. D., a famous man; but adds that through his haughtiness he nullifies all his good qualities. We always risk being unjust, if we simply follow or admit the square judgement of Saint Jerome on personalities of the Fourth Century. A consequence of this conclusion is that, in the case of Eusebius of Emesa, we have to check how Jerome in his *Chronicon* understands the substantive or adjective "Arian", and whether his notion can be justified.

The *Chronicon* uses the term "Arrianus-Arriani" seventeen times.<sup>19</sup> The literal translation of course is always "Arian". But, if we consider the facts described by Jerome as we know them by other means, we find that a version "quoad sensum" of the word is in most cases "Arian-minded", that is, ranging from the purest Arians to those persons who admit the Nicene doctrine as described and defended by Saint Athanasius and Saint Hilary, but who object only to the validity or the opportuneness of using the "homousios". Or it means "Semi-Arian, anti-Nicene"; and again "anti-Nicene" is not forcibly equivalent to unorthodox, since it includes those who make a reservation concerning the opportuneness of the much debated "consubstantial". In the mind of Jerome, it seems, the word "Arian" always includes some sort of unorthodoxy, but that does not say that the reality covered by the term is necessarily always real unorthodoxy.

All this may sound rather paradoxical, and the critical reader certainly has the right to expect some evidence in favor of our assertions.

Jerome, describing the ecclesiastical situation under Constantius, says that around 339 the Arian impiety of the emperor persecuted Saint Athanasius and other non-Arian bishops, sending them into exile or putting them in prison.<sup>20</sup> Now, the exile of Athanasius, from 339 to 345, was not the work of Constantius. Furthermore, it is acknowledged by modern scholars that the emperor was not, at that time, a pure

<sup>18</sup> *Edit. cit.* 248, lines 9—12: "Basilius Caesariensis episcopus Cappadociae clarus habetur, qui multa continentiae et ingenii bona uno superbiae malo perdidit".

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.* 232, lines 11—12; 234, l. 5 and 26; 235, l. 18, 22 and 25—26; 236, l. 20 (Eusebius of Emesa); 237, l. 4, 9 and 20; 240, l. 3 and 13; 241, l. 22 and 25; 242, l. 17; 245, l. 4; 246, l. 3.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.* 234—235.

Arian. He favored the majority of the bishops of his (oriental) empire, who were Semi-Arians, allowing them different opinions on particular points within the frame of their common doctrine.

Upon relating the exile of Eustathius of Antioch, the *Chronicon* mentions that from that time down to the moment Jerome composed his work, all the bishops of Antioch — and they are indicated by name — were Arians.<sup>21</sup> However, no modern scholar maintains that Eulalius, Eusebius, Euphronius, Flacillus, and the others were simply Arians. In our terminology they were not more than Semi-Arians.

Jerome's text on the see of Jerusalem is still more clearly in favor of our interpretation.<sup>22</sup> At the year 348 Jerome announces that Maximus, bishop of Jerusalem and successor of Macarius, died. Thereupon, he says, that church was overrun by Arian bishops: Cyril, Eutyches, again Cyril, Irenaeus, a third time Cyril, Hilary, and a fourth time Cyril.<sup>23</sup> Now, this "Arian" Cyril is not only acknowledged by the Catholic Church as a saint, and, since 1883, as a Doctor of the Church, but a strict historical analysis of his *Catecheses*, a work composed most likely in 348, proves that at that time Saint Cyril was anti-Nicene in the sense that he absolutely avoided the use of the Nicene "consubstantial", because this term, according to him, favored Sabellianism. Practically, however, he was an orthodox author, admitting the doctrine of Nicea while rejecting its terminology.<sup>24</sup> The Arians and Semi-Arians understood well that this verbally anti-Nicene bishop actually was a Nicene author, and accordingly sent him into exile three times.<sup>25</sup>

It is clear, it seems, that Jerome's notion of "Arrianus" is much broader than our term "Arian". Consequently, in the case of Eusebius of Emesa, it is unjustifiable to conclude directly from the *Chronicon*, without further considerations, that the Syrian bishop was an out-

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.* 232, lines 7—17.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.* 237, lines 3—15.

<sup>23</sup> From this text it appears that the *Chronicon* was written at the earliest in 378, since in that year, coming back from his third and longest exile, Saint Cyril was for the fourth time in actual control of the see of Jerusalem.

<sup>24</sup> See, for instance, J. LEBON, *La position de saint Cyrille de Jérusalem dans les luttes provoquées par l'arianisme*, art. in *Revue d'Histoire eccl.* XX (1924) 181—210, 357—386.

<sup>25</sup> See B. ALTANER, *Patrologie* (2d edit. Freiburg 1950) 268; or better G. BARDY in *De la paix constantinienne à la mort de Théodose (Histoire de l'Eglise* by A. FLICHE & V. MARTIN, t. 3) 167: first exile in 357 A. D., through the intervention of Acacius of Cesarea, a Semi-Arian himself, but less close to Nicea than Cyril of Jerusalem; 170—171: second exile in 360 through the Homoian synod of Constantinople; Cyril was a third time exiled by the Homoian emperor Valens in 367.

standing Arian.<sup>26</sup> A possible meaning of Jerome's phrase is that Eusebius, among people with some sort of anti-Nicene leanings, was a rather important personality.

The text of Theodoret is less troublesome, since it says that the works of Eusebius of Emesa were written under the influence of the Arian doctrine, adding that they aptly and rightly defend the impassibility of the Logos' divinity, though they try to show that the Father is greater than the Son. That means that in our terminology Eusebius is to be called a Semi-Arian or a Subordinationist.

We stated above that, in describing the trinitarian doctrine of Eusebius, usually only these two texts of Jerome and Theodoret are quoted. Now, first of all, in the later works of both these authors, their judgment on Eusebius of Emesa become, it seems, less severe.<sup>27</sup> Secondly, antiquity has left us much more than just these rather short texts. For instance, in Syrian literature, Eusebius is quoted or referred to by Philoxene of Mabbug,<sup>28</sup> James of Edessa,<sup>29</sup> and Ebedjesu bar Berika.<sup>30</sup> As far as we can judge from their writings, none of them had any idea that Eusebius was an Arian. In Armenian writings he is quoted among the "God-inspired" Fathers, who are the sources of the unknown author of the work on i'iled *Seal of the Faith*,<sup>31</sup> and two theologians of the Armenian catholicos Khatchik Arsharunik use his writings in their disputes with the Byzantines, enumerating him among the "columns of the Church".<sup>32</sup>

In Greek and Latin, too, we find more texts than those of Jerome and Theodoret. Saint Jerome in his *De viris illustribus* informs us that

<sup>26</sup> The mistake was made by an author, who, not unlike Saint Jerome, loves to judge his fellow-writers without too many nuances, namely L. S. LE NAIN DE TILLEMONT, *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire ecclésiastique des six premiers siècles*.

<sup>27</sup> *L'Héritage littéraire* 5—16, 19—23.

<sup>28</sup> In a not-published work preserved by ms. Vatic. syr. 138 and *British Museum* 676 (Add. 12164); commentary on the quotations in *L'Héritage littéraire* 30—31.

<sup>29</sup> In a work answering different questions on obscurities in the Bible. Syriac text published by W. WRIGHT, in *Journal of Sacred Literature and Biblical Record* New Series X (1876) 430 ff.; commentary on the quotation in *L'Héritage littéraire* 33—34.

<sup>30</sup> List of works of Eusebius conserved in Syriac, in *Carmen EBEDJESU metropolitae Sobae et Armeniae continens catalogum librorum omnium ecclesiasticorum*, edit. J. S. ASSEMANUS, *Bibliotheca Orientalis*, III 1 (Rome 1725) 44; Syriac text with Latin version; commentary in *L'Héritage littéraire* 38—41.

<sup>31</sup> Edit. K. TER-MEKERTTSCHIAN (Armenian text only; Etschmiadsin 1914) 323—325, 326—327; commentary *L'Héritage littéraire* 31—33.

<sup>32</sup> *L'Héritage littéraire* 35—37, with references to the editions.



Eusebius wrote against the Novatians;<sup>33</sup> we do believe that this fact has to be connected with the trinitarian doctrine of our author. Theodoret says that Eusebius wrote against the Marcionists,<sup>34</sup> and both Epiphanius of Salamis and Theodoret mention that he attacked Mani.<sup>35</sup> It is not evident that the latter fact has anything to do with trinitarian doctrine, but on the other hand it is suggestive that the same Epiphanius — whose self-imposed task was to unmask every possible heretic — does not list Eusebius of Emesa among the Arians or Semi-Arians.

Facing this rather vague and even somewhat contradictory testimony of antiquity, one cannot reach a final conclusion. At any rate, it is an exaggeration to maintain that Eusebius of Emesa was a pure Arian. It seems fair to say, however, that he was anti-Nicene, and perhaps that he was a Semi-Arian, of a nuance as yet undefined.

## 2. Testimony of Eusebius' Biography.

Education, and more surely friendship, points to community of ideas and opinions. That is the principle presupposed here.

Eusebius' early education in Edessa does not suggest anything particular, at least concerning his being an Arian. Maybe he left his native city before the Council of Nicea. At any rate, as far as we know from the records preserved, there is no evidence that at this time the system of Arius was known in Edessa. More likely Eusebius left his country shortly after the first General Council. In that case he knew, through his bishop Aitalaho, who subscribed to the symbol of Nicea and the condemnation of Arius' fundamental teachings,<sup>36</sup> that the Arian system was unorthodox. In these circumstances it is strange indeed that he went, for his more formal education, straight to the Arian bishop of Scythopolis, Patrophilus, and to the Semi-Arian Eusebius of Cesarea, who did not subscribe wholeheartedly to the decisions of Nicea.<sup>37</sup>

But a disciple does not always strictly follow the line of his masters. What then about the subsequent facts in the life of Eusebius of Emesa?

First of all, we have no evidence that at any moment of his career he was in close contact with a strictly Nicene personality. Perhaps he

<sup>33</sup> *Edit. cit.* 54.

<sup>34</sup> *Haereticarum Fabularum Compendium*, edit. P. G. 83 376—377.

<sup>35</sup> For Theodoret, see *ibid.* 381—382; for Epiphanius, see *Panarion* edit. HOLL III 48—49 or edit. P. G. 42 65.

<sup>36</sup> See e. g. J. D. MANSI, *Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio*, II 694 (Ethilaus Edessenus).

<sup>37</sup> See his letter to the church of Cesarea, in SOCRATES *Church-history*, edit. P. G. 67 65—77.

was during the years he spent at Alexandria, but we possess no proof for it. Certainly he was at Antioch witnessing the deposition of Eustathius, but it does not seem that he was there out of friendship for the luckless patriarch since he was a friend of Eustathius' Semi-Arian successors.

On the other hand, there was no intimate relationship with pure Arians either. Under the direction of the Arian bishop Eusebius of Nicomedia, one unorthodox synod requested him to take the supposedly vacant see of Saint Athanasius of Alexandria. But Eusebius of Emesa did not show himself a forward candidate for this dubious honor. A short while later, when Eusebius was installed by the patriarch of Antioch as bishop of Emesa, the Arian bishop Narcissus of Neronias was there too, but exactly on that occasion our man was accused of being a Sabellianist, which suggests that the Emeseniens, maybe under the influence of his refusing the bishopric at Alexandria, figured that he was pro-Nicene rather than Arian.<sup>38</sup> His momentary candidacy for the Alexandrian see certainly had a bad influence on Eusebius' fame. However, his refusal and the silence of Saint Athanasius — who, incidentally, strongly attacked and accused his actual substitutes — seem to point out that Eusebius was rather an unhappy victim of circumstances. We do not deny, however, that the synod of Antioch was convinced that, at least, he was not pro-Nicene; otherwise his conditional election would make no sense whatever.

During his later life, Eusebius' friends, it seems, were all Semi-Arians: Georges of Laodicea, his future biographer; Acacius of Cesarea, who formerly under Eusebius of Cesarea had been his condisciple; the Semi-Arian bishops of Antioch between Eustathius and Leontius; maybe Macedonius of Beirut and the anti-Nicene though orthodox Cyril of Jerusalem, since both bishops allowed Eusebius of Emesa — or invited him? — to preach in their city;<sup>39</sup> finally, the Semi-Arian emperor

<sup>38</sup> For dating that accusation we follow here the version of SOCRATES, *op. et edit. cit.* 200; according to SOZOMEN (*Church-history* edit. P. G. 67 1048) Eusebius was accused of Sabellianism at the end of his career. If Sozomen is right, we have a new reason to believe that Eusebius followed the same line of evolution as his friends Georges of Laodicea and Acacius of Cesarea, namely that at the end of his life he came closer and closer to the doctrine of Nicea.

<sup>39</sup> The history of the Beirut diocese in the Fourth Century is not clear at all. At any rate, one Macedonius of Beirut played an important role in the Semi-Arian synod of Antioch in 344. See MANSI, *op. cit.* II 1361—1368, and R. DEVREESSE, *Le patriarcat d'Antioche depuis la paix de l'Eglise jusqu'à la conquête arabe* (Paris 1945) 197. That this synod of Antioch was not a gathering of pure Arians is proven by the symbol it published: the fundamental teachings of Arius are condemned; see text in MANSI, *op. cit.* II 1364.

Constantius. Now, at least at the end of Eusebius' career, several of these persons, especially Georges and Acacius, not to speak again of Cyril, were certainly closer to the Nicean doctrine than to the pure Arian theories, though they did not adopt the Nicean terminology.<sup>40</sup>

Consequently, one can deduce from these biographical data that Eusebius was a Semi-Arian. But if he followed the same doctrinal evolution as his companions — and the constant friendship of Georges of Laodicea makes this theory acceptable — then it seems that, at least at the end of his life, he was a Semi-Arian of the extreme right, if not an anti-Nicene orthodox of the type of Saint Cyril of Jerusalem.

If we now compare the conclusions reached here with the first point of our exposition, the testimony of antiquity, it would seem that we have to follow the opinion of Theodoret on Eusebius rather than that of Saint Jerome, or that in his *Chronicon*, Jerome was again using his "Arrianus" in one of its softer meanings.

### 3. Testimony gathered from some of Eusebius' writings.

One fundamental difficulty for an historical analysis of Eusebius' doctrine on the Blessed Trinity is that the writings preserved do not contain enough chronological elements, to permit any dating of the works. There is only one real exception: the "Book" against Sabellius seems to be a panegyric of Eusebius of Emesa's master, Eusebius of Cesarea.<sup>41</sup> Thus we know that this discourse was pronounced around 340 A. D., since the historian died in 339. The general lack of chronological indications makes it rather impossible, at the present at least, to prove the always possible evolution in the opinions of our author.

The writings of Eusebius present still another difficulty, connected with the first: the author avoids making clear references to the persons he is attacking. We presume that for the hearers of his speeches his allusions were obvious enough, but that is not always so for the modern reader.

The opuscles we are speaking about here deal only in part with the trinitarian problem. In a certain sense this is an advantage, because the

<sup>40</sup> For Acacius of Cesarea, see e. g. J. LEBON, *art. cit.* 209, 372.

<sup>41</sup> The text is published in *P. G.* 24 1059—1070; a new edition in *La collection de Troyes* 105—127. For dating the panegyric, see E. M. BUYTAERT, *L'Authenticité des dix-sept opuscles*, *loc. cit.* 86—87. The *De fide* (edit. in *La collection de Troyes* 79—104) is composed after 335, probably later than 341; see *L'Authenticité des dix-sept opuscles*, *loc. cit.* 84. The opuscle from which Theodoret preserved two fragments in Greek (first complete edition of the discourse in *La collection de Troyes* 13—43) seems to have been written between 353 and 359; see *L'Authenticité des dix-sept opuscles*, *loc. cit.* 39—40.



non-trinitarian discourses or passages composed without being influenced by the greatest struggle of the period allow us sometimes to grasp how Eusebius conceived some notions in the ordinary sense, notions used also in expounding his trinitarian doctrine.

All the opuscles we propose to analyze are sermons or discourses, and it seems that most of them, if not all, were finally redacted by Eusebius himself or by somebody else, with the aid of short-hand notes taken in church or wherever the discourses were pronounced.

One final observation before considering the contents of the writings: when a passage refers directly to Sabellius for instance, we are not permitted to draw hasty conclusions, for instance on Eusebius' anti-Arian or anti-Nicene attitude. The context is always decisive in understanding and explaining the real value of a passage. With the same reserve we may use texts dealing with the Son's incarnation, or with our salvation or sanctification, since again and again they contain elements of Eusebius' concept of the Word.

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First of all, it seems appropriate to make some observations on Eusebius' theological method. The latter has direct bearing on his trinitarian vocabulary and doctrine. The reader does not have to fear that we shall unduly apply our author's theological method to his doctrine on the Trinity, since most of the time Eusebius reports his methodological statements exactly when writing on that point so much debated during his lifetime.

In short, Eusebius of Emesa's theology uses three great principles: the authority of the Bible, of the Church, and of common sense. But, since these criteria are quite common among theologians,<sup>42</sup> the problem is, as it is for every theologian: what is the respective value of these principles in the system of Eusebius?

We do not exaggerate in stating that Eusebius' writings contain primarily a biblical theology, supposing a rational or realistic method of interpreting Holy Scripture.<sup>43</sup> The other theological principles appear

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<sup>42</sup> The Scholastics and in modern times the authors called 'speculative theologians' use Philosophy too. This Philosophy, even when it is called "philosophia perennis" is not always, *salva reverentia*, simply common sense. Eusebius of Emesa, in his extant writings, does not always show any particular interest in Philosophy; neither does Saint Athanasius at that time. It does not seem that Eusebius' philosophical studies in Alexandria, attested to by the sources, had any influence on his Theology.

<sup>43</sup> From the exegetical viewpoint our Eusebius seems to be at the beginning of a famous lineage: Theodore of Mopsuestia, Diodore of Tarsus, Saint John Chrysostom.

only occasionally, and then usually either as a means of understanding the Bible, or as confirming what is already known through Scripture.<sup>44</sup>

Before anything else, in the opinion of Eusebius, the Christian has to consult the *Bible*, which tells us what we have to admit and what we have to reject, what problems we are able to solve — accepting the solution given by the Bible — and what questions are insoluble for us.

By "Holy Scripture" the author understands both the Old and the New Testament: there are texts in his discourses attacking the concept of Marcion that the New Testament is to be separated from the Old Testament.

The biblical books have authority since they are the work of Moses the Prophets, Saint John, Saint Paul, or because they contain the testimony of Saint Peter, for instance. These men are our criteria of truth, since they received their doctrine from the Holy Ghost, from Christ or from the Father himself. For example, Saint John received his doctrine on the Logos from Jesus, when during the Last Supper the Apostle rested his head upon Jesus' bosom. And Saint Peter was a good witness for the divinity of Christ, since upon the mountain of the transfiguration he heard the Father saying: "This is my beloved Son . . .". Speaking about God, the Holy Ghost knows what he says, since he receives his knowledge from the Son, and the Son himself testifies that he alone knows the Father; the authority of the Father is unquestionable: if the Truth were lying, where is truth to be found?

All this is quite right. But the trouble was — and Eusebius knew it — that in the preceding history and even in our author's own days different systems were proposed which were unacceptable to the Church, and nevertheless used evidence taken from the Bible. Therefore Eusebius had to explain how we are to understand the Sacred Books.

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<sup>44</sup> Such scholars as B. ALTANER (*op. cit.* 201) and O. BARDENHEWER (*Geschichte der althkirchlichen Literatur*, III, 2d edit., Freiburg 1923, 263) simply list Eusebius of Emesa under the rubric "Disciples and imitators of Eusebius of Cesarea". We believe that they are over-simplifying matters. Eusebius of Emesa studied under the direction of the great historian, that much is certain. But how long? And how strong was the influence of the master. In describing the theological principles of our author we already see that the disciple does not slavishly follow the master, Eusebius of Cesarea. Church history and symbolic biblical exegesis play a minor part in the Theology of Eusebius of Emesa.

One principle of Eusebius' biblical exegesis is that we have to accept everything that is in the Scriptures, and that we are not allowed to reject anything written in them. This principle, according to the context, is clearly directed against Sabellius, or better, to avoid mistakes in our interpretation, against all those who admit that "Father" and "Son" are but different names for what in fact is completely identical. Such a theory, according to Eusebius, does not accept the texts "and God had the World abiding with him", "there was a voice which said to them out of the cloud, This is my beloved Son", "I will ask the Father", etc., which undoubtedly suppose some kind of distinction between the Father and the Son. Although immediately directed against Sabellius or kindred spirits, this principle, if we consider the historical ambience and the rest of Eusebius' doctrine, may contain some point against both Arius and Nicea. Against Arius, since this man does not accept what according to Eusebius is clearly expressed by the Bible, that the Word is God. Against Nicea, since the Council effaced from the symbol proposed by Eusebius of Cesarea the biblical expressions "the Word" and "*primogenitus omnis creaturae*", expressions abused by Arius and his supporters.

Another principle, connected with the preceding, is that we have to be satisfied with what the Bible tells us. No additions are allowed. This principle is particularly applied to the doctrine on the Blessed Trinity. Among the reasons currently given by Eusebius for this application, are two biblical passages: "Whose birth is beyond our knowing", taken from the Deutero-Isaias; and this text from Saint John: "None knows the Son except the Father, and none knows the Father except the Son". In the opinion of Eusebius apparently the terms of the Nicene creed "consubstantial" and "from *the substance of* the Father" are among the unjustified additions. As a matter of fact, Eusebius never as much as pronounces or writes the word "consubstantial", not even to discuss its validity or opportuneness; but, where a pro-Nicene author would have used "from the substance of the Father", he simply repeats after Eusebius of Cesarea "from the Father".

On the other hand, Eusebius of Emesa follows what sometimes is called "the rationalistic method (of the Antiochene theologians) of interpreting Holy Scripture". He maintains that we have to look for a common sense interpretation, without dispute, not adding our personal ideas, but considering and analyzing what we now call 'text and context' and recalling what other passages of the Bible say about the same problem. For him, an exegesis not taking into account the true nature



of the text and the parallel passages is a "dry" interpretation, and inadmissible. One of Eusebius' own applications is this: if a biblical expression is symbolic or, speaking about God, anthropomorphic, we have to find out, if possible, what is the reality covered by the symbol. Thus, in one of his discourses on the spirituality of God, he makes or quotes numerous objections against anthropomorphic expressions, difficulties taken especially from the Old Testament, such as "the mouth of God", "the voice of God", God's hand", God's feet", and the like. About the divine generation he says that it surely is not a generation like that of created beings. Eusebius' sensible principles make it relatively easy to get around this type of difficulty created by biblical symbolism.

If a biblical analogy is rightly understood, Eusebius does not fear to use it. He even develops it. The biblical term "Filius" introduces "nasci, gignere, generare, progenies, progeneratio". But as soon as an analogy, even a biblical one, appears to be dangerous, because some authors abuse it, Eusebius does not fear to reject it. What we said in this paragraph proves that Eusebius' principle of "no additions" to the Bible and "no deletions" are understood with moderation.

In this context we have to recall the other criterion of Eusebius' theology: the teachings of the *Church*. What are these teachings? Eusebius does not say it very clearly. Anyhow, according to him, they are not necessarily those of the Council of Nicea.<sup>45</sup> In other words he does not consider the decisions of the Council as decisions of the universal Church. He rather refers to "the faith of the confessors, the one for which the martyrs died", that is, the doctrines generally accepted before the era of Constantine. This fact and Eusebius' fundamental aversion for disputes, explains the total absence of such terms as "consubstantial", ὑπόστασις, οὐσία and the like.

The third fundamental principle of Eusebius is *common sense*, requiring avoidance of fancy interpretation of the Bible and the teachings of the Church, as implied before.

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A detailed analysis of Eusebius' doctrine based upon his writings would be in order right here, but it will be published later. We can now only summarize briefly what we found up to the present. Eusebius of

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<sup>45</sup> This attitude of Eusebius will surprise only those who, for aprioristic reasons, believe that the Church between 325 and 360 already had our clear-cut doctrine on the authority of a general council.

Emesa keeps silence about Nicea, but strongly attacks pure Arianism. He uses the Homoian terminology, but „quoad sensum” he belongs to the right wing of the so-called Third Party. This as yet unpublished analysis, consequently, will confirm the conclusion reached in considering the life of our author.

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## JOHN DE BASSOLIS, O. F. M.

### III. HIS CONCEPT OF PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE

#### A. Aristotelian and Scholastic Concept of Science

As it has been shown previously, the doctrinal position of de Bassolis is highly controversial.<sup>1</sup> This, of course, is to be expected since he belonged to the "progressive" elite, to that group of modern fourteenth-century thinkers, whom many have accused as having gone beyond the limits of sound criticism. Some think that this group taught a partial scepticism. In order to appraise our author's intellectual attitude, independently and objectively, and in order to present some foundation for the opposite opinion, we think that a knowledge of at least one controversial point from his theological and philosophical creed is necessary. A good instance of this is de Bassolis' concept of science and theology.

Historically speaking, there is neither any completely original and isolated philosophical personality, system or current of thoughts, without any interrelation and interdependence whatsoever, nor is there any absolutely isolated problem and solution in a system constructed by any philosopher or philosophical school. Further, even the most strange and objectively entirely erroneous scientific idea of the world (*Weltanschauung*) has at least one unquestionable quality—the inner consistency, the logical procedure from the accepted principles, the logically correct inferences, consequences, applications etc.

This same "law" or fact may be applied, of course, to de Bassolis' philosophical attitude. It is not enough, and moreover, it would be unjust to him, to consider and investigate the solution regarding any particular problem of his philosophical and theological "Creed" as an isolated problem, without discussing many of his other basic theological and methodological concepts, which have prepared and conditioned "a priori" the solution of this particular problem. For, it

<sup>1</sup> See *Franciscan Studies* vol. 13 n. 4 (Dec. 1953), p. 70.



is quite obvious that the meaning of any given text demands the knowledge of the whole context, and of other parallel texts. Hence, every particular theological and philosophical problem discussed by de Bassolis, by its very nature, is incorporated in the body of many other more general problems of theology, e. g., the possibility of proving the existence of God and His perfections depends on his notion of strict science and theology. Then, there is another reason for precaution, another application of the "law" just expressed. We must not forget that de Bassolis, living in the fourteenth century, formed his ideas about almost everything under the relatively recent influence of Aristotle's logical, physical and metaphysical works. This influence can never be overestimated, since Aristotle's philosophical concepts impressed the minds of thirteenth and fourteenth century Christians as nothing since the time of St. Augustine and this doctrinal predominance lasted almost until the century of Kant. At that time, Aristotle's works supplied not only the ready solutions for the old and new problems, but also they were the source of the method of scientific work and the tool for further scientific research and the canon for the division of sciences. Such was his idea of strict science, of its nature and of its method and division. His influence was very decisive and in many cases fateful. For many centuries he was responsible for many later philosophical and theological deviations and even for many of the non-academical struggles in the Universities. The authority of the Stagirite was so great that even the most critical minds of that time could not free themselves completely from his influence.

John de Bassolis is no exception. Hence, using historical facts for a better understanding of his philosophical personality and his system as for every Scholastic of the thirteenth and especially of the fourteenth century, it is necessary to take into account the corresponding Aristotelian ideas as an almost indispensable source and root of the problems and solutions.

#### I. The Aristotelian and Scholastic concept of strict science.

As we mentioned before, the Scholastic concept of science, with numerous others, was taken from Aristotle with full devotion, without any opposition and applied everywhere. A science is some kind of knowledge. Knowledge is generally defined as "a certain and evident cognition through causes". In fact there are two definitions of science given by Aristotle, that is, a science in a strict and a broad sense.

The definition of science in the strict sense is given by him in *Analytica Posteriora*.<sup>2</sup> science in the broad sense is defined in his *Nicomachean Ethics*.<sup>3</sup>

Thus, he gives the following definition of a strict science: "We suppose ourselves to possess unqualified scientific knowledge of a thing, as opposed to knowing it in the accidental way in which the sophist knows, when we think that we know the cause on which the fact depends, as the cause of that fact and of no other and, further, that the fact could not be other than it is."<sup>4</sup> Then he adds immediately: "What I now assert is that at all events we do know by demonstration. By demonstration I mean a syllogism productive of scientific knowledge, as syllogism, that is, the grasp of which is eo ipso such knowledge. Assuming then that my thesis as to the nature of scientific knowing is correct, the premises of demonstrated knowledge must be true, primary, immediate, better known than and prior to the conclusion, which is further related to them as effect to cause. Unless these conditions are satisfied, the basic truths will not be 'appropriate' to the conclusion."

Thus, according to Aristotle the strict science is a conclusion drawn from evident, necessary and first and immediate principles, which are called the causes of a conclusion, by the means of a legitimate syllogism.

According to this definition of the strict science and its method and on the basis of the condition of strict science given by Aristotle in the same place, Scotus has formulated the "Glossa" on the conditions of a strict science of a particular object:

- a) The knowledge has to be a certain one, excluding deception and doubt.
- b) The knowledge has to be of a necessary (necessarily existing) object.
- c) It must be caused by a cause evident for the intellect.

<sup>2</sup> *Analyticorum Posteriorum*, Liber I, c. 2 v. 1. (Firmin-Didot, Paris, 1927, I, 122).

<sup>3</sup> *Ethica Nicomachea*, Liber VI, c. 3. (Firmin-Didot, Paris, 1927, II, 68).

<sup>4</sup> *Analyticorum Posteriorum*. *loc. cit.*: "Scire autem arbitramur unumquodque simpliciter, sed non sophistico modo, secundum accidens, quando arbitramur nos cognoscere et causam, per quam res est, quod ea cuius causa sit, nec contingere ut hoc aliter se habeat . . . Dicimus autem etiam per demonstrationem rem scire. Demonstrationem vero dico syllogismum, qui facit scire. Si igitur et  $\tau\omicron$  scire quale quid illud posuimus, necesse est scientiam quoque demonstrativam esse, et ex veris et primis, et immediatis et notioribus et prioribus et causis conclusionis." — The translation of these texts, given above, is taken from: *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, by Richard McKeon, New York, 1941, 111—112.

- d) The knowledge has to be connected with the known object through a syllogism.<sup>5</sup>

As we said before, this Aristotelian idea of a strict science was generally accepted in the Middle Ages. But since we have to evaluate its strict application in de Bassolis' work, we think it will be useful to see how he understood and explained the nature and the conditions of the Aristotelian strict science in his *Commentaries on the Sentences* of Peter Lombard.<sup>6</sup> In the first question of his Prologue to the First Book of *Commentaries* he states that scientific knowledge may be considered in a two-fold manner, either virtually or formally. "Virtual scientific knowledge propter quid is called simple knowledge of the subject or medium as well as of a principle and cause and in a certain manner virtually contains the scientific knowledge of properties and the conclusion as heat or a hot object is virtually called that which contains heat virtually and is capable of formally heating matter. Formal scientific knowledge, on the other hand, is called a knowledge of a property concluded from the subject, or a knowledge of a conclusion evidently deduced from primary, true and necessary causes of the conclusion. The former refers to complex or incomplex truth; the latter, only to the complex. The first may refer to either mediate or immediate truth; the second, only to mediate truth, and this constitutes knowledge strictly speaking."<sup>7</sup>

Then at the beginning of question V of the Prologue de Bassolis gives his own definition of science: "Formal knowledge properly speaking is a certain and evident knowledge of some necessary, complex truth, evidently deduced from some necessary truths, previous known evidently, mediately or immediately."<sup>8</sup>

Then, giving the explanation of this definition, he concludes: "These are the conditions which per se pertain to knowledge, insofar as science is not extended broadly to include faith as did Augustine in the XV Book of *De Trinitate* when he says: let it not be said, that we deny the name of a science to that which we have learned through the testimony

<sup>5</sup> Joannis Duns Scoti *Opera Omnia (Ordinatio)*, ed. Balić, Rome, 1950, I. 141. "Ad primam quaestionem dico quod scientia stricte sumpta quatuor includit, videlicet: quod sit cognitio certa, absque deceptione et dubitatione; secundo, quod sit de cognito necessario; tertio, quod sit causata a causa evidente intellectui; quarto, quod sit applicata ad cognitum per syllogismum. Haec apparent ex definitione 'scire' I Posteriorum."

<sup>6</sup> *Comm.* I fol. 3vb—4ra. — With *Comm.* we refer from now on to the *Commentary* of John de Bassolis.

<sup>7</sup> *Comm.* I fol. 20va.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*



of others. Accepting science strictly speaking and not as distinguished from wisdom as did Augustine in the XII Book of *De Trinitate*: Wisdom is the knowledge of eternal truths, science of things human; but by accepting science and sciences as did Aristotle in the first book of the *Posterior Analytics* where he says that we hold everything that belongs to science simply and not in the customary manner, that is considered accidentally since through the cause we know why a thing is and because this is its cause, it is impossible for it to be otherwise. To know this, he says, is to know by demonstration."<sup>9</sup>

Thus it is obvious and certain that de Bassolis holds the concept of a strict science and its conditions according to Aristotle, whom he tries to follow faithfully.

Then he enumerates and explains five conditions of true science as it is taken, not absolutely, but as about the created things: "But there are some conditions which belong to whatever science or to some sciences not *per se* inasmuch as they are absolute sciences, but inasmuch as they are sciences of created objects, and in such or such an intellect or for any reason whatsoever."<sup>10</sup> These conditions are: universality, demonstrability, infallibility of inference, a causal procedure *propter quid* and syllogistic discourse.

"The first condition is on the part of the object, namely that science deals with a universal . . . ; the second, that a science is acquired by means of a demonstration which is the definition properly so called or what is of the essence . . . ; the third, which proceeds from the created subject or object, is that no science or demonstration can conclude or concludes that any property essentially distinct from the subject actually exists in the subject . . . ; the fourth, that science proceeds either from the causes of the subject or from properties . . . ; the fifth belongs to science on the basis of the imperfections of the subject, namely, that it proceed by syllogistic reasoning in which the principles are known prior in nature and in time to the conclusions, by reason of the potentiality and imperfection of the intellect."<sup>11</sup>

## II. Science in a broad sense.

Besides the forenamed strict notion of a science there is another admitted by Aristotle, namely, science in a broad sense, "*scientia sensu largo, scientia in communi*", as it is sometimes called by Scholastics. The definition of this science or knowledge is given by Aristotle in the Sixth Book of his *Ethics*: "For it is when a man believes in a

<sup>9</sup> *Comm.* I fol. 20vb.

<sup>10</sup> *Comm.* I fol. 20vb—21ra.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

certain way and the starting-points are known to him that he has scientific knowledge, since if they are not better known to him than the conclusion, he will have his knowledge only incidentally."<sup>12</sup>

Thus science in the broad sense is a certain knowledge deduced from certain principles syllogistically. The only difference is that the principles are not self-evident but are otherwise certain. Magrini gives the following commentary on this definition: "This is a science which is similar to science in strict sense by its mode of procedure, since it has the principles, conclusions and syllogistic argumentation by which it descends from the principles to the conclusions, but it is not a strict science because it lacks evidence. It is a science in which knowledge is certain and in which we can adhere to the given truths with a more firm assent than to the truths of a strict science, as it happens with truths held by faith; but it is such a science that when we possess it we are not said to have a science in the strict Aristotelian sense since we do not apprehend the principles immediately with their own reasons, or mediately and in confused manner, as it happens in subaltern sciences."<sup>13</sup>

This concept of science in the broad sense was very often used by the Scholastics especially in theological questions, and is sometimes identified as the "*scientia vel notitia probabilis*" (probable science or knowledge), which notion we now proceed to explain.

## B. Probable Knowledge

Everybody acquainted with the works of the Scholastics of the fourteenth century knows that such expressions as "*opinio vel sententia probabilis, aequae probabilis, vere probabilis, plus probabilis, mere probabilis*" occur very often. The same is true concerning their use

<sup>12</sup> Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, Liber VI, c. 3 (Firmin-Didot, II, 68). The translation is taken from: *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, by Richard McKeon, New York, 1941, 1025.

<sup>13</sup> Magrini, Aeg., "*Joannis Duns Scoti doctrina de scientifica theologiae natura*", *Antonianum* XXXVII (1952), fasc. 3, 289. "*Est quidem scientia, quae in suo procedendi modo assimilatur scientiae sensu stricto sumptae, eo quod gaudet principiis, conclusionibus et argumentatione syllogistica, qua a principiis in conclusiones descendit, sed quae a ratione scientiae proprie et stricto sensu sumptae deficit ob defectum evidentiae. Est scientia in qua cognitio est certa, immo aliquando certissima, et in qua veritatibus ibi traditis adhaerere possumus firmiori assensu quam veritatibus traditis in scientia proprie dicta, ut accidit in veritatibus quas per fidem tenemus; et est scientia quam possidentes non dicimur habere scientiam proprie Aristotelicam, cum non apprehendamus eiusdem principia sub propriis rationibus ex evidentia rei immediate vel mediate et in confuso, ut evenit in scientiis subalternis.*"

by de Bassolis.<sup>14</sup> But the real meaning of these expressions is quite different from those which we now commonly associate with them. It is therefore very easy to be misled into giving them a modern connotation and consequently misjudging and misinterpreting the medieval authors. Somehow this seems to be the case with Michalski<sup>15</sup> and even Ehrle.<sup>16</sup>

On the other hand there is some difficulty in finding exact "definitions" or explanations of these "suspected and questionable and harsh sounding terms" in the works of the individual authors. The difficulties are increased when a translation is attempted. In using these terms the medieval writers usually had in mind demonstration, argumentations or conclusions of reasoning based on the "topical syllogism," that is, on the syllogism which has at least one premise that was either not necessary or not an evident principle. Thus, at least in many cases the probable knowledge is to be identified with a science in the broad sense.

The most clear and at the same time the most important explanation of these terms is to be found in the *Summa totius logicae* of William Ockham. It seems to be the best explanation, because of its comprehension and clearness. At the same time, it seems to be the most important, because it is given by the man who is known for his tendency to define and to express his ideas as logically and as strictly as possible. He is also the one who is supposed to have affected the fourteenth century Scholastics with his "nominalistic logic".

In the forenamed work Ockham gives the following explanation: "But the topical syllogism is composed of probabilities. Those are probable which seem so to all, to many, or especially to the experts (the wise); this description is to be understood in this way: probables are those which are true and necessary, however neither known per se nor deduced syllogistically from per se known propositions, nor evidently known by experience, nor flowing from such propositions, but which, because of their own peculiar truth, seem to be true to all, or to many etc. Let the following be a brief description of probabilities: Probables are necessary truths, not principles or conclusions of a demonstration, which, because of their own peculiar truth, seem true to all or to many etc. The first phrase excludes all those necessary

<sup>14</sup> E. g., distinction 42, qu. 1.

<sup>15</sup> Michalski, "Les Courants critiques et sceptiques dans la Philosophie du XIVe siècle", passim.

<sup>16</sup> Ehrle, F., *Der Sentenzenkommentar Peters von Candia des Pisaners Papstes Alexander V.*, Muenster in Westf., 1925, passim.



truths which appear false to all or to many, as for example, the articles of faith which are not principles of demonstration nor conclusions, nor are they probable, because to all or to many or to the wise they appear false. By the wise, we understand the wise of the world and principally those using natural reason, because that is the way the wise are considered in the description of a science or philosophy. From this it follows that the topical syllogism never sins in matter or form."<sup>17</sup>

In the *Commentaries* of de Bassolis, besides a mention in the forty-second distinction cited above, we find the following explanation of the probable syllogism and consequently of a science. A strict science is a conclusion deduced from some necessary principles. He explains this as follows: "By the phrase 'from some necessary truths', (science) differs from any knowledge vitiated by a materially false syllogism or by a dialectical or probable syllogism, of which the former proceeds from false, the latter from probable non-necessary propositions and occasionally from necessary propositions which are, however, not evidently necessary."<sup>18</sup>

The same idea is expressed by de Bassolis later when he speaks about the scientific habit of the theologians who use other sciences in proving the theological truths. Such arguments do not give any scientific evidence of such truths but only probability.<sup>19</sup>

This explanation seems to be common to all the Scholastics. Probable science or knowledge is based on the topical syllogism. But in giving this particular explanation of the terms "probable" or "probability" we do not pretend to decide that there is no deviation among Scholastics regarding the meanings of these terms. It is always better

<sup>17</sup> William Ockham, *Summa totius Logicae*, ed. Marcus Beneventanus, Bologna, 1507, fol. 44va. "Sed topicus est syllogismus ex probabilibus. Et sunt probabilia, quae videntur omnibus vel pluribus vel maxime sapientibus et illa descriptio est sic intelligenda quod probabilia sunt illa, quae cum sint vera et necessaria, non tamen per se nota, nec ex per se notis syllogizabilia, nec etiam per experientiam evidenter nota, nec ex talibus sequentia, tamen propter sui veritatem videntur esse vera omnibus aut pluribus et cetera. Et ut sit brevis descriptio probabilium, sit ista: Probabilia sunt necessaria, nec principia, nec conclusiones demonstrationis, quae propter sui veritatem videntur omnibus vel pluribus et cetera. Per primam particulam excluduntur quaedam necessaria, quae tamen apparent omnibus falsa vel pluribus, et sic articuli fidei non sunt principia demonstrationis, nec conclusiones, nec sunt probabiles, quia omnibus vel pluribus vel sapientibus apparent falsi et hoc accipiendo sapientes pro sapientibus mundi et praecipue innitentibus rationi naturali, quia illo modo accipitur sapiens in descriptione scientiae vel philosophiae ex istis sequitur quod syllogismus topicus numquam peccat in materia vel in forma."

<sup>18</sup> *Comm.* I fol. 20vb.

<sup>19</sup> *Comm.* I fol. 22ra.

to look for the definition given by individual authors, since the fourteenth century is known for the tendency of substituting new meanings for old expressions, as will be seen later in our presentation of the notion of intuitive and abstractive knowledge. Probably, too, "the persuasion" used by fourteenth century authors has the same meaning as "a probability". Thus, in the forty-second distinction dealing with God's omnipotence de Bassolis says: "Secondly it is a persuasion because if such an omnipotence could be demonstrable this way then it seems that the philosophers had attained this from the effects and the perfect metaphysician would have attained it."<sup>20</sup>

### C. Knowledge from Authority

According to St. Thomas Aquinas the weakest demonstration is that which is based on authority of others, the "*testimonium aliorum*". But in spite of that the Middle Ages are famous for their devotion to all philosophical and theological authorities. The medieval authors, though conscious of the weakness of such arguments, cite authorities quite frequently especially Augustine and Aristotle, either for confirmation (confirmatory arguments) or in solving some problems (usually theological ones). Sometimes they call these arguments "confirmation", sometimes "persuasions". John de Bassolis does this too. His favorite expression is "according to Holy Scripture and the teaching of the Saints". In the thirty-seventh distinction dealing with omnipresence of God, he says: "Concerning the first, since I have no reasons I cite the authorities."<sup>21</sup> This is also the only reference to the ecclesiastical Tradition and Authority.

### D. Intuitive and Abstractive Knowledge

There is no doubt whatsoever that the first and the best discussion of this epistemological problem is to be found in *Scotism*. It is Scotus who introduced or at least treated this problem "*ex professo*" and more extensively than any one before him. Later it was treated still more extensively by all of his disciples and followers and especially by Ockham who according to Boehner made "intuitive cognition a basis for any non-inferential evident existential proposition".<sup>22</sup> The following is a

<sup>20</sup> *Comm. I*, dist. 42, qu. 1.

<sup>21</sup> *Comm. I*, dist. 37, qu. unica: "De primo, quia non habeo rationes adduco auctoritates".

<sup>22</sup> Boehner, Phil., *William Ockham*, notes, 9.

summary of the teaching of Scotus, Ockham, and de Bassolis in order to see *their mutual relation* in this matter.

a. *John Duns Scotus*

Scotus writes about the intuitive and abstractive knowledge in many places of his *Ordinatio*, *Quodlibet* and *Collationes*. Since it is not our purpose to give any comprehensive information about this, we quote but a few texts in order to make clear the relation between him and Ockham and de Bassolis.

Thus, in the *Ordinatio* (*Opus Oxoniense*)<sup>23</sup> we read: "There can be some cognition of an object which abstracts from all of its actual existence and there can be some other cognition of it as it is existing and present in some actual existence." "Intuitive intellection is a cognition of a thing as it is present in se; the abstractive is through some similitude which can be either of an existing thing or also of a non-existing thing, present or not."<sup>24</sup> "In intuitive cognition the thing in its proper existence acts objectively per se, but in abstractive cognition the acting per se is something in which the object has its intentional existence either as a cause which contains virtually the thing as knowable, or as an effect, namely, a species or a representative similitude which contains that of which it is a similitude."<sup>25</sup>

Thus, Father Day, who investigated this problem "ex professo", summarizes the respective doctrine of Scotus as follows:<sup>26</sup>

1. Scotus shows clearly that an exclusively abstractionistic explanation is false and impossible.
2. He establishes the fact of intuitive cognition, or proves that we do have intuitive cognition as well as abstractive cognition.
3. His teaching on these two points rests on solid foundations and can neither be refuted nor ignored.

<sup>23</sup> *Opus Oxoniense* (*Ordinatio*), Book II, d. 9, q. 9, n. 6, edit. Vivès, 12, 212: "Potest aliqua esse cognitio obiecti secundum quod abstrahit ab omni existentia actuali et potest esse aliqua eius secundum quod existens et praesens in aliqua existentia actuali."

<sup>24</sup> *Op. cit.*, book I, d. 10, qu. 8 (Vivès 17, 285): "Intellectio intuitiva est cognitio rei ut in se est praesens; abstractiva potest esse existentis et etiam non existentis, sive praesentis sive non."

<sup>25</sup> Joannes Duns Scotus, *Quodlibet*, qu. 13, n. 10 (ed. Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure, New York, 1950, fasc. II, 310): "In cognitione intuitiva res in propria existentia est per se motiva objective, in cognitione autem abstractiva est per se motivum aliquid in quo habet esse cognoscibile, sive sit causa virtualiter continens rem, ut cognoscibile, sive ut effectus, puta species, vel similitudo repraesentative continens ipsum, cuius est similitudo."

<sup>26</sup> Day, S., *Intuitive Cognition a Key to the Significance of the later Scholastics*, (Franciscan Institute Publications, Philosophy Series No. 4) St. Bonaventure, New York, 1947, pp. 137—138.



4. Scotus also teaches that the distinction between intellectual intuitive and abstractive cognition applies only on the level of simple apprehension; therefore lack of discursive reasoning does not distinguish intuitive cognition from abstractive cognition, for the latter is also non-discursive.

5. Any reality can be known by intuitive cognition, even material particulars. But the knowledge of material particulars is not characteristic of intuitive cognition. For material particulars can also be known by abstractive cognition. Intuitive cognition is not distinguished from abstractive cognition by reason of what is known by each, but rather by reason of how each mode of cognition enables us to know the objects common to both modes. Intuitive cognition gives us knowledge of an *existent as existing*; abstractive cognition is indifferent to the existence or non-existence of the object known. Therefore, even though abstractive cognition can give us knowledge of existents, it cannot give us knowledge of them as existing.

6. Intuitive cognition is therefore necessary for "subjective verification" of contingent truths.

7. Abstractive and intuitive cognition are specifically distinct. Intuitive cognition is more perfect than abstractive.

8. A *species* is not necessary for intuitive cognition; in fact intuitive cognition would be impossible if it were dependent on a *species*.

9. The human intellect has intuitive cognition even in this life.

10. Among other things, material singulars are known by intuitive cognition (and these *directly*) as also are immaterial singulars (such as our interior acts). We do not, however, know our own soul by intuitive cognition.

11. Besides being the only basis for certitude concerning contingent facts, intuitive cognition is also the only justification for the introspective method in psychology and for every appeal to evidence based on "experience".

### b. William Ockham

This doctrine of Scotus was retained and further developed by his disciples William Ockham and John de Bassolis whose doctrine we will discuss now.

Regarding Ockham's teaching we shall limit our consideration to the summary given by Father Day.<sup>27</sup>

For Ockham intuitive cognition can be characterized in these words:

Intuitive cognition of a thing is such a cognition by which it can be known whether a thing exists or not, so that, if the thing exists, the intellect at once judges that it is and knows clearly that it is, unless it is accidentally impeded by the imperfection of that knowledge.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>27</sup> *Op. cit.* 201—203.

<sup>28</sup> *Commentaries*, Book I, prol. qu. 1: "Notitia intuitiva rei est talis notitia, virtute cuius potest sciri utrum res sit vel non, ita quod si sit res, statim intellectus iudicat eam esse et evidenter cognosci eam esse, nisi forte impediatur per imperfectionem illius notitiae."

Regarding abstractive cognition Ockham says:

Abstractive cognition is such by which it cannot be known clearly about a contingent thing, whether it exists or not . . . neither can it be thereby clearly known of the existing thing that exists, nor about the non-existing thing, that it does not exist, in opposition to intuitive cognition.<sup>29</sup>

Thus, we see clearly that all the essential elements of Scotus' intuitive and abstractive cognition are present in Ockham's doctrine. No wonder that Father Day, after analyzing these and many other texts of the Venerabilis Inceptor regarding the problem of intuitive and abstractive knowledge concludes as follows:

In general, there is unanimity of opinion (between Scotus and Ockham) even on some of these points where Ockham criticizes Scotus. For though Ockham denies that several of Scotus' distinctions between intuitive and abstractive cognition apply *universally* (emphasis of author) he is willing to concede that they do apply to our normal and natural intuitive and abstractive cognition. But for the rest he merely develops Scotus' ideas and follows them through to their logical conclusions. Thus, for instance, though Scotus seems to have had difficulty in admitting that singulars are known by intuitive cognition and directly, Ockham shows that nothing but singulars are known intuitively. Again, in the question of perfect and imperfect intuitive cognition, Ockham develops the ideas of Scotus to show something that Scotus had not touched on, namely the causal and chronological relations between intuitive and abstractive cognition. Finally, Ockham based his doctrine of intuitive cognition more resolutely and more systematically on an analysis of evidence, though here again it was Scotus who had first appreciated the significance of this doctrine in the light of the problem of certitude.<sup>30</sup>

And regarding the relation between Doctor Subtilis and Venerabilis Inceptor Father Day rightly reached the following conclusions:

1. Ockham's teaching on intuitive cognition depends on the corresponding teaching of Duns Scotus, in the sense that Ockham was influenced by Scotus in this regard, not only negatively but also positively and constructively.
2. That Ockham was influenced by Scotus in the manner we suggested is proved by the fact that Ockham either quotes Scotus or refers to him on numerous occasions, not to refute him but to show that Scotus thought precisely the same doctrine as Ockham himself.
3. From all . . . it should be clear that in one sense, Ockham began where Scotus began; but in another sense it is true also to say that Ockham was the logical continuator of Scotus, insofar as he resolved the *dubia* (emphasis

<sup>29</sup> *Loc. cit.*: "Notitia abstractiva est illa, virtute cuius de re contingenti non potest sciri evidenter, utrum sit vel non sit . . . , nec per ipsam potest evidenter sciri de re existente, quod existit, nec de non existente, quod non existit, per oppositum ad notitiam intuitivam."

<sup>30</sup> Day, *op. cit.*, 201.

of author) which arose because of Scotus' incomplete treatment of intuitive cognition and explicitated the conclusions which were sometimes only hinted at in Scotus.<sup>31</sup>

*c. John de Bassolis*

Now, we will try to make as clear as possible de Bassolis' concept of the same intuitive and abstractive cognition. To discuss this problem is not an easy task. For, the distinction describing de Bassolis' concept of intuitive and abstractive cognition seems to be the most confused passage of the whole of his *Commentaries*, the printing mistakes numberless, the punctuation often misleading. Obviously, even the corrected manuscript of Orontius was very inferior and the compositors at the Regnault & Frellon printery were really misled.

In the 1516—17 edition this important question is to be found in the Prologue of Book I, on fol. 2vb—7ra.

I. The tenor of the question and its original division.

This first question of the Prologue to the First Book of de Bassolis' *Commentaries* is expressed by him as follows: "I ask at this beginning: Whether it is possible for a pure wayfarer to have some evident cognition besides the natural cognition which is possible to be had."<sup>32</sup> But this expression of the problem which has to be discussed here is not clear. It does not state exactly what de Bassolis will be discussing. For, the main question which will be discussed here "per longum et latum" is whether any pure wayfarer can have any so-called abstractive cognition of God's essence, produced in his mind by God supernaturally, which enables him to have a strict knowledge of God and His perfections. The possibility of this knowledge, which is according to de Bassolis mediate "inter fidem et visionem",<sup>33</sup> is in fact the kernel of this question and all other problems are solved rather as the prerequisites of that. To these prerequisites, as we shall see immediately, the problem of intuitive and abstractive cognition belongs.

The question is originally divided in three parts: Introduction, Solution and Refutation.

A. Introduction. It contains the following points:

1. The exposition of the problem, principal reasons and "Contra".
2. The exposition of terms: wayfarer; objective, intuitive and abstractive cognition; virtual and formal science; natural and supernatural potency and possibility.

<sup>31</sup> *Op. cit.*, 143 and 145—146.

<sup>32</sup> *Comm.* I fol. 2vb.

<sup>33</sup> *Comm.* I, dist. 1, qu. 1, prol. Ad rationes principales . . . Ad tertiam.



### B. The main body of the question:

In this second part de Bassolis discusses whether a pure wayfarer can have supernatural knowledge of God's essence.

1. Firstly he gives the reason against the possibility of such a cognition, and declares that "whatsoever can be said about these reasons, it seems that it can be said: First, that the abstractive cognition of God in the above explained manner, is possible for the pure wayfarer by divine power which can give it to him, though he remained a pure wayfarer. This is said about the simple cognition of all the divine complex truths, at least of those which are necessary, as it will be deduced later."<sup>34</sup>

2. Then he gives the proofs for such a possibility, but as regards only the abstractive, not intuitive cognition.

### C. In fine, de Bassolis answers:

1. The reasons against the possibility of such a cognition and for possibility of such intuitive cognition.

2. The principal objections.

## II. Intuitive cognition according to de Bassolis.

### *a. Objective evidence and its branches.*

John de Bassolis begins the question with the explanation of the terms used in it. The most important of these for us is, of course, to know what is the exact meaning of intuitive and abstractive cognition. He starts this explanation with the definition of objective evident cognition, that is, a cognition whose evidence is produced immediately by the object itself, by its own intelligibility, i. e., by its own testimony. Its definition is as follows:

The objective evident knowledge is such to which the intellect assents under the influence of the object and by its own natural power, to which the command of the will does not contribute or cooperate."<sup>35</sup>

Thus, this definition stresses that an objective knowledge is based on the objective evidence which again causes the necessary assent of the intellect independently of any influence of the will. The only role of the human will in such a case is to turn the attention of intellect to such objects. This assent is totally different from the assent given in an act of faith, which is produced under the influence of a will and not under influence of the inner evidence of the article of faith. For, as de Bassolis says, quoting St. Augustine "no one can believe unless he wishes".<sup>36</sup>

<sup>34</sup> *Comm.* I fol. 4va.

<sup>35</sup> *Comm.* I fol. 3ra.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*

Now, such defined objective intellectual cognition is twofold: one intuitive, another abstractive: "Dico, quod est duplex notitia talis evidens ex obiecto intellectuali: una quae dicitur abstractiva et alia quae dicitur intuitiva."<sup>37</sup>

*b. The intuitive cognition according to de Bassolis.*

The intuitive cognition is defined and explained first:

The intuitive cognition is briefly that which concerns *per se* the primary object, existing actually or in potency, in its proper nature and in the external world, present to the knowing subject or knowable by it.<sup>38</sup>

Now de Bassolis gives a commentary on this definition word by word.<sup>39</sup>

1. He stresses rightly, after Scotus, that our introspection and consciousness tell us much less about the existence of intellectual intuitive cognition than of the abstractive. However, his statement that we need rather to prove the existence of the intuitive cognition than of the abstractive seems to be too strong:

Therefore there is no doubt about the abstractive cognition itself, whether it is possible, but there is more doubt whether any intuitive cognition is possible to our intellect because we do not experience it at all (*quia ipsam minime experimur*). And for this it is possible to cite the one reason by Scotus in his *Quodlibet* in the sixth question.<sup>40</sup>

2. The object of this intuitive cognition can be everything that exists or can exist in external world and is present to the intellect.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>39</sup> *Comm.* I fol. 3<sup>ra</sup> seq.

<sup>40</sup> We find de Bassolis' argument in *Comm.* I fol. 3<sup>va</sup>. Since there is a difference between this quotation and Scotus' text we give here Scotus' argument taken from his *Quodlibet*, question 6: *Utrum aequalitas in divinis sit relatio?* (The Franciscan Institute edition, St. Bonaventure, New York, 1950, I, 145, n. 8): "Alius autem actus intelligendi est: quem non ita certitudinaliter experimur in nobis: possibilis tamen est talis: qui, scilicet praecise sit obiecti praesentis, ut praesentis et existentis, ut existentis. Hoc probatur: quia omnis perfectio cognitionis absolutae, quae potest competere potentiae cognitivae sensitivae, potest eminenter competere potentiae cognitivae intellectivae. Nunc autem perfectionis est in actu cognoscendi, ut cognitio est, perfecte attingere primum cognitum. Non autem perfecte attingitur quando non in se attingitur, sed tantummodo in aliqua diminuta vel derivata similitudine ab ipso. Sensitiva autem habet hanc perfectionem in cognitione sua, quia potest obiectum attingere in se, ut existens et ut praesens est in existentia reali et non tantum diminute attingendo ipsum in quadam perfectione diminuta. Ergo ista perfectio competit intellectivae in cognoscendo. Sed non posset sibi competere, nisi cognosceret existens et ut in existentia propria praesens est vel in aliquo obiecto intelligibili eminenter ipsum continente, de quo non curamus ad praesens. Talem autem actum cognitionis de existente, ut existens, et praesens est, habet Angelus de se . . ."

De Bassolis states this in his *Corollaria*, placed after the explanation of intuitive and abstractive cognition:

The first (corollary) is that everything can be the primary object of the intuitive intellectual cognition which can be or does exist outside of the intellect which is really present to the knower, whether it is an essence or existence, substance or accident, at least speaking absolutely.<sup>41</sup>

3. Though a real presence of an immediate external object is required for intuitive cognition, it is not absolutely necessary in this sense, that even "God can not so make an object that the primary object of an intuitive cognition can not be actually existent externally and not present actually in its own nature to the knower himself."<sup>42</sup> De Bassolis only demands that the object should be present immediately, "actually", or "in potency". For, God by His absolute power, "can make a vision without the existing thing and an intuitive intellection without any existing and created object."<sup>43</sup>

4. Furthermore, regarding God's intuitive knowledge, de Bassolis admits that God can have intuitive knowledge not only of existing and possible things, but also negations and impossibilities.<sup>44</sup> The reason is that the intuitive cognition is more perfect than the abstractive.<sup>45</sup>

5. The main feature of the intuitive cognition and its specific difference is the immediate vision of the existing object. The mind of de Bassolis is here clearly expressed:

But intuitive cognition is necessarily immediate, so that it immediately reaches the object without any medium, either by reason of the object known, or by reason of the not-known representation, but only by the reason of knowing (*ratio cognoscendi*), which is the species mediating between the act and the object . . . By this means, therefore, the intuitive cognition is best distinguished, namely that the intuitive cognition is always immediate.<sup>46</sup>

How to understand exactly this immediacy is explained just above.

6. Since according to de Bassolis intuitive cognition is immediate and the object is present in its proper nature, there is no necessity of any "intelligible species," which is also excluded by the definition. Immediate cognition is impossible through the species alone. In contradiction to the abstractive cognition which is always mediate,

<sup>41</sup> *Comm.* I fol. 3vb.

<sup>42</sup> *Comm.* I fol. 3r.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*; cfr. also fol. 6vb, art. III, ad primam.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>46</sup> *Comm.* I fol. 3rd.



the intuitive cognition is necessarily immediate so that it immediately reaches the object without any medium either by reason of the object known, or by reason of the not-known representation, but only by the reason of knowing (*ratio cognoscendi*) which is the species that mediates between the act and the object as representing the object.<sup>47</sup>

But this immediacy is again nothing absolute and it does not exclude some possibility of a species. At least, the existence of the species in the sensory organs does not make the intellectual intuition impossible. For de Bassolis says expressly:

If a species mediated between an object and a potency, making active a potency and giving to it the first object of intellection, as is imagined by some and as there are some who formerly held a species in Heaven (*patria*), through this the intuitive knowledge would not be destroyed, since they posited some species not because of any necessity of representing the object in order to attain it by such a cognition, that is, by an abstractive one, but by reason of the condition or a disposition of an organ or for some other cause, whatever it might be; as some say about the species in the organ of sight."<sup>48</sup>

7. Though "*naturaliter et de lege communi*" the object of the intuitive cognition is present "*immediate et in propria natura*," it is not necessary that it be present in the same manner as to the Blessed in Heaven. For immediate intuitive cognition of God it is enough that He be present to the created mind by essence, presence and potency. For, according to de Bassolis:

to be present under the aspect of an object does not add any more reality to the reason of His essence and His actual existence, unless maybe a respect of reason which does not belong to the question. Hence, I say that as far as being an object is concerned and as being necessarily present, God is as much present to men on earth and the damned as He is to the Blessed, and therefore it is not necessary to add this condition, as it seems.<sup>49</sup>

### *c. The abstractive cognition according to de Bassolis*

According to him this can be twofold, one attained naturally and according to the common law or course of nature, another caused supernaturally by God through a knowledge of His essence. Hence we shall deal with this problem in two parts.

#### I. The natural abstractive cognition.

The natural abstractive cognition is defined by de Bassolis as follows:

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*

Abstractive cognition, as it is accepted in the question, is that which lacks some condition posited in the description of intuitive cognition. It can be said to be any cognition whatever which by common law and naturally does not discern its primary object as actually existing and really present to the knower, nor as immediately known, but always mediately: actually, if this knowing occurs naturally and by common law: but aptitudinally, if it occurs only by divine power without any medium or without any representation, as was said above.<sup>50</sup>

This definition de Bassolis does not explain immediately as he usually does. Instead he gives simply the argument of Scotus for the existence of intuitive knowledge and then a series of "correlaria".<sup>51</sup> Again we gather and group together the following points:

1. According to de Bassolis, the fact of the existence of the abstractive cognition is much more evident than the existence of intuitive cognition. Having given the definition he says:

From this it is immediately apparent that every intellectual cognition which we have naturally and by the common law is abstractive and not intuitive, because all such cognition is mediate and through something. Its representation is a phantasm or some intelligible species. And therefore there is no doubt whether abstractive cognition is possible. The doubt rather is whether any intuitive cognition is possible for our intellect, because we do not experience it at all.<sup>52</sup>

This expression sounds like one written under influence of Kant or some idealist, but it is not so, for de Bassolis immediately admits with Scotus the possibility of proving the existence of the intuitive knowledge.<sup>53</sup>

2. The object of this abstractive cognition can be anything that exists. He states:

The primary object of the abstractive cognition can be anything that can be present to the knower, present that is in a representation which is the only reason of knowing, whether it is an essence or an existence, or briefly, whatever exists.<sup>54</sup>

3. The "specific difference" that distinguishes abstractive cognition from the intuitive is its immediacy.

Abstract cognition is neither called nor is it abstractive inasmuch as it abstracts from the being of an actual existence from the viewpoint of the known object, since even the being of an actual existence can be abstractively known and represented by the representation as explained above.

<sup>50</sup> *Comm.* I fol. 3va.

<sup>51</sup> *Comm.* I fol. 3va—4ra.

<sup>52</sup> *Comm.* I fol. 3va.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>54</sup> *Comm.* I fol. 3vb.

Rather, it is called and is abstractive cognition inasmuch as it abstracts from the being of an actual existence and from the presence of the object *in its proper nature* and it is a condition or perfection of an existing external being also when it occurs naturally and by common law. It is accidental to abstractive cognition that its object be externally actually existing, because naturally and by the common law abstractive cognition takes place through a representation, which indifferently represents an object whether it exists or not.<sup>55</sup>

4. Thus, abstractive cognition is essentially the cognition of a non-present object; accidentally, it sometimes also represents an actually existing object. Therefore it neither excludes nor includes the real existence of the object, but „naturaliter et de lege communi” it indifferently represents either an existent or a non-existent object.

But the object is said to be existing in its proper nature . . . to differentiate it from abstractive knowledge which does not always require that its primary object exist actually in its proper nature and in reality outside the known, as is necessary for intuitive abstraction, according to common law and the course of nature.<sup>56</sup>

5. This abstractive cognition is mediate. It is obtained by a species or some representation. What is it? Is it absolutely necessary?

There is some answer given by de Bassolis to it in the First Question we are now discussing, when he says that the “ratio cognoscendi” is the only representation admitted by him in the explanation of the intuitive and abstractive cognition.<sup>57</sup> But a still more clear and definite answer is given in the distinction 27, q. 2 of the First Book of his *Commentaries*.

There he rejects all explanations of the “verbum mentale” understood as “image”. He identifies the “verbum mentale” with actual intellection. He writes there: “Having said these the fourth opinion becomes true, namely that which holds that verbum “is an actual cognition.”<sup>58</sup>

This representation of the object is not absolutely necessary because it can be produced immediately by God. For, he says:

Abstractive cognition naturally and by a common law is always actually mediate or at least it is ordained to be such irrespective of what actually happens by divine power. For, I think that by the divine power abstractive cognition can be caused and conserved without any medium or representation as it has been proved above that the intuitive cognition of the caused object can exist without its caused object.<sup>59</sup>

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>56</sup> *Comm.* I fol. 37.

<sup>57</sup> *Comm.* I fol. 3va, and fol. 5va.

<sup>58</sup> *Comm.* I dist. 27, q. 2, fol. 158va ff.

<sup>59</sup> *Comm.* I fol. 3va.

## II. Supernatural abstractive cognition

Besides the abstraction cognitive which is produced according to the law of nature and which is obtained "from natural principles and concurring causes with only a general influence of God", there is another abstractive cognition caused by the absolute power of God regarding the knowledge of His essence and perfections. Thus, according to de Bassolis this is the main purpose of the First Question, i. e., to prove that the divine power can produce in the mind of a wayfarer such a cognition of God's essence that enables the pure wayfarer to have a scientific knowledge of God which otherwise would be impossible.

This problem was stated not too clearly at the beginning of the First Question of his *Commentaries*. It is more clearly repeated at the end of the introductory part of it as follows:

After the explanation of these things there remains the question: in what way is it possible for a pure wayfarer who does not have any obstacle *in via*, to have a scientific evident cognition of God which is distinct from the science and cognition which are possible to be acquired naturally from the creatures.<sup>60</sup>

### 1. Its possibility

There are many objections against the possibility of such special supernatural cognition, abstractive and simple, of the divine essence. They are taken from the concept of abstractive cognition, from the point of view of the knowing subject and from the concept of "the thing represented" by which this cognition is impressed in the mind of the wayfarer. De Bassolis quotes them faithfully.<sup>61</sup> But he ends this list of objections with the words:

But whatever can be said in favor of these reasons, it seems that it can also be said first, that an evident abstractive cognition of God in the sense explained above is possible by the divine power to the pure wayfarer. The power of God can give this to him though he remains a pure wayfarer; that is, a simple knowledge of the divine essence and, consequently, a scientific cognition of all divine complex truths, at least of necessary ones, as it will be deduced later.<sup>62</sup>

He immediately proves his thesis with many arguments paralleling the reasons against it, under three headings:

Firstly, I prove this on the part of the object, namely the divine essence; secondly, on the part of the subject, namely the conjoined intellect of the wayfarer; thirdly, on the part of the mode or medium of the object.<sup>63</sup>

<sup>60</sup> *Comm.* I fol. 4ra.

<sup>61</sup> *Comm.* I fol. 4ra—va.

<sup>62</sup> *Comm.* I fol. 4va.

<sup>63</sup> *Comm.* I fol. 4va—5vb.



In addition he adduces one reason given by Scotus in his *Quodlibet*.<sup>64</sup> He concludes:

From the preceding I conclude that a pure wayfarer who has nothing incompatible with his state can, by the power of divine aid, come to some scientific formally and truly demonstrative cognition of God and His perfections; consequently, the articles of faith which concern the necessary things of God can be known by him *a priori*, demonstratively, abstractively; and this I prove by the argument of Scotus in his *Quodlibet* . . .<sup>65</sup>

## 2. Résumé

a) This abstractive intellectual cognition is possible only by the absolute power of God, by His omnipotence, which can do everything which does not imply contradiction. And here is such a case. De Bassolis said at the beginning of his thesis:

The abstractive (cognition) naturally and by a common law is always actually mediate, or at least it is ordained to be such irrespective of what actually happens by divine power. For, I think that by the divine power abstractive cognition can be caused and conserved without any medium or representation, as it has been proved above that the intuitive cognition of the caused object can exist without its caused object.<sup>66</sup>

And here he also says that he holds such abstractive cognition is possible for the wayfarer "only by the divine power and special influence."<sup>67</sup>

b) This cognition is mediate between the beatific vision and faith. Answering the last principal objection de Bassolis says:

In the proposition such a medium between faith and vision is abstractive cognition. And therefore I say that regarding this it is not repugnant to faith, but is consonant with it in the wayfarer.<sup>68</sup>

c) It is already clear that this cognition is a very special gift of God, given very rarely by His absolute power

because He did not order nor determine to infuse it in such a way . . . because it seems that it is infused in very few people and in a special way and not by the common law, even to those who have the disposition required for it.<sup>69</sup>

Some Saints, e. g., St. Paul, have had such special knowledge.<sup>70</sup>

d) This supernatural abstractive cognition, according to de Bassolis, is obtained usually through a species. Regarding this point he says:

For I say that this (i. e., abstractive cognition) is possible distinctly and immediately by the representative species of the divine essence which

<sup>64</sup> *Comm.* I fol. 5vb.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>66</sup> *Comm.* I fol. 3va.

<sup>67</sup> *Comm.* I fol. 4ra.

<sup>68</sup> *Comm.* I fol. 7rb.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>70</sup> *Comm.* I fol. 5vb.

is only the reason of cognition and not the first known object, which can be infused by God in the intellect of the wayfarer.<sup>71</sup>

Thus, probably this representative species is to be understood according to the meaning formerly expressed, that is, as "intellectio" (operation) and not as "imago".<sup>72</sup> He also states expressly that there is no repugnance of the divine essence to be represented by the species. He gives reasons for this and in confirmation cites St. Paul's vision from the II *Corinth.* 12:

I know a man who — years ago, etc. . . . And he saw or heard secret words that man may not repeat. This text therefore records both the act and the object of the act through some species, as it seems.<sup>73</sup>

But it seems that this abstractive knowledge of the divine essence can be also obtained without such a species, according to the general principle admitted by de Bassolis and expressed as follows:

I think that by the divine power the abstractive cognition can be caused and conserved without any medium or representation.<sup>74</sup>

But here he is inclined not to admit such an explanation. For, citing some authors who admitted that

God can infuse the forenamed abstractive cognition without any mediating species, I do not accept this other mode, because though God can cause and maintain such an abstractive cognition in existence without a species, it is always capable of existing *in se* or in something else similar to it, by means of a species, as it was said above, and therefore I reject this mode.<sup>75</sup>

Hence according to John de Bassolis, the supernatural abstractive cognition is usually given by God through the species.

#### *d. Comparative appraisal of de Bassolis*

Having completed this long discussion about the intuitive and abstractive cognition according to Scotus, Ockham and de Bassolis we shall now try to evaluate briefly the doctrinal position of de Bassolis with respect to Scotus and Ockham. On the basis of given data, we think these conclusions are fairly justified:

On the basis of the question which deals "ex professo" with the problem of intuitive and abstractive cognition, in spite of the fact

<sup>71</sup> *Comm.* I q. 1 prol.: "Decimo dicendo . . . Dico enim quod hoc est possibile, sicut per speciem repraesentativam essentiae divinae distincte et immediate, quae solum est ratio cognoscendi et non obiectum primo cognitum quam Deus potest infundere intellectui viatoris."

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.* dist. 27, q. 2, *edit. cit.* fol. 158va ff.

<sup>73</sup> *Comm.* I q. 1 prol.: "Scio hominem huiusmodi ante annos et cetera . . . Et vidit vel audivit arcana verba quae non licet homini loqui. Recordabatur ergo et de actu et de obiecto actus per speciem aliquam, ut videtur."

<sup>74</sup> *Comm.* I fol. 3va.

<sup>75</sup> *Comm.* I fol. 5vb.

that it is presented in a very poor condition, it is evident that both of these concepts of de Bassolis are fundamentally identical with the doctrine of Scotus and Ockham.

Considering his position in every detail and his applications and his emphasis on the absolute power of God in human cognition de Bassolis is closer to Ockham than to Scotus.

In his applications of intuitive knowledge de Bassolis really goes further than Ockham, for he admits that God has not only intuitive cognition of all possibilities or non-existing things, but also that He has the intuitive cognition of negations and impossibilities. For, when he proved that God knows the creatures as an object of His intuitive cognition, he adds that this cognition has as the primary object "*non solum respectu obiectorum secundariorum possibilium et posteriorum, sed etiam respectu negationum et impossibilium, quae etiam, licet non existant in re extra, nec possint existere, tamen intuitive a Deo cognoscuntur.*"<sup>76</sup>

### E. Science and Theology

Having explained the nature of a science in general, its branches and degrees, with a special emphasis of the concept of the intuitive and abstractive cognition according to the Franciscan Masters of the fourteenth century, Scotus, Ockham and John de Bassolis, in this last part we will see what concept of science may be applied to Theology.

For us, of course, the answer is quite obvious: theology is as true a science as any other branch of human knowledge, since it fulfills all conditions required for a science in the modern sense. But the answer was not so easy for the men of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. On the one hand, they were really dazzled by the authority of the Stagirite and did not dare to question his concept of a strict science. On the other hand, as men of deep faith they respected theology as the highest and most noble of sciences. Thus, the conflict resulted in three opinions which tried to solve the crucial problem with its all-important consequences not only for theology but also sometimes for the theologians themselves. But we shall mention briefly only the chief representative of each opinion. We shall try to give a comprehensive explanation only of de Bassolis' point of view. His original doctrine is expressed in the fifth question of the Prologue to his First Book of *Commentaries*.<sup>77</sup>

<sup>76</sup> *Comm.* I fol. 3<sup>ra</sup>.

<sup>77</sup> *Comm.* I fol. 18<sup>va</sup>—23<sup>va</sup>.

### a. The opinion of St. Thomas

According to St. Thomas Aquinas, our theology is a real science but subalternated to the theology of the Blessed in Heaven. The meaning is, that the principles of our theology are taken from their theology and are evident to them, though they are not evident to us. Our theology is also, according to him, more a speculative than a practical knowledge.<sup>78</sup>

### b. The position of Henry of Ghent

The strict scientific value of our theology without any restriction regarding the evidence of its principles is admitted by Henry of Ghent.<sup>79</sup> He holds that theology is true and the highest of sciences, for its principles are evident through the special light given by God. It is a purely speculative science.

### c. The teaching of Duns Scotus

Scotus refuses to call theology a strict science in the Aristotelian sense. One can read in his *Ordinatio*:

But it seems that there cannot be a science about the contingent, as is clear from the definition of a science; therefore it seems that the whole theology, as it is extended to all things contained in it, cannot have the name of a science whether with the reasoning process or without . . .<sup>80</sup>

But a theology is a science in a broad sense. Father Magrini, who studied this problem, writes:

Therefore according to this accepted mode which considers the science in the broad sense or by extended name, broadly or commonly, theology is a science. For we give assent to the given truth as to conclusions, just

<sup>78</sup> Cfr. his *Commentaries on Sentences*, Prologue; *Commentary on De Trinitate of Boethius*, q. 2; *Summa I*, q. 1, q. 32, a. 1; II—II<sup>ae</sup>, q. 1, a. 5; *Quodlibeta IV*, a. 18; *Summa contra Gentiles*, I, 3—9; II, 2—4; *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, 14, a. 1 and 9. A comprehensive explanation of "Scientia subalternans et subalternata" was given recently by A. Magrini in his "Joannis Duns Scoti doctrina de scientifica theologiae natura", *Antonianum*, XXXVII (1952), fasc. 3, 289 ff.

<sup>79</sup> Henry of Ghent, *Summa quaestionum ordinariam*, ed. Jodocus Badius Ascensius, Paris, 1520. Reprinted Franciscan Institute edition text series n. 5, 1953, I; art. 1, q. 2, fol. 3v; art. VI, q. 1—4 fol. 42 ff.

<sup>80</sup> Joannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio I*, 144, n. 210 (ed. Balić, Rome, 1950): "Ad theologiam pertinent contingentia sicut et necessaria. Quod patet de theologia nostra, quia omnes articuli de incarnatione sunt de contingentibus in theologia etiam Beatorum quia omnia cognoscibilia de Deo in respectu ad creaturas extra sunt de contingentibus. De contingentibus autem non videtur posse esse scientia, patet ex definitione scientiae; igitur videtur quod theologia tota ut extendit se ad omnia illa contenta non possit habere rationem scientiae sive cum discursu sive non."



as to the truth which is known or demonstrated, though not as to the truth demonstrated by the perfect demonstration, which carries with itself the conclusion inferred from principles which are first, true and immediate to him who deduces them or demonstrates; but as to the truth which is demonstrated or rather inferred from the certain principles, namely, from the articles of faith according to the perfect syllogism and necessary reasons.<sup>81</sup>

#### d. The view-point of de Bassolis

John de Bassolis shares the opinion of Scotus. Consequently he denies that theology is a science in strict sense. He writes in the fifth question of the Prologue as follows:

But about our theology which is concerned with necessary truths which are merely theological or which are deduced necessarily from these and not from others, I say that it is not nor can it be a science, if it remains in the same species or number, if we speak properly of science in the manner which was explained above; it is neither a subalternating science nor subalternated to another, neither in the light of faith nor in the natural light nor in any mediate light, nor in the light of the Blessed, if it were possible in heaven.<sup>82</sup>

And then he gives several reasons why theology cannot be a strict science.<sup>83</sup> He concludes:

I say therefore briefly that theology is neither a science nor is it possible for it to be a proper science as it is impossible for a man to be an ass. For in an essentially ordered series, if the first is wanting so also is the second. The proofs (*evidentiae*) of the principle and the conclusions are essentially ordered in scientific procedure. Hence, if evidence is wanting in the former, from which alone we can proceed in such a science, the evidence of the conclusion is also necessarily wanting and consequently there is no science.<sup>84</sup>

Somewhat later he stresses this point again:

Thus, I say briefly that the pure theologian as such, both in regard to the habit and the object of theology, does not have a habit of science which could be so called truly and properly, but only so called in a broad sense, as St. Augustine says that we know improperly what we have learned by faith from the testimony of others.<sup>85</sup>

<sup>81</sup> Magrini, Ae., "Joannis Duns Scoti doctrina de Scientifica theologiae natura," *Antoniarum* XXXVII (1952), fasc. 3, 298: "Secundum igitur istum modum accipiendi scientiam sensu largo vel extenso nomine, large vel communiter, theologia est scientia. Veritatibus enim ibi qua conclusionibus traditis assensum praebemus sicut veritati scitae seu demonstratae; non quidem ut veritati demonstratae secundum perfectam demonstrationem secumferentem conclusionem illatam ex principiis primis veris et immediatis ipsi deducenti vel demonstranti, sed ut veritati demonstratae vel potius illatae secundum perfectum syllogismum et rationes necessarias a principiis certis, id est, ab articulis fidei."

<sup>82</sup> *Comm.* I fol. 21va.

<sup>83</sup> *Comm.* I fol. 21va—22ra.

<sup>84</sup> *Comm.* I fol. 22ra.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*

Of course, de Bassolis is perfectly conscious that his conclusion denying that theology is a strict science is "male sonans" to some people. Therefore in answer to the last principal objection which states clearly "if a theology is not a science, a theologian is not a scholar. But in this case we vilify theology or theologians and say that they labor in vain", de Bassolis says:

To the last (objection) I say that a theologian as such is not a scholar, speaking properly about a science, but this implies no lack of appreciation for theologians or theology, because it is more noble and perfect to know those things what he knows about God, than to know all inferior things with which other sciences deal. For, according to Aristotle in *De Animalibus*, it is better to know or to understand a few truths with less certitude about the superior things than to know many things with more certainty about these inferior or less noble things. Hence I say that among all men the theologians should be held in the highest esteem.<sup>86</sup>

Though theology is not a strict science, according to de Bassolis, it is a science in the broad sense. He leaves no doubt about this. In the first question of the Prologue he says:

It is certain to those who speak in the usual way, that there can be some scientific evident cognition of God a posteriori and through creatures.<sup>87</sup>

And in the fifth question, having given the explanation of the definition of strict sense, he concludes:

These are the conditions which *per se* pertain to knowledge as it is not extended broadly to include faith as does Augustine in XV book of *De Trinitate* when he says: let it not be said that we deny the name of science to that which we have learned through the testimony of others.<sup>88</sup>

According to de Bassolis the abstractive theology of the wayfarer seems to be speculative:

Concerning the abstractive theology which is possible to men on earth I say that it seems to be speculative, since it is not in potency of man but is infused . . .<sup>89</sup>

Further on he says that theology acquired through studies is a practical science:

About the theology of the wayfarers which the doctors and theologians have acquired by the exercise of study aided by faith, it is doubtful whether it is speculative or practical or both. And I say it seems to me at present that regarding it as whole and with all its parts (as it was said above), it is a practical science.

<sup>86</sup> *Comm.* I fol. 23<sup>ra</sup>.

<sup>87</sup> *Comm.* I fol. 4<sup>ra</sup>.

<sup>88</sup> *Comm.* I fol. 20<sup>vb</sup>.

<sup>89</sup> *Comm.* I qu. 8, prol. a. 2.

## IV. CONCLUSIONS

Having presented a life sketch of John de Bassolis, however obscure and involved, and two small and brief specimens of his theological and philosophical method and doctrine, one may now attempt to evaluate his historical position in the fourteenth century, his importance in the Scotistic school, his relation to other philosophical schools and currents and his controversial influence on his contemporaries and upon later systems of thought. This remains a very difficult and trying endeavor, because his life is still veiled in the cloak of mystery, uncertainty and enigma. In most cases, the sketch of his life was woven from probabilities or interpretations of rare historical facts. Nevertheless, on the basis of the existing facts, it must be admitted that John de Bassolis was an outstanding personality, with many and varied interests and accomplishments in the Franciscan Order of the fourteenth century. In existing historical data, he is mentioned as a profound theologian and philosopher, as a doctor of medical science and even as an outstanding preacher of the Word of God. Since of all his writing and works, only the Commentaries are extant, we are necessarily limited to them in any objective appraisal of his philosophical system.

## A. Relation of de Bassolis to Scotus and Contemporaries

After even a superficial and haphazard reading of only a few of the distinctions of his Commentaries, there will remain no doubt in the mind of the reader that John de Bassolis belonged to the so-called "modern thinkers" of the fourteenth century, of the School of Duns Scotus.<sup>90</sup> It is very easy for anyone who is acquainted with the characteristic features of this intellectual movement, to find these in the writings of de Bassolis. De Bassolis discusses quite extensively all of the controversial problems of his time, e. g., the problem of abstractive and intuitive knowledge,<sup>91</sup> the univocity and analogy of being;<sup>92</sup> he betrays the tendency to speculation and rationalism, the insatiable desire of seeking new approaches and new solutions to prob-

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<sup>90</sup> Sometimes he clearly distinguishes himself from what he calls "modern thinkers". In his "terminology", the "modern thinkers" are all the scholars of the School of Scotus, and "the old or traditional thinkers", among whom he counts himself, are all who tried to follow "a pure Aristotelianism".

<sup>91</sup> *Comm.* I, dist. I, prol.

<sup>92</sup> *Op. cit.*, dist. 8.

lems, the separation of faith from science as the sources of knowledge and certitude.<sup>93</sup> It is patently evident that de Bassolis was one of the disciples of John Duns Scotus. Though we cannot write conclusively about the similarities and dissimilarities between de Bassolis and Scotus, it is very obvious that in the very first pages of de Bassolis we are also in the shadow of Duns Scotus. His terminology, both philosophical and theological, his fundamental definitions and concepts and even some of his entire questions and proofs are taken almost bodily from Scotus.<sup>94</sup> De Bassolis sometimes uses the arguments of Scotus, calls these arguments subtle, though there is no trace of any reference to Scotus as the "Doctor Subtilis", as it might be expected from this supposed "preferred disciple". He simply refers to Scotus as "doctor ille Scotus" or some like expression. But even if we had admitted that de Bassolis was not an "auditor" of the Doctor Subtilis, it is almost certain that he received from Scotus his critical sense and attitude and the impetus for the critical evaluation of all data of the senses and intellect. Still we have to agree with some others, against many historical testimonies and appraisals, that no one can state conclusively that de Bassolis was an inveterate or faithful student and continuator of Scotus nor are his *Commentaries* the echo and reflection of the latter's doctrine.<sup>95</sup> In an allegorical comparison, Scotism may be likened to the solar system, with Scotus as its center and with de Bassolis at its outmost fringes. Some say that Ockham occupies an identical position with respect to Scotus and that there is an interdependence between these both scholars much more than between them and Scotus.<sup>96</sup> This opinion and teaching are debatable. Further analytical and historical study is necessary before one can decide the degree of comparative influence either had upon the other. We only know the result recorded in de Bassolis' *Commentaries*, that he was at least on the borderline between sound criticism originated by Scotus and scepticism or agnosticism or traditionalism or fideism in our contemporary meaning. From previous analysis of his few distinctions we know that de Bassolis believed, thought and defended that a void exists between faith and philosophy concerning the possibility of proving by strict natural reason fundamental theological truths as the existence of God, His primacy and unicity, His omnipotence and ubiquity. Hence it is no

<sup>93</sup> *Op. cit.*, dist. 2.

<sup>94</sup> E. g., the question about God's omnipotence seems to be taken from Scotus' *Quodlibet*.

<sup>95</sup> Michalski, "Les Courants Critiques et sceptiques . . ."

<sup>96</sup> Callebaut, A., in *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* XVII (1924), 581.



wonder that some scholars, like Michalski, dared to classify de Bassolis as a sceptic and "precursor" of John de Mirecourt.<sup>97</sup> But it is very easy to be mistaken in such a case and misled by terminology, as we have pointed out before, especially as concerns Michalski. For, we must take into account the spirit of that time and the method and the concept of science and the meanings and usages of terms, if we are to judge the authors and their works objectively. We must study all of these characteristics in their proper historical and even personal setting or background. The usage of words and their meanings vary from century to century. To give a modern meaning to the terminology of fourteenth century would be contrary to historical truth and method, as we have mentioned in the introduction. Somehow this seems to be the fault of Michalski.<sup>98</sup> But on the other hand neither the ability of the scholar to find new problems and new solutions nor his endeavor to be a pure aristotelian, are by themselves sufficient ground for excusing his faults and erroneous doctrines.

## B. Opponents of John de Bassolis

According to Michalski, de Bassolis has a "clearly antithomistic tendency in his works" though he does not quote St. Thomas by name but only by his works.<sup>99</sup> Michalski further states that de Bassolis continues Scotus' doctrine of the reality of the universals. Concerning the second opinion, we do agree with Michalski in stating that de Bassolis continues, generally speaking though with many exceptions, the Scotistic doctrine of realism of the universals. However, with reference to St. Thomas, the observation of Michalski is not wholly justified, at least if we understand Thomism in the broad sense. We have found up to the present at least one reference to Thomas ("Thom"). We may also say that de Bassolis was not an intransigent follower of Scotus, for there are certain questions in which he prefers St. Thomas to Scotus, e. g., in the question of the analogy and univocity of being.<sup>100</sup> His position of generally favoring Scotus but also occasionally of accepting St. Thomas is an indication of an independent mind that tries to judge all problems and solutions objectively and critically. Perhaps this disagreement with Scotus is also somehow connected with his

<sup>97</sup> "Les Courants Critiques et sceptiques . . ."

<sup>98</sup> *Op. cit.*

<sup>99</sup> *Op. cit.*, 221.

<sup>100</sup> *Comm.* I, dist. 8.

"criticism" of the so-called "modern thinkers". For in contradistinction to them, as it seems, he tries to be the pure Aristotelian. But this attitude does not hinder him from criticizing Aristotle and the great Arabian Commentators, Averroes and Avicenna. The other opponents of de Bassolis cited by name are Henry of Ghent,<sup>101</sup> Richard, probably Hugh of St. Victor.<sup>102</sup> In most cases, as a rule, the opponents are not mentioned by names.

### C. The Sources of the Philosophical and Theological Doctrine of John de Bassolis

Regarding the sources of de Bassolis philosophical and theological doctrine, they were sufficiently pointed out elsewhere, especially in the first part of this chapter. Here a summary is given. De Bassolis predominantly formed his ideas under influence of Scotus. His teacher and master had a most decisive influence on him and in many cases de Bassolis is really the continuator of the doctrine of the Doctor Subtilis.<sup>103</sup> But it is also unquestionably true that he is not to be considered as a representative of genuine Scotism and of the fourteenth century Franciscan School taken in the strict sense. Some have found a positive dependence of de Bassolis upon Ockham. But it can be also a reverse case. The solution of the question of mutual influence of both these men depends of course on the dating of their works. This matter has never been fully studied and even now this is impossible since critical editions of the works of both authors are lacking. Michalski has found some dependence upon William of Ware and Walter of Chatton.<sup>104</sup> Schmaus found some texts that were identical to those of Alnwick.<sup>105</sup>

De Bassolis himself often quotes St. Augustine, St. Anselm, Aristotle, Averroes, Avicenna. One can also find references to Alexander of Hales, St. Hilary, Maimonides. Concerning quotations from contemporaries, he does not cite authors or works, except Scotus<sup>106</sup> and St. Thomas<sup>107</sup> and Henry of Ghent.<sup>108</sup>

<sup>101</sup> *Comm.* I, qu. 5. prol.

<sup>102</sup> *Op. cit.*, dist. 42, qu. unica.

<sup>103</sup> Michalski, *op. cit.*

<sup>104</sup> Michalski, *op. cit.*

<sup>105</sup> Schmaus, M., *Der Liber Propugnatorius des Thomas Anglicus*, Muenster in Westf., 1930, II. Teil, I. Band, Register, 641.

<sup>106</sup> *Comm.* I, qu. 1 prol; qu. 8 prol; I. Book, dist. 1, q. 1.

<sup>107</sup> *Comm.* I, qu. 1 prol: "Ille Thomas . . . ponit etiam in Prima parte."

<sup>108</sup> *Comm.* I, qu. 5 prol.

## D. The Traces of His Influence

As was mentioned before, the interrelation and interdependence of de Bassolis with Ockham and other co-disciples of Scotus is vague, obscure and generally unexplored. The first mention of his importance and influence is recorded by A. Rubio y Lluch, who wrote that the king of Spain (Aragon and Catalonia), probably Juan I de Aragon (El Casador), asked for the "la obra del Bazals" from the Cardinal Bishop James of Aragon, on March 24, 1388.<sup>109</sup>

The editors of the 1516-17 edition of the *Commentaries* of de Bassolis state that this edition was published as the "Glossa" of Duns Scotus' philosophy and theology. This is also a positive and important proof of the significance and influence of de Bassolis.

In the seventeenth century, Wadding states that there were many manuscripts of the works of John de Bassolis in the libraries of France.<sup>110</sup> This ought to be interpreted as some indication of his importance and influence.

In modern history, we find the doctrine of de Bassolis about the possibility of mathematical infinity and about the possibility of many or infinite worlds cited in the work of the famous French philosopher of science, Pierre Duhem,<sup>111</sup> and in the work of the famous historian of science, George Sarton.<sup>112</sup> De Wulf emphasizes de Bassolis' concept of quantity of mass, "quantitas molis".<sup>113</sup>

Generally, one finds his name mentioned in every work that deals with the theological and philosophical problems of the fourteenth century.<sup>114</sup> However, the critical and integrated evaluation of his thought is still wanting.

## E. Historical Appraisal

The importance and significance of John de Bassolis as a historical personality and the historical recognition of his doctrine and of his scientific method of explanation are expressed by the two honorary titles that are ascribed to de Bassolis, namely, "doctor ordinatissimus",

<sup>109</sup> Rubio y Lluch, *Documenta per l'Historia de la Cultura Migeval*, Barcelona, 1908, I, 28 and II, 58; cited after Langlois.

<sup>110</sup> Sbaralea, J. H., *Supplementum et Castigatio* . . . Rome, 1921, 39.

<sup>111</sup> Überweg-Geyer, *Die Patristische und Scholastische Philosophie*, Berlin, 1928, 787.

<sup>112</sup> *Introduction to the History of Science*, Baltimore, 1947, III, Part I, 549.

<sup>113</sup> *Histoire de Philosophie Médiévale*, Louvain-Paris, 1947, III, 79.

<sup>114</sup> Heynck, V., "Die Reuelehre des Scotusschülers Joannes de Bassolis," *Franziskanische Studien* XXVIII (1941), 1 ff.

i. e., the most ordered doctor, as given to him by Fabricius,<sup>115</sup> or "doctor ornatissimus" the most ornate doctor, as given to him by Wadding.<sup>116</sup> Taking into account his other praises, especially from the *Commentaries* of 1516/17 wherein he is called "the most profound philosopher and theologian"<sup>117</sup> and "the most excellent theologian",<sup>118</sup> if I may express an opinion, the title "doctor ordinatissimus" fits more aptly to John de Bassolis. His effort to give a good clear division of the distinctions and questions of his *Commentaries* is evident; and he tries also to be accurate and faithful to the order intended. Probably we may be substantiated in our opinion by that voiced by Fr. Anastasius Turronius,<sup>119</sup> who saw in de Bassolis' *Commentaries* a "Glossa" for a better understanding of the doctrine of Scotus; or by Fr. Francis Vila, O. F. M.,<sup>120</sup> and M. Schmaus,<sup>121</sup> who say that John de Bassolis sought to make doctrine of Scotus presentable.

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<sup>115</sup> *Bibliotheca Latina Mediae et Infimae Aetatis*, IV, (Padova, 1754), 152.

<sup>116</sup> *Annales Ordinis Minorum*, VI (Quaracchi, 1931), 152.

<sup>117</sup> *Commentaries*, title.

<sup>118</sup> *Op. cit.*, table of content, II. Book, without pagination, last page.

<sup>119</sup> *Op. cit.*, dedication.

<sup>120</sup> Vila, Francis, "Fr. Joannes de Bassolis, Doctor Ordinatissimus (1332). De vita, operibus ejusque Theodicea Dissertatio historico-doctrinalis". (Unpublished dissertation, Department of Theology, Athenaeum Antonianum de Urbe, Rome, 1929.) I owe Father Grajewski this information.

<sup>121</sup> Schmaus, M., "Joannes de Bassolis", *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche*, ed. Buchberger, II (1931), 34.



## CATECHETICAL INSTRUCTION IN THE EASTERN CHURCHES

**T**he Encyclical of Pope Pius XI. of 1928 gave a new impetus to the study of the doctrines of the Eastern Churches in the interest of an eventual re-union. The liturgical customs of those churches have also been made better known among the Catholic as well as among large groups of non-Catholic students of the Western people. The practices of Oriental Christianity have not received the same amount of attention. Yet in this regard the East can teach valuable lessons to the West as we hope to point out in regard to the system of catechetical instruction.

In general the Eastern Churches retained the method of catechizing as practised in the Primitive Church, while in the West religious instruction became in the Middle Ages compendious and later under the impact of the Reformation textuary.

### I. Catechetical Instruction in the Early Church

I. CREED. — The Apostles taught Christian doctrine ORALLY like their Master. Their instructions embraced preaching penance, belief in God, baptism, resurrection of the dead, eternal judgment, imposition of the hands (Hebr. 6, 1—2) and Eucharist (I Corinth. 11, 13). Their successors added other doctrines and in the course of time the twelve articles of the Apostles' Creed became the foundation of catechetical teaching. The bishop was the official catechist assisted by priests, deacons and lectors. Preparatory instruction could also be given by laymen and laywomen, deaconesses and virgins. Yet as soon as their beginners were enrolled into the class of catechumens, the clergy had the exclusive right of teaching Christian doctrine to them.

Catechising was a liturgical function consisting of homilies and explanations of Scripture during Mass; it was an essential part of the Mass following the reading of the gospel and epistle. The explanations of the Biblical lessons in Mass by the bishop and his assistants were generally extemporized talks and for this reason there was no uniformity in teaching the catechism in different churches and also no uniformity

in the selection of the portions of Holy Writ read and expounded by homilies. Catechetical instruction was preached every Sunday and Feast-day but in Advent and Lent on every week-day also. Sometimes several homilies were preached during a Mass by different catechists and as the case might be also in different languages. As a rule several portions of the Bible were read during Mass but the catechist had the choice to explain all or only one or two of them. St. Augustine develops generally one text but at time would touch upon the others. Some bishops would explain whole books of the Bible or even the entire Scriptures to the catechumens in serial homilies. As a result of extemporizing the homilies or catechetical instructions contain many digressions and casual remarks without any systematic treatment of Christian doctrine; the catechist would pass from one article of faith to another without pointing out the logical connection of them. In the final exhortation, more than in other parts of the homilies, disparate matter is congregated. However now and then we come across systematic and oratorical preaching. The bishops would preach their catechetical homilies sitting and the priests standing.

Thus reading from the Bible and explaining the Biblical texts by homilies remained the canonical method of teaching Christian doctrine from the times of the Apostles (Acts. 13, verse 15) down to the thirteenth century in the Western Church and down to modern times in the Eastern Churches.

The place, where catechetical instruction was given were during the first three centuries rooms in private houses, buildings owned by the Church and in exceptional cases in crypts of catacombs or cemetery-churches. Of course, in later centuries churches, where Mass was celebrated, became the regular places for catechetical instruction.

The central subjects of catechetical instruction were summarized in the articles of the Creed or Symbolum which had to be accepted as profession of faith of the converts. These short formulars were communicated to the catechumens gradually and orally. This act of teaching the mysteries of faith is called "tradition of the symbolum". The articles were repeated orally till the catechumen had learnt them by heart and could say them correctly. This act is called "rendering of the symbolum" (*redditio symboli*). It was strictly forbidden to write down the symbolum in order to memorize it to avoid eventual profanation by the pagans. The symbolum at first was a baptismal creed i. e. a profession of faith to be recited by the catechumen at baptism. In the course of time, however, it became also a mark of religion ex-

pressing the Rule of Faith in opposition to new and heretical doctrines. There were no fixed and uniform formulas in use; even the same writer gives various formulas of profession of faith. It was only about the year 500 A. D. that the present formulas of the Apostles' Creed were standardized in the West. The converts recited the profession of faith or the creed, the renouncing of satan and the abjuring of sin in the vernacular from memory at baptism.

The catechumens were also subjected to various liturgical ceremonies which likewise are still in use in the administration of baptism. At the reception of a candidate into the catechumenate the postulant was breathed upon with praying an exorcism over him, was signed with a cross on the forehead, blessed with imposition of hands, and given blessed salt to taste. Sometimes unction with oil was applied on the breast and the shoulders. Yet there was no uniformity in these matters to be found anywhere. The reception into the catechumenate and the admission to baptism were preceded by various scrutinies or examinations, in which the faithful gave the decision. Before baptism the neophyte was taught the Pater Noster in the same way as he had been taught the Symbolum or Creed. Yet he was only allowed to pray it after baptism, when he stepped out of the baptismal water; for it was only then that he could say in truth **OUR FATHER** having been enrolled among His children.

II. **ETHICS.** — The teaching of the moral virtues and duties was at first like the creed not standardized by rigid formulas. The Apostles in preaching the practice of Christian virtues enumerate sometimes six chief virtues (Phil. 4, 8), sometimes five (2 Pet. 1, 5), sometimes four (I Cor. 1, 30) and sometimes three (Tit. 2, 12). The comprehensive list of virtue (Gal. 5, 22—23) enumerates twelve virtues. In regard to moral precepts the **TEN COMMANDMENTS** are enjoined as showing the Way of Godly Life (Rom. 13, 8—10, Tim. 1, 9—10). The vices to be avoided are enumerated (Mark. 7, 21—22, thirteen, and Matth. 15, 19, eight).

In a similar way the Fathers of the Church immediately following the Apostles do not teach any standardized formulas. St. Clement of Rome enumerates at one place six virtues and at another eight. Hermias mentions seven good works and thirteen evil deeds with additional nine others, the **TWO WAYS** are marked by four virtues and four vices. Barnabas writes that the **WAY of LIGHT** is traveled by thirty-one virtues and the **Way of Darkness** by thirty-eight vices.

The *Didache* describes the WAY of LIFE as consisting of forty-nine virtues and the WAY of DEATH of forty-one vices. Thus virtues and vices are strung together in an arbitrary way.

The classification of the FOUR CARDINAL VIRTUES of the BOOK of WISDOM (8, 7) which, is not mentioned in the New Testament, was first introduced into the Church by Athenagoras. Clement of Alexandria accepts the same grouping but besides gives long lists of virtues and vices strung together without any logical connection. The GOOD WAY consists of the TWO COMMANDMENTS: love of God and neighbor, the TEN COMMANDMENTS and the three precepts enjoined by Isaias (1, 16—18). "There are myriads of injunctions", he remarks, but he mentions a few "for the sake of example". Of works of corporal mercy he enumerates three. Origen uses also the classification of the four cardinal virtues but his catalogue of vices is greatly longer than the one of Clement of Alexandria. Methodius teaches the classification of the Four Cardinal virtues and six chief vices. John Chrysostom follows the classification of four cardinal virtues and a grouping of five chief vices and eight evil desires. Macarius of Egypt enumerates sometimes four, then six or seven or even ten vices placed into opposition of the corrective virtues. Once he lists seventeen virtues as opposing eighteen vices.

Evagrius Ponticus (died in 400 A. D.) was the first writer who sets forth a systematic classification of vices; he enumerates eight capital sins: gluttony, immorality, avarice, melancholy, anger, sloth, conceit and pride. He gives also a classification of eight virtues: the four cardinal and four others. Nilus Sinaita (died about 430 A. D.) adopted the eight-vices grouping of Evagrius and the classification of the four cardinal virtues. In the Latin West this eight-vices classification was changed into a seven-vices grouping.

In the Latin Church a similar evolution of the teaching of the moral code is observed. Tertullian considers patience as the chief virtue which is the mother of faith, hope, charity, obedience, trust in God, piety, wisdom, justice, humility and a host of other virtues. He enumerates as chief vices: idolatry, fornication and murder, mentions six principal sins against the Lord and systems of seven or eight or nine principal sins. Cyprian follows Tertullian in his classification of virtues and vices and adds six works of corporal mercy. Lactantius (died ca 340 A. D.) enumerates three passions: anger, avarice and immorality which are the mothers of almost all crimes. The Way of Life consists



in the five works of corporal mercy: hospitality, ransom of captives, protecting orphans and widows, nursing the sick and burying the dead and the Way of Death consists of the three vices: anger, cupidity and lust. Ambrose (died 397) adopts the grouping of the four cardinal virtues like Lactantius and considers them as offsprings of the virtue of piety. Prudentius (died about 408) enumerates seven virtues as opposed to seven vices: faith, chastity, patience, humility, sobriety, operosity and harmony contrasted with idolatry, immorality, anger, pride, avarice, gluttony and discord. St. Augustine (died in 430) classifies the virtues into the four cardinal virtues and the three theological virtues. The chief vices are listed as concupiscence of the eyes, the flesh and pride. Sometimes he reduces all vices to pride which engenders forty-five crimes. Orientius (died ca 440) enumerates seven capital sins as: immorality, envy, varice, conceit, mendacity, gluttony and drunkenness. Cassian (died ca 430—435 A. D.) transplanted the eight-vices system of Evagrius to the West and besides enumerates seven venial sins of thought, ignorance, forgetfulness, idle talk, laxity in faith, conceit and ease. He does not use the system of the four cardinal virtues. Julian Pomerius (died ca 480 A. D.) lists as principal sources of all sins: concupiscence, envy and pride and as principal virtues the four cardinal virtues. Caesarius of Arles (d. 542 A. D.) places six chief vices: fornication, fury, sadness, sloth, cupidity and envy in opposition to six virtues: chastity, wisdom, joy, humility, mercy and simplicity. At another place he enumerates ten chief vices: lying, cursing, breaking promises, calumny, backbiting, drunkenness, gluttony, immorality, immodest thought and immodest talk. Again at another place he lists twelve chief vices: sacrilege, murder, adultery, false witnessing, robbery, theft, pride, envy, avarice, revenge, drunkenness and calumny. A contemporary of Caesarius enumerates the eight chief vices of Cassian. Martin of Dumio and Cassiodore (both about 580 A. D.) adopt the grouping of the four cardinal virtues. St. Gregory the Great reduced about the year 600 A. D. the eight-vices classification to the seven capital sins grouping of our catechism.

This survey shows that the Greek Fathers liked to group the catechetical formulas into systems of four and eight members, whilst the Latin Fathers preferred systems of the Biblical numbers three and seven. Yet in regard to precepts of natural law the classification of the Ten Commandments remained a uniform standard.

The Decalogue was not taught as a catechetical subject in the first centuries, because the converts from Judaism knew it in its entirety

and the converts from paganism in its essential parts. With the development of the catechumenate the Book of Exodus was read like other books of the Bible to be explained. However the decalogus contained in it did not receive much attention. Actually we have only one homily of Origen on the first commandment. Yet in the multiple classifications of the virtues and vices of the Fathers of the third and fourth centuries partial lists of precepts and prohibitions of the Decalogue were enumerated for the guidance of the catechumens. Finally St. Augustine introduced the Decalogue into the catechetical instruction as a main subject and in the course of time all precepts and prohibitions of the Christian law were grouped according to the decadic system of the Ten Commandments.

III. PRAYER. — The Christian Religion entered into the world principally as a religion of prayer which made orison an indispensable duty of the Christian. Accordingly the catechumen had to be taught certain methods of prayer from the very start.

The catechumen learnt the first formulas of prayer in assisting the divine services of the congregation. In the first part of the Mass to which he was admitted such formulas were responses and acclamations and repetitions. Yet of greater importance was the recitation of the Psalms which constituted a principal part of the Mass of the Catechumens. The Jewish converts were already familiar with this mode of prayer and the pagan convert took soon a great liking to it owing to the poetic form and to the deeply religious character, and this the more since the psalms were chanted by the congregation. One way which was found in the small congregations of Jewish converts consisted in congregations' chanting; everyone sang the text in a uniform tone, but often not according to the rules of harmony. However, more customary was the responsory psalmody: one part leading and the other part responding. This was done in various way. Sometimes a precentor sang a verse and the congregation repeated the same verse. The catechumen received by such psalmody an easier knowledge of the content of the text than he could have through textuary study. Sometimes the congregation joined the precentor or the choir in chanting the last part of the psalm. This mode of psalmody had been widely in use with the Jews. Again the congregation would repeat a verse or part of a verse as a sort refrain to stress its importance. Finally one part of the congregation would alternate with the second part so that each chanted a different text.

The use of the psalms in the Mass of the catechumens was rather restricted in extent. More extensive was the use of those Biblical prayers in the public prayers at the canonical Hours of day and night. It is an apostolic custom that the Christians met in their oratories to pray at the third, sixth and ninth hour of the day. Later prayer-meetings became customary. In the morning, evening and in night. In all these meetings recitation and singing of the psalms formed the principal part of prayer. However catechumens were not admitted in all churches, yet whenever such were present the creed and the Our Father had to be prayed silent, as it is done even to-day.

In the forth century hymns were introduced into the liturgy which likewise furnished the catechumens with formulas of prayer for private use.

IV. BIBLE-STUDY. — The catechumen was taught the content of the Bible by assisting at the numerous readings and explanations he heard at the Mass of the catechumens and the chanting of the divine Office at the canonical hours. St. Augustine would in his first homily to the new candidates give a summary survey beginning with the opening chapters of Genesis and covering the whole of the biblical history; he would lay particular stress on the doctrinal parts of Scripture together with moral reflections. Succeeding lessons began with reading long portions of the Bible which were explained by homilies. Origen (died about 254 A. D.) tells us that for the instruction of the beginners were read and explained the books of Esther, Judith, Tobias and Wisdom. The Apostolic Constitutions state that about the year 350 A. D. the full course of a three years' catechumenate comprised reading and explanation of the Five Books of Moses, Judges, Kings, Paralipomenon, Esdras, Nehemias, Job, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Canticle of Canticles, Wisdom, Four greater and Twelve minor Prophets, Psalms, Acts of the Apostles, Letters of St. Paul and the Gospels (*Const. Apost.* Book II, chapt. 57). Athanasius tells us that also Ecclesiasticus was read and explained. Sometimes whole books were read and explained, but otherwise always long portions of the Biblical text selected by the bishop or catechising priest. It was only about the year 500 A. D. that a uniform system of pericopes was introduced which shortened the lessons considerably.

Certainly the Jewish catechumens received at the beginning a different instruction from the one given to converts from paganism. The Book of Wisdom was uniformly selected as best suited for teaching the latter, since it shows better than any other Biblical book the vanity

of polytheism. For Jewish converts the Gospels were naturally the first book to be studied.

The oral instruction gave the catechumens a remarkably large amount of Biblical knowledge. The memory of these men and women was not spoiled by too much reading as is ours, so that by listening they were able to memorize long texts and discourses. It is said of some Jewish rabbis that they did not lose a single word of all their master had told them, and, in fact, the Talmudic literature, which is quite extensive, was transmitted orally for several centuries, before it was written down. Even to-day a preacher will observe that the illiterates among his audience will better remember his talk than the educated.

The homilies of St. Cyril of Jerusalem (died in 386 A. D.) evince how much Biblical knowledge was acquired by the catechumens of the fourth century. In his third catechetical sermon he quotes about fifty texts, in his thirteenth hundred fifty and in his second he instances a long line of examples or facts taken from Scripture which show the infinite mercy of God. These direct quotations and allusions taken from various books of the Two Testaments prove to evidence that his catechumens had mastered the content of the whole Bible, in the second and third years of instruction.

The Church did not place the Bible into the hands of catechumens. Yet some Jewish converts possessed copies of the Old Testament and from the third century onward both Jewish and pagan converts could use at home the whole Bible for private instruction and devotion. The custom to baptize adults remained even in regard to members of pious Christian families. Accordingly men and women who applied late in life for baptism who had never been heathen and were familiar with the chief articles of the Christian religion. Such catechumens could get access to the Scriptures which circulated among Christian communities, both before and during the catechumenate. For them the grade of instruction could be more elevated and the catechumenate could be shortened.

V. PICTORIAL INSTRUCTION. -- Signs and symbols proved to be a powerful means for imparting Christian doctrine to the catechumens. Pictures were used to serve, like the homilies of the Fathers, as manuals for catechetical instruction; they were symbolical readers in which both the illiterate and the educated could acquaint themselves with the teaching of the Christian religion. The paintings of the catacombs were of a symbolic character; they revealed to the initiated catechumen



and Christian another and deeper meaning than to the uninitiated looker-on. Pictures of animals, plants, mathematical figures were made to serve as expressions of spiritual things. Since the New Testament was the fulfilment, the Old Testament was to be interpreted in the light of the New and thus certain persons and events of the Old Testament became types which prefigured New Testament persons and events. Thus Abraham is the type of faith, Isaac the type of purity, Jacob of patience, Joseph of chastity. Jesus Christ is typified by Isaac and Jacob, Moses and Aaron, Josue and especially David slaying Goliath. Yet in the catacombs only a limited number of mysteries are represented in the paintings; the crucifixion and Passion of our Lord are not indicated in the least. These mysteries were represented later in the mural paintings in the churches above the surface.

VI. SCHOOLS. — The Apostles and their successors received from our Lord the command to spread the Christian religion by “teaching all nations” (Matth. 28, 19). Accordingly the Christian churches became schools, where the bishops and priests instructed their flock in Christian doctrine. These schools were public and ecclesiastical institutions and their attendance was the necessary preparation for all those who wished to become Christians. These schools are properly called Catechumenal Schools; they imparted only the intellectual and moral training to catechumens necessary for admission to baptism, and as such are identical with the catechumenate or course of instruction given to the candidates for baptism. The catechumenal schools differed from the Catechetical Schools in essential points. The latter were institutions whose aim was to teach general as well as religious culture; heathen as well as Christians were admitted to them and they were rivals of the secular schools. Besides they were not established within the church but in building outside the churches. The name CATECHETICAL SCHOOLS implies merely instruction and not instruction in religion. The most important of these schools was that established in Alexandria, all embracing in its character: combining a grades’ school, college and university. Origen, its president, taught all branches from grammar upwards to theology. The catechetical school in Antioch was in fact only a theological school which excluded general and profane education. The catechetical school in Caesarea followed strictly the model of Alexandria. Later schools were those of Edessa and Nisibis. These are all the catechetical schools known by name. Whether there were any others seems doubtful. Even in Rome, where the heretical Mo-

narchians had established a catechetical school, and in Carthage, where the great luminary St. Augustine had been bishop, we do not hear of catechetical schools. Evidently at these places as at all others, where bishops resided, the Church kept only catechumenal schools. This explains why in the fourth century Christian boys attended the pagan schools like St. Basilius, the two Gregory and Jerome. A third class of schools were private institutions conducted by such teachers in the Church as Justin the Martyr, Tatian and others.<sup>1</sup>

## II. Catechetical Instruction in the Orthodox Greek Church

Difference of Greek and Oriental culture from Latin civilization as well as difference of Greek and Roman mentality placed their respective stamp on the formation of Christendom with the result that despite unity in essential things differences were to arise in the expression of the dogmas, in the attitude towards speculative and practical problems of faith, in the development of the liturgy and canon law. Whilst Rome and the papacy became the leader in the development of ecclesiastical language, liturgy, law, profane and sacred science among the nascent Germanic-Roman people in the West, a manifold expansion took root in the East on the soil of the ancient civilizations of Egypt, Mesopotamia, Asia Minor and Greece and within the civil and ecclesiastical reigns of Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem and Constantinople. Their autonomous Patriarchs founded national Churches which differ from each other in creed, liturgy and ecclesiastical polity. Yet despite these national peculiarities they are all at one with each other in regard to the mode of catechetical instruction. In all these Eastern Churches Christian doctrine is taught to the people according to the manner of the primitive Church: orally, without books and without schools. Armenia, the ELDEST DAUGHTER of the Christian Church, makes an exception to this rule during a short period of time.

Of course the abolition of the catechumenate with its discipline of the secret and the introduction of infant baptism caused some changes in the primitive discipline of the Church: the catechetical instruction which formerly preceded baptism was relegated to the time after baptism, and was no longer reserved to the clergy.

Modern times witnessed a few changes in the "immutable East"; we are not considering them, because they do not call in question the

<sup>1</sup> The works treating on the subject stress the creedal instruction and barely touch on the other features of the catechumenate.

fact that in the Eastern Churches catechetical instruction is still taught according to the oral and bookless manner of the primitive Church.

In 529 A. D. emperor Justinian banished from his empire the last pagan philosophers and closed thereby the last pagan school. By the year 680 A. D. the antagonism between the Greek and Latin Churches had grown to such an extent that the Council of the Trullo dared to brand the customs of the Latin Church as unjustified innovations. Two centuries later, in 861, the Latin Church was declared as heretical and in 1054 the schism of the Greek Church became a reality. In this state of antagonism we cannot expect to find agreement between the two churches in such a matter as mode of catechizing. Besides the excessive conservatism of the East did not leave room for innovations in that matter.

CREED. — The Greeks differed from the Latins in the adoption of the symbol of faith. They made the Nicene Creed of 325 A. D. and the creed of the synod of Constantinople of 381 A. D. the basis of catechetical instruction. They are regarded as the inviolable and exclusive formulations of the Greek Church. The text of the Nicene Creed was woven into the vestments of the highest dignitaries of the Russian Church, an offspring of the Greek Church, in the translation into the Slavonic Church language and the recitation of that creed formed the most solemn act of divine service as also of the coronation of the Czars, when it was publicly recited in the presence of the people. Naturally every Greek Catholic knew the Nicene creed by heart. To facilitate memorizing small pictures were spread which would illustrate the meaning of the text in the same way as the West produced pictorial representations of the Apostles' Creed.

The Creed was explained in church by the homilies of bishops and priests or deacons. Ever since the second century we find in the Greek Church priests and deacons who were specially appointed to explain the Creed; they were called "teachers" or "catechists". In Constantinople ever since the fourth century four priests were appointed as permanent catechists, one was charged to explain the Gospels, a second to explain the Epistles, a third to explain the Psalter and a fourth to preach at the court assisted by twelve other priests.

Greek continued to be the language of the homilies in church as in the time of the Fathers. The people listening to the sermons delivered in classical Greek received a better knowledge of Christian doctrine than the Germanic nations in the West listening to Latin homilies.

Yet the Greek theologians had not the benefit of the development of theology achieved by the great scholastic doctors of the West. Accordingly there is much looseness of presenting certain aspects of Christian doctrine, where Western theologians have arrived at greatest precision. Nevertheless the sermons of the Greek theologians proved to be powerful means of catechetical instruction through the interpretation given by parents and sponsors to their respective children and godchildren; thus the grand sermons preached in the church were translated into the idiom of the home and adapted to the mental capacity of children and youths. However, the Church was forced to use the vulgar idiom also in teaching the rudiments of faith to young and old. Since the eleventh century the so-called Middle Greek, became the language of the uneducated Greek people, whilst the Hellenistic Greek continued to be the language of the Church's liturgy. The conversion of the Slavic people in the ninth century necessitated the translation of the Greek liturgy into the Church Slavonic language and the instruction of Christian doctrine in various other languages.

In the Byzantine empire the Church was zealous in preaching the word of God to her own children and to spread the Gospel among pagan nations. Preaching made a more powerful impression on the congregations of Greek Catholics than on those in the West. Witness of this fact are the theological discussions on the streets and in the market-places of Constantinople during the controversies on the person of Christ in the fourth and fifth centuries and on other theological topics in later centuries up to modern times. Thus Christian doctrine became a subject of conversation among all classes of people. When in later centuries the zeal of the Greek clergy abated, the priests were always supplied by the liturgies with ready-made sermon material for reading to the congregation in church.

Parents and sponsors were also official catechists charged to teach Christian doctrine to their baptized wards. The Apostolic Constitutions written about 350 A. D. and accepted in the Greek Church as authoritative ordain: "Christian parents teach your children the Word of God, instruct them in the Holy Scriptures from their very youth" (Book IV, chapt. 11). The priests, however, examined those children before promoting them to the reception of the sacraments of penance and holy communion. Parents and sponsors employed sometimes other laymen and laywomen to assist them in teaching Christian doctrine to their respective charges. Women were preferred as instructresses of girls and adult female converts.



**ETHICS.** — Instruction in the duties of Christian children and youths was continued in the Byzantine empire according to the system of the Greek Fathers, i. e. orally and without a book. Likewise the catechists received their training in conformity with the same system. However, a new formulation of virtues was introduced by the writings of pseudo-Denis the Areopagite.

The classification of the virtues did not pay attention to the various degrees of Christian perfection which were obtained by their practice. The distinction of the Three Ways of perfection by pseudo-Denis naturally led to a re-groupment of virtues; virtues which are necessary for beginners lose their importance on ascending to higher perfection. Thus arose the scalar or "ladder" system of classification of virtues practised on the various stages of ascetical and mystical life.

John Climacus (died about 650 A. D.) describes thirty steps of moral ascension corresponding to the thirty years of Our Lord's life. He adopts the classification of eight capital vices of Nilus and Cassian adding warnings against ambition and pride together with exhortations to the practice of humility, prudence, fortitude and tranquillity. The last and highest step consists in love of God coupled with faith and hope. In the eight-vices enumeration sadness is replaced by bad language. In the description of the twenty-sixth stage of ascetical life Climacus mentions two moral alphabets, i. e. lists of virtues whose names begin with the letters of the Greek alphabet in running order. The alphabet for beginners starts out with obedience, fasting, penance, tears and the alphabet for advanced ascetics begins with purity of heart and charity.

Daniel of Raithu, a disciple of John Climacus, follows his master in classifying the principal vices. The anonymous Greek monk who wrote the book called **WORDS OF THE ANCIENT FATHERS** in the eighth century, reduced the eight-members classification of vice to a six-member list by omitting sadness and immorality. Maximus Confessor (died in 662) lists only four principal vices contravening the four cardinal virtues: prudence-foolishness, justice-injustice, fortitude-cowardice and temperance-intemperance, yet the basis of all virtues is love of God and the basis of all vices is self-love.

St. John Damascenus (died about 750 A. D.) wrote a book on virtues and vices which gives the most detailed classification of those moral habits. From the four cardinal virtue branch off two series of parallel virtues. The first series called psychic virtues begins with faith, hope, charity followed by spirit of prayer, humility, mildness, longanimity,

goodness, affability, and several others. The second series called somatic virtues is formed by chastity, fasting, watches, sobriety, standing posture, genuflexions, use of one tunic, foregoing the luxury of bathing, use of only dried food, abstaining from wine, sleeping on the floor, poverty, solitude, silence and the like. Contrary to the virtues are two series of vices. The first series called also psychic is formed by distraction, sloth, ignorance (mother of irreligion, heresy and blasphemy), fury, anger, inhumanity, detraction, rash judgment, depression, fear, envy, conceit, lying, selfishness and avarice, root of all evils. The second series of somatic vices consists of gluttony, fornication, drunkenness, adultery, incest, theft, profanation of churches, robbery, murder, vaticination, incantation, effeminacy, fondness of finery, hatred, jealousy, gambling and some more. Yet all these vices originate from the three chief vices: incontinence, ambition and covetousness.

St. John Damascene lays down also a second classification of virtues and vices based on the three faculties of the soul: intellect, anger and desire. Chief vices of the intellect are: irreligion, heresy, foolishness, blasphemy contrasting the chief virtues: belief in God, belief in the church's doctrines, reading of Scripture and prayerfulness. Chief vices of anger are: cruelty, hatred, unmercifulness opposed by the chief virtues: humaneness, kindness and affability. Chief vices begot of desire are: gluttony, immorality, avarice, and ambition which are remedied by the virtues: fasting, continence, almsgiving and voluntary poverty. In conclusion he enumerates the classification of the eight vices of Evagrius placing gluttony and immorality at first place. This classification of the eight chief vices is repeated by St. John Damascene and explained in a short tract more in detail. Finally in his exposition of orthodox faith St. John Damascene gives another classification of vices according to psychological aspects.

Photius (died about 897 A. D.) adopts also the classification of eight vices. Finally the Greek poet Eugenius of Palermo (XIIth century) classifies the vices into the seven chief vices: avarice, gluttony, loquacity, envy, mockery, calumny and anger; and the chief virtues into the four: chastity, love, contemplation and modesty.

Meanwhile the mystics had expanded the scalar theory to society and developed a gradation of states of life. The individual Christian may not only rise interiorly to ever higher stages of purgation of soul but he may also rise exteriorly from a lower state of life to a higher one. Originally three states of life were distinguished: laical life, the lowest, monastic and contemplative life, the highest. Later a gradation

of four states of life was developed: married, clerical, monastic and eremitical. Theodore Studita (died 826 A. D.) introduced a division in the monastic state of life: lower monks who attend to the external affairs of the monastery and higher monks who devote themselves to contemplation. Niketas Choniates (about 1210 A. D.) developed the three degrees of practice of virtue: civil, purgative, contemplative; into a practice of six degrees: physical, ethical, political, purgative, theoretic and theurgic. A manual of moral instruction for a special class is the *MIRROR OF PRINCES* written by Theophylact, archbishop of Achrida (died about 1100 A. D.).

Thus the catechists of the Byzantine empire were supplied with suitable handbooks for instruction of children entrusted to their care. Yet no such book was written to be placed into the hands of the children.

**CATECHISM.** — In 1549 the *BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER* defined catechism as "shorte instruction to be learned of every child before he be brought to be confirmed". Such a book was unknown to the Eastern Church and the Latin Church of the Middle Ages. As a matter of fact catechetical instruction was taught in all these churches orally and without the aid of a book. The catechisms written were only intended to serve as manual of instruction to teachers and parents or their substituting sponsors.

It is not quite true what Adrian Fortescue writes, that "the Greeks did not feel the need of tabulation of their articles of faith"<sup>2</sup> they tabulated well those articles in the various symbols of the councils of Nicea (325), Constantinople (381), Ephesus (431), Chalcedon (451), Constantinople (553, 680, 869) and Nicea (787). On the other hand it is true that the Greeks did not "arrange the articles of faith into a clear and consistent system that has been the characteristic of the western mind". The reason for this lack of systematization is to be found in the fact that they did not apply, like the western theologians Aristotle's metaphysics to the development of theology.

The treatise of St. John Damascene on the Orthodox Faith (died 749 A. D.) was the great store-house of Eastern theologians; it occupied among them the same place as later Peter Lombard or Thomas Aquinas among the medieval Scholastics. Besides his great dogmatical work he wrote also a short explanation of the Creed and a treatise on virtues and vices which we sketched above. A contemporary of John Damascene called Anastasius Sinaita (died some time after

<sup>2</sup> *The orthodox Eastern Church*, 3. edit., London, 1929, p. 110.

700 A. D.) left a short explanation of the Creed. Theodore Studita (died in 826 A. D.) is the author of a short exposition of the Creed and of more than 300 catechetical homilies. Photius (died about 891 A. D.) wrote a confession of faith to draw the Bulgars over to the Greek Church. George of Cyprus, Patriarch of Constantinople (died in 1290 A. D.) edited a confession of faith and an explanation of the creed. Gennadius II, Patriarch of Constantinople, wrote in 1453 a confession of faith for the first Sultan of Constantinople. Yet it was only hundred eight years later that the Orthodox Church found it necessary to issue an authoritative exposition of the tenets of the Eastern Christians. This was done in 1643 by the Council of Jassy when it published the: *Orthodox Confession of Faith of the Catholic and Apostolic Church of the East*.<sup>3</sup>

The Greek theologians in the course of time published a number of apologetical works in defense of their faith against heathens, heretics and Roman Catholics.<sup>4</sup>

The reasons why the Greeks did not issue a catechism before the year 1723 are well stated by John Mason Neale. "One of the most striking differences", he writes, "between the theology of the two churches is the paucity, I might rather say, non-existence of the practical and devotional (and we add "catechetical") works in the Greek church which are the glory of the Latin communion. I mean such treatises as the imitation of Christ, the Spiritual Combat, Bonaventure's

<sup>3</sup> Schaff, Philip. *The Creeds of Christendom*, vol. II, 5th. edit., New York 1890, publishes the text of the Nicene-Constantinople Symbol of 381 in Greek, Latin and English (pp. 57—60) and that of Chalcedon of 451 in Greek, Latin and English (pp. 62—63), that of Constantinople of 680 in Greek and Latin (pag. 72) and that of the Council of Jassy of 1643 in Greek and Latin (pp. 275—400). The confession of Gennadius II. is summarized in Schaff, vol. I, 5th edit., New York 1887, pp. 46—50.

<sup>4</sup> The works of the Byzantine theologians are printed in Migne, *Patrologia Graeca*, Paris 1857—1866. Descriptions of the theological literature of the Byzantine empire are given by K. Dietrich in: *Catholic Encyclopedia*, III, pp. 113—124 and in German in his work published at Leipsic in 1902 and again in 1909. A more extensive account is found in Krumbacher, *Geschichte der byzantinischen Literatur*, 2nd edit., Munich 1897, pp. 37—216. Still very valuable is Joh. Albert Fabricius, *Bibliotheca Graeca*, 4th edit. in 12 vols., Hamburg and Leipsic 1790—1838 who describes the Greek literature from Homer till up to his time. Cardinal Hergenroether, *Photius: Leben und Werke*, 3 vols., Ratisbon 1867—1869 treats the dogmatical literature of the Byzantine empire. Fortescue, A., *The Orthodox Eastern Church*, new edit. London 1929 has little about theological literature and nothing about catechetical literature. — Bibliographies of all Greek works, sacred and profane, printed since 1476, are published by Hoffmann. *Bibliographisches Lexikon*. 2nd. edit. 3 vols., Leipsic 1838—1845 and by Emil Legrand, *Bibliographie Hellénique*, 10 vols., Paris 1885—1918.



Life of Christ. There is perhaps a double reason for this want in the Eastern Church. The first is that the Troparia and Stichoi of the Office Book are much better adapted for private devotion than any similar composition in the West. This explanation has been suggested to me by Russians themselves but I cannot think it the principal cause of the peculiarity. It seems to me, that the IMMUTABLE Eastern Church is herein strictly following the steps of her primitive Mother. We may rejoice in the development which has furnished us with so many works of private devotion and meditation but a development quite unknown to the first ages, we must confess it to be. The system of individualizing Christians in their private life has never yet been introduced in the East, and the advantages and disadvantages of the primeval system still remain there",<sup>5</sup> and remain in all Eastern Churches.

Yet a catechism in the Greek languages has been printed in the West as early as the year 1516. In 1722 the noted bibliographer Michael Maittaire listed the following title: *Didaskalia christianike pros ten taxin kai synedoian tes anatolikes ekklesias*, printed in Rome by the printer Bartholomew Zanetti.<sup>6</sup> This book is not found at present in any library of Rome nor of America. There is, however, no reason to deny the existence of the edition, because Maittaire was a very reliable bibliographer. So much is certain that the book printed in 1516 by Zanetti is the first catechism of the Greek church issued at a time, when the Latin Church had nothing like it to offer.

ECCLESIASTICAL LANGUAGES. — Uniformity of speech was always absent in Greece from the time of Homer to modern times. There was always a difference between the literary language and the vulgar tongue. The Apostles and their successors preached the Gospel in the common and vulgar Greek called Hellenistic. This dialect had slightly changed, when the liturgies were written down in the sixth and seventh centuries and thus was created the present Greek ecclesiastical language. When later in the tenth century the modern Greek idiom, the Neo-Hellenic language, was developed, the text of the Bible and liturgy was retained unaltered up to our times.

<sup>5</sup> *General Introduction to a history of the Holy Eastern Church*, vol. I, London 1850, pp. 1182—1183.

<sup>6</sup> *Annales Typographici*, vol. II, Hagae Comitum, 1722, pag. 282. — Zanetti had been born between 1486 and 1487, worked in 1514 in Florence as journeyman, then as master printer in 1516 in Rome and Florence, in 1520 in Fontebuona, in 1535—1541 in Florence and Venice. Since he was a poor man, someone else who was interested in the Greek Church financed his edition of the catechism.

Yet even at a time when the language of the Church was also the common language of the people, much interpreting was required to convey the church's message to the minds of certain classes of society. In Greece as well as in the America of to-day the speech of the children at home and the man in the street differ from the dignified language of the preacher in the pulpit. It happened about the year 390 A. D., when St. John Chrysostom was preaching in the cathedral of Antioch, a woman stopped him saying that she does not understand his sermon. Thereupon the Saint continued his sermon preaching in the vulgar language. In the same way the children and uneducated people had to be instructed in a language which somewhat differed from the language used in the church's services. This interpretation became the more necessary, the more the vulgar Greek drifted away from the stereotyped language of the liturgy. Although the modern Greek language is in many ways different from the church language, a man who is well versed in Neo-Hellenic may, to a great extent, understand the ecclesiastical Greek used in the Church without any difficulty. This explains why the Greek-speaking people did not favor the introduction of the translation of the Bible into modern Greek; it was only in modern times that the Bible in Neo-Hellenic is used in the church services.

The interpretation became a necessity for a whole nation, when in the ninth century the Slavs were converted. The missionaries Cyrillus and Methodius translated parts of the Bible and the Greek liturgy into the Old Slavonic the common language of those people. In the course of time, however, this mode of speech became a dead language and the Slavs speak now various dialects: Russian, Bulgarian, Croatian, Servian, Slovak and Slovenian but retain the old Church language in Dalmatia, the Balkans, Russia and the Ruthenian Uniates of Hungary. The Rumanians who are no Slavs used the Church Slavonic language in church up to the seventeenth century.

Educated Slavs speaking their national language are able to understand to a certain extent their dead Church language, yet in regard to children and adults with mediocre education translation into the civil language is absolutely necessary.

The Church Slavonic language became also the literary language of Croatia until the 16th century, of Russia until 1700, and of Bulgaria, Servia and Rumania until the early part of the 19th century. The literature in Church Slavonic is with few exceptions ecclesiastical in character. Translation of the whole Bible into this language was only

finished in the 15th century. Translations from Greek form a considerable stock of this literature; some Greek works are only preserved in Church Slavonic translations. In general this literature presents the trends and traits of Byzantine and post-Byzantine literary production. Accordingly the example of the Mother Church was followed in regard to catechetical instruction: Christian doctrine was taught orally and without a catechism.<sup>7</sup>

**BIBLE STUDY.** — With the decline of the catechumenate in the fifth century the discipline of the secret relaxed and the Scriptures were made accessible to the children and adults in general. Thus the Bible became a *sort of textbook and catechism for private instruction* of young and old, and at the same time a book of prayer and meditation for all. The Scriptures which had been a source-book for catechists became now a manual for catechumens.

This development was in accordance to the educational system of ancient Greece. The sons of the citizens of Athens were placed into the school at the age of six. Yet no sooner had they learnt to read and write than the poets had to be studied by heart, first of all Homer, then Hesiod, Theognis, Phocylides. Xenophon relates that a boy could say by heart the whole Iliad and Odyssey. Mythology and ethics were taught incidentally by the explanation of the text. At the age of sixteen the boy was supposed to have mastered all those poets and thereby studied his religious beliefs and moral principles. The Jewish boy was treated to the same system of education. The Psalms and Book of Genesis were his first reader and catechism.

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<sup>7</sup> The history of the Church Slavonic literature is amply treated together with the history of the various national histories of literature in the following works: Schafarik (or Safaric), *Geschichte der slavischen Sprache und Literatur nach allen Mundarten*. Ofen 1826, 2nd edit. Prague 1869 and *Geschichte der suedslawischen Literatur*. 3 vols., Prague 1864—1865; Mickiewicz, *Les Slaves*. 5 vols., Paris 1849; Pypin-Spasovich, *Geschichte der slavischen Literatur*. 2 vols., Leipsic 1880—1884; Krek, *Einleitung in die slawische Literaturgeschichte*. 2nd edit. Graz 1887; Karasek, *Slawische Literaturgeschichte*. 2 vols., Leipsic 1906; Machal, *Slovanske literatury*, 2 vols., Praze 1922; Murko, *Geschichte der aelteren suedslawischen Litteraturen*, Leipsic 1908; Stanoyewich, *Early Jugoslav Literature*, New York 1922. — Lists of editions of Church Slavonic books printed from 1491 to 1652 in: Karataev, *Opisanie slavyano-russkikh knig*. St. Petersburg 1883 and printed from 1491 to 1730 in: Karataev, *Rospis slavyanskikh knig*. St. Petersburg 1861, printed from 1491 to 1864 in Undolskij in: *Ocerk slavyano-russkoj bibliografij*. Moscow 1871. — Rob. J. Kerner. *Slavic Europe: a selected bibliography in the western languages comprising history, language and literature*. Cambridge, Mass. 1918 (Harvard Bibliographies I.).

The Fathers of the Church recommended the reading of the Bible to the laity even during the time of the catechumenate. The author of the Apostolic Didaskalia (written between 250 and 300 A. D.) admonishes the Christians to read no other book than the Bible, because Scripture contains every kind of literature. "Stay at home", he writes, "and read in the Law and in the Book of the Kings and in the Prophets and in the Gospel (which is) the fulness of these things. Keep far away from all the books of the heathen." In general the Bible, at least parts of it, was widely spread in cities. The homilies of the Fathers presuppose an astonishingly great familiarity with the Bible; they are full of Biblical quotations and allusions and the preachers evidently expected that their audience understood them. St. John Chrysostom who preached from 386 till 407 told his hearers repeatedly in his homilies that they should read at home the particular portions of the Scriptures which he would explain in church; he does not allow an exception for the poor who excuse themselves with not possessing a copy, evidently presupposing that the poor could easily loan a copy. This is the more remarkable, since circulation of the Bible in those days encountered the greatest difficulties. Yet the transcripts of the Scriptures found their way even into the deserts. The hermits living there in seclusion evinced an astonishing familiarity with the Bible.

Thus the Scriptures were a regular text-book for the adults in the Greek homes. At the same time they also used as a text-book for teaching the children. The Apostolic Constitutions (written between 300 and 350) admonish the parents: "Teach your sons the Word of God, instruct them in Holy Writ: communicate to them EVERY book" (Book IV, chap. XI). St. John Chrysostom shortly after urges parents to do the same. "Teach your children", he writes, "from their very youth to read the Bible. Do not believe that only monks need instruction in the Bible. There is rather a greater need for boys who enter the world, just like a ship needs more a pilot on the high sea than anchored in the harbor" (In Epist ad Ephes. c. VI, homil. 21, n. 2).

We know that these injunctions were carried out. As in the pagan school the boy had to study by heart the text of the poets, so in the Christian home the boy was put to memorizing parts of the Bible. Origen (born 184—185 of Christian parents) was assigned by his father to learn by heart certain portions of the Scriptures every day and his father would examine him about this study. St. Athanasius (born in 295 A. D.) likewise had to memorize parts of the Bible as a boy. St. Macrina (died in 379 or 380) was tutored by her mother who kept



her away from reading the Greek pagan poets and charged her to study by heart certain parts of the Bible, foremost the Psalms and the books Salomon. When she grew up, she would carry always a copy of the Psalter with her.

In this way we find later many preachers noted for their readiness for extemporaneous speaking and usually the remark is added that it was because they knew the Scriptures by heart. And it was in the same way that the people became accustomed to use in speech Biblical phraseology and thereby exerted an influence on the formation of colloquial Greek as well as on literary works like romances. As the Greek boy through his study of the poets acquired a knowledge of mythology, ethics, history, so the Christian boy by memorizing the Bible became familiar with Christian doctrine and the principles of Christian morality: the Scripture study turned out to be the study of Christian doctrine. The Greek children made their Bible studies from the Greek Bible and the Slav children from the Church Slavonic translation.

**LITURGY.** — In general liturgy means the complex of public prayers and ceremonies of the Church as opposed to private devotions. It consists of prayers and ceremonies at Mass, administration of the sacraments and canonical Hours. For celebration of Mass the Greeks use two eucharistic liturgies; the divine Office has eight hours and the administration of the sacraments and sacramentals is exercised with recitation of special ritual prayers. The Greek or so-called Byzantine liturgy was formed in the fourth century. Before that time the liturgical prayers, sermons, hymns and collects were not written down nor read from a book, because nothing was permanently established. No other books were used except the Bible, from which lessons were read and psalms sung. St. Basil (d. 379) arranged the liturgy of the Mass of the Byzantine Rite which was reformed by St. John Chrysostom (d. 407). The Divine Office for the whole year has been arranged by St. Sabas (d. 532) and St. John Damascene (d. 749). The liturgy is used in Greek in Constantinople, Macedonia and Greece, in its translation into Church Slavonic in Russia, the Balkans, Bulgaria and Hungary, in translation into the Rumanian language by the church of that country and in Arabic in parts of Syria, Palestine and Egypt.

The Greek Church has no collections of liturgical prayers in convenient small books like our Missal, Breviary and Ritual; it uses rather a number of loosely arranged books which form in their totality a veritable

library. There are eighteen books in general use for the Mass only. The total number of liturgical books is raised to sixty-four by duplication and sub-division.<sup>8</sup>

Liturgy has always exerted a greater influence on the people of the East than those of the West. Father John La Farge, S. J. writes: "Liturgical life enters more intimately into the life of the Eastern than it does into the life of his equally religious-minded Western brother. Even where secular influences prevail as in a great metropolis, the liturgy plays a large part in helping the Orthodox to maintain their religion against the corrosive paganism around them. The richness of the Byzantine liturgy and its material requirements offer little temptation to go "outside" in search of devotional effects".<sup>9</sup> And hundred years ago Neale stresses the same fact stating that: "pious Russians of the middle classes (who can read) feel a repugnance to use any devotions but those of the Church".<sup>10</sup>

The hold of the liturgy on the Eastern people is strikingly illustrated by the fact that demand for printed copies of their service books was first found among the laity and not, like in the West, among the clergy.

About the year 1488 the German printer Schwaypolt Fiol, settled in Cracow, began to issue from his press four liturgical books in Church Slavonic and with cyrillic type in this order, first *Triod Postnaya* (services for Lent), *Triod Tsvitnaya* (services for Eastertide), *Oktoikh* (hymns in eight tones) and *Chasoslow* (breviary). These four editions were finished, when on November 1491, the printer was indicted by the episcopal court of Cracow, imprisoned and finally released on June 8, 1492, after he had declared that he renounces heresy of every kind. His crime consisted in the simple fact that by printing the service-books for the Schismatics he was considered as favoring heresy.

<sup>8</sup> On Byzantine liturgy and liturgical books see: *Cath. Encycl.* IV, pp. 312—320, IX, pp. 303, 310, XIII, pp. 69—70, 82—83; Fortescue, *Orthodox Eastern Church*, London 1937; Attwater, *Christian Churches of the East*. Milwaukee, 1948, vol. I, pp. 40—58. The most exhaustive description of liturgical books is in: Neale, *General introduction*, 1850, pp. 828—894. — English translations of the liturgy in Neale, *General Introduction*, pp. 894—1048; Littledale, *Liturgies of St. Mark, James, Clement, Chrysostom and Basil*, 2nd edit. London 1869; Hammond, *Liturgies Eastern and Western*, Oxford 1879, Swainson, *Greek Liturgies*, London 1884; Brightman, *Eastern Liturgies*, London 1896; de Meester. *Divine Liturgy of John Chrysostom, Greek and English*. London, 1926; Sembratovich, *Divine Liturgy of John Chrysostom translated from the Slavonic*. Detroit 1932; Thompson, *Orthodox Liturgy translated from Slavonic*, London 1939.

<sup>9</sup> In: *Eastern Branches of the Catholic Church: six studies on the Oriental Rites*. New York 1938, pp. 63—64.

<sup>10</sup> *General Introduction*, p. 1183.

Of course the inquisition confiscated all the books and types and destroyed them; only a few copies were saved. Fiol emigrated to Hungary, where he died in 1525; he never resumed printing there. These editions of liturgical books were intended for the White Russians, and must have been financed by one or more rich members of the Greek Orthodox Church.<sup>11</sup>

Orthodox printers resumed the work of the unfortunate Catholic Fiol and issued from their presses in quick succession, financially assisted by their rulers, editions of the Oktoikh, Psalter and Trebnyk in Cetinj in the years 1493 till 1495 for the Servians, the Gospels in 1512 for the Rumanians, the Sluzhebnik or Missal in Venice in 1519 for the use of the Yugoslavs. In 1589 the first edition of the liturgy was printed in Moscow for the use of the Great Russians.<sup>12</sup>

Thus the liturgy was made accessible to the reading public and together with the homilies in church and the translation of the Bible in the homes became the great educator of the catechists in church and homes.

PRAYER AND HYMNS. — In accordance to the usage of the catechumenate the children were taught to say the Nicene creed and the Our Father as daily prayers. Besides these there are to be memorized the "Ten Commandments, the Hail Mary, morning and evening prayers, prayers before and after meals, prayers before and after learning, the hymn to the Holy Ghost and the hymn in praise of the Blessed Virgin. Being in the Church Slavonic language these prayers present difficulties which the English prayers do not to English children".<sup>13</sup> And in 1850 Neale writes: "The Russian Church was teaching up to our days the children in Slavonic to read the prayers and the catechism but taught Bible History in Russian."<sup>14</sup> "The sacred songs", Staneye-

<sup>11</sup> Golowatzkij, Jakov Fiodorowitsch, *Sweipolt Fiol und seine kyrillische Buchdruckerei in Krakau vom Jahre 1491, eine bibliographisch-historische Untersuchung* in: *Sitzungsberichte der kais. Akademie*, vol. 83, Vienna 1876, pp. 425—448.

<sup>12</sup> Safarik, Paul Jos., *Geschichte der suedslawischen Literatur*, vol. III, Part 1, Prague 1865, pp. 123—125, 249—273; Jagic, V., *Der erste Cetinjer Kirchendruck vom Jahre 1494, eine bibliographisch-lexikalische Studie* in: *Druckschriften der kais. Akademie*, vol. 43. Vienna 1894, pp. 1—80 and reprinted in 1894. — The Catalogue of the printed books of the British Museum lists s. v. Liturgies 347 editions of books of the Greek Rites up to 1899 on coll. 9—47.

<sup>13</sup> Romanoff, H. C., *Sketches of the Rites and Customs of the Greco-Russian Church*. London 1869, pp. 116—117.

<sup>14</sup> Neale, *General Introduction*, p. 826.

wich remarks,<sup>15</sup> "ministered far more copiously to the purposes of devotion and edification than architecture, painting and sculpture. Employing word and tone, they spoke more directly to the mind than plastic arts and gave more adequate expression to the thought and emotion. Of the various species of sacred poetry of the Slavs the earliest and most important was the church hymn, a vast mass of texts and melody to be found in the Mineya, Oktoikh and other liturgical books of the Greek Church."

PICTORIAL INSTRUCTION. — Art, the Book of the UNLETTERED, proved the same powerful means of catechetical instruction as in the West. Excepting sculpture, both architecture and painting wrote the articles of Christian doctrine in symbolic language on the walls and in the windows of the churches. Quite early "the people had their furniture in the homes decorated with Biblical symbols; lamps showed Noe's Ark or Jonas' whale, Jesus with His disciples in a ship or Jesus treading upon the lion and adder, the serpent and dragon (according to Psalm 90). Rich people wore sumptuous garments embroidered with representations of Biblical scenes. The preachers complain that these people wear the miracles of Christ on their coats instead of taking them to their heart. Thus the Bible ruled the home and daily life."<sup>16</sup> The Greek Church developed the typological interpretation of the Bible like the West and produced a pictorial manual for teaching Bible history which corresponds to the famous *Biblia Pauperum* of the West.<sup>17</sup>

SCHOOLS. — Apart from theological schools other educational institutions did not teach Christian doctrine to any great extent. Up to the year 1723 the catechism was unknown and Christian doctrine was taught orally in connection with the liturgy and Bible history. The schools in the Byzantine empire like the schools in the West taught all kinds of secular wisdom but no Christian doctrine. Instruction in religion was relegated to the catechumenal schools in the same way as it was done in the West during the Middle Ages. Later during the five centuries of Turkish dominion all schools practically disappeared

<sup>15</sup> *Early Yugoslav Literature*, New York 1922, pp. 15—17. On hymnody in general see Tillyard, *Byzantine Music and Hymnography*, London 1930 and Attwater, D., *Christian Churches of the East I*, p. 46.

<sup>16</sup> Dobschuetz, *Influence of the Bible on civilisation*. New York 1914, p. 37.

<sup>17</sup> *Die Armenbibel des Serai (Biblia Pauperum)*, herausgegeben und erklärt von Adolf Deismann und Hans Wegener. Berlin u. Leipzig 1934. 8vo. pp. 48, with 41 plates.



and oral instruction without books became a necessity. Even as late as 1879 63 percent of the male and 91 percent of the female population of Greece could neither read nor write. The few children who learnt to read were given as primer the copies of Chasoslow. As in the West children learnt to write and read from copies of the Office of the Blessed Lady, so the children in the East used for the same purpose the copies of the Greek breviary.

Thus for more than thousand years catechetical instruction in the Greek Church was taught orally and without the aid of books.

*(To be continued)*

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## BOOK REVIEWS

QUINTI SEPTIMI FLORENTIS TERTULLIANI *Opera*: Pars I, Opera catholica adversus Marcionem (Corpus Christianorum, *Series Latina*, I, 1) Turnhout, 1953; XXVI + 75. pp.

In the December issue, 1953, of the *Franciscan Studies* (vol. 13, n. 4, p. 130—131) we introduced our readers to the *Corpus Christianorum*. Presently before us is the first fascicle of the first volume. Besides a general introduction to the works of Tertullian, it contains an edition of *Ad Martyras* by E. DEKKERS, O. S. B. and of *Ad Nationes libri duo* by J. G. Ph. BORLEFFS.

What surprises us in the scholarly bibliography of the Introduction, pp. X—XXV, is that the works of Tertullian are not always listed in the same order, and that these enumerations are still different from the order adopted in the *Clavis Patrum* and the order in which Tertullian's writings seemingly will be published.

As to the edition of the two works, we rather prefer the system of publishing adopted by Dekkers. It results in a clear, readable text, which will be easy to quote. The *Ad Nationes*, admittedly, poses very particular editing problems. But the vast majority of the scholars, for whom this edition is intended, will hardly be much interested in such matters as where in the manuscript a new line starts; which words or letters in the codex are readable with the unaided eye and which, only under ultraviolet light; and which letters are blurred by spots. The various typographical devices invented by Borleffs to indicate these items make for unpleasant reading. And to quote this edition will be quite a task. Ours is certainly the preference that the *Corpus* be published according to the conservative rules of Dekkers rather than in the hypercritical fashion of his colleague. Since Dom Dekkers is the General Manager of the *Corpus*, could he not arrange that the collaborators follow his very acceptable method?

No doubt it was decided to start the monumental edition of the Latin Fathers with a fascicle rather than with a complete volume, so that the Management could observe the reactions of reviewers and possibly derive benefit for the remaining works. Still it might be remarked here in behalf of librarians that surely they at least would appreciate the editing of complete volumes.

The *Corpus Christianorum* might well serve as a fitting marker for the enormous progress made in patristic studies during the first half of this century. May it be the sources of still greater achievements in the decades ahead.

ELIGIUS M. BUYTAERT, O. F. M.

*Franciscan Institute*

San Aurelio AGUSTIN, *La Inmortalidad del Alma* (Publicaciones del Instituto de Filosofía, Sección Textos, II), Ciudad Eva Perón: Instituto de Filosofía, 1953. Pp. 87.

This booklet first gives a short Introduction (pp. 9—11) stressing the Platonic character of the *De immortalitate animae* of Saint Augustine. Thereupon follows the Latin text with a Spanish translation. The Introduction is written by Msgr O. N. Derisi, the Latin text is a reproduction of the Maurist edition, and the Spanish is done by José Bezic.

The booklet is intended for use in Seminars. Hence, one may regret that the Introduction is so short, and that footnotes are entirely lacking.

ELIGIUS M. BUYTAERT, O. F. M.

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*Liber de sex principiis* Gilberto Porretae ascriptus, ad fidem manusciporum edidit Albanus HEYSSE O. F. M., recognovit Damianus VAN DEN EYNDE O. F. M., Editio secunda (Opuscula et Textus historiam Ecclesiae eiusque vitam atque doctrinam illustrantia — Series Scholastica, edita curantibus J. Koch et Fr. Pelster S. J., fasc. VII), Münster-Westfalen: Verlag Aschendorf, (1953); 36 pp.

Fr. A. Heyse, the driving power behind the edition of the *Summa Hallesiana* vol. I—III, and the original editor of the *De sex principiis*, died in 1952. The second and timely edition of the latter work is now presented by Fr. Damian Van den Eynde, a scholar well known to the readers of the *Franciscan Studies* and the *Franciscan Institute Publications*. Fr. Van den Eynde rewrote the Introduction, pp. 3—6, and checked the entire text of the small work, pp. 8—36.

The Introduction describes the life of Gilbert Porreta (this is the correct orthography according to the editor), discusses the authenticity of the work, its contents and nature, its influence and former editions; it enumerates the manuscripts on which this new edition is based and gives a bibliography on the life of Gilbert and the *De sex principiis*.

These few introductory pages give us an unusually large amount of information. Some reserves, however, are in order as to the statements bearing on the inauthenticity of the work. But first we believe, together with Heyse and Van den Eynde, and against G. Iacombe in *New Scholasticism* IV (1930) 60—61, that the work is most likely not written by Gilbert. Our argument would be the references to a Latin version of Aristotle, inexistent as yet during the lifetime of Gilbert. But Van den Eynde also invokes the non-existence of manuscripts of the *De sex principiis* dating from the Twelfth Century, and the absence of quotations from the work during the same Century; and in his discussion he mentions that the last chapter could be a later addition. In these three points we do not follow the editor.

1. As to the non-existence of manuscripts from before 1200, it can be argued contrariwise: we know with certainty that Burgundio translated the *De orthodoxa fide* of Damascene sometime between 1150 and 1158;

this work was still more popular and more important than the *De sex principiis*; however, from the manuscripts still in existence most likely only the *Vatic. lat.* 313 is from the Twelfth Century. Furthermore, the *Catalogo dei codici manoscritti esistenti nella biblioteca di Sant' Antonio di Padova* by L. M. Minciotti (Padua 1842) lists one manuscript of the Twelfth Century containing the *De sex principiis* (ms. 401, pp. 106—107 of the *Catalogo*). The catalogue may contain a mistake; but still that ought to be proven.

2. As to the absence of quotations during the same period, it should be remembered that the work is small and lacks originality (Van den Eynde 5); consequently, it might have taken some time before a writer found it worthy of quotation (and copying; see the preceding point).

3. As to chapter 8 being a later addition, it can be counterargued that all the manuscripts seem to have it. The main argument, moreover, of Heyse-Van den Eynde in favor of their hypothesis is none too strong. The final phrase of chapter 7, "Hec quidem de principiis dicta sufficient, . . .", has still a good meaning, even if chapter 8 belonged to the work from the beginning. The author surely realized that the body of his work was constituted of chapters 2—7, the six chapters dealing with the last six predicaments. As a fitting conclusion, therefore, he added another chapter not directly bearing on the topic, as he similarly proceeded in chapter 1 introducing the main subject of discussion. Construed in this way, the final phrase of chapter 7 concludes chapters 2—7 and not 1—7 or the entire work. Furthermore, parallel formulas are repeated so frequently in this little work (num. 2, 3, 4, 5, 11, 16, 30 of the edition) that they hardly seem to mean much. Finally, Saint Albert the Great and Walter Burleigh,<sup>1</sup> likewise, understood that the phrase concludes merely chapters 2—7. This is especially clear in Burleigh, who divides the work into three parts: I (chapter 1), II (chapter 2—7), and III (chapter 8); the second part corresponds to the title of the book. In other words, if the last chapter is not original, it might seem that the first chapter, also, did not belong to the original draft.

To illustrate more pointedly the popularity of the little work in the Middle Ages, the editor could have added (p. 5) the following facts. Gerard of Cremona, Peter of Auvergne and William Mylverley (or Robert Alington?) also wrote commentaries on the *De sex principiis* (cf. Gaudens MOHAN, *Incipits of Logical Writings*, in *Franciscan Studies* XII (1952) 400—401). Walter Burleigh seemingly wrote twice on the *De sex principiis* (cf. A. MAIER in *Archivum Franc. Hist.* XLVI (1953) 189—190). Finally, some 40—50 manuscripts of the little work are still in existence. Lacombe knows of a dozen Paris mss (*loc. cit.* 61), Heyse and Van den Eynde use three others, Mohan (*loc. cit.*) lists twenty three more codices; and in *Aristoteles Latinus* I of Lacombe are still others.

<sup>1</sup> From Burleigh we checked the edition of Venice 1509, as well as ms. 2 of the Franciscan Institute (a paper manuscript, 97 folios, 31,1 x 21,2 cm., written in the Fifteenth Century by several hands; Burleigh's commentary is the first item in the manuscript, covering fol. 11r—22r). Both the edition and our manuscript give the longer text of the commentary. Our Manuscript has the correct *incipit*: "Forma est compositioni . . . *Quamvis* Aristoteles in libro Praedicamentorum"; the edition, together with some mss., reads "Postquam" instead of "*Quamvis*".



In this context, it might be noted that the edition of Van den Eynde is based only on three manuscripts. *Ms. lat. 16. 597* of the National Library of Paris is not used throughout, but the editor adopted all the variants from this codex which were proposed by Lacombe, *loc. cit.* 61, with the exception of p. 11 line 3 Sortis/Socratis, where the error was on the side of Lacombe and his manuscript and not due to Heyse or his sources. Certainly, the use of this limited number of manuscripts might be perfectly in order; but the reader would like to know the basis of the choice, especially since there are many more manuscripts of the Thirteenth Century: *Arras 362, Assisi 658 and 664, Avranches 228, Brussels Royal 2905, Charleville 39 and 250, Erfurt Amplon. Fol. 39, Qu. 20 and Qu. 340, Laon 433, St. Omer 620, Toulouse 735, Vat. Borgh. 18, 56, 58 and 131, Venice S. Mark Cl. X cod. 15*, etc. (we did not check the catalogues of the Paris mss.).

The text-edition itself, which, of course, is the main part of the booklet, is very reliable. It is to be recommended for reading in seminars, for which it is mainly published; and it is a "must" for critical editions which are to make reference to the *De sex principiis*, since the Van den Eynde edition surpasses all preceding ones, above all, the unreliable Renaissance version of Hermolaus Barbarus reproduced by Migne.

ELIGIUS M. BUYTAERT, O. F. M.

Franciscan Institute

*La Mariologia di S. Antonio di Padova.* Pontificia Facultas Theologica Fratrum Minorum Conventualium in Urbe, Dissertationes ad Lauream, n. 23. By Beniamino Costa, O. F. M. Conv., Padua: Il Messagero di S. Antonio, 1950. Pp. 181.

Father Costa is not strictly speaking a pioneer in the field of Antonian mariology, since the subject has already been treated by such authors as Romeri, Roschini, and Di Fonzo; but he is the first to study the topic exhaustively in all its aspects.

As a basis of his research the author accepts only source material which has been definitely proven authentic; namely, the *Sermones dominicales*, *Sermones in laudem Beatissimae Mariae Virginis*, and *Sermones Solemnitatum*, as presented in the edition of A. Locatelli, Padua, 1895. As aids he makes use of a comprehensive specialized and general bibliography.

In his introduction Father Costa gives helpful information on the method and theological value of St. Anthony's sermons. He points out that the saint's purpose in writing his *Sermones* was to prepare a doctrinal directory for preachers. To this end St. Anthony made extensive use not only of Scripture and the Fathers, but also of the commentaries of Peter Lombard and the theological writings of St. Bernard.

To offer a logical synthesis of the mariological doctrine contained in St. Anthony's sermons is not easy, since the Evangelical Doctor presents it in fragmentary rather than in organic form. Father Costa had naturally to group the points of doctrine found in the sources around modern divisional

headings. The author's first plan was to divide the book into three parts: 1. Mary's mission; 2. her privileges; 3. her cult and devotion. As, however, the material for the third part was too scanty to give the book a balanced appearance, he decided simply to divide his treatise into eight chapters which treat of Mary's divine maternity, her mediation, her predestination, her sanctity, her virginity, her assumption, and her cult and devotion.

The danger in interpreting the thought of an author, and especially of a christian orator, lies in reading into the text theological concepts which the author did not really intend to express. Father Costa has been very carefully on his guard against this tendency. He manifests moderation especially when dealing with such questions as Mary's predestination, her Immaculate Conception, and her Co-Redemption. I think his argumentation to show that St. Anthony did *not* explicitly teach the doctrine of Christ's absolute primacy and of Mary's association with Him in His predestination is convincing. As much may be said regarding Our Lady's Immaculate Conception. All that can be derived from St. Anthony's teaching is Mary's immunity from actual and habitual concupiscence; sufficient data are not on hand to prove that the saint taught her immunity from original sin.

As for Mary's Co-Redemption, Costa does not dare ascribe to the Evangelical Doctor more than an implicit admission of her concurrence with Christ in the objective redemption. St. Anthony does state that Mary compassionated her divine Son on Calvary, but he does not explicitly attribute a co-redemptive value to this compassion.

Interesting to note is that St. Anthony clearly expressed the idea of Mary's Bridal Motherhood in much the same sense as Scheeben did centuries later. Another point of interest is St. Anthony's distinction between Mary's consecration through her divine Motherhood and her consecration through sanctifying grace. Mary's soul was sanctified by her dignity of divine Motherhood independently of the presence of sanctifying grace within her. In this respect St. Anthony seems to have been a precursor to Franciscan authors like Carolos del Moral (18th century).

Father Costa deserves commendation for the effort he has put forth in presenting us with a clear, concise, and sober synthesis of St. Anthony's mariology.

WENCESLAUS SEBASTIAN, O. F. M.

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*Roger Bacon: The Problem of the Soul in his Philosophical Commentaries.*  
By Theodore Crowley, O. F. M. Preface by F. Van Steenberghen,  
Louvain: E. Nauwelaerts; Dublin: Duffy. 1950. Pp. 223. \$ 3.00.

In this dissertation submitted for the degree of *Maître Agrégé* at Louvain the author undertakes not only a philosophical but also a bio-bibliographical investigation of the Doctor Mirabilis. The first chapter traces Bacon's life and works (pp. 17—78); the succeeding sections, his doctrines on the soul as contained in the *Quaestiones* (ed. Steele-Delorme) or quasi-commentaries

which Bacon gave on various Aristotelian and pseudo-Aristotelian works during his Parisian sojourn c. 1241—1245. Thus in succession: the thought of Bacon on hylomorphism (81—115); his general conception of the soul, its definition, origin, unity, immortality (119—159); and his teaching on the rational soul, with the problems of the passive and active intellects, the “two faces” of the soul, etc. (163—191). The conclusion (195—207) adequately sums up the findings of the author, and is followed by a good bibliography and index of proper names. The Roger Bacon who emerges from this study is deeply attached to Aristotle, influenced by Avicenna and Gundissalinus, well read in Averroes, Avicenna, Boethius. Though almost entirely without contact with so-called Augustinianism, and elaborated before Bacon became a Friar Minor, his doctrine is considered very close to that of the Franciscan School proper, especially of Saint Bonaventure.

The birth of Roger Bacon is set as about 1220, instead of the year 1214 hitherto accepted (p. 18); the reasoning seems quite plausible. After previous schooling, according to our author, Bacon entered the University of Oxford about 1234, attending perhaps the lectures of Saint Edmund Rich but scarcely those of Robert Grosseteste (20—22). His arts-course was completed at Paris, with 1238 or 1239 suggested as the date of his arrival. This supposed sojourn at Oxford is well criticized by Fr. Victorin Doucet (*Archivum fran. hist.* 44, 1951, 222—223), who prefers to hold that Bacon went directly to Paris about 1234, to take the full Parisian course in Arts and receive the magisterium c. 1240—1241. Perhaps also he began the study of theology. At Paris, Bacon knew or at least saw William of Auvergne (d. 1249), Saint Albert, and Alexander of Hales (d. 1245). His lectures, which form the *Quaestiones* of the *Opera Hactenus Inedita*, would thus be dated 1240—1241 and 1245—1246 (p. 195; see also p. 73, though little or no explanation is given for the hiatus 1241—1245). This implies that Bacon was one of the first to lecture on Aristotle at Paris (p. 76 ff.). In 1247, Father Theodore conjectures, Roger returned to Oxford and continued the study of theology; and then in 1257 (returned to Paris?) entered the Franciscan Order. Yet in 1251 Bacon was in Paris (p. 25); hence there seems little ground for conjecturing that Bacon had returned to England (cf. V. Doucet, *loc. cit.*).

Little is said of Saint Bonaventure's early relations with Bacon or his influence on the latter's vocation. In passing, the author suggests that Bonaventure may have studied under Bacon: “St. Bonaventure's teaching resembles so closely that found in Bacon's earlier writings that one is inclined to ask whether he had followed the lectures of the young master of arts. It is not impossible; St. Bonaventure graduated in the faculty of arts before commencing his theological studies in 1243 and Bacon was teaching at that time” (p. 99, n. 69). While we grant a similarity of doctrine (a point deserving of further study), chronologically the young John Fidenza must have been a fellow-student of Bacon under some common master rather than a pupil, since he himself came to Paris in 1235 or 1236. They would have been introduced to Aristotle together; and we know Saint Bonaventure's reaction: “*Audivi, cum fui scholaris, de Aristotele, quod posuit mundum aeternum; et cum audivi rationes et argumenta quae fiebant ad hoc, incepit concuti cor meum et incepit cogitare: quomodo potest*

hoc esse" (*De Decem Praeceptis*, II, 28; t. V, 515). The author moreover says nothing of the part Saint Bonaventure most probably had in the vocation of Roger Bacon: the *Epistle to an Unnamed Master* (*De tribus Quaestionibus*, t. VIII, 331—336; new ed., F. Delorme, in *Archivio Italiano per la Storia della Pietà*, I, 1951, p. 209—218) is almost certainly addressed to Bacon, who is saluted as *amice carissime*. The comparison which Saint Bonaventure makes herein between Saint Augustine and the philosophers may well have been intended to remind Bacon that though he had studied Aristotle and the philosophers he had yet to taste the *sermo scientiae et sapientiae* found in Augustine.

Bacon's life as a Friar, from 1257 until his death after 1292, is indeed obscure. But it seems extreme to say that from the time he entered "he lived in an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion" (p. 193). If Bacon is the *amicus carissimus* of the foregoing epistle (dated by Fr. Delorme as of 1254), whom the Dominicans were trying to entice away from the Minorites, it seems hardly human that the new Minister General of 1257 would subject his friend to distrust and suspicion. That the chronology, events, writings, etc., of Bacon's later life bristle with difficulty, one must admit; and I should prefer to leave to others judgment on Father Theodore's findings and conclusions. His analysis is to be preferred, however, to the more recent *Roger Bacon and his Search for a Universal Science* (by S. C. Easton, Oxford, 1952).

The body of the dissertation is, of course, occupied with the problem of the soul as found in the Paris commentaries of Bacon. These chapters are rich in doctrinal and historical research, since the author endeavors not only to discover Roger's doctrine but also to compare it with that of his contemporaries. It is a very serious and well-documented study, though it unfortunately does not avail itself completely of the recent findings on the early Franciscan School, Alexander, John de la Rochelle, and the *Summa sic dicta fratris Alexandri*. It can be sometimes supplemented by the use of Fr. Robert Zavalloni's *Richard de Mediavilla et la controverse sur la pluralité des formes* (*Philosophes médiévaux*: II, Louvain, 1951), and the current edition of the *Glossa* of Alexander of Hales.

The *Glossa* reveals, for example, that in the question of universal hylo-morphism (c. 2) Alexander must be credited with the re-introduction of the distinction of *quod est* and *quo est* and was, before Philip the Chancellor, a resolute opponent of spiritual matter (p. 81). Throughout the excellent exposé of Bacon's doctrine on matter one becomes increasingly aware of the kinship of thought between the *Quaestiones* of Bacon and the philosophical positions of the *Sentences* of Saint Bonaventure. But I would disagree with several interpretations of the latter which the author offers in the third chapter, "General Conception of the Soul". His conclusions sometimes exceed the texts on which they are based (e. g., p. 130, n. 39; p. 133, n. 41); but for the most part this chapter and the last, on "The Rational Soul" throw exceptional light on thirteenth-century disputes.

Father Theodore has most interestingly and provocatively presented to us the Roger Bacon of the *Quaestiones*, i. e., of the first half of the thirteenth



century, before he was influenced by Robert Grosseteste and Adam Marsh, before he became a Friar Minor: a Bacon who is primarily of Paris not of Oxford, primarily a philosopher and not a theologian, primarily an Aristotelian not an "Augustinian". No student of Scholasticism can afford to neglect this book.

IGNATIUS BRADY, O. F. M.

*Franciscan Institute*

*S. Bonaventurae Philosophia Christiana.* By Leon Veuthey, O. F. M. Conv., Rome: Catholic Book Agency, 1943. Pp. XXIV+315.

The review of this work has been inexcusably delayed, to the detriment of the author and undoubtedly of some of our readers (the reviewer intended to give it a large place in a survey of recent literature on Saint Bonaventure, a survey which did not materialize). The book is a compact study by a competent scholar of the philosophical position and tenets of the Seraphic Doctor, and as such a work of interest to adherents of the Franciscan School and to historians of philosophy.

One may object, perhaps, to the presentation of Saint Bonaventure's doctrines after the pattern of modern philosophy or in the framework of a text-book order, since it is such a radical departure from the spirit and approach of the Saint himself. After an introduction on Christian philosophy and a first chapter on the status of philosophy in the thought of the Seraphic Doctor, the book considers the Theory of knowledge (c. 2), the Value of knowledge, Bonaventurian metaphysics, the Constitution of created being, the Rational creature, Moral life, and lastly the End of the rational creature. A conclusion re-emphasizes the author's thesis on the Christian philosophy of Bonaventure; this is followed by an analytical index. A good bibliography is likewise included. Though this is rather a non-Bonaventurian framework, the exposé and interpretation are both faithful and penetrating.

At the same time, a study of the historical background of many questions, especially as found in the more immediate predecessors or the contemporaries of Saint Bonaventure, would furnish greater clarification for certain facets of his thought. The historical approach, which is becoming increasingly more necessary to understand the Scholastics and especially Saint Thomas, has not been sufficiently used to understand Saint Bonaventure. Thus, were one to study the question of the relation of soul and powers (pp. 185—188) in terms of the history of that dispute, a deeper insight would be gained into the rather obscure doctrine given in the *Sentences*.

The most important contribution of this work, as the author himself intends, is the study it provides of Saint Bonaventure's concept of philosophy and its relation to human knowledge as a whole and to theology in particular. How precisely must one "label" (if one must) the philosophy of Saint Bonaventure has often been disputed in recent years, together with the question of the very legitimacy of "philosophy" as a name for his doctrine. Father Veuthey's analysis (c. 1—2) seems one of the clearest exposés of this delicate problem: Saint Bonaventure's is a Christian philo-

sophy, i. e., neither a purely natural philosophy nor a doctrine reduced to Christian theology, but an approach which, while distinguishing both in their principles and methods, unites both to arrive at a whole solution of the problems of human life and all reality: *philosophia est de facto et de iure christiana in quantum, agnoscens (suam) propriam insufficientiam, complementum harmonicum accipit et debet accipere a Revelatione, quin tamen confundatur cum theologia neque amittat valorem proprium rationalis certitudinis* (p. 16). That such is the position of the Seraphic Doctor is borne out by this study of his philosophy.

IGNATIUS BRADY, O. F. M.

*Franciscan Institute*

*Philosophisches Wörterbuch.* By Walter Brugger, S. J. 3rd edition. Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1950. Pp. XLIV+544.

The demand for a third edition within a period of a few years attests the popularity of Father Brugger's *Philosophisches Wörterbuch*. As pocket-edition dictionaries go, the present reference manual provides the philosophy student with a handy and, in general, a fairly accurate introductory notion of technical philosophical terms. Perhaps the greatest weakness of the book is the cursory survey of the history of philosophy which contains so many inaccuracies or misleading notions as to make it valueless as an independent source of information. The crediting of the *Summa universae theologiae* to Alexander of Hales without qualification, the relation of Olivi and the Council of Vienne, the dates of John Duns Scotus, are but a few items noted by the reviewer. The author himself recognizes the shortcomings of his work, pointing out that he has kept the changes in the new edition at a minimum to avoid the cost of an entirely new printing. Alteration, for the most part therefore, are of a minor nature. Exceptions are the articles: "Mechanismus", "Recht" and "Unterscheidung" which have been rewritten. The additions incorporated in the second addition are still found in the new revision in the form of an appendix. The latter, however, has been expanded somewhat by the inclusion of bibliographical material (up to 1948), the addition of an entry "Physisch", and the expansion of articles "Existenzphilosophie" (which includes an account of French existentialism), "Ganzheit" (which summarizes Smuts' theory of "holism") and "Nichts" (which contains something of the existentialists' notion of nihilism). Unfortunately, the analytical index remains unchanged and contains no references to the new material.

ALLAN B. WOLTER, O. F. M.

*Franciscan Institute*

*Lexicon Capuccinum.* Promptuarium historico-bibliographicum Ordinis Fratrum Minorum Capuccinorum (1525—1950), Romae: Bibliotheca Collegii Intern. S. Laurentii Brundusini, 1951. Pp. XLVII and 1868 col.

This anonymously published encyclopedia on the Capuchin Order is the work of some 77 scholars from various, mostly European, Capuchin Provinces. It deals not only with the Provinces, Saints, scholars, Missions, periodicals, etc. of the Order, but also with Popes, General Councils, the Eucharistic doctrine and devotion, the Immaculate Conception, etc., in so far as these have particular relation with the Capuchin Order. Indeed, a monumental work on the past achievements of the Capuchins, as well as the notable activities of the Order today. Statistics on the membership of the various Provinces and their Missions, etc., complete the picture.

The compilation of material for articles on particular topics, which constitute the major portion of the *Lexicon*, is the work of local scholars who had access to local archives and to the literature in the various native tongues. In this way the reliability of the information is guaranteed. The articles, all written in Latin, are short but followed by relatively long bibliographies.

Cross-references are numerous. This was necessary, since the ordinary members of the Order — exceptions are made, as in the case of bishops — are listed under their first name followed by their patronym, and not under their family-name, and since the places where the Capuchins, their Second and Third Order have houses are described under names as written in the native tongue. (Under 'Amadeus a Zedelgem', for example, we find the biography and bibliography of this Capuchin, and not under his surname 'Teetaert'. Antwerp and the Capuchins is found under 'Antwerpen', not under Antuerpia, Anvers or Antwerp; etc.). Among personalities still living, only the Fr. General, Capuchin bishops and some such persons are listed.

Everybody interested in things Franciscan will be glad to have this *Lexicon* on hand. Indirectly it suggests that a parallel book on the Friars Minor, for instance, would render many a service, though a satisfactory redaction of such a book would be a still more difficult task. For there is the fact of a longer and more complicated history.

The attainment of an absolute perfection in a work such as the *Promptuarium* perhaps cannot be expected. A definite short-coming, however, seems to result from one of the principles of the edition. Apparently, the editors purposed to give abundant bibliographies on the various items, so that even in very small libraries some information on a particular topic would be available. The principle itself seems to me quite unfeasible. Because of the bibliography stress, it appears that some articles have been shortened. But many items in the bibliographies are of very local circulation and importance, and in a number of instances, without any scientific value. In other words, the average reader would derive more profit from longer articles with shorter bibliographies, especially since some of the already limited space is wasted in laudatory phrases.

In a few cases, more distinctions would have been appreciated. In the article on libraries, for instance, the editors could have mentioned the scientific libraries of the Order, the libraries containing manuscripts, archivalia, etc. In the article on the periodicals of the Order a distinction could have been made between scientific and other publications. It gives the

wrong impression to find the name of a highly scientific periodical side by side with parish bulletins.

As to typography, it would have been better if persons acquainted with the different languages had read the proofs. The language of smaller ethnic groups — orthography and word-division — is quite mishandled.

Such a monumental work, celebrating the many achievements of the great Capuchin Order and recording its notable, current activities certainly merits a more canonical, if not moderately elegant, Latinity.

ELIGIUS M. BUYTAERT, O. F. M.

*Franciscan Institute*

*The Existentialist Revolt: The Main Themes and Phases of Existentialism.*

By Kurt F. Reinhardt, Milwaukee: The Bruce Publ. Co., 1952.

Pp. X + 254. \$ 3.50.

Existentialism is the fashion and the confusion of our times. Prophetically, in 1942, when Kierkegaard's books began to appear in English (and J. P. Sartre's name was being mentioned in popular journals), Professor Allers remarked: "There can be little doubt that Kierkegaard begins to exercise a great influence also in the English-speaking world (after influence in Denmark and, later, in Germany). We shall have before long a great literature on the ideas of this man who conceived himself as a 'corrective', as a power sent to stir up complacency, to awake slumber, and to revive things too vital for mankind that they be allowed to sink into oblivion" (*New Schol.* 16, p. 309).

Perhaps in some quarters Existentialism has been more of a fad that has since run its course: in the latest (eleventh) International Congress of Philosophy references to it were few. This would suggest that it has lost some of its importance, though on the other hand it was the subject of discussion through a whole day at the recent Fourth Centenary of the Gregorianum. Fad or fashion, it has had to be taken seriously, for it has all the signs of a revolt arising from the confluence of many sources. For this reason one welcomes such a survey as this book, by an author who is deeply read in the works of the leading existentialists, who studied under some of them, and for whom the writing of this work was "a matter of compelling personal urgency" (p. v). For him, existentialism in its varying forms can help the *philosophia perennis* rediscover forgotten or neglected truths. *Fas est et ab hoste doceri.*

After a brief survey of Hegelianism and the current crisis of humanity which "issues from the confused mind, the sick heart and the perverted will of modern man" (p. 8), and a general indication (c. 1) of the problem of human existence which existentialists of all ages as well as of our own attempt to answer, the book takes up the leading exponents of the new approach: Kierkegaard (c. 2), Nietzsche, Husserl and Heidegger (c. 4), Sartre, Jaspers, Marcel, to close with an over-all picture of the general themes of existentialism. The work includes a bibliography limited to books only: the works of existentialists



or studies on them; and an index. Each chapter contains sufficient biographical material to afford an insight into the character and background of its subject, while the philosophical analysis is made directly from the works of each author. As a result the book is appealing in its balance between the man and his thought, for solidity without heaviness, and for general intelligibility. It can be handled fairly well by the average student of philosophy, and could easily be used as the basis of discussion-classes or seminar work. Criticisms offered in the light of Scholasticism or particularly of Saint Thomas are rather intermittent and perhaps do not always serve their purpose. The work, however, should receive a deserved welcome in the classroom and the library.

IGNATIUS BRADY, O. F. M.

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
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Cum permissu superiorum.



## LITERARY NOTE

### ON THE EARLIEST SCHOLASTIC COMMENTARII IN PSALMOS

While preparing a study on the works of Peter Lombard, I happened to meet in his Gloss on the Psalter the now famous expression *regio dissimilitudinis*. It is to be found at the very beginning of the interpretation of psalm I, 1: *Beatus vir qui non abiit*. Knowing how closely twelfth century writings of this kind depend on one another, I made an inquiry into all the available commentaries on the psalms of the time. As was to be expected, several of them use the same expression at the same place. Because a number of them go under false names and have not been checked thoroughly, I shall list them here alphabetically according to the names of the authors to whom they are usually ascribed:

Anselm of Laon, *Glossa (interlinearis) in psalmos*.<sup>1</sup>

Beatus vir qui non abiit "in *regionem dissimilitudinis*" cogitatione quamvis impii hoc molirentur: quod et laudabilius.

Bruno bishop of Würzburg, *Expositio psalmorum*.<sup>2</sup>

Beatus igitur qui non abiit cogitatione a Deo in *regionem* longinquam *dissimilitudinis*, id est cogitatione non peccavit, quamvis esset positus in concilio impiorum, id est quamvis impii hoc molirentur . . .

Gilbertus Universalis, *Glossula in psalterium*.<sup>3</sup>

Et unde apparet quod sit vir? Ex eo scilicet quia non abiit, id est, non se seiunxit a Deo, eundo in *regionem dissimilitudinis*, sicuti primus Adam qui, similis Deo secundum innocentiam, recessit ab eo in quo sibi bene erat, qui erat requies et patria sua.

Peter Lombard, *Commentarius in psalmos*.<sup>4</sup>

Beatus . . . vir . . . qui non abiit a Deo in *regionem dissimilitudinis*, id est cogitatione non peccavit, quamvis esset positus in consilio impiorum, id est, quamvis impii hoc molirentur: quod est laudabilius.

<sup>1</sup> The printed text of the *Glossa ordin. in psalmos* (in *Biblia sacra*, ed. Venice 1588, III, 87) has: *in regionum dissimilitudine*. This is evidently incorrect. All manuscripts of the *Glossa* that I consulted (*Vat. lat.* 85 f. 1r, 86 f. 5r, 87 f. 9r, 88 f. 3r) have: *in regionem dissimilitudinis*.

<sup>2</sup> PL 142, 49 B.

<sup>3</sup> Ms *Laon* 17, f. 2a.

<sup>4</sup> PL 191, 61 B.

Pseudo-Bede, *In psalmorum librum Exegesis*.<sup>5</sup>

Praecessit olim in humano genere quidam miser et infelix, nulli imitandus, tradux scilicet peccati Adam, qui abiit in *regionem dissimilitudinis* a suo creatore, in peccatis pluribus delectando.

The occurrence of the same expression — *abire a Deo in regionem dissimilitudinis* — at exactly the same place, in five different commentaries on the psalms, is not a fortuitous coincidence. It can only be explained by a direct or indirect dependence upon one of them or upon a source common to them all. This is the more evident since the parallel places of two other Glosses of the time, those of Gilbert de la Porrée and the Pseudo-Haymo of Halberstadt, are so akin to the ones quoted that they also must have known the same interpretation of psalm I, 1. Indeed Gilbert de la Porrée writes:<sup>6</sup>

Vir est beatus. Quis? Qui non abiit, id est non recessit a Deo in *regionem deserti*, in quo ovis perdita erravit; non abiit, inquam, cogitatione, id est non peccavit voluntate per se, quod est laudabile; non, inquam, quamvis positus in consilio et multorum impiorum, id est, quamvis hoc multi suggererent: quod est laudabilius.

The Pseudo-Haymo likewise comes very near to the expression *regio dissimilitudinis* where he says:<sup>7</sup>

Ita Adam in beatitudine positus, abiit non localiter ab eo qui ubique prae-sens est . . . sed recessit a Deo *per dissimilitudinem*, ad quem acceditur per similitudinem.

All these examples, then, raise a rather intricate problem concerning the literary connexions and the chronological succession of the works in which they occur. To solve that problem is the purpose of this article.

It will be noted that among the seven commentaries mentioned so far, only one or possibly two are supposed to belong to the eleventh century, namely that of Bruno, bishop of Würzburg from 1034 till 1045, and that of the Pseudo-Bede, at least if the presumed identification of that author with Manegold of Lautenbach († c. 1103) is correct.<sup>8</sup> In fact, as will be seen, they too are strictly contemporary with the other five. In not a single commentary of the eleventh century was I able to detect the expression *regio dissimilitudinis*, neither apropos of psalm I, 1 nor elsewhere. For the years 1100—1150, on the contrary, only two of the hitherto known commentators, viz. the Pseudo-Rufin or Letbert of Lille and Master Yvo of Chartres do not employ it.

<sup>5</sup> PL 93, 484 D.

<sup>6</sup> Ms *Vat. Reg. lat.* 2094, f. 2a; *Vat. lat.* 89, f. 1c.

<sup>7</sup> PL 16, 197 B.

<sup>8</sup> See below p. 139—147.

Hence the field of our investigations will be restricted to the first half of the twelfth century and, within these limits, to those commentaries which have not yet been sufficiently examined.

Indeed, for four of them, namely the *Glossa minor* or *interlinearis et marginalis* of Anselm of Laon, the *Glossatura media* of Gilbert de la Porrée and the *Glossatura maior* of Peter Lombard, the problems of authenticity and chronology are already sufficiently settled.

A. Wilmart<sup>9</sup> restored the commentary long ascribed to Rufin of Aquileia to its genuine author, Letbert of Lille, formerly canon of his native city, then from 1100 till 1110 abbot of Saint-Ruf in Dauphiné. Here Letbert wrote his *Commentarius in psalmos*. In 1125, fifteen years after his death, his work found an editor in the person of Walter, bishop of Maguelonne, who had it copied in two beautiful volumes which he presented to the chapter of Lille. From there it then spread through France, Normandy and England. During the first decades after its publication it exerted an extraordinary influence.

With solid proofs, Miss B. Smalley<sup>10</sup> has vindicated Anselm of Laon's authorship of the *Glossa interlinearis et marginalis in psalmos*, which later on became part of the *Glossa ordinaria*. The date of its composition lies most probably only a few years before Anselm's death in 1117.

As for the commentaries of Gilbert de la Porrée and Peter Lombard, the so called *Glossatura media* and *Glossatura maior*, it is well known that the first is one of the main sources of the second and that their respective dates are roughly 1125—1130 and 1134—1138.<sup>11</sup>

All in all, there remain five commentaries on the psalms which up till now have been either completely neglected or too hastily investigated. Of those, the commentaries ascribed to Bruno of Würzburg, Haymo of Halberstadt and the Venerable Bede have been published, the last however only in part; the *Glossula Gilberti Universalis* and the commentary of Master Yvo of Chartres Jr. on the contrary, are still unedited.

<sup>9</sup> *Le Commentaire sur les Psaumes imprimé sous le nom de Rufin*, in *Rev. bédéd.*, 31 (1914—1919) 258—276.

<sup>10</sup> *Gilbertus Universalis*, Bishop of London (1128—1134), and the Problem of the "*Glossa ordinaria*", in *Rech. théol. anc. médiév.*, 7 (1935) 235—262 and 8 (1936) 24—60 (especially 24—50).

<sup>11</sup> On the first, see P. Vernet, art. *Gilbert de la Porrée*, in *Dict. théol. cathol.*, VI, 1352; on the second, see J. de Ghellinck, art. *Pierre Lombard*, in *Dict. théol. cathol.*, XII, 1953. Cf. also D. Van den Eynde, *Essai chronologique sur l'oeuvre littéraire de Pierre Lombard*, soon to appear in the *Miscellanea Petri Lombardi* (Novara).

## 1. The Glossula Gilberti Universalis.

Ms *Laon 17* contains the only known copy of an incomplete running commentary on the psalms, with the inscription *Glossula magistri G universalis super psalterium*. It was described by Miss Smalley, who also gave valuable information about the contents and the sources of the work itself.<sup>12</sup>

From a comparison with contemporary commentaries, it appears that this *Glossula* is related not only to the *Glossa marginalis* of Anselm of Laon, as Miss Smalley has already established, but also to the *Glossatura media* of Gilbert de la Porrée and the *Commentarius in psalmos* of Letbert of Lille.

On the whole, direct contacts between the *Glossula* and Anselm's Gloss are scarce. Though she read the whole work with a special study of selected passages, Miss Smalley<sup>13</sup> found only one single quotation from the marginal Gloss, namely on psalm IV, 4:

## Anselm

Aug.: Nota "et" in initiis poni ut dicta cum visione quae in corde est coniungat. Ita hic ut: "Nolite diligere vanitatem. Et scitote."

Sed diapsalma interpositum sic iungi vetat.

*Glossula, Laon 17, f. 7c*

Nota "et" initiis poni cum dicta cum visione quae est in corde coniungat. Ita hic vel sic: "Nolite diligere vanitatem. Et scitote."

Sed diapsalma coniungi sic vetat.

To this I can add another parallel taken from the introduction to psalm I. Its resemblance to the printed text of Anselm's Gloss is particularly striking:

## Anselm

*Vat. Lat. 86, f. 3b*

Propheta considerans perditionem humani generis evenisse per Adam et praevidens reparationem per Christum . . . in laudem erumpit: „Beatus vir”.

## Anselm

Ed. Venice 1588, 86d

Propheta considerans destructionem generis humani quae contingit per Adam et ex opposito praevidens propheticospiritu reparationem per Christum futuram . . . prorumpit in laudem illius, dicens: „Beatus vir.”

*Glossula*

*Laon 17, f. 2a*

Propheta considerans deiectionem humani generis per inoboedientiam Adae et ex opposito considerans propheticospiritu reparationem eius futuram per secundum Adam prorupit in laudem eius, ita dicens: "Erat quidam vir."

<sup>12</sup> Cf. B. Smalley, *Gilbertus Universalis*, etc., in *Rech. théol. anc. médiév.*, 8 (1936) 51—60.

<sup>13</sup> *O. c.* 52—53.



More conspicuous is the affinity which exists between our *Glossula* and the commentary of Gilbert de la Porrée. In the explanation of psalm I alone, one comes upon the following parallels:

Gilbert de la Porrée

*Vat. 89, f. 1c; Reg. 2094.f. 2a*

Item, thronus regum, tribunal iudicum cathedra doctorum.<sup>14</sup>

V. f. 1d, R. f. 2ab

Et ne voluntas putaretur esse otiosa, subdit "et meditabitur", non ad horam, quia voluntas taedium laboris excludit, sed "die ac nocte", id est assidue vel in prosperis et adversis... Meditabitur, dico, in quo? Repetit "in lege". Lex est in declinandis peccatis sancta praeceptio. Lex dicta quod liget.<sup>15</sup>

V. f. 1d, R f. 2b

Vide qualiter haec supradictis respondeant: ibi "non abiit", hic "voluntas in lege"; ibi "non" in via peccatorum", hic "in lege Domini"; ibi "non sedit in cathedra pestilentiae", hic "est in assidua meditatione legis".

Dabit fructum... tempore suo, id est competenti, confirmatis scil. discipulis post resurrectionem et ascensionem, misso Spiritu.

Ante namque non: "Nondum erat Spiritus datus, quia Christus nondum erat glorificatus."

Closest of all, though, is the resemblance between the *Glossula* and the commentary of Letbert of Lille. By way of proof, it will be enough to reproduce here the parallel texts that occur in the explanation of the first three psalms. The text of the *Glossula* is given in full, Letbert's variants are put in brackets:

*Glossula*

*Laon 17, f. 2b*

Thronus regum, tribunal iudicum, cathedra doctorum.

f. 2b

Et ne voluntas putaretur otiosa, subdit "meditabitur", non ad horam, quia voluntas taedium laboris [f. 2c] excludit, sed "die ac nocte", id est assidue vel in prosperis et adversis. Meditabitur, dico, in quo? "In lege". Lex est in declinandis peccatis sancta praeceptio. Lex dicta quod liget.

f. 2c

Contra hoc quod dixit "non abiit in consilio", posuit hic "voluntas". Et contra hoc quod posuit "in via peccatorum", posuit hic "in lege Domini"... Contra hoc quod dicit "non sedit", posuit "meditabitur".

f. 2d

... Dabit fructum suum... in tempore suo, id est competenti, confirmatis discipulis post resurrectionem [et] ascensionem, misso Spiritu.

Unde alias dicit: "Nondum erat Spiritus datus, quia nondum erat glorificatus".

<sup>14</sup> This text abridges the text of the *Glossa ordin.* in *psalm.*, I, 1: "Thronus regum, tribunal iudicum, cathedra proprie doctorum." In its turn the *Glossa* depends upon Cassiodore, *Expos. in Psalt.* (PL 70, 28 D): "Cathedra... proprie doctoribus datur... Sic etiam iudicum tribunal et solium regum proprium esse memoramus." Pseudo-Remi d'Auxerre and Bruno the Carthusian have no parallel.

<sup>15</sup> On this definition of *Lex*, see below p. 137—138.

Ps. I, 3 (*Glossula, Laon 17, f. 3a* = Letbert, PL 21, 648 D):

*Quia* (L qui) dum tentationibus *agitantur* (L agitur) quasi pulvis vento movetur. *Quos* (L quem) dum ira conturbat, superbia inflat, vana gloria elevat, luxuria enervat, avaritia subicit, invidia dividit, tristitia prosternit, quot tentationum motibus *urgentur* (L urgetur) quasi tot ventorum flatibus pulvis dispergitur.

Ps. II, 5 (*Glossula 4b* = Letbert 651 B):

Sed quia adhuc sumus in certamine, suis nos praeceptis non cessat admonere. Unde bene dicitur: "Praedicans praeceptum eius." Quia non praecepta sed praeceptum dicit, fortassis caritatem nobis innuit *vel Evangelium* (L in qua cuncta praecepta finiuntur).

Ps. II, 13 (*Glossula 5a* = Letbert 653 D—654 A):

*Aliter* (L om.). Modo dum districti iudicis ira differtur et peccator in desideriis animae suae laudatur, dum iustus tribulationes et angustias sustinet, quae malorum poena, quae iustorum gloria sit non apparet. Hinc est quod Ioannes Apostolus ait: "Carissimi, nunc filii Dei sumus, et nondum apparuit quid erimus; scimus autem quoniam, cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus, quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est." Tunc profecto apparebit quam fallax huius mundi fiducia exstitit, quam transitoria vita, quam brevis gloria, quam parva voluptas, quam falsa prosperitas et quam cito transiit quidquid hic carum et pretiosum fuit. Ergo infelices illi qui in talibus confisi sunt, beati autem (L add. omnes) qui confidunt in Domino.

Ps. III, 1—3 (*Glossula 6b* = Letbert 654 C—655):

*Item, est alia lectio* (L om.) . . . Hoc sancti martyres clamaverunt cum multiplicari Ecclesiae persecutores viderunt. Hoc praesens Ecclesia vel quaeque fidelis anima (L om.) clamare non cessat, quae in tempore pacis suae in (L om.) multis adversitatibus elaborat, dum [f. 6c] occulti hostis tentationibus agitur, dum prave viventium moribus gravatur, dum carnalium hominum apertas iniurias graviter tolerat et quorundam quasi iustorum sub imagine sanctitatis (L add. simulationem) gravius *tolerat* (L portat). Quamdiu caro concupiscit adversus spiritum et spiritus adversus carnem, et corpus quod corrumpitur aggravat animam et terrena *inhabitatio* (L habitatio) deprimit sensum multa cogitantem: quamdiu in hac periculosa et laboriosa vita manet, tamdiu dicere anima fidelis habet: "Domine quid multiplicati sunt qui tribulant me" (L here adds a few phrases). Et quoniam plerumque coacervatione vitiorum subreptit desperatio sanitatis, tamquam ipsis vitiis insultantibus animae vel etiam diabolo et angelis eius per noxias suggestiones ut desperemus operantibus, verissime dicitur: "Multi *dicunt* (L dicent) animae meae, non est salus ipsi in Deo eius". Sed quisquis nos adversarius oppugnet quaeque tribulatio gravet, semper dicendum est (L add. quod sequitur): "Tu autem, Domine, susceptor meus es, gloria mea et exaltans caput meum". Capitis nomine in sacro eloquio mens solet intelligi. Sicut enim a capite membra, sic sensus a mente reguntur. Tales superna bonitas libenter suscipit quos ad suum adiutorium humiliter *suspensos* (L confugere) cernit, et caput, id est mentem eorum dono gratiae suae elevat quos non in hoc saeculo, non in seipsis, sed in Domino Deo suo gloriari delectat. Hinc Apostolus nos admonet dicens:

"Qui gloriatur, in Domino gloriatur". Si tu enim gloriaris in Domino, Deus gloriatur in te; si tu non tuam sed eius gloriam quaeris, ipse quaerit quomodo te exaltet et glorificet.

"Voce, inquit, mea ad Dominum" (L *add.* clamavi, et exaudivit me de monte sancto suo. Voce sua ad Dominum clamare, est intende Dominum deprecari. Voce sua) clamat, cum *quisque* (L *quisquis*) ita intende orat quod sonus vocis ab intentione cordis non discrepat. Hinc egregius doctor ait: "Psalmis et hymnis cum oratis Dominum, hoc versetur in corde quod profertur in ore." Et Apostolus dicit: "Psallam spiritu, psallam et mente." Tales libenter exaudit Dominus quos scilicet *huiusmodi* (L *ita*) clamare conspicit. *Quicumque exauditur, per haec exauditur.* (L Unde bene dicitur:) "Et exaudivit me de monte sancto suo", id est de altitudine iustitiae suae. Legimus enim: "Iustitia tua sicut montes Dei" (L *adds a few sentences*). Nos quoque de monte sancto suo exaudit, quando preces nostras non ex nostris meritis sed ex sua sancta misericordia suscipit. Non enim digni sumus ut audiamur, sed ipse misericors est ut exaudiat.

The idea of the priority of the *Glossula* must be dismissed as contrary to the facts. Indeed their dependence on Letbert's commentary, which was published after Anselm's Gloss and simultaneously with that of Gilbert de la Porrée, cannot be denied, for twice in the text just quoted we see them introducing Letbert's explanation as an optional exegesis with the words *aliter* and *alia lectio*.<sup>16</sup>

It is clear then that the *Glossula* was written some time, we may say a few years, after Walter of Maguelonne published Letbert's commentary in 1125. Consequently we must admit that not only do they depend on the two other Glosses as well, but also that the attribution of ms. *Laon 17* to Gilbertus Universalis becomes very doubtful. Gilbertus was indeed already elected to the see of London at the end of 1127; he was consecrated bishop in January 1128<sup>17</sup>. Even granted that he got possession of one of the earliest copies of Letbert's edition by bishop Walter, he could by no means have finished his own extensive commentary by the end of 1127. The only way to save Gilbertus' authorship of the *Glossula* is to date them from the time of his episcopate, viz. 1128—1134.

This supposition however is not likely to attract much approval. Improbable in itself, it fails furthermore to solve two difficulties which Miss Smalley has already pointed out.<sup>18</sup> On the one hand indeed, the negligent style of the *Glossula* contrasts strikingly with the polish of Gilbertus' authentic contributions to the *Glossa ordinaria*. On the other,

<sup>16</sup> Cf. beginning of the texts just quoted on psalm II, 13 and psalm III, 1—3.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. B. Smalley, *Gilbertus Universalis* etc., in *Rech. théol. anc. médiév.*, 7 (1935) 239—240.

<sup>18</sup> *A. c.*, in *Rech. théol. anc. médiév.*, 8 (1936) 55—59.

in presenting a series of doctrinal discussions or *quaestiones*, it uses a technique unheard of before, about 1135/1138, Abelard wrote his Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans and Peter Lombard his Gloss on the Psalter.

The very nature of these questions though, which reminds one of the oldest Sentence-books,<sup>19</sup> the prevalence of the works of Gilbert de la Porrée and Letbert over Anselm's *Glossa*, finally the absence of all traces of Peter Lombard's commentary, forbid our putting the *Glossula* back too far. Everything suggests rather that they were written between the years 1130—1140.

## 2. The Commentary of Master Yvo of Chartres Junior.

Thanks to Miss Smalley,<sup>20</sup> the personality of Master Yvo of Chartres Jr. now appears clearly distinct from that of Yvo, bishop of Chartres from 1090 till 1117 and another of the *Decretum* and the *Panormia*. Yvo Jr. comes somewhat later. He was a disciple of Gilbert de la Porrée and an contemporary of Peter Lombard and Robert of Melun. Like many other theologians of the time, he too wrote a commentary on the psalms, preserved in at least eleven manuscripts, in several of which it is attributed erroneously to John of Reims († 1125).<sup>21</sup>

Mlle M. Th. d'Alverny, conservatrix of the Bibliothèque Nationale, was so kind as to inform me of the existence of two redactions of that commentary, a long one contained in ms. *Paris Nat. lat.* 12006, f. 1—279 (= A), and a short one in ms. *Paris Nat. lat.* 440, f. 33—227 (= B). At the moment I am in no position to give an appreciation of the whole work, as I have at my disposal the photographs of only the first folios of those two codices. Nevertheless I think it worth while to give here all the facts I was able to gather.

As far as my fragmentary documentation allows me to judge, the longer redaction differs mainly from the shorter in that it inserts sporadically new sections into the text common to both. In this way the prologue in A is twice as long as in B and the commentary on psalm I starts with a lengthy explanation of the word *Beatus*, absent from B. Only in two places does the latter present a longer text than A:

<sup>19</sup> Especially the question *Quid sumit mus* (ms. *Laon* 17, 39d), published by Miss Smalley (a. c. 58). See also A. Landgraf, *Die in der Frühscholastik klassische Frage "Quid sumit mus"*, in *Divus Thomas* (Fribourg), 30 (1952) 47.

<sup>20</sup> Master Ivo of Chartres, in *The Engl. histor. Review*, 50 (1935) 680—686.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. F. Stegmüller, *Repertorium biblicum medii aevi*, III, Madrid 1951, 410 (Ioannes Remensis) and 507—509 (Ivo de Chartres).



A f. 2a

Sciendum quoque est centum quinquaginta psalmos cecinisse David, quorum praedictorum cantorum, ut supra dictum est,

ideo nominibus psalmi quidam titulantur,

sicut nonnullos nominibus Salomonis, Aggaei et filiorum Core titulos invenimus.

A f. 3b

Ideo iste psalmus caret titulo, quia est quasi titulus et praefatio aliorum.

Nonnulli etiam hunc et sequentem psalmum unum esse voluerunt, sed revera duo sunt. Hic enim primus est in ordine psalmorum, sed sequens primus est in ordine titulorum. Si autem unum essent, psalmi centum quinquaginta non essent.

B f. 33b

Sciendum quoque est centum quinquaginta psalmos cecinisse David. Nam quia praedictorum cantorum, quatuor scil. principum qui trecentis cantoribus praepositi fuerunt, nominibus psalmi quidam titulantur, non ideo factum est quod ipsi psalmos composuerint, sed recte ministerium suum administraverint, vel etiam propter mysteria nominum ad quae sequens sermo pertinere videtur, verbi gratia, sicut nonnullos nominibus Salomonis, Aggaei et filiorum Core titulos invenimus.

B f. 34a

Ideo iste psalmus caret titulo, quia est quasi titulus aliorum, id est, brevis illuminatio. In se enim breviter comprehendit principalem intentionem totius sequentis operis. Et si hunc psalmum dicimus esse titulum tantum aliorum, ut quidam volunt, iam falleremur in numero: sunt enim centum quinquaginta psalmi.

Hic oritur quaestio cur videlicet apostoli in Actibus Apostolorum dicant: "Sicut scriptum est in primo psalmorum 'Quare fremuerunt gentes' etc.", cum non primus sed secundus in ordine ponatur psalmorum. Quae quaestio facile solvitur, si ratio titulorum attendatur. Primus est enim psalmorum titulos habentium.

In both cases, recension A has either suppressed a tedious repetition or abridged a prolix explanation of B. From this it seems justifiable to conclude that the longer redaction is a second enlarged and revised edition of B.

Among the contemporary authors, whose commentaries Master Yvo used in order to compose his own, Letbert of Lille is again, as in the case of the *Glossula Gilberti Universalis*, the most important. From him both recensions borrow the following literal quotations:

A f. 1c, B 33b

... David ... volens magnificare cultum templi, elegit ...

Letbert, PL 21, 644 B

Volens enim magnificare cultum templi ... elegit ...

A f. 2a, B f. 33c

Iste liber apud Hebraeos propter diversas causas tribus modis intitulatur: Liber Hymnorum, Liber Soliloquiorum, Liber Psalmorum...

Liber Hymnorum ideo intitulatur, quia totum istud opus ad laudem Dei pertinet.

644 A

Iste liber apud Hebraeos propter diversas causas tribus modis intitulatur, id est aut Liber Hymnorum aut Liber Soliloquiorum aut Liber Psalmorum ...

Ideo titulus eius est Liber Hymnorum, quia totum istud opus pertinet ad laudem Dei.

A f. 2b, B f. 33d

David ... illam prophetiam modulabatur in psalterio. Et non sine causa magis in psalterio quam in alio instrumento.

644 BC

David ... prophetiam hanc modulabatur in psalterio. Et non sine causa magis in hoc quam in alio instrumento.

A f. 3b, B f. 33d—34a

Solet quaeri cui parti philosophiae supponatur. Ad quod istud respondemus: secundum hoc quod tractat de moribus, Ethicae supponitur; secundum hoc vero quod tractat de natura ipsius divinitatis, Physicae potest supponi.

644 D

Quaeritur a quibusdam cui parti philosophiae supponatur. Quibus respondendum est: secundum quod agit de moribus, Ethicae; secundum quod tractat de natura, Physicae potest supponi.

A f. 3b, B f. 34a

Intentio sua est nos commonere ut beatitudinem, in primo parente amissam, in nobis et exemplo nostro in aliis studeamus reparare. Et ut hoc possimus facere, hortatur conformari nos imagini dominici hominis.

645 A—646 A

Intentio sua est nos commonere ut beatitudinem, in primo parente amissam, studeamus reparare in nobis et exemplo nostro in aliis. Quod ut possimus facere, hortatur nos imagini novi hominis Christi conformari.

A f. 4a, B f. 34b

Superfluum videtur esse, postquam dixit "Non abiit" ... illud quod postea addit "non stetit" ...

Sed ideo hoc facit quia ordinem vult exsequi secundum quem primus homo peccavit, ut dominicum hominem a primo parente ex toto ostendat esse dissimilem.

645 B

Postquam dictum est "Non abiit" superfluum videtur esse quod additur "non stetit" et "non sedit".

Sed ideo hoc facit quia ordinem vult exsequi quo primus homo peccavit, [ut] secundum hominem ostendat a primo penitus esse dissimilem.

To be complete, one other quotation, proper to recension B, should be added:

B f. 33b

Quia praedictorum . . . nominibus psalmi quidam titulatur, non ideo factum est quod ipsi psalmos composuerint, sed recte ministerium suum administraverint, vel etiam propter mysteria nominum ad quae sequens sermo pertinere videtur.

644 D

Et licet quidam psalmi aliorum nominibus intitulentur, . . . non ideo factum est quod ipsi psalmos composuerint, sed propter mysteria nominum sive officia ad quae sermo sequens videtur pertinere.

Anselm's *Glossa* too, at least in the printed text, contributed to the redaction of Yvo's commentary, though its share is far more modest. I noticed two borrowings in the preface. One is common to both recensions:

A f. 2a, B f. 33bc

Nec eo modo ordinati sunt et constituti quo a David cantati. Ante enim peccavit cum uxore Uriae Aethaei quam sustinisset persecutionem filii sui, et ante cecinit de paenitentia "Misere mei Deus" quam de persecutione "Domine quid multiplicati sunt".

Sed ab Esdra propheta instinctu divino ita ordinati esse creduntur.

*Glossa*, ed. Venice 1588, prothem.

Ordo psalmorum ab ordine historiae discordat, quia ante peccavit David cum uxore Uriae et de paenitentia cecinit "Miserere mei Deus" quam filius eius eum persequeretur et cecinerit "Domine quid multiplicati".

Sed ab Esdra propheta instinctu divino ita ordinati creduntur.

Another contact is proper to recension A:

A f. 1b

Nec a munere prophetiae sunt alieni quibus data est facultas bene intelligendi vel interpretandi scripturas.

Et sic datus est Spiritus sanctus prophetis ut aliquando pro peccatis recederet et placatus rediret.

*Glossa*, ed. Venice 1588, prothem.

Non sunt autem illi a munere prophetiae alieni quibus data est facultas intelligendi vel interpretandi scripturas.

Spiritus autem sanctus sic datus est prophetis ut aliquando pro peccatis recederet et placatus rediret.

Neither the preface nor the commentary on psalm I show any influence from the Glosses of Gilbert de la Porrée or Peter Lombard. But only a thorough search through the whole work will tell us whether this is due to a deliberate attitude of Master Yvo or just an accident. My experience though with the *Glossula Gilberti Universalis* and the other commentaries yet to be examined is that in all these works the preface reflects rather faithfully the fundamental attitude of the authors towards their sources. Hence I would say, in this case also, that Master Yvo

wrote his commentary at a moment when Letbert's work, though still outshining all the others, had already found a dangerous competitor in Anselm of Laon but not yet in Gilbert de la Porrée or Peter Lombard. That would point to the years 1130—1140, when Letbert's success was apparently at its peak.

### 3. The Commentary of the Pseudo-Haymo of Halberstadt.

The *Explanatio in psalmos*, edited by Erasmus at Fribourg in 1531, and reprinted in Migne, *Patrologia latina*, t. 116, col. 191—696, was attributed for centuries to Haymo, disciple of Raban Maur and bishop of Halberstadt from 840 till 853. But in 1890 A. Hauck<sup>22</sup> and again in 1936 A. Wilmart<sup>23</sup> did away with that age long tradition. By referring to the Castel Sant-Angelo as the *turris Crescentii*<sup>24</sup> and especially to the antipope Clemens III (1080—1100) as *Guibertus demens*,<sup>25</sup> the commentary itself shows that it was composed at the turn of the eleventh century or shortly after. Dom Wilmart made a further discovery. In the ms. *Vat. Reg. lat.* 296, the text of our *Explanatio* bears the inscription *Glosule Anselmi archidiaconi super Psalterium*. As this title fits to perfection Anselm of Laon, who taught for many years in the school of that town and became archdeacon of the diocese of the same name in 1115, two years before he died, Wilmart assigns the work to him.

This attempted identification has found general favour. Only one author, A. Landgraf,<sup>25b</sup> objected to it on the ground that literary tradition knows of no other commentary of Anselm of Laon on the Psalter than his *Glossa interlinearis et marginalis*.

In fact Dom Wilmart's hypothesis is based on insufficient evidence. Who can be sure that the title *Ansellus archidiaconus*, given by one

<sup>22</sup> *Kirchengeschichte Deutschlands*, Leipzig, II (1890) 507 sq., III (1906) 865 sq. and 1043 sq.

<sup>23</sup> *Un commentaire des Psaumes restitué à Anselme de Laon*, in *Rech. théol. anc. médiév.*, 8 (1936) 325—344.

<sup>24</sup> Pseudo-Haymo, *Explan. in ps.*, XLVIII, 12 (ed. Wilmart, *a. c.*, 329): "Tabernacula eorum duratura in progenie et progenie, vocaverunt nomina sua, id est per nomina sua, ut dicatur palatium Tiberii, turris Crescentii; et hoc faciebant ut memoria eorum haberetur, quae tamen non erat nisi in terris suis." The edition in Migne (PL 116, 363 C) has: *vocaverunt nomina sua, id est praenomina sua*.

<sup>25</sup> *Ib.*, XC, 6 (ed. Wilmart, *a. c.*, 332 = PL 116, 510 AB): "Non timebimus a gravissima persecutione manifesta, qualis esset persecutio, si aliquis infandus episcopus praedicaret et praeciperet fornicationem vel simoniam, ut Guibertus demens."

<sup>25b</sup> *Die Zuweisung eines Psalmenkommentars an Anselm of Laon*, in *Biblica*, 23 (1942) 170—174.



single manuscript of the end of the twelfth century, was really meant for Anselm of Laon, and, supposing it was, is it truly genuine? At least Dom Wilmart should have tested his supposition by the contents of the work itself and the sources it relies upon. Had he done so, he would never have proposed the name of Anselm of Laon as the author of the *Explanatio* nor the years 1096—1110 as the date of its composition. Indeed a comparison of the commentary of the Pseudo-Haymo with similar contemporary works gives quite different results.

One thing is true, the *Explanatio* has very close, if few, connexions with Anselm's Gloss on the psalms. In two places even, the texts of both works run absolutely parallel without any significant variations:

Ps. V, 7 (Pseudo-Haymo, PL 116, 211 BC = *Glossa marg.*, ed. Venise 1588, i. h. l.):

“Perdes omnes qui loquuntur mendacium”, quia hoc est veritati contrarium. Veritas est de eo quod est; mendacium non est substantia vel natura, sed de eo quod non est. Et merito perditur *qui* (G quod) declinat ab eo quod est ad id quod non est. Mentiri est contra hoc *quis* (G om.) animo sentit loqui. Augustinus: Sunt mendacia quaedam pro salute vel pro (G om.) commodo alicuius, non malitia sed benignitate: ut obstetrices quae dixerunt pro filiis Hebraeorum falsum Pharaoni. Haec autem mendacia non re, sed in dolo laudantur: quia qui sic mentiuntur, merebuntur aliquando ab omni mendacio liberari. Est etiam mendacium *ioco* (G iocosum) quod non fallit: scit enim cui dicitur causa ioci dici. Et haec duo genera non sunt sine culpa, sed non cum magna. Perfectis autem non convenit mentiri, nec pro temporali vita, cuius morte sua vel alterius non occiditur anima. Licet autem eis, si non falsum dicere, verum tacere: ut si quis hominem non vult ad mortem *perdere* (G prodere), verum taceat, sed non falsum dicat, *nec* (G ne) pro corpore alterius animam suam occidat. Non est culpa verum tacere ut (G add. et) Dominus: “Multa habeo vobis dicere.” Illud autem ubi non est duplex cor, non debet dici mendacium, ut si quis commodet (G add. mihi) gladium et *promittat* (G promittam) se (G om.) poscenti *redditurum* (G reddere): si furens poscit, non debeo reddere *ut* (G ne) se vel alium occidat. Ideo hic non est duplex cor, quia cum promisi reddere non *cognovi* (G cogitavi) furentem postea *repetiturum* (G posse repetere).

Ps. VI, tit. (Pseudo-Haymo, PL 116, 213 CD = *Glossa ord.*, ed. Venise 1588, i. h. l.):

Augustinus. Octavam *quidam* (G aliqui) dicunt adventum Domini, *quia* (G qui) venturus est post septem millia annorum, ut aiunt. Sed nulli hoc tempus *notum* (G cognitum) est: potius octavus dies (G add. dicitur), quia omnia tempora septem dierum *revolutione* (G repetitione) volvuntur: *ille* (G illae) nullam *habeat* (G habent) varietatem. Vel duae vitae sunt. Una pertinet ad corpus, *qui* (G quod) est vetus homo, cui et vetus datum est Testamentum (G add. in) qua regnavit mors; altera ad animam, *qui* (G quod) est novus homo, regeneratus per Christum. Ad corpus autem quaternarius, ad animam ternarius pertinet. Peracta *igitur* (G ergo) utraque quasi septenario numero,

veniet octavus dies iudicii, ubi *unicuique* (G cuique) pro meritis reddetur. Unde timens Ecclesia *sic* (G *hic*) orat: "In finem pro octava psalmus David".

The relationship involved by those two texts is obvious: the *Glossa* presents the original, the *Explanatio* the counterpart. Both passages indeed, for the very reason that they consist of free excerpts from St. Augustine, fit the normal procedure of Anselm in his *Glossa marginalis*. For the Pseudo-Haymo on the contrary, they constitute exceptional cases, the equal of which is not to be found elsewhere in his commentary. Besides, the first of those texts is followed in the latter by another optional interpretation<sup>26</sup>, absent from the *Glossa*. This means again that here the Pseudo-Haymo, far from being original, is simply collecting opinions of various commentators.

But the *Explanatio* is not only dependent upon and posterior to the Gloss, it belongs to an altogether different author. If Dom Wilmart's hypothesis were to be accepted, we would be faced with the literary puzzle of one and the same medieval author, writing two commentaries on the Psalter so different as practically to ignore one another.

For the rest, to establish the distinction of authors, one needs but to compare what Anselm and the Pseudo-Haymo state respectively on the double *Alleluia* which separates psalm CIV from psalm CV:

*Glossa*, ps. CIV (end)

Quidam dicunt unum "alleluia" ad finem superioris psalmi pertinere, alterum esse sequentis. Hanc enim regulam Hieronymus tenendam esse tradit, cuius assertioni Cassiodorus quoque consentit. Sed plures ubique est "alleluia" sequenti dant, et aliquando semel, aliquando bis, ut Dominus in Evangelio nunc dixit "amen", nunc "amen, amen", pro maiori certitudine rei. Istis consentit Augustinus, praesertim cum nulli Graecorum codices in fine psalmi habeant "alleluia".

*Explanatio*, PL 116, 556D

Volunt quidam hic bis poni "alleluia". Sed beatus Hieronymus dicit quod quicumque psalmus habet in principio "alleluia" in fine quoque habet "alleluia", et ita dicemus quod alterum "alleluia" sit de praecedenti psalmo, alterum de sequenti.

Anselm and the Pseudo-Haymo evidently disagree on the matter. But, whereas the former carefully discusses the problem, quoting the authorities and the reasons on both sides, the latter disposes of St. Augustine's opinion with a simple *quidam volunt*, to indicate thus without

<sup>26</sup> *Explan. in ps.*, V, 7 (PL 116, 211 D): "... furem postea repetiturum. Vel accipiamus mendacium de haeresi, ut esse negare Christum esse Deum, negare partum Virginis; et pro huiusmodi mendaciis aggravat dicens *perdes*."

any more add his assent to St. Jerome's view. This is the more astonishing as the literary note before each psalm is always more developed in the *Explanatio* than in the Gloss. Of course, Anselm might have abandoned in a later work some of the ideas he held before, but it is unthinkable that he should ever have contradicted himself in such a crude way. Whoever he may be then, the Pseudo-Haymo is decidedly not Anselm of Laon.

Other proofs lead to the same conclusion. Indeed the preface of the *Explanatio* incorporates entire sections of the prologue which precedes the commentary of Letbert of Lille. The statements on the name *Soliloquia*, on the origin, the subject matter and the method of the Psalter, on the lack of title to psalm I, are all taken word for word from Letbert. Here follows a summary of those borrowings indicated by their *incipit* and *explicit*:

Pseudo-Haymo, PL 116

194D: Soliloquium unusquisque...  
habet Ecclesia.

195C: Volens enim David... quae  
in Psalterio leguntur exsequitur.

196C: Communis materia... ad  
Christi conformitatem reducat.

196CD: De hac vero materia...  
Christo conformes efficiat.

196D: Esdras autem cum ceteris  
...sequentis operis tangit.

Letbert of Lille, PL 21

644B: Liber etiam Soliloquiorum  
...habetur in Ecclesia.

644BC: Volens enim magnificare  
...exsequitur quae in psalterio  
scripta leguntur.

644CD: Communis materia... ad  
Christi conformitatem inducat.

645A—646A: De hac vero ma-  
teria... Christo conformari.

645A: Esdras autem cum ceteris  
...sequentis operis tangit.

In order to show how slavishly the Pseudo-Haymo is transcribing, we shall produce in full his text on the subject matter of the Psalms, together with the variants of his source:

Communis materia totius huius operis, Christus est tripliciter acceptus: scil. (L id est) secundum *deitatem* (L divinitatem), secundum humanitatem (L *add.* et) secundum corpus (L *add.* eius quod est Ecclesia). Quod vero de contrariis, id est *daemonibus impiis* (L daemoneis et impiis hominibus) interseritur, non ideo fit quod *sit* (L sint) de principali materia, sed ut principali materie *subserviat* (L subserviant) per quasdam commoditates *admiscetur* (L admiscuntur): ut in primo psalmo de impiis *adducit* (L inducit), *ut* (L quatenus) per eorum poenam (L poenas) homines ab eorum conformitate deterreat et ad Christi conformitatem *reducat* (L inducat).

The assumption that Letbert would be the borrower is contradicted by some peculiarities in the text of the Pseudo-Haymo, which can only be explained as errors of transcription. For instance, the second of the two passages quoted above starts with *Volens enim*. In Letbert's

case, the causal conjunction *enim* connects the sentence logically to the preceding one:

Liber psalmodum recte appellatus est, quia sanctus David dulce mysterium huius prophetiae dulci sono, dulci organo, id est Psalterio, voluit declarare. Volens *enim* magnificare cultum templi ad honorem Dei, cum arcam de Silo reduceret, elegit tria millia hominum musicis instrumentis Deum laudantium.

With the Pseudo-Haymo on the contrary, the same conjunction is out of place, as it is preceded by a lengthy exposition of the nature and the various kinds of prophecy. It only makes sense when it is referred to the sentence which comes before the excursus on prophecy and which explains, in agreement with Letbert, the reason of the title *Psalterium*:

Haec vero prophetia Psalterium vocatur, quod nomen a quodam musico instrumento tractum est, quo instrumento David et alii praecentores psalmos modulabantur. [Definitur autem prophetia . . . Fit autem prophetia . . . aut gratia aut permissione: gratia . . . ; permissione ut in Sybilla vate et in infidelibus philosophis qui multa . . . de Christo praedixerunt.] Volens *enim* David cultum Dei amplificare . . . constituit . . . , cum arcam de Silo reduceret, tria millia virorum omni musico instrumento cantantium.

No doubt, the Pseudo-Haymo uses the conjunction *enim*, not because it is needed, but simply because he found it in his source, viz. Letbert. If however the Pseudo-Haymo's dependence on Letbert is a fact, then his identity with Anselm of Laon is out of question, for, as we have noted before, Letbert's commentary only came to be known after 1125, eight years after Anselm's death.

There is more. The doctrinal elements of the *Explanatio*, few as they are, betray unmistakably a later origin than the first decade of the twelfth century. The most characteristic item in that respect is precisely the passage on prophecy just mentioned. In the long run, it goes back to the well known description of *prophetia* which Cassiodore inserts in the prolegomena to his commentary on the psalms:<sup>27</sup>

Prophetia est aspiratio divina quae eventus rerum aut per facta aut per dicta quorundam immobili veritate pronuntiat. . . Multis autem modis gratiae istius munera praestabantur. Sed ut de plurimis pauca complectar, acta est per operationes hominum . . . per natiuitates quoque geminorum . . . per angelos . . . per visiones . . . per somnia . . . per nubem et vocem de caelo . . . Unde constat David non per operationes etc. . . nec per alios quoscumque modos, sed coelesti inspiratione fuisse completum.

Cassiodore is not any too clear. Through the restriction *aut per facta aut per dicta*, he seems to exclude from his definition the highest kind of prophecy, namely the *coelestis inspiratio* proper to the Psalter. Already

<sup>27</sup> Cassiodor, *Expos. in Psalt.*, praef. 1 (PL 70, 12 BC).



the Pseudo-Remi d'Auxerre in the tenth century was aware of this; he tried to remedy the defect by defining prophecy as a *divina inspiratio vel cognitio mysteriorum Dei et fit per occultam inspirationem vel per angelicam administrationem*<sup>28</sup>, but he found no support. Anselm of Laon returns to the formula of Cassiodore<sup>29</sup>, and so does Master Yvo of Chartres Jr.<sup>30</sup> Shortly after Anselm though, two new attempts were made to arrive at a perfect formula: one which broadens Cassiodore's definition by cancelling the words *aut per facta aut per dicta*; another which respects it, but reduces the inspiration of the Psalter to the common *prophetia per dicta*. The first is to be found in the Glosses of Gilbert de la Porrée<sup>31</sup> and Peter Lombard<sup>32</sup>, the second in the commentaries of the Pseudo-Haymo and the Pseudo-Bede<sup>33</sup>. Whether the last attempt originated from one of these two commentators or from some unknown previous author, is immaterial here;<sup>34</sup> the main point is that by its progressive and at the same time traditional character it reveals itself as the latest development in the matter.

A second example occurs in the interpretation of psalm I, 2: *Sed in lege Domini voluntas eius*. This verse gave Cassiodore the opportunity of defining the *Lex Dei* as *in declinandis peccatis sancta praeceptio*, and, further on, to present the etymology of the word: *Lex dicitur ex*

<sup>28</sup> *Enarr. in psalmos*, praef. (PL 131, 145 D—147 A). Bruno the Carthusian omits to give a definition of prophecy in his *Expos. in psalmos* (PL 152, 639 AB).

<sup>29</sup> Prothem. (ed. Venice 1588, III, 86b): "Prophetia est inspiratio vel revelatio divina quae eventus rerum vel per facta vel per dicta immobili veritate pronuntiat. Multis autem modis haec gratia data est: vel per operationes hominum . . . vel per natiuitates . . . vel per loquentes angelos . . . vel per visiones . . . vel per somnia . . . vel per nubem et vocem de coelo . . . vel adhuc aliis modis. David autem nullo horum sed coelesti inspiratione intus edoctus . . . completus est."

<sup>30</sup> *Ms Par. Nat. lat. 12006*, f. 1a and 440, f. 33a: "Prophetia est inspiratio divina quae eventus rerum aut per facta aut per dicta aut etiam per somnia immobili veritate pronuntiat. Per facta . . . Per dicta . . . Per somnia . . . His itaque multisque aliis modis ostensa sunt patribus futura mysteria rerum eventibus. Verum in psalmis nihil tale factum legimus, quia neque per dicta neque per facta aut etiam per somnia David revelata est psalmorum melodia, sed potius per internam inspirationem . . ."

<sup>31</sup> *Ms Vat. lat. 89*, f. 1b; *Reg. lat. 2094*, f. 1c; *Barb. lat. 486*, f. 1a: "Prophetia est inspiratio divina quae rerum eventus immobili veritate pronuntiat. Fit autem et per dicta . . . et fit per facta . . . Fit etiam inspiratio, cessantibus dictis et factis, solo sancto Spiritu illustrante, ut David."

<sup>32</sup> *Comment. in psalmos*, praef. (PL 191, 58 C): "Est igitur prophetia inspiratio vel revelatio divina rerum eventus immobili veritate denuntians . . . Fit autem quatuor modis . . . Per facta . . . Per dicta . . . Per visiones . . . Per somnia . . . Praeter haec est et alius prophetiae modus, ceteris dignior, quando scil. ex sola Spiritus sancti inspiratione . . . prophetatur. Hoc modo prophetavit David."

<sup>33</sup> Pseudo-Haymo, *Explan. in ps.*, I (PL 116, 195 BC) = Pseudo-Bede, *Exegesis*, praef. (PL 93, 479 CD). See text below p. 141—142.

<sup>34</sup> On that question, see below p. 142.

*eo quod animos nostros liget.*<sup>35</sup> For centuries these formulas were neglected. Gilbert de la Porrée seems to be the first commentator who picked them up. He writes i. h. 1.:<sup>36</sup> *Lex est in declinandis peccatis sancta praeceptio; lex dicta quod liget.* The Pseudo-Gilbertus Universalis copies Gilbert's text,<sup>37</sup> while the Pseudo-Bruno of Würzburg<sup>38</sup> transcribes Cassiodore. Only the Pseudo-Haymo presents an improved formula, which, as Dom O. Lottin has noticed,<sup>39</sup> became in the second half of the twelfth century one of the classical definitions of Law: *Lex enim Dei est in devitandis peccatis bonisque perpetrandis sancta praeceptio.*<sup>40</sup> Here again the Pseudo-Haymo comes at the end of the evolution.

These doctrinal items imply that the *Explanatio* is posterior to the apparition of the first *Summae* and *Sententiae*; they confirm thus our conclusion that it comes after the Glosses of Anselm of Laon and of Gilbert de la Porrée and after the publication of Letbert's commentary.

What then is the accurate date of the *Explanatio*? To that question it is difficult to give a clear-cut answer. Everything suggests a date previous to 1150. For a later date, the commentary attaches too much importance to Letbert of Lille and too little to the *Glossa ordinaria*. Neither should one forget that the Pseudo-Haymo still calls the antipope Clemens III, who was already dead in 1100, *Guibertus demens*. If Dom Wilmart exaggerates where he says that the souvenir of Guibert's schism was lost about 1110,<sup>41</sup> it remains nonetheless true that the use of the said nickname still points to the generation that remembered vividly the tragic events of the end of the eleventh century. This would favour the earliest date possible, viz. around or close after 1130.

On the other hand though, the text where the Pseudo-Haymo paraphrases Anselm's formula *abire in regionem dissimilitudinis* with *abire per dissimilitudinem* bears a strange resemblance to a corresponding passage of Lombard's commentary on the psalms:

Pseudo-Haymo, PL 21, 197 BC

Ita Adam . . . abiit, non localiter . . . sed recessit a Deo per dissimilitudinem . . . cum . . . Evae et consilio serpentis paruit.

Lombard, PL 191, 60D

Abiit ergo Adam a Deo, non loco sed dissimilitudine, cum, persuasioni diaboli et Evae consentiens, a Deo recessit.

<sup>35</sup> PL 70, 29 D et 29 D.

<sup>36</sup> Ms *Vat. lat.* 89, f. 1d; *Reg. lat.* 2094, f. 2a.

<sup>37</sup> Ms *Laon* 17, f. 2b. See above p. 125.

<sup>38</sup> PL 142, 50 A.

<sup>39</sup> *Psychologie et morale*, II, Louvain 1948, 13 n. 5.

<sup>40</sup> PL 116, 198 C.

<sup>41</sup> *Un commentaire des psaumes* etc., 335.

In via peccatorum stetit, quando  
actualiter pomum comedit.

In cathedra pestilentiae sedit cum  
se . . . excusando . . .  
posterios suos . . . excusationem docuit.

Stetit cum, pomum vetitum come-  
dens, in peccato delectatus est.

Sedit  
cum se excusando . . .  
in superbia confirmatus est.

Although from the time of Bruno the Carthusian onwards all commen-  
tators abound with similar ideas and formulas, the texts of none are  
so akin in wording and disposition as those of Peter Lombard and the  
Pseudo-Haymo. Considering that the commentary of the former very  
soon enjoyed great popularity, it is probable that it served already  
as an occasional source to the latter. If this presumption be true, the  
composition of the *Explanatio* should be put back to the forties of the  
twelfth century rather than to the thirties. But for greater certainty  
it would be necessary to establish more contacts between the two works.

At any rate, the *Explanatio* of the Pseudo-Haymo is not to be at-  
tributed to Anselm of Laon, but to some unknown author who wrote  
certainly between 1130 and 1150 and probably shortly after 1140.

#### 4. The Commentary of the Pseudo-Bede.

The *Exegesis in librum psalmorum*, edited, at least in part, among  
the works of the Venerable Bede in Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, t. 93,  
col. 477—1098, contains three different sections for each psalm, namely,  
an *argumentum*, an *explanatio* and a *commentarius*. Already in 1894  
J. D. Bruce<sup>42</sup> and Dom G. Morin<sup>43</sup> have proved that originally these  
sections formed separate works, belonging to three different authors,  
though all three go under the name of Bede in the manuscript tradi-  
tion. This then is the reason why some copyist has arranged the three  
works into one.

Only the third and by far the largest section will concern us here,  
as the first and second are much older than the twelfth century.<sup>44</sup>

In an article published in 1911<sup>45</sup> Dom Morin made it clear that this  
third section of the *Exegesis in librum psalmorum* is by no means to  
be ascribed to Bede's penmanship, but dates from the beginning of  
Scholasticism. Thus far, his argument deserves full approval. At the

<sup>42</sup> *The Anglo-Saxon Version of the Book of Psalms commonly known as the Paris Psalter*, Baltimore 1894. — I am sorry to say that this work is, at the moment, not accessible to me.

<sup>43</sup> *Notes sur plusieurs écrits attribués à Bède le Vénérable*, in *Rev. bénéd.*, II (1894) 289—295.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. G. Morin, *a. c.*, 292—293.

<sup>45</sup> G. Morin, *Le Pseudo-Bède sur les psaumes et l'Opus super Psalterium de Maître Manegold de Lautenbach*, in *Rev. bénéd.*, 28 (1911) 331—340.

same time, however, he also proposed, at least hypothetically, to identify its author with the famous controversialist of the eleventh century, Manegold of Lautenbach, who died shortly after 1103.<sup>46</sup> This hypothesis, although it has been widely accepted, makes one wonder. If Dom Morin be right, Manegold would show signs of a marvelous precocity. Not only would he be the first medieval author to use the expression *regio dissimilitudinis*, but in using it he would be ahead of his time by half a century. Indeed, in the commentary of the Pseudo-Bede that expression occurs in many other places besides psalm I, 1 and with a variety of applications, which in the rest of theological literature does not appear till several decades later. The edition of Migne, though very incomplete, offers at least six other instances:

Ps. I, prol. (PL 93, 483 D): Est autem haec primi psalmi intentio hortari fideles ut a triplici morte animae . . . festinent resurgere, id est ut in quantum possint, a *regione dissimilitudinis*, in qua per primum parentum traducti sunt, studeant redire.

Ps. 35, 12 (671 A): Superbia dicitur pes, quia per eam a Domino in *regionem dissimilitudinis* recessimus.

Ps. 38, 13 (691 C): Omnes amatores mundi peregrinantur quidem in *regione dissimilitudinis*, ab illa superna patria remoti et non sunt apud Deum.

Ps. 45, 2 (725 A): Quando autem per inoboedientiam in *regionem dissimilitudinis* recessimus, tunc quasi in loca tribulationis et inquietudinis pervenimus.

Ps. 47, 3 (730 C): De his etiam fuit filius ille qui, devorata substantia sua cum meretricibus, abiit in *regionem dissimilitudinis*, et adhaesit uni principi illius regionis.

Ps. 48, 15 (738 B): Diabolus autem ideo mors dicitur, quia causa et mortis animae et mortis corporis fuit, cum primo homini ut in *regionem dissimilitudinis* a Deo suo recederet suasit.

After examining the matter more closely, I discovered many other reasons for relegating the Pseudo-Bede's *Exegesis* to a later date than the turn of the eleventh century.

First of all there is the question of sources. The preface indeed contains at least one passage which is certainly copied from the commentary of Letbert of Lille:

Letbert, PL 21, 644 AB

Dicunt et quidam quod hymnus proprie dicitur laus Dei metricè composita. Unde proprie in Hebraeo dicitur Liber Hymnorum, quia ibi totum Psalterium est metricè scriptum.

Pseudo-Bede, PL 93, 480D—481A

Hymnus est proprie laus Dei metricè scripta. Constat enim totum Psalterium in Hebraeo metricè compositum. Unde proprie in Hebraeo dicitur Liber Hymnorum.

<sup>46</sup> On this author, cf. M. Manitius, *Geschichte der lateinischen Literatur des Mittelalters*, III, Munich 1931, 27—28 and 175—180.



Dicitur etiam apud nos recte Liber Hymnorum, quia licet impediēte translatione non teneat metrum, tenet tamen quod praecipuum est, scil. quod in omni parte apud nos, sicut et apud Hebraeos, laudem Dei significat, quod perspicuum est.

Apud nos vero, et fortasse apud Graecos, non servat impediēte translatione metrum. Dicitur tamen apud nos recte Liber Hymnorum, quia licet non teneat metrum, tenet tamen id quod est praecipuum, scil. quod in omni parte, tum apud nos quam apud Hebraeos, laude Dei est conspicuum.

The Pseudo-Bede has slightly amplified the text of Letbert. Especially the words *et fortasse apud Graecos* are so alien to the context, which contrasts exclusively *Hebraeos* to *nos*, as to betray the hand of the copyist.

Besides Letbert of Lille, the Pseudo-Haymo also seems to be one of the sources of the Pseudo-Bede. According to Dom Morin,<sup>47</sup> J. D. Bruce has noticed several close parallels between the two authors, though he gave priority to the latter. I only found one place which runs identical in both commentaries. It is the text on prophecy which we mentioned before.<sup>48</sup>

Pseudo-Bede, PL 93, 479C—480A

Definitur autem sic prophetia: prophetia est divina inspiratio quae rerum eventus aut per visiones aut per facta aut per quorundam dicta immutabili veritate demonstrat.

Per visiones, ut Ezechieli, Danieli et beato Ioanni in extasi positis, divina inspiratio per quasdam imagines futura praemonstravit.

Per facta, ut in immolatione Abrahæ, qui monitus . . . arietem . . . pro filio immolavit; in qua immolatione . . . ductus est etc. Potest quoque prophetia per facta in Iacob accipi, qui transpositis manibus Manassen et Ephraim, filios Ioseph, benedixit . . . In quo divina inspiratio . . . electus fuit.

Prophetia autem per dicta est, ut quod in Moyse de Christo legitur: "Suscitabo de fratribus vestris prophetam: tamquam meipsum audite", et ut Psalterium et quorundam dicta prophetarum.

Pseudo-Haymo, PL 116, 195B

Definitur autem prophetia sic: prophetia est divina inspiratio quae rerum eventus aut per visiones aut per facta aut per quorundam dicta immutabili veritate demonstrat.

Per visiones, ut Ezechieli et beato Ioanni in extasi positis.

Per facta, ut Abrahæ per immolationem arietis,

et Iacob, qui transpositis manibus Manassen et Ephraim, filios Ioseph, benedixit.

Per dicta, ut in Moyse de Christo legitur: "Suscitabo de fratribus vestris prophetam: ipsum tamquam me audite", vel in Psalterio.

<sup>47</sup> *Notes sur plusieurs écrits*, etc., 290 and 291.

<sup>48</sup> See above, p. 136.

Fit autem inspiratio praedicta duobus modis: aut gratia aut permissione. Gratia: ut in Moyse et in ceteris bonis. Permissione: ut in Sibylla vate et in infidelibus philosophis, qui multa divino instinctu de Christo praedixerunt. Quorum eloquia per argentea vasa . . .

Fit autem prophetia per dicta duobus modis: scil. aut gratia aut permissione. Gratia: ut in Moyse et ceteris bonis. Permissione: ut in Sibylla vate et in infidelibus philosophis, qui multa divino instinctu de Christo praedixerunt.

But for the long-winded additions of the Pseudo-Bede, the two texts show no difference. Hence one is a copy of the other or both depend on a common source not yet detected. To judge from its elaborate form, that of the Pseudo-Bede is most probably the later one. However that may be, we saw that even the original represents already the most advanced stage in the development of the texts on prophecy.<sup>49</sup> I suspect it derives from the Gloss of Gilbert de la Porrée, who is the first of all known commentators to speak in his prologue of the prophecies of the Sibylla and the infidel philosophers<sup>50</sup>: *Et fit in bonis ut in Isaia, et in malis ut in Balaam, Caïpha, Sibylla et philosophis infidelibus.*

As in the case then of the Pseudo-Haymo, the text of the Pseudo-Bede on prophecy necessarily implies that his commentary comes well after the Glosses of Anselm and Gilbert and after the publication of Letbert's work.

Except for the two passages just discussed, no other evident borrowings of the *Exegesis* have come to my knowledge. This is in keeping with the technique and method the Pseudo-Bede follows throughout his entire work. Indeed, of all the commentators of the time, he is the most prolix and in a way the most personal. Not as far as ideas are concerned, but in exploiting his sources — of which the commentaries of St. Augustine, the Pseudo-Remi d'Auxerre and Bruno the Carthusian come first — instead of copying slavishly, he prefers to paraphrase. The personal twist he thus gives to nearly all his sentences makes it hard to detect his literary contacts with other authors.

Still I have the impression that he draws constantly on the Glosses of Anselm of Laon and Gilbert de la Porrée. Let us compare for instance his commentary on psalm I, 6: *Ideo impii non resurgunt in iudicio*, with that of the *Glossa marginalis*. For the interpretation of the particu-

<sup>49</sup> See above, p. 136—137.

<sup>50</sup> Ms *Vat. lat.* 89, f. 1c, *Reg. lat.* 2094, f. 1c.

lar verse, both Anselm and the Pseudo-Bede make use of St. Augustine's *Enarrationes psalmorum* and St. Bruno's *Expositio in psalmos*. St. Augustine understands it solely of the resurrection of the dead,<sup>51</sup> but St. Bruno leaves the option between the resurrection of the body at the last judgement and the resurrection of the soul from sin in the present life.<sup>52</sup> Anselm of Laon adopts Bruno's exegesis, but develops the idea by designating, in line with the Apocalypse, the resurrection of the soul as *resurrectio prima*, and by adding a short description of the *duplex resurrectio*. The Pseudo-Bede, though drawing liberally on Augustine and Bruno alike, presents a text which bears all the peculiarities and reproduces all the developments of Anselm's Gloss; he furthermore improves on it:

Anselm, ed. Venice 1588

Ideo non resurgunt prima resurrectione ut se iudicent.

Vel ideo non resurgunt in futuro ut iudicent, vel ut iudicati in concilio, id est in collegio iustorum, quiescant.

Duae resurrectiones:

animae a peccatis in praesenti;

corporis a morte in futuro, qua fiet impassibile et immortale.

Pseudo-Bede, PL 93, 489BC

... non resurgunt in hac vita per primam [resurrectionem], id est ponendo se in iudicium ...

Et quia in hac prima resurrectione non resurgent, ideo ipsi peccatores, id est impii non erunt in consilio iustorum, id est in conventu iustorum, in futura resurrectione.

Duae enim sunt resurrectiones, altera prima, altera secunda.

Prima est in praesenti, quando aliquis a morte vitiorum per paenitentiam in anima resurgit.

Secunda erit in die iudicii, quando boni per immutabilitatem et impassibilitatem carnis ita in carne resurgunt.

Gilbert too seems to have influenced the Pseudo-Bede in the following instances, all taken from the commentary on psalm I:

Gilbert

*Vat. 89, f. 1c; Reg. 2094, f. 1d*

Vetus homo terrenus qui recedens a Deo factus est miser, non est imitandus ...

Attende ordinem ...

Non abiit ... id est non peccavit voluntate per se ...

Pseudo-Bede

PL 93, 484D—485A

Praecessit ... quidam miser et infelix, nulli imitandus ...

Nota ordinem verborum ...

Non abiit etiam voluntate quantum ad se ...

<sup>51</sup> *Enarr. in ps.*, I, n. 5 (PL 36, 69).

<sup>52</sup> PL 152, 642 B—643 A.

V f. 1d, R f. 2b

487 BC

Fructum dedit quando per orbem ecclesias constituit. Sed hoc tempore suo, id est competenti, confirmatis scilicet discipulis post resurrectionem et ascensionem, misso Spiritu sancto. Ante namque non: „Nondum erat Spiritus datus, quia Christus nondum erat glorificatus”.

Tempus suum . . . dicit fuisse postquam ipse Christus clarificatus est resurrectione et ascensione. Tempus enim non suum . . . fuit illud de quo dicitur: “Nondum erat Spiritus sanctus datus, quia Iesus nondum erat clarificatus” . . . Post clarificationem in apostolis dedit [fructum], . . . Spiritu sancto desuper misso, illuminatis et confirmatis, per quos apostolos Ecclesiam toto orbe constituit.

Examples of this kind could easily be multiplied, but it is hardly worth while to track them down. Indeed, apart altogether from the sources he has been using, the Pseudo-Bede reveals himself as a theologian of the middle of the twelfth century. True enough, his commentary has no outspoken dogmatic features, any more than other commentaries of the time. Still whatever doctrinal elements it contains, all carry us invariably back to the period of the *Summae* and *Sententiae*, which starts after Manegold's and even Anselm's lifetime. A consideration of the following definitions, formulas and opinions will prove the point.

Ps. IV, 2 (PL 93, 502 C): *Cum invocarem exaudivit me Deus*. Here the Pseudo-Bede reports the opinion of *quidam* according to whom Christ, though free from all fault, has nonetheless been tainted somehow by original sin:

Dicunt tamen quidam carnem Christi casum originalem quodam modo attigisse, materialiter scilicet, non personaliter. Omnis enim caro in Adam casum communiter pertulit. Attamen illa caro, quae Verbo adiuncta est, licet casum attigerit quantum ad materiam, quia de peccati carne nata est, tamen quantum ad personam Christi casus omnis expers iudicanda est.

This particular opinion, couched in these precise terms, is but an application of a general theory on original sin, the first traces of which go back to the so called *Sententiae Anselmi*<sup>53</sup> and to the collection *Prima rerum origo*.<sup>54</sup>

Ps. IV, 6 (505 AB): *Et sperate in Domino*. With reference to the word *sperate*, we find an analysis of the virtue of hope, which is evi-

<sup>53</sup> *Sent. Anselmi* (ed. F. Blimetzrieder in *Beiträge zur Gesch. der Philos. des Mittelalters*, 18, Munster i. W. 1915, 67): “Augustinus. Omnes quippe in eo peccaverunt, quia omnes unus homo in eo fuerunt, non personaliter sed materialiter, quia omnium materia in eo fuit.”

<sup>54</sup> Same text as in preceding note; quoted by O. Lottin, *Les théories du péché originel au XII<sup>e</sup> siècle*, in *Rech. théol. anc. médiév.*, II (1939) 23, n. 29.



dently influenced by the attempts, first made by Abelard<sup>55</sup> and to a greater extent by the Victorins,<sup>56</sup> to distinguish the objects of faith and hope:

Sperare in Domino est, cum vera de benefactis conscientia, fiducialiter remunerationem verorum et futurorum bonorum a Domino exspectare. Spes enim tantum est de futuris et veris bonis. De futuris ideo, quia nullus quod praeteritum est vel praesens sperat, sed tantum quod futurum est. De veris bonis autem ideo tantum est, quia dicit Apostolus: "Spes non confundit"; quod falsum esset, si aut de falsis bonis aut de malis spes esse posset. Ponitur tamen aliquando improprie sperare pro timere.

Ps. V, 7 (508 BD): *Perdes omnes qui loquuntur mendacium*. St. Augustine in his *Enarrationes*<sup>57</sup> takes advantage of this verse to expound his ideas on *mendacium*; among other things, he distinguishes two kinds of lies which are not great sins, namely the *mendacium ex ioco* and the *mendacium ex benignitate*. Like most commentators of the time, the Pseudo-Bede reproduces the remarks of St. Augustine, but unlike him, he has a special technical term for the *mendacium ex benignitate*; he calls it *mendacium officiale*<sup>58</sup>. Now this term, or rather the similar one *mendacium officiosum*, is of late origin. To my knowledge, it is not to be found in any commentary or *Summa* before the middle of the twelfth century. The first author to use it is Geroch of Reichersberg in his commentary on the psalms, i. h. l.,<sup>59</sup> which was begun around 1145.

Ps. LVII, 3 (783 D): *Operamini iniquitates in corde*. The Pseudo-Bede writes: *In hoc loco dicit beatus Augustinus: "Quidquid vis et non potes, pro facto Deus habet"*. This is not quite true. St. Augustine has: *Quidquid vis et non potes, factum Deus computat*.<sup>60</sup> In their commentaries Anselm of Laon<sup>61</sup> and Peter Lombard<sup>62</sup> respect the letter of the augustinian

<sup>55</sup> See for instance *Summa Scholarium*, I, 1 (PL 178, 981 C): "Est itaque fides tam bonarum quam malarum rerum et tam praesentibus vel praeteritis quam futuris . . . spes autem de bonis est tantum et de futuris."

<sup>56</sup> cf. *Summa Sent.*, I, 1 (PL 176, 43 C and 44 AB): "Spes est fiducia futurorum bonorum ex gratia Dei et ex bona conscientia veniens . . . Hoc distat inter fidem et spem quod fides est de praeteritis . . . et de praesentibus . . . et de futuris; spes autem de futuris tantum est. Item, fides est de bonis et malis, spes de bonis tantum adipiscendis."

<sup>57</sup> *Enarr. in ps.*, V, n. 7 (PL 85—86).

<sup>58</sup> PL 93, 508 B: "Sciendum tamen duo esse mendacia, quae, licet a culpa penitus libera non sint, parvum tunc [*lege tamen*] culpam habent. Quorum alterum fit causa iocandi . . . alterum vero est officiale, id est fit causa benevolentiae . . .".

<sup>59</sup> PL 193, 697 B: "Officiosa vero mendacia, quae fiunt non voluntate fallendi, sed consulendi, nec fiunt pro malitia sed pro benevolentia . . .".

<sup>60</sup> *Enarr. in ps.*, LVII, n. 4 (PL 36, 677).

<sup>61</sup> I. h. l. (ed. Venice 1588, 165c): "Quidquid vis et non potes, Deus factum putat."

<sup>62</sup> I. h. l. (PL 191, 535 B): "Quidquid vis et non potes, Deus factum imputat."

dictum. The form in which the Pseudo-Bede quotes it is a later elaboration which is only found around 1150.<sup>63</sup>

Ps. LXXVIII, 8 (912 D): *Ne memineris iniquitatum nostrarum*. In the course of his interpretation of this verse, the Pseudo-Bede mentions the strange opinion of those who held that relapsing into sin entails the reviviscence not only of all actual but also of original sin:

Unde constat quod si filius quilibet imitator fuerit paternae iniquitatis, ipsa etiam peccata patrum super eum redundabunt. Quod quidam de originalibus post baptismum quoque dicunt. Aiunt enim quod et originalia et actualia praecedentia taliter in baptisate remunerantur, si quae ibi promittuntur servantur; si autem aliquis ibi sola tantum verba dedit et ad vomitum relabatur, reus erit eorum quae remissa fuerant.

This extravagant opinion is one of the many answers given to the Scholastic question: *Utrum peccata redeunt*. It appears, within that question, for the first time in the *Decretum Gratiani*, which quotes in its support a text of the Pseudo-Raban Maur<sup>64</sup>.

Ps. LXXXIII, 6 (933 CD): *Ascensiones in corde suo disposuit*. This verse gives the Pseudo-Bede the opportunity of inserting a short but charming summary of the chief christian virtues, theological and cardinal:

Ascensiones vocat virtutes agendaе vitae necessarias, scilicet fidem, spem, charitatem, et has etiam quatuor principales virtutes, scilicet prudentiam, iustitiam, temperantiam, fortitudinem et quae sub illis sunt. Prudentia est qua discernimus inter bonum et malum. Iustitia est qua cuique tribuimus quod debemus... Temperantia est qua libidinem et omnes carnales concupiscentias refrenamus. Fortitudo vero est qua adversa tolerantur. Et hae virtutes praesentis tantum sunt vitae, non futurae.

Though the component parts of this summary all derive from the patristic age, the composition itself and the fixed terminology point unmistakably to the period of the *Summae* and *Sententiae*.

Finally, apropos of psalm CX, 5, the Pseudo-Bede adduces the well known definition: *Sacramentum est sacrae rei signum*<sup>65</sup>. But this substitute for the authentic augustinian definition *Sacramentum est sacrum signum* came into being only at the very end of Anselm's lifetime.<sup>66</sup>

<sup>63</sup> Cf. the *Summa* ms Vat. Barb. lat. 484, f. 165c: "Quod vis et non potes, Deus pro facto accipit."

<sup>64</sup> *De Paenit.*, IV, c. 1 (ed. Friedberg 1229): "Item Rabanus: § 1 *Tradidit eum tortoribus* etc. Considerandum est quod dicit *universum debitum*, quia non solum peccata quae post baptismum homo egit reputabuntur ei ad poenam, verum etiam peccata originalia quae in baptismo ei dimissa sunt."

<sup>65</sup> PL 93, 1038 A.

<sup>66</sup> Cf. D. Van den Eynde, *Les Définitions des sacrements pendant la première période de la théologie scolastique*, Louvain 1950, 18—27. The oldest attestation in Rupert of Deutz, *Epist. ad Cunonem* (PL 169, 202).

These different examples fit in perfectly with the frequent and varied use of the expression *regio dissimilitudinis*. They all go to show that the *Exegesis in librum psalmorum* of the Pseudo-Bede, far from being a work of Manegold or any other writer of the eleventh century, is strictly contemporary with the *Summae* and *Sententiae* which were published between the years 1225—1250. This is in agreement with our conclusions about the sources of the *Exegesis*.

Although more definite criteria are lacking, the particular use the Pseudo-Bede makes of the expression *regio similitudinis*, his elaboration of the Pseudo-Haymo's text on prophecy and his acquaintance with several refined theories of early Scholasticism point rather to the end than to the beginning of the aforesaid period.

But I do not think that the Pseudo-Bede wrote after the middle of the twelfth century. If he had done so, the traces of the three *Glossaturae*, the *minor*, the *media* and the *maior*, which became standard works about that time, would have left more easily recognisable traces. It is safer then to date the Pseudo-Bede's *Exegesis* from the years 1140—1150.

##### 5. The Commentary attributed to Bruno of Würzburg.

Bruno, bishop of Würzburg from 1034 till his death, May 27 1045, has been credited with a work against the simonists and a commentary on the psalms.<sup>67</sup> If the very existence of the former is extremely doubtful, the latter has been preserved and is accepted by all authors as truly genuine. First edited, supposedly from Bruno's now lost autograph, at Würzburg in 1480 by von Reyer, it was republished in 1533 at Leipzig by Cochlaeus, and again by H. Denzinger in Migne, *Patrologia latina*, t. 142, col. 9—568.

In spite of the common opinion, it is impossible to maintain the authenticity of this *Expositio psalmorum* for the following reasons.

The prolegomena cite expressly a certain Papias as an authority on the matter of asterisks.<sup>68</sup> By the very nature of the quotation, the identification of this Papias with the Greek writer of the same name is excluded; the author meant is no other than Papias, the famous Italian glossographer and grammarian of the eleventh century.<sup>69</sup> Actually this

<sup>67</sup> On Bruno of Würzburg, see M. Manitius, *Gesch. der lateinischen Literatur des Mittelalters*, II, Munich 1931, 71—74.

<sup>68</sup> *Exp. psalmorum*, proleg. (PL 142, 41 B): "Quae signa, scilicet obeli asterisque sive, ut Papias dicit, asterisci . . .".

<sup>69</sup> On this author, see M. Manitius, *o. c.*, II, 717—724.

Papias speaks of the sign of the asterisc in one of his works, his so-called *Glossarium* or *Lexicon*.<sup>70</sup> Now, on the very first word of the same work, viz. *Aetas*, he says that king Henry III of Germany is in the thirteenth year of his reign.<sup>71</sup> Since Henry succeeded his father, Conrad III, in 1039, Papias must have begun his *Glossarium* thirteen years later, that is in 1052, eight years after Bruno's death. To this the last editor H. Denzinger<sup>72</sup> replied that the reigning years of Henry should not be counted from the time of his accession to the throne, but from the date of his coronation, which took place in 1028; thus Papias would have already begun the composition of his *Glossarium* in 1041, four years before Bruno died. But Denzinger's supposition is a poor escape, for, as Papias himself states in the preface, the *Glossarium* took ten years to complete,<sup>73</sup> so that it was not available before 1051. M. Manitius recognises the strength of the argument; yet he is at the same time so convinced of the authenticity of the *Expositio psalmorum*, that he prefers to believe that the quotation in the prolegomena refers not to the *Glossarium* but to one of Papias' lost works.<sup>74</sup>

Even the acceptance of such a weak position as this cannot save Bruno's authorship. A simple examination of the sources employed in the explanation of psalm I shows clearly that the earliest date of the *Expositio* that can be accepted is not the eleventh century but the middle of the twelfth. The commentary on psalm I, as on all the others, consists mainly of extracts taken word for word from Cassiodore. Here and there however, the author adds some details and even sentences which are to be found neither in his main source nor, — as the editor Denzinger would have us to believe, — in Augustine's *Enarrationes psalmorum*, but in the *Glossa* of Anselm of Laon and in the Commentary of Peter Lombard. This is already suggested by the comparison of the very first sentence in all four commentaries: indeed while Cassiodore explains the words *Beatus vir* by *cui omnia desiderata succedunt*,<sup>75</sup> and Anselm,<sup>76</sup> with Peter Lombard,<sup>77</sup> by *cui omnia optata succedunt*, the Pseudo-Bruno combines both readings, for he writes: *cui optata*

<sup>70</sup> Cf. M. Manitius, *o. c.*, II, 72 and 717—718.

<sup>71</sup> See text in M. Manitius, *o. c.*, II, 717.

<sup>72</sup> PL 142, 28 AB.

<sup>73</sup> *Lexicon*, prol.: "Opus quidem... a me quoque nuper per spatium circiter decem annorum prout potui adauctum et accumulatum...", in M. Manitius, *o. c.*, II, 723.

<sup>74</sup> *O. c.*, II, 72 and 718.

<sup>75</sup> *Expos. in Psalt.*, I, 1 (PL 70, 27 D).

<sup>76</sup> *Glossa interlin.*, i. h. l. (ed. Venice 1588, III, 87).

<sup>77</sup> *Comment. in ps.*, I, 1 (PL 191, 61 B).



*omnia vel desiderata succedunt.*<sup>78</sup> The fact becomes quite evident when, a little further on, we notice that entire sentences, absent from the work of Augustine, Cassiodore, Bruno the Carthusian and all the older commentators, occur textually in the Glosses of Anselm and Peter Lombard:

Pseudo-Bruno, PL 142, 49B

Beatus igitur qui non abiit cogitatione a Deo in regionem longinquam dissimilitudinis, id est cogitatione non peccavit, quamvis esset positus in conciliis impiorum, id est quamvis impii hoc molirentur...

Adam vero abiit, dum uxori a diabolo deceptae consensit. Impii vero hoc molientes sunt diaboli, Scribae et Pharisei...

51D

"Peribit" igitur pro "non novit" dixit. Sed et planius dicitur, quia hoc est nesciri quod perire et sciri manere et esse.

Lombard, PL 191, 61B

Beatus... vir... qui non abiit a Deo in regionem dissimilitudinis, id est cogitatione non peccavit, quamvis esset positus in consilio impiorum, id est quamvis impii hoc molirentur...

Non abiit iste sicut Adam, qui consensit uxori a diabolo deceptae. Impii hoc molientes daemones sunt et Scribae et Pharisei...

Glossa interlin., i. h. l.

"Peribit" pro "non novit". Sed planius dicitur, quia hoc est nesciri quod perire et sciri quod manere et esse.

These textual agreements speak for themselves. The Pseudo-Bruno of Würzburg draws directly on Anselm of Laon and more so on Peter Lombard. The supposition that he would be the lender instead of the borrower is too preposterous to need lengthy treatment. The way he speaks of the *regio longiqua dissimilitudinis*, combining thus the augustinian expression with the *regio longinqua* of the parable of the prodigal son,<sup>79</sup> sufficiently betrays the fact that he comes after Anselm's and Peter Lombard's commentaries. Whoever the Pseudo-Bruno of Würzburg really is, he was writing his *Expositio* around 1150: not earlier, for he is already very well acquainted with Peter Lombard's Gloss; not later, because, apart from psalm I, he takes no further account, it seems, of neither Anselm's nor Peter Lombard's commentaries, which became classical around the years 1150—1160.

Our long and tiresome inquiry into the earliest Scholastic commentaries on the Psalter has not been fruitless. It enabled us to disentangle their complicated relations and to settle the questions of chronology and authenticity of most of them. But its main value, it would seem, lies in the discovery of the important part that the commentary of

<sup>78</sup> *Expos. in ps.*, I, 1 (PL 142, 49 B).

<sup>79</sup> *Luc.* XV, 13.

Letbert of Lille played in the revival of the literature on the psalms during the first half of the twelfth century. We saw indeed that this seemingly insignificant work left definitive traces in all commentaries published after 1125, except in Peter Lombard's Gloss and in the *Expositio* of the Pseudo-Bruno of Würzburg; in some of them, especially in the *Glossula Gilberti Universalis*, it even manifests itself as the main authority of that time. Hitherto the influence of Letbert of Lille was gauged only indirectly through the surprisingly high number of manuscripts, — Dom Wilmart lists as many as twenty-six,<sup>80</sup> — in which his commentary is still preserved. Henceforth, as far as the Psalter is concerned, he must be ranked equally with and perhaps higher than the author of the *Glossa*, Anselm of Laon; at least he should be counted among the most influential commentators of the beginning of the century.

### Appendix

#### On the expression *regio dissimilitudinis*

The foregoing article, it will be remembered, grew out of the discovery of the expression *regio dissimilitudinis* in the earliest Scholastic commentaries on the Psalter. Since É. Gilson<sup>81</sup> called attention to the use of that expression by St. Bernard, modern scholars have been discussing its origin, sense and diffusion in the literature of early Scholasticism.<sup>82</sup> It is but natural then to conclude this article by checking the repercussions which our own findings might have on the outcome of the problem.

Previous studies made out that the expression *regio dissimilitudinis*, though of platonic-plotinian formation, entered into Scholastic literature through the single mention S. Augustine made of it, namely, in the *Confessions*.<sup>83</sup> How exactly this happened, is not yet clear.

The earliest attestations, known so far, have been found in the works of William of Saint-Thierry and Bernard of Clairvaux. The former

<sup>80</sup> *Le Commentaire sur les Psaumes imprimé sous le nom de Rufin*, in *Rev. béd.*, 31 (1914—1919) 260 and 276 Ps.

<sup>81</sup> *La théologie mystique de Saint Bernard* (Études de philos. médiév., 20), Paris 1934, 63, n. 1.

<sup>82</sup> Cf. A. E. Taylor, *Regio dissimilitudinis*, in *Arch. d'hist. doctrin. littér. du Moyen âge*, 9 (1934) 305—306; F. Chatillon, *Regio dissimilitudinis*, in *Mélanges É. Podechard*, Lyon 1945, 85—102; É. Gilson, "Regio dissimilitudinis" de Platon à saint Bernard de Clairvaux, in *Mediaeval Studies*, 9 (1947) 108—130; J. C. Didier, *Pour la fiche "Regio dissimilitudinis"*, in *Mélanges de Science relig.*, 8 (1951) 205—210.

<sup>83</sup> *Conf.*, VII, 10, n. 16 (PL 32, 742): ". . . et inveni longe me esse a te in regione dissimilitudinis."

uses it three times: once in his *Liber de natura et dignitate amoris*,<sup>84</sup> written between 1120 and 1135, a second time in his *De natura corporis*,<sup>85</sup> which belongs to the same years, and a third time in his commentary on the *Canticum*,<sup>86</sup> composed between 1135 and 1148. St. Bernard quotes it once in his *De gratia et libero arbitrio*,<sup>87</sup> slightly older than 1127, once in his 36th sermon on the *Canticum*<sup>88</sup> from the years 1138—1145 and three times in his undated *Sermo 42 de diversis*.<sup>89</sup>

After 1150, the expression seems to have spread more rapidly, at least in spiritual literature and in circles connected with the Cistercians. Up to the present, it has been found in a letter of the Cistercian cardinal Hugh de Trois-Fontaines (1153)<sup>90</sup>, in a sermon of Peter Lombard (1160,<sup>91</sup> in the Pseudo-Bernard's *De fuga et reductione filii prodigi* (after 1153),<sup>92</sup> in a letter of John of Orleans (1158—1172),<sup>93</sup> in the *Microcosmus* of Godefroid of Saint-Victor (c. 1185)<sup>94</sup> and in a letter of Adam of Perseigne (after 1185).<sup>95</sup>

The most difficult problem is that of the origins. It seems that William of Saint-Thierry has priority over St. Bernard. But in spite of their mutual friendship, it is by no means sure that the latter borrowed the expression from the former. According to É. Gilson,<sup>96</sup> he might even have taken it directly from the *Confessions*.

Our discovery of the occurrence of *regio dissimilitudinis* in the *Glossa* of Anselm of Laon and in four (or six)<sup>97</sup> subsequent commentaries of the time, is liable, I think, to throw some fresh light on the matter.

<sup>84</sup> PL 184, 401 A. See text below p. 152.

<sup>85</sup> PL 180, 725 C: "Nam ad imaginem et visionem Dei creatam . . . , habitat in regione dissimilitudinis."

<sup>86</sup> PL 180, 494 B. See text below p. 152.

<sup>87</sup> X, 32 (PL 182, 1018 C): "Sed neque in hoc saeculo aequè inveniri uspiam posset similitudo . . . , si non . . . Sapientia in carne appareret . . . , hoc est imaginem suam . . . tolleret de regione dissimilitudinis."

<sup>88</sup> *Sermo in Cant.*, 36, 5 (PL 183, 969 D): "Nonne se ita intuens clara luce veritatis, inveniet se in regione dissimilitudinis?"

<sup>89</sup> *Serm. de div.*, 42, 2—3 (PL 183, 661 D, 662 B, 663 B): "Regiones tuae quinque sunt, quae perambulant ad negotiandum institores tui, ubi te quaerunt dilecti tui et inveniunt electi tui. Prima est regio dissimilitudinis . . . In hac diisimilitudinis regione, quid negotiamur, Domine Deus? . . . Haec sunt mercimonia quae inveniuntur in regione dissimilitudinis."

<sup>90</sup> Cf. *Epist. S. Bernardi*, 488 (PL 182, 695 C).

<sup>91</sup> Ed. B. Hauréau, *Notices et extraits*, III, Paris 1891, 44—49.

<sup>92</sup> *Parabola* I, 2 (PL 183, 757 D).

<sup>93</sup> *Epist. ad Ervisium abb.* (PL 196, 1388 C).

<sup>94</sup> *Microc.*, c. 226 (ed. Ph. Delhay 64).

<sup>95</sup> *Epist.* 25 (PL 211, 672 C).

<sup>96</sup> *Regio dissimilitudinis* etc., in *Mediaeval Studies*, 9 (1947) 128—130.

<sup>97</sup> Gilbert de la Porrée and the Pseudo-Haymo knew the formula as used by the *Glossa ordinaria* apropos of psalm I, 1, but preferred to use an equivalent expression, cf. above p. 122.

Two facts are beyond discussion: Anselm's Gloss is older than any of the writings of either William of Saint-Thierry or Bernard, and the four (or six) other commentaries depend, in their use of the formula, upon the *Glossa*. The first statement needs no further proof, as Anselm was already dead in 1117. The second is warranted by the fact that all four (or six) commentaries reproduce the expression or its substitute, together with the context, in the same place as the Gloss, namely, apropos of psalm I, 1. Indeed, instead of quoting St. Augustine's sentence *Inveni longe me esse a te in regione dissimilitudinis*, they all imitate Anselm by saying *abire* or *recedere a Deo in regionem dissimilitudinis*.<sup>98</sup>

Now this is exactly what William of Saint-Thierry writes in two of the three places where he uses the expression. We read indeed in his *Liber de natura et dignitate amoris*:<sup>99</sup>

Videbat (Dominus) hominem abiisse in regionem dissimilitudinis tam longe ut per se nec sciret nec posset redire.

And again in his commentary on the *Canticum*:<sup>100</sup>

Abi a me, a similitudine mea, in locum dissimilitudinis; a te autem in devia concupiscentiae et curiositatis.

Is it presumptuous then to suppose that he did so under the influence, direct or indirect, of Anselm's *Glossa* on psalm I, 1?

The temptation to accept that explanation grows stronger when we consider that two of the commentators mentioned, viz. the Pseudo-Bede and Peter Lombard, in making a relatively extensive use of the same expression, show a marked preference for the very form in which it was handed down to them by the *Glossa*.

I have cited above the six instances in the commentary of the Pseudo-Bede, where, apart from psalm I, 1, the formula occurs.<sup>102</sup> Whereas none betrays the slightest knowledge of the particular context of St. Augustine's sentence, four speak like the *Glossa* of *recedere* or *abire in regionem dissimilitudinis*.

The sermons of Peter Lombard are another rich mine for the use of the formula in question. Besides the one published by B. Hauréau, in which J. C. Didier notices it two times,<sup>103</sup> there are eight other sermons

<sup>98</sup> Cf. texts above p. 121.

<sup>99</sup> PL 184, 401 A.

<sup>100</sup> PL 180, 494 B.

<sup>102</sup> Cf. texts above p. 140.

<sup>103</sup> Pour la fiche "Regio dissimilitudinis", 209.



containing fourteen texts that are to the point. Here follows the complete list of all sixteen instances:<sup>104</sup>

*Sermo 7* (PL 171, 404 D): ... filius prodigus in *regione dissimilitudinis* dissipavit substantiam suam, vivendo luxuriose, et cupiens saturari de reliquis porcorum, adhaesit uni civium regionis illius, id est diabolo.

*Sermo 9* (847 C): Filius ergo honorabilis Ephraim, puer delicatus, transmigravit ab imagine et similitudine Dei, in qua conditus erat, in *dissimilitudinis regionem*.

*Ib.* (848 D): His tribus traxit diabolus hominem in *regionem dissimilitudinis*, qui Dei similitudinem, in qua conditus fuerat, tribus aliis tenebat, scil. memoria, intellectu, dilectione.

*Ib.* (850 D): ... ideoque spiritus propheticus hominem qui in terram alienam, id est in *regionem dissimilitudinis* abscesserat, honorata appellatione revocat ad prudentiam . . .

*Sermo 12* (445 C): Intellexisti breviter nostrae aversionis atque elongationis incentiva, et quemadmodum his quatuor modis itur in *regionem dissimilitudinis*.

*Sermo 14* (856 AB): Sicut enim tribus modis a Deo receditur in *regionem dissimilitudinis*, scilicet cogitatu, verbo et opere malo, ita tribus modis in contrarium versis proficitur et ad Dei similitudinem revertitur, scil. cogitando bonum, loquendo et operando.

*Ib.* (857 B): In hac aqua sine substantia perdidit ille prodigus filius substantiam suam quam a patre acceperat et uni civium regionis adhaesit, scil. *regionis dissimilitudinis*, id est diabolo.

*Sermo 17* (610 C): Voluit enim (Dominus) in *regione dissimilitudinis* nos alere lacte suae Incarnationis, quo crescere nos faceret ad suavissimum et inaestimabilem gustum suae divinitatis.

*Sermo 20* (354 B): Peccantes enim, id est recedentes a Deo in *regione dissimilitudinis* septem corruptelae excipiunt.

*Sermo 23* (798 B): Homo vere, cum esset in abundantia divitiarum . . . diabolicae persuasioni elatione superba acquiescens, a Deo in *regione(m) dissimilitudinis* abiit, a bono declinans, malo adhaesit.

*Sermo 26* (434 AB): A iustitia ad iniquitatem, a quiete ad miseriam, a beatitudine in mortem, ab accepta portione substantiae, quae eum contingebat, ad *regionem* longinquam abiit, scil. *dissimilitudinis*, qua elongatur a Deo, non loco, quia ubique totus ipse et aeternaliter, adhaerens uni civium regionis illius, id est diabolo, qui est princeps *regionis dissimilitudinis*, qua elongatur a Deo.

*Ib.* (436 A): Haec trinitas . . . est *regio dissimilitudinis*, ubi memoria dissipatur, intellectus caecatur, voluntas foedatur.

*Sermo 27* (ms Paris Nat. lat. 3537, f. 29v): Hic (Assur) violenter opprimebat Adam, hic est genus humanum, hic est filius prodigus qui dissipabat omnia sua bona, ut Lucas (ait), unde adhaesit uni civium regionis illius, id est diabolo, qui est civis, immo etiam princeps *regionis illius dissimilitudinis*.

<sup>104</sup> In numbering Peter Lombard's sermons, we follow the list published in the prolegomena of *Petri Lombardi Libri IV Sententiarum*, Quaracchi 1916, XXX—XXXI, and revised by J. de Ghellinck, art. *Pierre Lombard*, in *Dict. théol.*, XII, 1961—1962.

*Sermo* 29 (ed. B. Hauréau, *Notices et Extraits*, III, 45, lin. 1): Videntur haec verba esse peccatoris qui longius advolavit in regionem longinquam, in *regionem dissimilitudinis*, ubi prave et inordinate vivendo dissipavit substantiam suam.

*Ib.* (ib. 45, lin. 26): Quatuor sunt alae sive pennae quibus advolavit in *regionem dissimilitudinis*, in qua tribus vinculis irretitur et ligatur ne liberum habeat reditum.

Again, of these sixteen instances, thirteen are constructed with the verb *adire* or some synonym, like *transmigrare*, *recedere*, *abscedere* etc. In several, the context contains many reminders of the fundamental passage of Peter Lombard's commentary on psalm I, 1.<sup>105</sup>

It is strange on the other hand that among the forty odd quotations,<sup>106</sup> previous to 1160, not one gives the original construction of St. Augustine.<sup>107</sup> The only reference to the text of the *Confessions*, that I have met so far, is to be found in the following *incipit* of one of the sermons contained in ms *Paris Nat. lat.* 14590, f. 154:<sup>108</sup>

In festivitate S. Augustini. Invenit se Augustinus longe esse a Deo in regione dissimilitudinis. De solemnitate venerabilis patris nostri Augustini sermones exquisitos saepe audistis.

But the contents of this codex, as described by Hauréau<sup>109</sup> consist of sermons which were all preached to the canons of Saint-Victor as late as the second half of the twelfth century.

From these facts, I would not dare conclude apodictically that Anselm of Laon was responsible for the introduction of the expression *regio dissimilitudinis* in Scholastic theology. It is always possible, though not probable, that someone preceded him. At least, of all the authors who have used it, he is the oldest that we know of up to the present, and there can be no doubt that his *Glossa in psalmos* was one of the main channels, if not the only one, through which it spread in the spiritual literature of the time.

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<sup>105</sup> Especially in the sermons 14, 23 and 26.

<sup>106</sup> To the ten previously known (three of William of Saint-Thierry, five of St. Bernard, one of Peter Lombard and one of Hugh de Trois-Fontaines, exactly twenty-six new ones should be added, viz. five from the commentaries on the psalms, six from the Pseudo-Bede and fifteen from Peter Lombard.

<sup>107</sup> The only possible exception could be, according to É. Gilson (see above n. 96), the text of St. Bernard quoted n. 88.

<sup>108</sup> Cf. B. Hauréau, *Notices et Extraits*, III, 63.

<sup>109</sup> *O. c.*, III, 18—67.

# GULIELMI DE WARE, O. F. M. DOCTRINA PHILOSOPHICA PER SUMMA CAPITA PROPOSITA

**S**eries doctorum insignium qui scholam franciscanam in aetate eius aurea, inter S. Bonaventuram scilicet et Duns Scotum, operibus magni momenti illustraverunt, continua est, per consequens etiam evolutio doctrinalis eiusdem scholae per gradus procedit. Saltus tamen, et non parvi, adsunt in nostra cognitione quam de hoc progressu habemus; nam etiamsi auctores simulac eorum opera iam dudum innotuerunt, doctrina in iis tradita nondum est sufficienter explorata. Quod quidem mirum non est si prae oculis habetur, quantum sit laboriosum aut editiones criticas postulatis hodiernis aptatas parare aut opera adhuc inedita sub aspectu doctrinali explanare.

Inter auctores franciscales huius aetatis, quorum doctrina philosophico — theologica ignota vel fragmentarie tantum nota est, sine dubio eminet Gulielmus de Ware, dictus etiam Doctor Fundatus, quem constans traditio tamquam magistrum Doctoris Subtilis indicat. — In praesenti articulo eius mentem intendimus de principalibus problematibus philosophicis ex opere suo adhuc inedito summatim colligere paucisque exponere.

## *Notula de vita et opere.*

a) De vita Gulielmi de Ware (Warre, Guarro, Varro etc.) perpauca nobis transmissa sunt: natus est loco Ware (Hertfordshire) prope Londinum in Anglia; Ordinem Minoriticum iuvenili aetate ingressus, Provinciae Londinensis alumnus fuit. Studiis — haec iam in coniectura sunt posita — Oxonii absolutis, ibidem tamquam baccalaureus Sententiae legit, postea vero Parisiis, paulo ante Duns Scotum, docuit. In documentis iam inde a saeculo XIV ut magister Scoti laudatur, saeculo vero subsequenti huiusmodi traditio communis evasit simul cum titulis honorificis, utpote: „doctor praeclarus“, „doctor profundus“, praesertim autem „*doctor fundatus*“ eidem passim attributis.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> De vita et opere Gulielmi de Ware optimae disserit E. Longpré, *Maîtres Franciscains de Paris: Guillaume de Ware*, in *La France Franciscaine*, V 1922, pp. 71—82, ubi tam documenta antiqua quam studia moderniora recensentur.

b) Unicum opus Gulielmi de Ware, quod hucusque innotuit, est scriptum super quatuor libros *Sententiarum* Petri Lombardi,<sup>2</sup> quod quidem non continet commentarium verum et proprium, sed potius quaestiones super problemata maioris ponderis quae occasione textus Magistri tractari solent. Qua de causa non omnes distinctiones exponuntur neque quaestiones super quatuor libros aequa ratione distributae sunt, habentur enim super primum librum 101, super secundum 53, super tertium 37, super quartum vero 39 quaestiones, quarum titulos A. Daniels evulgavit<sup>3</sup>. Tempus compositionis huius operis, si considerantur auctores ibidem saepe citati, ut Henricus Gandavensis, Godefridus de Fontibus, Aegidius Romanus, Richardus de Mediavilla, vel alii nunc in textu nunc vero in margine passim nominati, ut Philippus de Bridlington, Ioannes de Berewick, Petrus de Baldeswelle et Thomas Rundel,<sup>4</sup> magna cum probabilitate inter annos 1290—1305 circumscribi potest.<sup>5</sup> — Quaestiones Doctoris Fundati, immerito sane, usque hodie ineditae remanserunt, exceptis 23 quaestionibus, maxima ex parte ad thologiam spectantibus, sparsim editis.<sup>6</sup> Certe, qui hoc scriptum critica ratione edendum suscipiet, haud communes difficultates superare debet, tum quia in permultis codicibus asservatur,<sup>7</sup> tum quia, iudicio

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Bibliographiam usque ad an. 1938 exhibet J. Lechner, *Wilhelm von Ware*, in *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche*, X 1938, p. 9108, cui adde: J. M. Bissen, *Question inédite du Guillaume de Ware*, O. F. M. sur le motif de l'incarnation, in *Études Franciscaines*, XLVI 1934, pp. 218—22; E. Magrini, *La produzione letteraria di Guglielmo di Ware*, in *Miscellanea Francescana*, XXXVI 1936, pp. 12—32, XXXVIII 1938, pp. 411—29; A. Emmen, *Mariologische ideeën bij Willem van Ware*, in *Studia Catholica*, XXI 1946, pp. 134—73; J. Lechner, *Die mehrfachen Fassungen des Sentenzenkommentars des Wilhelm von Ware O. F. M.*, in *Franziskanische Studien*, XXXI 1949, pp. 14—31.

<sup>2</sup> Utrum Noster alia quoque opera scripserit necne, nescimus. Argumenta quibus E. Magrini, *art. cit.*, nititur probare Gulielmum praeter *Quaestiones in Sententias* alia quinque opera scripsisse ad minus, neminem persuadent.

<sup>3</sup> *Zu den Beziehungen zwischen Wilhelm von Ware und Johannes Duns Scotus*, in *Franziskanische Studien*, IV 1917, pp. 221—38. In paginis sequentibus *Quaestiones Gulielmi* brevitatis causa iuxta numerationem A. Daniels allegabimus, adiecto folio codicis Laurent., Plut. 33 dext. l. *Quaestiones per singulos libros* sic dividuntur: I, qq. 1—101; II, qq. 102—154; III, qq. 155—191; IV, qq. 192—230.

<sup>4</sup> De his quatuor ultimis auctoribus cf. A. G. Little — F. Pelster, *Oxford Theology and Theologians*, Oxford 1934, pp. 248, 278; J. Lechner, *Beiträge zum mittelalterl. Franziskanerschrifttum, vornehmlich der Oxforder Schule des 13/14. Jahrh., auf Grund einer Florentiner Wilhelm von Ware-Hs.*, in *Franziskanische Studien*, XIX 1932, pp. 99—127.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. E. Longpré, *art. cit.*, p. 77; F. Pelster, *Duns Scotus nach englischen Handschriften*, in *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie*, LI 1927, pp. 678; F. Stegmüller, *Repertorium Commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi*, Herbipoli 1947, I, p. 1428.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Stegmüller, *op. cit.*, 142.

<sup>7</sup> Elenchus codicum magis completus habetur ap. F. Stegmüller, *loco cit.* Sine dubio adhuc alii codices innotescent.



J. Lechner,<sup>8</sup> hi codices idem opus in tribus, vel forsitan in quatuor, redactionibus ab invicem plus minusve discrepantibus continent.

Nostra praesens elucubratio fundatur super codicem qui habetur Florentiae, in Bibl. Laurentiana, Plut. 33, dext. 1 (membr., mm. 347/236, ff. 222, plenis paginis, manu anglica initio vel circa medietatem saec. XIV exaratus), quem iam plures variis sub aspectibus illustraverunt,<sup>9</sup> quique absque omni dubio opus genuinum Doctoris Fundati continet. Praeter hunc quoad locos maioris momenti aspeximus etiam duos alios codices Florentinos, scilicet Bibl. Nat. conv. sopp. A. 4. 42 (= A) et C. 4.991 (= C), non ea quidem intentione ut lectiones variantes notemus, sed ea tantum ut "solutiones variantes", si adsint, indicemus. Ad methodum vero quod attinet, opportunum visum est nobis verba auctoris frequenter et aliquando etiam abunde citare, partim quia non videmus quid prosit lectorem ad opus ineditum, quod prae manibus habere vix poterit, simpliciter remittere; partim quia hoc modo facultas datur auctori mentem suam propriis verbis explicandi. Nec intendimus sententias Doctoris Fundati cum opinionibus auctorum qui ipsum praecesserunt aut secuti sunt ex professo comparare, nam tali methodo non articulum sed librum scribere oporteret.

## I. Relatio inter philosophiam et theologiam.

Gulielmus de Ware quaestionem specialem de relatione inter philosophiam et theologiam non instituit; nihilominus e quaestionibus prologi, ubi investigat utrum theologia sit scientia, quid sit eius subiectum et finis etc., sufficienter colligi potest quid de hac re senserit. Tempore enim suo hoc problema speciale momentum ac gravitatem induit, causa praesertim Averroistarum, qui concentum fidei et rationis in dubium revocarunt.

### 1. Theologia Dei et theologia nostra.

Cum Doctor Fundatus de theologia tanquam scientia loquitur, sedulo distinguit inter *theologiam in se* et *theologiam per accidens*, seu quoad nos, homines viatores.<sup>10</sup> Theologia, primo modo considerata, est illa

<sup>8</sup> *Die mehrfachen Fassungen cit.*

<sup>9</sup> Accuratam huius codicis descriptionem videsis ap. P. Muscat, *Gulielmi de Ware quaestio inedita de unitate Dei*, in *Antonianum*, II 1927, pp. 137s; auctoritates in eodem codice citatas collegit H. Spettmann, *Die philosophiegeschichtliche Stellung des Wilhelm von Ware*, in *Philosophisches Jahrbuch der Görresgesellschaft*, XL 1927, pp. 401—13; XLI 1928, pp. 42—49; de notis marginalibus, studio dignis, optime egit J. Lechner, *Beiträge cit.*

<sup>10</sup> Etiam Duns Scotus distinguit theologiam 'in se' et 'in nobis'; vide *Ordinatio* I, prologus, n. 144: "Circa solutionem huius quaestionis sic procedo:

cognitio quam Deus ipse habet de se, vel angeli et beati in patria de ipso; nil mirum igitur si theologia, hoc sub aspectu accepta, est scientia, immo scientia perfectissima, certissima et evidentissima. Sed res aliter se habet si theologia comparatur ad nos: ad hoc enim ut theologia, vel quaecumque alia disciplina, sit scientia nobis, necesse est ut perfecte cognoscamus principia eius. Sed principia huius scientiae sunt articuli fidei, qui non sunt nobis noti ex evidentia rei, nec in se nec per aliquid aliud evidenter notum; qua de causa theologia nostra non est scientia. — Recitatis igitur atque refutatis opinionibus S. Thomae, Godefridi de Fontibus et Henrici Gandavensis,<sup>11</sup> Noster suam “opinionem propriam” (ita notatur in margine) his verbis comprehendit:

“Ideo dico aliter, quod accipiendo scientiam perfectam et propriam, haec scientia in se perfecta est, immo perfectissima et certissima, et hoc ex evidentia rei; homini tamen viatori, et hoc de lege communi, non est scientia. Primum patet, quia ista est de principiis, scilicet articulis fidei, quae secundum se sunt certissima et evidentissima et notissima et verissima, tamen nobis non, eo quod nobis non sunt nota ex evidentia rei, sed solum Deo et beatis in patria; et ideo *nobis non est perfecte scientia*“ (Q. 3, f. 4v).

Iam manifestum est quod causa huius defectus non in theologia ipsa, sed in nobis quaerenda est: ex parte enim obiecti nihil deest theologiae quominus sit scientia; iamvero ratio scientiae ex parte obiecti sumitur, quod essentialiter respicit, non autem ex parte subiecti in quo est, et quod accidentaliter tantum respicit:

“Quod autem theologia non est nobis scientia, non est ex defectu aliquo ex parte sua, sed propter parvitatem intellectus nostri, qui non potest in via attingere ad articulos fidei, de quibus est (theologia), ut intelligat ea ut sunt intelligibilia secundum se. Exemplum de sole, qui secundum se est maxime visibilis, non tamen oculo noctuae. . . . Argumentum in contrarium verum concludit, quod haec scientia in se et in comparatione ad obiectum suum est certissima scientia, et ideo debet vere concedi scientia, quia *in ordine ad obiectum attenditur vera ratio scientiae*, non autem in ordine ad subiectum in quo; sed accidit

primo distinguo de theologia in se et de theologia in nobis” (ed. Vaticana 1950, I, p. 95). De quaestione utrum theologia per se et proprie debeat dici scientia speculativa vel practica, cf. L. Amorós, *La teología como ciencia práctica en la escuela franciscana en los tiempos que preceden a Escoto*, in *Archives doctrinales et littéraire du Moyen âge*, IX 1934, pp. 261—303, ubi pp. 291—303 quaestio 4a Gulielmi de Ware edita est.

<sup>11</sup> Hi sunt doctores quorum nomina in margine codicis nostri iuxta opiniones a Gulielmo recitatas apparent. Quid singuli de nostro problemate docuerint, supervacaneum putamus hic inquirere.

subiecto, quia essentialiter scientia respicit obiectum suum et refertur ad ipsum, accidentaliter respicit subiectum hoc vel illud; aliter idem bis diceretur essentialiter et aequè primo" (*Ibidem*).

## 2. Theologia et metaphysica.

Theologia et metaphysica in doctrina Doctoris Fundati tali intervallo separantur quo quaelibet confusio a priori excluditur. Verum quidem est quod Deus non solum in theologia est subiectum, sed quodammodo, scilicet in quantum ens, etiam in metaphysica, quippe quae considerat ens in quantum ens, et sic omne ens, sive creatum sive increatum; sed ex hoc nullo modo sequitur quod metaphysica sit superior scientia quam theologia, vel, ut dici solet, quod theologia subalternetur metaphysicae; nam in theologia Deus subiectum est ut supernaturaliter notus, in metaphysica vero ut naturaliter cognitus:

"Ideo dicitur aliter, quod *Deus in metaphysica non est subiectum* nec contentum sub subiecto *nisi ut naturaliter et lumine naturali notus est*. Sed Deus est subiectum theologiae ut supernaturaliter et in lumine supernaturali cognitus est. Et ideo Deus ut est hic subiectum, non cadit sub ente ut ens est subiectum in metaphysica, quia ens non quocumque modo est subiectum in metaphysica, sed ut naturaliter cognitum" (Q. 5, f. 7v).

Theologia utique praeter Deum considerat etiam creaturas, sed nonnisi in quantum ordinantur ad Deum; eodem modo ac ex. gr. metaphysica habet pro subiecto principalissimo substantiam, cetera vero praedicamenta solummodo in relatione ad substantiam considerat:

"Ut si ponatur quod metaphysica habeat substantiam pro subiecto principalissimo, et quod de ceteris praedicamentis non consideret nisi prout attributionem habent ad substantiam, sicut aliqui ponunt<sup>12</sup>, et credo quod sit verum. Similiter in proposito: Deus est subiectum principale et formale huius scientiae, et ceterae creaturae non considerantur hic nisi per attributionem ad Deum" (*Ibidem*).

Theologia et metaphysica in hoc quoque differunt quod prima est scientia specialis et considerat subiectum speciale sub ratione speciali, alia econtra est scientia generalis de subiecto generali sub ratione generali:

<sup>12</sup> Eadem comparatione utitur etiam Henricus Gandavensis in *Summa Quaestionum ordinariarum*, art. XIX, q. 1 (ed. Parisiis 1520) I, ff. 114v—115r et 117v; ipse tamen non censet exemplum, quantum ad metaphysicam spectat, veritati respondere. Ceterum nec Doctor Fundatus intendit hic negare ens esse subiectum metaphysicae; potest enim ens esse subiectum communissimum, substantia vero subiectum principalissimum.

“Item, et hoc est melius, sicut scientia generalis ad subiectum generale et sub ratione generali, ita scientia specialis ad subiectum speciale et sub ratione speciali. Cum ergo scientia generalis, ut generalis est, habet subiectum generale sive commune et sub ratione communi, sicut metaphysica; scientia specialis, ut specialis est, habebit subiectum speciale et sub ratione speciali. Sed ista scientia est scientia specialis; ergo subiectum suum erit speciale et sub ratione speciali. Ideo dico quod haec ratio bonitatis; et ita *Deus sub ratione boni et finis erit hic subiectum*. Cuius ratio est quia scientia nobilissima est de subiecto nobilissimo et sub ratione nobilissima, . . . quae quidem ratio est ratio boni et finis”<sup>13</sup> (Q. 5, f. 7r).

Tandem, alius est finis theologiae et alius metaphysicae: haec namque prosequitur nudam cognitionem veri naturalis, illa vero cognitionem veri supernaturalis, cum tendentia ad bonum supernaturale:

“Ideo dico quod finis istius scientiae (sc. theologiae) tantum est unicus, per se dico et proprius; et non dilectio boni nec cognitio veri ut stans in nuda cognitione, sed cognitio veri ut confesse, hoc est concorditer sive consonanter se habens appetitui recto tendenti in bonum supernaturale divinum, modo supernaturali” (Q. 1, f. 2r).

Insufficienter igitur assignant distinctionem inter theologiam naturalem seu theodiceam et theologiam supernaturalem qui dicunt quod sicut “theologiae naturalis est finis proprius cognitio naturalis veri, quare et alterius theologiae cognitio veri supernaturalis”, nam iuxta Gulielmum “theologia humana est tantum ut sciamus, alia non solum ut sciamus, sed ut boni fiamus”<sup>14</sup> (*Ibidem*).

## II. Theoria cognitionis.

Problema cognitionis in omni doctrina philosophica momentum fundamentale occupat. A solutione namque quaestionum: utrum cognitio veritatis sit nobis possibilis, quibus mediis fiat, quousque se extendat

<sup>13</sup> Noster hic Gandavensem impugnat, qui *op. cit.*, art. XIX, q. 2, (I, f. 116v—118r) asserit Deum simpliciter et absolute esse subiectum in theologia; ipse vero impugnatur a Scoto: iuxta cuius sententiam theologia est de Deo sub ratione qua est ‘haec essentia’, cf. *Ordinatio*, prologus, nn. 161—63 et 167 (I, pp. 107ss).

<sup>14</sup> Fundatus hic sine dubio in mente habuit verba Aristotelis de fine scientiae moralis, in *Ethica Nicom.*, II, c. 2: “Quoniam igitur doctrina haec omnis non cognitionis causa suscepta est ut ceterae; non enim quid sit virtus quaerimus, ut cognoscamus, sed ut boni efficiamur: alioqui enim nihil ad beatitudinem conferret” (ed. Firmin-Didot, Parisiis 1878) II, p. 15, ll. 34—37. Cf. etiam S. Bonaventura, *Sent.* I, procemii q. 3, Resp.: “Unde hic est contemplationis gratia, et ut boni fiamus, principaliter tamen ut boni fiamus” (*Opp. omn.* I, p. 13 b).



et huiusmodi, dependat etiam possibilitas metaphysicae in genere et theodiceae in specie. Cohaerens atque continuata expositio horum problematum apud Fundatum difficilis redditur eo quod ipse haec et similia raro sub proprio titulo tractat, nec facile diiudicari potest quamnam ex multis opinionibus, quas recitat, tandem suam faciat.

### 1. Cognitio sensitiva.

Iuxta axioma communiter receptum: "nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit prius in sensu",<sup>15</sup> etiam Gulielmus de Ware fatetur quod "omnis cognitio naturalis nostra ortum habet a sensu" (Q. 2, f. 2 v). Sensus enim et intellectus sunt potentiae ordinatae, et in talibus non potest aliquid esse obiectum superioris quin prius fuerit aliquo modo obiectum inferioris, "ut patet de sensu communi et sensibilibus pertinentibus, et de intellectu et voluntate" (*Ibidem*).

Sensus autem in hoc differt ab intellectu quod "sensus est virtus materialis alligata organo; ideo seipso non potest agere nisi informetur specie obiecti, quae est tibi ratio agendi" (Q. 129, f. 123 r). Inde tamen non sequitur quod ad quamlibet cognitionem sensitivam semper requiratur praesentia obiecti; nam, sicut Noster per transennam adnotat, cognitio sensitiva alicuius obiecti triplici modo fieri potest:

"Cognoscitur enim aliquid sensibiliter *per praesentiam* suam, sicut color praesens oculo bene disposito; secundo, *per speciem propriam*, quando est absens (f. 19 v), sicut patet quando homo imaginatur colorem exsistens in tenebris, quem visus videt in lumine; tertio, *per speciem alienam*, sicut ovis cognoscit inimicitiam lupi, et non per speciem inimicitiae sed ipsius lupi; et hoc pertinet ad potentiam aestimativam" (Q. 20, f. 19 r—v).

### 2. Processus cognitionis intellectivae

Problema satis intricatum cognitionis intellectivae Gulielmus de Ware methodo historica pertractat, plures referens et examinans opiniones, non quidem propter se, sed potius ut ex eis eligat illam quam pro suo fine principali, quaestionibus scilicet theologicis dirimendis, aptiorem iudicat. Inter auctores quos prae oculis habet, primatum tenet Henricus Gandavensis, cuius positiones aliquando crisi submittit, aliquando vero amplectitur.

a) *Functiones intellectus agentis et intellectus possibilis.* — Cognitio, saltem mundi exterioris, ut modo tetigimus, cum sensatione incipit: imago obiecti seu species sensibilis vel phantasma recipitur in vi imaginativa

<sup>15</sup> Cf. tamen infra, nota 21.

seu phantastica, ut cognitionem sensibilem eliciat. Sed cum phantasma non sit intelligibile nisi in potentia, ad hoc ut cognitio intellectiva habeatur, necesse est imprimis ut intellectus agens, qui est habitus luci similis, sua luce phantasma irradiet. Haec irradiatio efficit ut id quod in phantasmate erat intelligibile solum in potentia, fiat nunc actu intelligibile et qua tale intellectum possibilem moveat. Intellectus tamen agens, eodem momento quo phantasma illuminat, agit etiam super intellectum possibilem, eum disponendo simulatque illuminando, ut specie intelligibili recepta actum intelligendi eliciat.

Haec in quaestione 28a habentur ubi Gulielmus quaerit, utrum intellectus agens pertineat ad imaginem SS. Trinitatis. In promptu est quod ad hanc quaestionem dirimenda ante omnia necesse est determinare, quid sit et quid faciat intellectus agens. Circa hoc problema Noster, reiectis iam duabus opinionibus, tertiam proponit, quae licet his introducatur verbis: "aliter igitur dicitur", in margine tamen tanquam "opinio propria" indicatur:

"Aliter igitur dicitur: circa quod sciendum est primo, quid est intellectus agens . . . De primo sciendum est quod secundum Philosophum, III *De anima*, intellectus agens est habitus ut lux. Sicut enim lux non habet solum actuare colorem ut faciat de potentia visibili actu visibile, sed etiam disponere medium ad receptionem speciei, ita intellectus agens habet per irradiationem suam phantasma actuare, ut de in potentia intelligibilibus faciat actu intelligibilia. Et habet etiam disponere intellectum potentialem sive memoriam ad receptionem specierum intelligibilium . . . Si igitur ponamus opinionem Avicennae, cui ut videtur concordat Commentator, scilicet quod color in tenebris non habet esse nisi in potentia, et quod in oculo cati esset tantum lumen quod possit videre in tenebris: sicut tunc oculus cati faceret duo circa colorem, (f. 27r) . . . sic *lumen intellectus agentis* proportionaliter *duo facit circa phantasma*: unum, quod facit intelligibile quod est ibi in potentia, esse intelligibile in actu; et aliud, quod dat sibi actualitatem per quam possit movere intellectum possibilem. — *Similiter circa intellectum possibilem duo facit*: unum, quod disponit ipsum ad receptionem speciei; et aliud quod dat sibi actualitatem per quam possit elicere actum secundum" (Q. 28, f. 26v—27r).

Cum Doctor Fundatus haec scriberet, certo certius ante oculos habuit Henrici Gandavensis *Quodlibet* XIII, qu. 8, ubi eadem problemata cum solita prolixitate exponuntur.<sup>16</sup> Hanc Noster partim in brevior formam redegit partim vero immutavit. Intellectus enim agens etiam

<sup>16</sup> Ed. Venetiis 1613, II, f. 300v—301r.

iuxta Gandavensem "facit duo circa phantasmata et duo circa possibilem intellectum". Adest tamen non parvi momenti differentia, nam Henricus de receptione speciei intelligibilis ne verbum quidem facit, sed loco eius de causatione actus intellectionis loquitur.<sup>17</sup> Ipse enim, ut notum est, non admisit necessitatem ponendi speciem intelligibilem impressam in intellectu possibili;<sup>18</sup> Noster econtra eam admittit, quare eam in expositionem ipsius adversarii quasi furtim invexit.

b) *Species intelligibilis*. — Admissa necessitate speciei intelligibilis, iure quaeritur, ad quid talis species in processu cognitivo serviat. Terminos huius quaestionis Gulielmus accurate delimitat: "Utrum species requiratur in intellectu propter defectum potentiae vel propter absentiam obiecti; et hoc est quaerere, utrum species posita mediet inter potentiam et actum vel inter actum et obiectum" (Q. 129, f. 121v).

Secundum positionem Fundati intellectus est potentia activa, et ideo species intelligibilis non est forma elicitiva intellectionis, velut mediatrix inter potentiam et actum, ut ex. gr. in doctrina S. Thomae<sup>19</sup>, sed imprimatur in intellectum possibilem hac unica functione ut exprimat et repraesentet obiectum, quando hoc ultimum non potest esse praesens in intellectu per essentiam suam; mediat igitur inter obiectum et actum, non autem inter potentiam et actum:

"Quarta opinio,<sup>20</sup> quod species requiritur non propter potentiam sed propter obiectum; ut sic potentia sit activa pure. Et secundum hanc ultimam opinionem *species mediat inter actum et obiectum*, et solum imprimatur in intellectu possibili ut exprimat obiectum. Unde accidit speciei, ut deservit intellectui in intelligendo, quod imprimatur. Idem enim faceret quod nunc facit si posset ibi esse sine hoc quod inhaereret; quia non requiritur tanquam forma elicitiva a parte potentiae, sed solum sicut forma expressiva obiecti. Et hoc ideo quia obiectum ipsum in ratione obiecti non est ipsi intellectui praesens secundum essentiam suam" (f. 122v).

Verum quidem est quod intellectus possibilis de se potentia indeterminata est, sed ex hoc non sequitur quod indigeat specie tanquam

<sup>17</sup> *Ibidem*, f. 301r.

<sup>18</sup> *Quodlibet* XIII, q. 11: "In vi autem apprehensiva intellectiva nulla species requiritur de obiecto" (II, f. 309va). Cf. M. de Wulf, *Études sur Henri de Gand*, Louvain — Paris 1894, pp. 908.

<sup>19</sup> *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 85, a. 2: "Et ideo dicendum est quod species intelligibilis se habet ad intellectum ut quo intelligit intellectus."

<sup>20</sup> Non est dubium quin haec sit opinio propria Nostri, cum in quaestione: *Utrum ideae sint in Deo*, hoc idem in proprio nomine asserat: "Ideo dico quod ita proportionaliter est in Deo sicut in nobis. In nobis autem ita est quod species, quae est in intellectu, non cadit media inter potentiam et actum, sed inter actum et obiectum" (Q. 101, f. 87r).

forma elicitiva suae actionis, nam indeterminatio ipsius non est talis qualis ex. gr. lapidis, sed potius talis qualis indeterminatio ignis ad calefaciendum hoc vel illud lignum; et huiusmodi indeterminatio non fert secum imperfectionem nec significat defectum actualitatis:

“Et isto secundo modo intellectus possibilis est indifferens ad intelligendum hoc vel illud quantum est ex parte potentiae; et determinatur per voluntatem ad intelligendum hoc et non illud, et per speciem repraesentantem hoc determinatum (obiectum). Non quod species requiratur a parte potentiae propter defectum actualitatis potentiae, requiritur tamen propter obiectum absens, ut per ipsam obiectum praesentetur potentiae. Et sic *species repraesentative* determinat potentiam ad obiectum cuius est species, et *voluntas imperative*, sicut si caliditas esset sub imperio ignis, posset per imperium ignis calefacere hoc et non illud” (f. 123r).

Unde intellectus possibilis propter hoc solum vocatur possibilis, quia specie ei non impressa non potest exire in actum circa obiecta absentia. Intellectus agens autem in sua actione nec impressionem nec aliquam praeviam dispositionem praesupponit, sed immediate agit in phantasmata in quibus quiditas rei materialis, quae est obiectum intellectus, cum conditionibus materialibus continetur. Intellectus agentis est has condiciones remove seu abstrahere, et ita efficere, ut id quod ibi erat intelligibile solum in potentia, fiat actu intelligibile:

“Ita quod actio intellectus agentis non est recipiendo sed quasi operando circa aliud extra se, ut circa phantasma, et ipsius est facere universale. Universalia enim, ut dicit Commentator, III *De anima*, cap. 18, nullum habent esse extra animam, quod intendit Plato; quoniam si ita esset, non indigeret Aristoteles ponere intellectum agentem. Unde phantasma, eo ipso quod phantasma, est obiectum intellectus agentis. Sed aliter est de intellectu possibili, quia praesupponit ante se potentiam sui generis disponentem sibi obiectum, scilicet phantasma, et ideo *non potest agere sine specie recepta in se*. Et sic antequam agit, patitur ab obiecto, recipiendo impressionem obiecti. Non quod ipsa species sibi imprimatur ut sit sibi forma et ratio agendi, sed sibi imprimitur ut exprimatur ut forma obiecti inter obiectum et actum; et propter hoc dicitur intellectus possibilis” (*Ibidem*).

c) *Cognitio intuitiva*. — Ex positione, quam modo descripsimus, sequitur corollarium magni momenti, quod Noster subnotare non omittit: si species requiritur solummodo propter absentiam obiecti, tunc obiecta intellectui in se et per se ipsis praesentia immediate et sine specie intueri possunt:



"Hic praesuppositis patent multae difficultates, scilicet quod habitus animae, actus et potentiae et essentia animae et essentia divina in patria, et breviter *omnia quae sunt praesentia animae per essentiam, intelliguntur sine specie*, quia species solum requiritur propter absentiam obiecti. Et ipsa voluntas intelligitur sine specie et actus eius, quia omnia sunt spiritualia secundum se, et ideo per se intelligibilia.<sup>21</sup> — Non sic phantasma, absolute loquendo, quia illud, ut sic, non est intelligibile ante operationem intellectus agentis, quia ut sic (f. 123v), non est mere spirituale et immateriale. Aliae autem res materiales extra intelliguntur per species impressas in possibili" (f. 123r—v).

d) *Conceptus seu verbum mentis*. — Effectus seu terminus intellectualis operationis, quam modo descripsimus, est 'verbum mentis'. Quod cum sit imago Verbi divini, adeo ut eius efformatio repraesentet aeternam Verbi a Patre generationem, apud auctores scholasticos obiectum multimodae speculationis constituit; nostra tamen ad praesens non interest nisi examen ipsius in sensu stricte philosophico, scilicet in quantum idem est ac conceptus. — Quid igitur est verbum hoc sub aspectu acceptum? Doctor Fundatus post longam titubationem tanquam probabiliorem enuntiat sententiam iuxta quam verbum est "actus intellectus passive acceptus"<sup>22</sup> (Q. 85, f. 71v), et pro ratione huiusmodi probabilitatis assignat auctoritatem Henrici Gandavensis et aliorum doctorum "modernorum":

"Ista opinio videtur probabilis, quia verbo sic dicto convenit definitio Gandavensis superius data,<sup>23</sup> nam actus est terminus intellectualis operationis, non tamen realiter distinctus est; emanans ab agente secundum actum et manens in agente; et est declarativus obiecti. — Quod vero sic debet poni verbum quatuor signa adducuntur: primum est quod auctoritates Sanctorum videntur hoc dare, sicut allegatum est.

<sup>21</sup> Iuxta haec tritum illud axioma: 'nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu', integrandum est cum hoc supplemento leibniziano: 'nisi ipse intellectus', quod tamen apud Nostrum innatismum non implicat. — Similis est positio Henrici Gandavensis, *Quodl.* IV, q. 7: "Sic ergo de divina essentia praesente intellectui creato, ut visibili per essentiam, et de ipso intellectu sibi praesente per substantiam, ponimus quod sine omni specie media cognoscuntur ab intellectu. Simili modo ponimus hoc idem de omni quod per suam essentiam praesens est in intellectu quocumque modo" (I, f. 149d).

<sup>22</sup> Quaestio 85 edita est a M. Schmaus, *Der Liber Propugnatorius des Thomas Anglicus und die Lehrunterschiede zwischen Thomas von Aquin und Duns Scotus*, in *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, XXIX, Münster 1930, II. Teil: *Die Trinitarischen Lehrdifferenzen*, pp. 253\*—271\*; *ibidem*, pp. 234\*—285\* editae sunt aliae quinque quaestiones Nostri, nempe: 78—79, 83, 90 et 91.

<sup>23</sup> In hac quaestione, f. 69v. Cf. Henricum, *Summa*, art. XL, q. 7: "Verbum est terminus actionis intellectualis, emanans ab intelligente secundum actum, manens in ipso intelligente, alterius declarativum" (I, f. 260r).

Secundum, quia doctores moderni temporis in hoc concordant: Gandavensis et Murro<sup>24</sup> et Mediavilla.<sup>25</sup> Tertium est quod plures difficultates solvuntur; per hoc etiam patet, utrum in patria formetur verbum vel non, utrum de re praesenti, utrum in quolibet actu, utrum actu directo vel reflexo, et omnia talia . . . Quartum signum est, quod hoc modo ponendo salvantur omnia quae ponuntur a parte intellectus: nam sive ponatur species in intellectu sive non, adhuc potest poni verbum ex quo est actus. Similiter, ponendo terminum realiter differentem vel non realiter differentem, adhuc verbum salvari potest. Similiter, ponendo quod intelligentia et memoria sint duae vires vel quod sint una, stat cum hoc quod verbum ponitur esse actus" (Q. 85, f. 71v).

Quoad entitatem vero quae verbo mentis seu conceptui competit, Noster, verbis S. Augustini innixus, concludit conceptum esse passionem in anima seu "accidens inhaerens menti":

"Item, Augustinus, IX (*De Trinitate*, cap. 8, de magnis: Conceptam rerum veritatem notitiam tanquam verbum apud nos habemus, et dicendo intus gignimus; nec a nobis nascendo discedit. Cum autem ad alios loquimur, verbo intus manenti ministerium vocis adhibemus. — Ex his patet quod *verbum est accidens inhaerens menti*" (Q. 84, f. 68v).

Conceptus ergo habet esse reale physicum in intellectu tanquam subiecto, non est igitur ens mere ideale seu logicum.

Iuxta verba S. Augustini modo allegata "cum autem ad alios loquimur, verbo intus manenti ministerium vocis adhibemus", praeter verbum mentale seu conceptum habemus etiam verbum vocale seu vocem, cuius officium est significare. Sed quid: an conceptum vel rem ipsam extra mentem? Fundatus respondet quod vox immediate quidem conceptum, sed principaliter et finaliter ipsam rem extra significat:

"Ideo dicitur ad argumentum quod *vox immediate significat ipsam passionem sive conceptum, sed principaliter et finaliter significat ipsam rem extra*. Et sicut non fit praedicatio propter ipsas voces, similiter non fit praedicatio propter ipsas conceptiones, sed fit praedicatio rei de re.<sup>26</sup> — Tamen aliter: quod ista tria se habent secundum ordinem: species rei intelligibilis in anima, quiditas rei, et res ut individualiter

<sup>24</sup> Scilicet Ioannes Murrho, O. F. M., de quo cf. P. Glorieux, *La littérature quodlibétique*, Paris 1935, II, p. 158.

<sup>25</sup> Richardus de Mediavilla, *Sent.* I, d. 27, a. 2, q. 1: "Et sic verbum est formatus conceptus quem intellectus format; et sic magis proprie dicitur verbum, quia verbum dicit rem emanantem a dicente. Intelligere vero dicit 'quod' ut manens intelligibile, et etiam ipsa species" (ed. Venetiis 1509, f. 88a).

<sup>26</sup> Ita opinatur etiam Doctor Subtilis, *Op. Oxon.*, I, d. 17, q. 3, n. 19: "Illud quod significatur per vocem proprie est res; sunt tamen signa multa ordinata eiusdem significati: littera, vox et conceptus" (ed. Vivès, X, p. 378).

existit; ita quod quiditas rei est illud quod primo intelligitur, et ideo quiditas primo per vocem significatur. Tunc quando dicunt auctoritates quod vox significat passionem in anima, accipiunt ibi passionem non pro specie inhaerente menti quae est sibi ratio intelligendi, sed pro ipsa quiditate rei intellecta, quae dicitur passio in anima, quia est in anima sicut cognitum in cognoscente" (*Ibidem*).

### 3. Ratio et limites humanae cognitionis

a) *Lumen naturale — cognitio naturalis*. — Notum est quod S. Bonaventura eiusque discipuli ad plenam certamque veritatis cognitionem necessariam censebant immediatam luminis increati assistentiam. Etiam Henricus Gandavensis, modo suo, eiusdem luminis illustrationi tribuit possibilitatem cognoscendi verum sub ratione veri.<sup>27</sup>

Noster viam scholae bonaventurianae hac in re relinquens nec Gandavensi assentiens, contra ambos modos ponendi sine ulla haesitatione declarat: "Unde concedendum est quod *anima potest videre aliqua, immo omnia naturaliter cognoscibilia mediante lumine naturali*, sine aliquo tali lumine supernaturali, supposita semper influentia Dei generali" (Q. 19, f. 18v).

Lumen utique istud naturale nihil aliud est quam lumen proprium ipsius intellectus agentis a Creatore sibi inditum, influentia vero Dei generalis eadem est ac providentia divina universalis "secundum quod indidit sibi lumen naturale ad omnia cognoscibilia naturaliter cognoscenda" (Q. 2, f. 2v).

Contra positionem bonaventurianam, inter alia argumenta, ad nobilitatem animae humanae appellat, quae, Deo volente, non debet deficere in necessariis ad suam actionem naturalem:

"Anima est nobilissima inter omnes alias creaturas; ergo sicut quaelibet alia creatura habet instrumenta propria per quae potest elicere actionem suam naturalem, sic anima, immo multo fortius, cum sit nobilior, debet habere instrumenta propria per quae possit elicere actionem suam naturalem quae est intelligere. Sicut enim natura non deficit in necessariis, secundum Aristotelem et Commentatorem, II *De caelo et mundo* et III *De anima*, sic nec Deus" (Q. 19, f. 18v).

Opinio autem Gandavensis opponit, quod omni gradui cognitionis

<sup>27</sup> *Summa*, art. I, q. 2: "Absolute ergo dicendum quod homo synceram veritatem de nulla re habere potest, ex puris naturalibus eius notitiam acquirendo: sed solum illustratione luminis divini" (I, f. 8r): cf. *Quodl.* IX, q. 15 (I, f. 110v—112r).

<sup>28</sup> Hanc quaestionem cum brevi introductione edidit A. Daniels, *Wilhelm von Ware über das menschliche Erkennen*, in *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, I Supplementband, Münster 1913, pp. 309—318.

competit sua ratio operandi; et si in omni actione requiretur lumen supernaturale, nulla cognitio esset naturalis, quod falsum est:

“Sicut lumen gloriae sufficit ad cognoscendum omnia quae spectant ad cognitionem gloriosam, et lumen fidei ad cognoscendum omnia quae subsunt fidei, ita lumen naturale ad cognoscendum omnia quae subsunt cognitioni naturali, supposita, dico, universali influentia divina. — Item, si lumen supernaturale requiretur in omni cognitione intellectuali, cum omnis operatio accipiat denominationem et qualificationem ex modo et ratione operandi, sequitur quod omnis talis operatio esset supernaturalis” (*Ibidem*).

Et si adversarii arguant necessariam luminis infallibilis assistentiam ad praeveniendos errores intellectus nostri fallibilis, vel ad discernendum verum a falso, quae per speciem, iuxta ipsos, indifferenter repraesentarentur, Noster negat quod error ex insufficientia luminis naturalis proveniat, nam in rei veritate “error contingit in anima ex hoc quod male utitur illo lumine naturali”; quod vero ad species spectat, “species quantum est de se, semper repraesentat verum et facit cognitionem veram; unde quod accidit error in cognitione, hoc est aliunde, puta ex passione vel ex aliqua alia indispositione concurrente”<sup>29</sup> (f. 19r).

b) *Limites cognitionis naturalis*. — Ut ex praedictis manifesto apparet Gulielmus de Ware dignitatem intellectus humani strenue vindicat atque de possibilitate et obiectivitate humanae cognitionis nullatenus dubitat. Sed alia ex parte etiam limites eiusdem cognitionis non minori firmitate determinat; errant qui imaginantur quod “ad quaecumque cognoscenda supernaturalia et naturalia sufficiunt scientiae acquisitae et potentia naturalis cum lumine naturali sibi indito naturaliter” (Q. 2, f. 2v). Potentia enim naturalis, solo lumine naturali, non valet cognoscere nisi obiecta naturalia, modo naturali:

“Quando agens agit mediante instrumento aliquo, impossibile est ipsum agens attingere per actum suum obiectum aliquod excedens naturam instrumenti. Exemplum: quia mediante serra non attingitur archa, sed divisio ligni solum. Sed omnis operatio naturalis intellectus nostri est mediante lumine naturali tanquam instrumento: igitur non potest pertingere mediante isto lumine ad aliquod scibile quod istud lumen excedit. Sed multa sunt scibilia talia, scilicet resurrectio mortuorum, et quod Deus sit trinus et unus, et partus Virginis et huiusmodi multa” (*Ibidem*).

<sup>29</sup> Similiter respondet etiam Duns Scotus, *Op. Oxon.*, I, d. 3, q. 4, n. 14: “Respondeo: ista veritas quiescit in intellectu quod potentia non errat circa obiectum proportionatum nisi indisposita sit” (IX, p. 182s).



Habet tamen intellectus noster in se quandam dispositionem passivam seu potentiam obedientialem ad recipiendum aliquod donum supernaturale, quo adiuvante potest videre illa ad quorum visionem proprium lumen, utpote parvum ac limitatum, non sufficeret. Ex hoc tamen non sequitur quod inter potentiam intellectivam et obiecta supernaturalia sit omnimoda improportio, qualis est ex. gr. inter visum et sapes, sed potius talis qualis inter oculum et aliquod obiectum visibile parvum, quod lumine quidem proprio, utpote modico, videre non potest, lumine tamen maiori potest:

“Ita dico hic, quod ista improportio est parvitat<sup>is</sup> luminis naturalis et potentiae ad tale visibile, et ideo de se non potest assurgere ad illius cognitionem, sed requirit aliud lumen disponens potentiam et fortificans. — Quod autem accipitur in minori, quod potentia naturalis non fit non naturalis per donum supernaturale, verum est; tamen in virtute illius doni potest in aliquod cognoscibile cognoscendum in quod non possit ex proprio lumine tantum, eo quod tale donum fortificat potentiam et elevat ipsam supra se” (f. 3r).

### III. Theologia naturalis

Inquirenti de Deo duplex quaestio occurrit solvenda: ‘si est’ seu de exsistentia, et ‘quid est’ seu de essentia vel quiditate et de his quae essentiam consequuntur, scilicet de attributis. In promptu est quod ex his duobus primo loco quaestio de exsistentia est dirimenda, etiamsi prius oporteat scire quid sit illud quod per hoc nomen ‘Deus’ significatur.

#### 1. Propositio ‘Deus est’ demonstratione indiget

Oportetne demonstrare Deum esse, an vero sit per se notum velut haec propositio “omne totum est maius sua parte”, cuius veritas, terminis intellectis, immediate et sine ulla demonstratione percipitur? Explanatio huius quaestionis apud Nostrum satis spissa et operosa est cum solutione aliquantulum ambigua.<sup>30</sup>

Iuxta Fundatum illa propositio est per se nota quae ex intellectu terminorum et per evidentiam propriam innotescit, non autem ex aliis propositionibus notioribus, ut v. gr. conclusio alicuius syllogismi: “Illa propositio est per se nota quando scito quid significatur nomine termini, statim ex natura termini, non ex relatione ad aliud, scit praedicatum

<sup>30</sup> Quaestio 21, id est: *Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum*, edita est apud A. Daniels, *Quellenbeiträge und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Gottesbeweise im 13. Jahrhundert*, in *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, VIII, Münster 1909, pp. 98—104.

inesse tali subiecto; quod non contingit in aliqua conclusione" (Q. 21, f. 20r). Unde non omnis propositio necessaria, eo ipso quod necessaria, est etiam per se nota, sed solum illa "quae non habet evidentiam ab alio sed a se solum; quod non habet omnis propositio necessaria" (*Ibidem*).

Si nunc quaeratur utrum huiusmodi condiciones huic propositioni 'Deus est' convenient necne, Gulielmus ita respondet ac si tam negantibus quam affirmantibus satisfacere vellet: distinguit imprimis propositionem *magis* per se notam et *minus* per se notam; deinde declarat propositionem 'Deus est' esse minus per se notam quoad nos, ut tandem praeter expectationem concludat: "ideo ista propositio *non est per se nota . . . quoad nos*". Sed adducamus verba Auctoris:

"Ideo dicitur sic, quod sicut inter propositiones de contingenti est aliqua magis contingens et aliqua minus . . . Similiter in propositionibus per se notis est dare aliquam propositionem per se notam in suo potissimo esse, et aliam minus per se notam, non in potissimo esse notionis. Illa propositio est per se nota in potissimo suo esse quoad nos, quando significata terminorum sensibiliter et experimentaliter sciuntur sine magno labore, sicut patet de terminis huius propositionis "omne totum est maius sua parte": sensibiliter enim scit homo quid est totum et quid pars. Et illa propositio est minus per se nota, quando significata terminorum non sciuntur sensibiliter sed cum magno labore, saltem quoad nos. Et quia sic est de significatis terminorum huius propositionis 'Deus est' quod homo nescit nisi cum magno labore, ideo<sup>31</sup> *ista propositio non est per se nota*, quia prima, dico *quoad nos*, licet simpliciter sit notissima" (*Ibidem*).

Ex praemissis equidem conclusionem potius hoc modo antecepimus: ideo ista propositio est minus per se nota. Tota namque solutio tenorem affirmativum habet, ut etiam ex responsionibus ad obiecta apparet, ubi identidem repetitur: "hoc non obstat quin ista propositio sit per se nota modo supradicto", quod intelligitur non solum de propositione ut in se est seu simpliciter, sed etiam quoad homines, saltem sapientes: "Item, et aliter, quod propositio non est iudicanda talis vel talis secundum iudicium cuiuslibet, sed respectu sapientis . . . cum respectu sapientis et non ipsius (insipientis) debet iudicari per se nota vel non per se nota" (*Ibidem*).

<sup>31</sup> Loco "ideo . . . notissima" in A, f. 15b legitur: "Ideo ista proposito non est per se nota sicut prima", in C vero f. 21d: "Ideo ista proposito non est per se nota quia prima", similiter apud A. Daniels, *loco cit.*, p. 102; *ibidem*, nota 2 dantur lectiones variantes cod. Vindob. Nat. 1438: "quasi prima", et cod. Oxford, Merton 103: "Ideo ista propositio non est per se nota quoad nos, licet in esse suo potissimo et ideo per se nota quia prima omnium."

Ita, scilicet affirmative, intellexit hanc solutionem etiam A. Daniels; et quia Fundatus pro parte affirmativa citat Proslogion S. Anselmi, ideo idem cl. Auctor Nostrum quoque fautoribus celebris illius argumenti ontologici adnumeravit.<sup>32</sup>

Cum tamen immutationi textus, quam modo coniectavimus, codices manuscripti non suffragentur, intentio Gulielmi ita intelligenda videtur: haec propositio 'Deus est', cum sit iudicium analyticum in cuius subiecto includitur praedicatum, *de iure* per se nota est, et restat talis etiam si aliqui *de facto* relationem praedicati ad subiectum perspicere non valent. Hoc sensu resolvitur quaestio ad partem affirmativam, et etiam argumentum Proslogii nonnisi hoc sensu valet, scilicet si aliquis ita sapiens est ut illud penitus perspiciat. Sed nos communes mortales de lege communi, — et hoc est quod ad praesens nostra interest —, Deum esse nonnisi cum magno labore, id est per demonstrationem scimus; quod idem valet ac dicere: "ista propositio non est per se nota... quoad nos".

Ceterum, hanc interpretationem exigit etiam aliud Doctoris Fundati principium: "Nihil de Deo cognoscimus nisi per effectus ad quos se habet in ratione causae efficientis" (Q. 22, f. 20v). Si nihil, ergo nec existentiam, et si per effectus, itaque non per se et immediate. — Si autem de intentione Nostri aliquod dubium adhuc restaret, illud definitive tollet nota marginalis in imo folio prima manu apposita, quae ad hoc ipsum addita videtur ut quaestionem minus clare expositam melius explanet:

"Illa propositio quae nullo modo potest cognosci a nobis nisi arguitive et per demonstrationem, non est per se nota nobis. Huiusmodi est haec: Deum esse. — Maior est manifesta de se. Ex quo enim non cognoscitur nisi demonstrative, non potest a nobis per se cognosci, quia 'per se' et 'per aliud' opponuntur. — Minor patet, quia in notitiam terminorum huius propositionis non possumus nunc devenire nisi per arguitionem ab effectu ad causam; quia tolle effectum, nunquam sciatur significatum terminorum; et ex notitia terminorum immediate dependet inhaerentia praedicati ad subiectum. Ergo in fine discursus assentitur propositioni non ex evidentia terminorum, sed propter demonstrationem, quia quod praecisa causa causae, scilicet notitia terminorum, est causa causati, scilicet compositionis et inhaerentiae terminorum. Huiusmodi est demonstratio per effectus"<sup>33</sup> (f. 19v).

<sup>32</sup> *Loco cit.*, p. 125.

<sup>33</sup> Haec nota marginalis in codd. A et C non invenitur.

## 2. Viae ad existentiam Dei demonstrandam

Si Deum esse non est per se notum nobis, necesse est, fide utique exclusa, ad hanc veritatem per demonstrationem pervenire. Quae quidem demonstratio non erit a priori seu propter quid, sed solum a posteriori seu quia, accipiendo effectus pro medio ad concludendum esse de Deo.

Doctor Fundatus in quaestione: *Utrum Deus sit*<sup>34</sup> (Q. 15, f. 12r), pro fundamento allegat verba S. Augustini,<sup>35</sup> quae non solum Deum esse affirmant, sed simul etiam nominis definitionem, pro ulteriori argumentatione necessariam, exprimunt: “Universa rerum natura proclamat habere se praestantissimum Conditozem”, et “Omnes hoc Deum esse consentiunt quod ceteris rebus anteponunt” (f. 12v). Ad probandum autem quod tale ens in rerum natura existit, Noster, sine ulla ambitione novitatis, sex enumerat argumenta seu vias, non omittens indicare quemnam istae viae habeant auctorem.

a) Aristoteles, VIII *Physicorum*,<sup>36</sup> ex motu nititur ostendere Deum esse. Ast via ista Gulielmo minus placet, qua de causa modum arguendi Aristotelis crisi submittit: “Sed ista via probandi Deum esse infirmior est omnibus aliis, quia secundum istam viam Angelus non posset movere se de loco ad locum, nec voluntas posset seipsam movere”; praeterea, “secundum istam viam non esset devenire ad aliquod primum immobile, sed ad multa immobilia, quod tamen est contra mentem Philosophi, VIII *Physicorum*” (*Ibidem*).

b) Praeferenda est igitur huic argumento, ex moto physico desumpto, via qua idem Philosophus procedit II *Metaphysicorum*,<sup>37</sup> probans Deum esse per argumentum ex ordine causarum desumptum: “Hoc est causatum ab aliquo, et illud ab alio; et non est ire in infinitum in causis essentialiter ordinatis: ergo erit dare unam causam primam omnium, quae non sit ab alia causa; quia si non est dare primum, nec aliquod posterius” (*Ibidem*).

c) Porro, medium demonstrationis sumi potest etiam ex regimine universi; nam si in rerum natura aliqua sunt creabilia, necesse est illa ab uno increabili existentiam recepisse. Et hanc dicit fuisse viam Aristotelis, XII *Metaphysicorum*,<sup>38</sup> et Ioannis Damasceni, *De fide orthodoxa*, I, cap. 3.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>34</sup> Edita est apud A. Daniels, *Quellenbeiträge cit.*, pp. 89—97.

<sup>35</sup> *De Trinitate*, XV, c. 6, n. 6 (PL 42, 1061).

<sup>36</sup> Cap. 5 (II, pp. 350—53).

<sup>37</sup> Lib. I a, c. 2 (II, pp. 486s).

<sup>38</sup> Lib. XI, c. 10 (II, pp. 609—11).

<sup>39</sup> PG 94, 795.



d) Quarta via est S. Anselmi, *Monologion*, cap. 1,<sup>40</sup> quae ex imperfectione rerum exorditur, ut ad unum perfectissimum ascendat: "Nam is est dare aliquod iustum, est dare aliquod iustum perfectum secundum essentiam, per cuius participationem alia dicantur iusta" (*Ibidem*).

e) Etiam possibilitas seu contingentia rerum arguit Deum esse, iuxta viam Richardi a S. Victore, II *De Trinitate*:<sup>41</sup> "Quia enim quaelibet res creata de se possibilis est, de se firmitatem et permanentiam non habet, sed habet hoc ab alio" (*Ibidem*).

f) Ultimo tandem loco Fundatus mentionem facit de argumento ideologico seu potius noologico S. Augustini, II *De libero arbitrio*, cap. 12,<sup>42</sup> quo ostenditur Deus esse ex illustratione super mentes nostras: "Per hoc enim quod videmus aliquas veritates immutabiles, quae non possunt videri mente nostra quae mutabilis est, probat aliquam veritatem esse primam".<sup>43</sup>

E modo quo Gulielmus de Ware haec argumenta recitat, plane apparet quod sua intentio non erat nec nova afferre nec antiqua per longum et latum examinare, sed solummodo in mentem lectoris revocare; sunt enim argumenta iam a saeculis nota. Iudicium nonnisi de argumento 'ex motu' dicit, idque insufficiens declarat. Omnes autem viae quas recitat, a posteriori procedunt seu ab effectibus ad causam ascendunt. Hoc sensu debet intelligi etiam argumentum noologicum S. Augustini; nec est supponendum quod Noster, referendo hoc argumentum, retrac-tare voluerit illa quae iam prius contra doctrinam illuminationis dixerat.

Celebre autem argumentum 'ontologicum' inter has vias locum non obtinuit; quod quidem mirum non est, cum S. Anselmus in *Proslogio* non procedat "a posteriori, accipiendo effectus pro medio", unica via quae iuxta principia Doctoris Fundati rationi naturali in statu praesenti versus Deum aperta est.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>40</sup> PL 158, 144s. Iuxta cod. C, f. 14a hoc argumentum est "ex perfectione rerum".

<sup>41</sup> Cf. cap. 8 (PL 196, 905).

<sup>42</sup> Num. 34 (PL 32, 1259).

<sup>43</sup> Haec verba ab A. Daniels, *loco cit.*, p. 92 desumpsimus, quia in nostro codice legitur solum: "Idem etiam patet ex illustratione; et haec est via Augustini, II *De libero arbitrio*, cap. 4."

<sup>44</sup> "Nos autem non habemus scientiam de Deo propter quid, eo quod nihil est prius eo et causa ipsius, sed scientiam quia et a posteriori, accipiendo effectus pro medio ad concludendum aliquid de eo, ut talem perfectionem sibi inesse" (Q. 3, f. 4 v). — Cf. Scotum, *Ordinatio*, I, d. 2, n. 39: "Ad primam quaestionem sic procedo, quia de ente infinito sic non potest demonstrari esse demonstratione propter quid quantum ad nos, licet ex natura terminorum propositio est demonstrabilis propter quid. Sed quantum ad nos bene propositio est demonstrabilis demonstratione quia ex creaturis" (II, p. 148); et *Quaest. Metaph.*, I, q. 1, n. 9: "Ad maiorem dicendum quod non oportet quodlibet

3. *Attributa divina*

a) *Possibilitas et modus cognoscendi attributa*. — In quaestione: *Utrum per creaturas possit homo aliquid scire de Deo* (Q. 20, f. 19r), Doctor Fundatus positionem, seu potius modum dicendi, suorum praedecessorum relinquit. Opinio enim fuit, ut nota marginalis advertit, “quatuor doctorum, scilicet Alexandri, Bonaventurae, Thomae et Aegidii” quod de Deo potest cognosci ‘si est’, non autem ‘quid est’. Iuxta Nostrum econtra per creaturas quodammodo etiam quiditas Dei cognosci potest, in tantum scilicet in quantum similitudo et vestigium Creatoris in illis relucet:

“Dico igitur aliter, quod sicut aliquid sensibiliter potest cognosci tripliciter, ita aliquid cognoscitur intellectualiter tripliciter . . . (f. 19v)... Sic ‘quod quid est’ Dei potest cognosci tripliciter: per essentiam sive *per nudam praesentiam*; et sic solum videtur a beatis. *Per speciem propriam*, et sic non potest videri ab homine viatore, quia nunquam potest cognosci aliquid per speciem propriam nisi illa species inhaereat ipsi potentiae cognoscitivae, causata ab obiecto praesente; Deus autem non est sic praesens intellectui viatoris. *Per speciem alienam*, et sic ‘quod quid est’ Dei potest cognosci per creaturam in qua relucet similitudo Dei et vestigium Creatoris; quia cognoscendo creaturam esse bonam per participationem, arguitur ex hoc aliquid esse bonum per essentiam” (f. 19r—v).

Ad extensionem vero huiusmodi cognitionis quod attinet, prae oculis habendum est quod “omnia quae sunt simpliciter perfectionis in creaturis (utputa sapientia, bonitas etc.) possunt ostendi esse in Deo per rationem naturalem; quae autem dicunt modum perfectionis et non perfectionem simpliciter, sicut relationes, non possunt ostendi esse in Deo naturaliter (Q. 22, f. 21r).

Fundatus non immoratur in singulis perfectionibus divinis ostendendis, sed solummodo — velut notas fundamentaliores — infinitatem secundum essentiam et secundum potentiam demonstrat; in quaestione vero speciali divinae unitatis demonstrabilitatem examinat. Quid sibi de ceteris attributis videatur, ex principiis quae praemisimus sponte apparet.

b) *Infinitas Dei secundum essentiam*. — Noster in eadem quaestione ubi existentiam Dei demonstrat, ostendit etiam eius infinitatem; primo secundum essentiam, deinde vero secundum potentiam. Ad probandum

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subiectum habere principia priora se . . . De Deo autem solummodo est demonstratio quia; et ideo loco talium principiorum sumitur effectus pro medio, per quos concludimus perfectionem Dei de Deo tanquam per medium notius nobis” (ed. Vivès, VII, p. 15b).

infinitatem Dei secundum essentiam pro medio demonstrationis assumit, (vel potius supponit, quia nondum probavit), summam Dei simplicitatem: "Secundo ostenditur quod Deus sit infinitus secundum essentiam, quia essentia divina est simplex in fine simplicitatis" (Q. 15, f. 12v). Quod enim est simplex, non potest componi aliis, per consequens nec limitari ideoque non habebit finitatem, nec ad aliquod genus determinatur. Praeterea, quia in ordine rerum datur unum extremum, scilicet materia prima, quae est pure passiva et in potentia ad omnem actum, necesse est dari aliud extremum quod sit pure activum; et "quod est pure activum, ut Deus, habebit in se omnes perfectiones: quare *Deus erit infinitus intensive*, quia habens in se omnem perfectionem intranee" (*Ibidem*).

c) *Infinitas Dei secundum potentiam*. — Ex infinitate Dei secundum essentiam immediate sequitur infinitas eiusdem secundum potentiam seu omnipotentia. Potentia namque Dei in eius essentia fundatur et "sic certum est quod est infinita. Quare hoc? Quia fundamentum est infinitum, et potentia idem est re cum fundamento" (f. 13r). — Ad eandem conclusionem pervenit Gulielmus comparando potentiam Dei sive ad actus eius immanentes, ut intelligere et velle, sive ad actus eius transeuntes, ut ad actum creationis et conservationis: actus enim immanentes, cum sint idem cum essentia infinita, erunt et ipsi infiniti; actus vero transeuntes, ut mundum ex nihilo creare vel eundem infinito tempore conservare, similiter infinitam arguunt potentiam.

d) *Unitas Dei*. — Gulielmus de Ware, cum de unitate Dei ex professo investigat, a via communi iam in ipsa quaestionis positione declinat. Non enim quaerit, ut alii theologi ante ipsum solebant, utrum Deus sit unus, sed potius: *Utrum Deus esse tantum unum possit probari ratione demonstrativa vel sola fide teneatur*<sup>45</sup> (Q. 16, f. 13v). Quaestioni autem sic propositae primus inter theologos scholasticos negative respondens, viam aperuit longae seriei doctorum qui saeculo subsequenti hac in re exemplum eius imitati sunt.

Noster igitur, expositis perpensisque rationibus tam philosophorum quam theologorum, ad hanc — pro suo tempore satis audacem — conclusionem venit: "Iudicio meo istae rationes non concludunt nisi quia nos credimus ita esse"<sup>46</sup> (f. 14v). Non concludunt autem partim quia

<sup>45</sup> Edidit P. Muscat, *art. cit.*, pp. 344—50; *ibidem*, pp. 342s enumerantur 13 auctores saec. XIV<sup>i</sup>, qui influxum Gulielmi de Ware in quaestione de demonstrabilitate unitatis Dei subiisse videntur.

<sup>46</sup> Huic sententiae videtur alludere Subtilis cum in *Ordinatione*, I, d. 2, n. 163 dicit: "In ista quaestione conclusio est certa. Sed dicunt aliqui quod haec conclusio non est demonstrabilis, sed tantum accepta per fidem" (II, p. 225).

falsa supponunt vel insufficientes sunt, partim vero quia per easdem rationes concludendum esset unam tantum esse personam in Deo; quod falsum esset et contra fidem. Sed etsi rationes demonstrativae deficiunt, non desunt tamen rationes probabiles: "Ideo sustinendo quod sola fide teneatur Deum esse unum, licet praesupposita fide posset hoc aliququaliter probari..." (*Ibidem*).

Has vero rationes probabiles Doctor Fundatus adducit occasione quaestionis: *Utrum multitudo creaturarum possit esse immediate ab uno principio* (Q. 102, f. 88r), circa quod problema intendit procedere: "primo, ostendendo quod diversitas creaturarum arguit probabiliter unitatem primi principii scilicet Dei".

Diversitas autem creaturarum triplici via perducit nos ad unitatem primae causae, secundum quod Deus se habet ad creaturas in ratione triplicis causae, scilicet efficientis, formalis et finalis. Ex creaturis enim tamquam effectibus primi efficientis, devenitur ad unum primum efficiens. A consideratione vero causae formalis exemplaris rerum ducimur ad unam formam a materia maxime separatam, idcirco perfectissimam, quae perfectiones omnium rerum universaliter in se continet. Si tandem ratio causae finalis attendatur, similiter apparet quod omnia ad unum finem ordinantur sicut exercitus ad unum ducem<sup>47</sup>.

#### 4. Distinctio formalis attributorum

Gulielmus de Ware in proluxa et laboriosa simulac delicata quaestione: *Utrum attributa divina distinguantur re vel ratione vel qualiter* (Q. 17, f. 14v), examinatis per ordinem opinionibus Aegidii Romani, S. Thomae, Henrici Gandavensis, Godefridi de Fontibus et Richardi de Mediavilla,<sup>48</sup> aliam proponit solutionem, quae a nota marginali tam ad dexteram quam ad sinistram apposita 'opinio propria' declaratur. Et iuxta hanc positionem perfectiones attributales, quas simplicissima essentia divina unitissime et verissime continet, non differunt nec re nec intentione nec intellectus operatione, sed ratione reali obiectiva seu formaliter, ita scilicet quod ista distinctio, licet non sit realis, omnem prorsus operationem intellectus tam creati quam increati praecedit. Si nihilominus Noster aliquando dicat attributa 'differre ratione', hoc neminem debet in errorem inducere, nam ipse in hoc contextu per rationem non intelligit facultatem intellectivam, sed potius rationes reales seu obiectivas et formales diversarum perfectionum, quarum quidem distinctiones intellectus non facit sed invenit; et praecise hae

<sup>47</sup> Cf. Aristot., *Metaph.*, XI, c. 10 (II, p. 611, lin. 3—4).

<sup>48</sup> Opiniones in textu recitatae his auctoribus attribuntur in margine.



distinctiones sunt fundamentum et causa diversitatis conceptuum quos mens nostra de una et simplicissima divina essentia efformat. — Sed iam ipsi auctori loquendi potestatem concedamus:

“Alia est opinio, quod *circumscripto omni intellectu creato et increato adhuc ista attributa different ratione*.<sup>49</sup> Et hoc ostenditur sic: quia istae perfectiones attributales ibi sunt unitissime et verissime; unde dicit Dionysius, cap. 9 *De divinis nominibus*, quod causa prima habet in se et circumvolvit rationes omnium creatorum. Ex primo, scilicet ex hoc quod sunt ibi unitive, tollitur omnis compositio quae arguit imperfectionem, et est ibi maxima simplicitas. Ex secundo, scilicet quod sunt ibi verissime, sequitur quod sunt ibi verissimae perfectiones talium attributorum. Unde Richardus, II *De Trinitate*, cap. 20: In illo summo bono vere unitas, vere simplicitas et veritas et identitas. — Sed tunc arguitur sic: veritas ex proprietate sua aliter habet immutare (intellectum) quam bonitas ex proprietate sua; sicut ergo in creaturis verum et bonum et ens differunt ratione omni intellectu circumscripto, quia proprium modum habent immutandi alium et alium, similiter erit de attributis, quod ibi erit vera ratio boni ex hoc quod essentia divina nata est sic movere voluntatem, et similiter ratio veri ex hoc quod nata est (sic) movere intellectum circumscripto omni intellectu, ex hoc solum quod aliter et aliter nata est movere intellectum et voluntatem”<sup>50</sup> (f. 161r).

Si igitur ratio unius perfectionis aliter movet intellectum quam ratio alterius, luce clarius est quod ratio unius non est ratio alterius, et quod una ratio potest intelligi sine alia, ut ex exemplis Auctoris plenius patebit:

“Item, ad hoc est ratio Augustini in simili, V *Trinit.*, cap. 6, vult probare quod alia est notio innascibilitatis et alia paternitatis... Idem argumentum facio in proposito, quia si Pater non esset sapiens, adhuc nihil prohiberet ipsum habere potentiam, quia non ex hoc quod aliquis

<sup>49</sup> Hoc sensu intelligitur ‘ratio’ etiam a S. Bonaventura, *De mysterio Trinitatis*, q. 3, art. 1 Resp.: “Sunt ergo in Deo omnes conditiones nobilitatis, scilicet potentia et sapientia... et cetera similia vere, perfecte et summe sub propria et perfecta ratione” (V, p. 70b).

<sup>50</sup> De significato huius termini ‘ratio’ cf. Duns Scotum, *Ordinatio*, I, d. 2, n. 401: “Potest autem vocari ‘differentia rationis’, sicut dixit doctor quidam; non quod ‘ratio’ accipiat pro differentia formata ab intellectu, sed ut ‘ratio’ accipitur pro quiditate rei secundum quod quiditas est obiectum intellectus” (II, p. 355); quoad solutionem vero vide *Op. Oxon.*, I, d. 8, q. 4, n. 17: “Ad quaestionem respondeo et dico quod inter perfectiones essentielles non est tantum differentia rationis, hoc est diversorum modorum concipiendi idem obiectum formale;... Est ergo ibi distinctio tertia praecedens intellectum omni modo; et est ista quod sapientia est in re ex natura rei, et bonitas est in re ex natura rei. Sapientia autem in re formaliter non est bonitas in re” (IX, p. 644b).

est potens, sequitur quod sit sapiens; est enim invenire potentiam sine sapientia. Ergo in Deo *alia est ratio sapientiae et alia potentiae* omni intellectu circumscripto, sicut omni intellectu circumscripto alia est innascibilitatis et paternitatis notio" (*Ibidem*).

Noster etiam atque etiam insistit in ostendendo ac probando, quomodo et quare distinctio attributorum omnem operationem cuiusvis intellectus necessario praecedat: potentiae etenim obiectum suum non faciunt; ergo praesupponunt, quia actum circa nihil elicere non possunt. — Cum huiusmodi distinctionis applicatio tam philosophica quam theologica capitalis momenti sit, operae pretium erit Doctorem Fundatum de eius natura atque ratione amplius percontari. — En causa quare debet distinctio perfectionum praecedere operationem etiam ipsius intellectus divini:

"Item, in prima praesentatione ipsius essentiae divinae divino intellectui et voluntati Deus intelligit essentiam suam et vult eam. Isti actus sunt distincti ante omnem aliam operationem, quia nulla praecedit per positum, quare et formales rationes obiectorum suorum ante omnem operationem sunt distinctae. Quod probatur, quia immediate intellectus intelligit obiectum suum et voluntas vult suum: *ergo praesupponitur distinctio* formalis boni et veri ante omnem operationem intellectus"<sup>51</sup> (*Ibidem*).

Si igitur ista distinctio nullatenus est operata ab intellectu, necesse est ut proveniat a parte rei intellectae, scilicet essentiae divinae:

"Dico ergo quod circumscribendo omnem operationem intellectus creati et increati distinguente(m) et operante(m) distinctionem attributorum, attributa<sup>52</sup> differunt in divina essentia pro eo quod ex parte sua nata sunt diversimode immutare intellectum et voluntatem. — Item, potentia volitiva non facit obiectum suum sed praesupponit, et similiter potentia intellectiva; itidem saltem verissimum de obiecto simpliciter primo, quia si sic, tunc potentia operaretur et eliceret actum respectu nihili, quia respectu nullius obiecti. Sine ergo omni operatione distinguente habemus potentiam, actum et obiectum distincta secundum rationes suas: ergo ordine naturae verum et bonum praecedunt actum intelligendi et volendi" (f. 16v).

Et si obiciatur: quomodo possunt haec cum summa simplicitate divina concordari, praesertim cum omnis differentia consurgens ex

<sup>51</sup> Cf. Scotum.

<sup>52</sup> Loco "attributa . . . voluntatem" codd. A, f. 12c et C, f. 18a sic habent: "attributa differunt in divinis (*add. mg. A: ratione*) pro eo quod ex parte sua nata est essentia immutare intellectum et voluntatem diversimode."

natura rei videatur esse realis, Noster respondet quod attributa non differunt secundum esse, sed ex parte essentiae:

“Vel aliter, quod ista *attributa non differunt secundum esse*, ut ipse [Averroes] dicit, quia habent unum esse simplex; nec differentia eorum ita est in intellectu quod sit operata ab intellectu solum, sed *ex parte essentiae est illa differentia*, ex hoc quod nata est aliter movere intellectum, aliter voluntatem; sed pro tanto potest dici quod differentia eorum est in intellectu, quia differentia eorum non est realis extra” (*Ibidem*).

Iam planum est omnibus quod haec distinctio eadem est eodemque sensu intelligi debet ac celebris illa distinctio formalis scotistica, etsi eius denominatio ‘formalis’ nondum stabilita est. Verum quidem est quod verbis ‘formalis’ vel ‘formaliter’ Noster non raro utitur, sed ut videtur intentio ipsius non est distinctionem suam nomine ‘formalis’ baptizare; alioquin vix intelligitur quare quotiescunque de nomine proprio suae distinctionis interrogatur, sensum ‘formalis’ nonnisi per circuitionem significet, ut ex. gr. hic: “Ad aliud dico quod differentia attributorum *nec est realis nec rationalis* ita quod solum operata ab intellectu, sed *differunt sicut verum et bonum in crealis*, ex hoc quod ex natura eorum habent quod possunt sic vel sic intellectum movere et etiam voluntatem”<sup>53</sup> (*Ibidem*).

Etiamis perfectiones essentiae divinae non sunt eiusdem rationis, hoc nullatenus est signum imperfectionis, quinimo maximae perfectionis:

“Quod vero dicitur ultra, quod magis est unum quod est unum re et ratione, quam quod re solum: dico quod differre ratione est duobus modis; uno modo sicut differunt duae sapientiae, et ista differentia est eiusdem rationis, et hoc modo verum est quod assumitur. Alio modo sicut differunt sapientia et bonitas, et haec est alterius rationis, et hoc modo non est verum: quanto enim aliquid magis est unum unitate

<sup>53</sup> Iuxta hunc textum in margine, sed absque signo inclusionis, amanuensis addidit: “Est enim dare medium, scilicet formaliter differre”; quod, ut credimus, propria industria et contra intentionem Auctoris fecit. Fundatus enim, ut infra, in § de distinctione essentiae et esse videbimus, expressis verbis negat, contra Gandavensem, posse dari ‘medium’ inter distinctionem realem et distinctionem rationis. Et recte quidem, nam distinctio formalis non est ‘media’ inter has duas distinctiones, eo sensu ac si esset maior quam una et minor quam altera. Assertores enim distinctionis formalis nullo modo intendunt in essentia divina ‘maiorem compositionem’ significare quam illi qui pro distinctione rationis militant. Sed hoc inter duas positiones interest quod iuxta distinctionem rationis intellectualis distinctio attributorum a nostro intellectu operatur, iuxta distinctionem formalem econtra ipsa essentia divina simplicissima, praecise propter suam infinitam perfectionem, nata est movere intellectum ad varios conceptus de se eliciendos; qui quidem conceptus, cum in ipsa re fundentur et a parte rei originentur, non sunt fictiones sed veri et obiectivi conceptus.

perfectionis et simplex cum hoc, tanto plures habet rationes alterius rationis" (*Ibidem*).

Hoc modo Gulielmus de Ware, dum una ex parte summam divinae essentiae simplicitatem minime infirmat, alia ex parte etiam obiectivitatem conceptuum, quos intellectus noster de diversis attributis efformat, definite salvat. Namque si rationes formales divinarum perfectionum iam a parte rei distinctae sunt, planum est quod conceptus, qui eis correspondent, non sunt vani cassi, nec nomina, quibus hi conceptus exprimuntur, sunt flatus vocis aut nomina mere synonyma:

"Ad aliud quod essent nomina synonyma, dico quod illa sunt nomina synonyma quae habent eundem conceptum, non contractum nisi per aliquam proprietatem accidentalem, sicut lapis et petra. Quando autem nomina faciunt diversum conceptum non est verum. Sic est in proposito, quia *alius est conceptus de Deo sub ratione veritatis, alius sub ratione bonitatis*" (*Ibidem*).

Quaestio de distinctione attributorum est periculis plena, nam ita est assignanda perfectionum diversitas ut non infirmetur divinae essentiae simplicitas; et ita defendenda simplicitas ut non tollatur conceptuum nostrorum obiectivitas. Via quam Doctor Fundatus inter Scyllam et Charybdim navigando secutus est, in linea generali eadem est cum illa quam longe ante ipsum S. Bonaventura designaverat quamque post ipsum Duns Scotus cum sua schola numerosa ingressus est.<sup>54</sup>

(To be continued)

GEDEON GÁL, O.F.M.

Quaracchi, Italy

<sup>54</sup> Optime de hac re disserit T. Szabó, *De distinctionis formalis origine bonaventuriana disquisitio historico-critica*, in *Scholastica ratione historico-critica instauranda* (Bibliotheca Pontificii Athenaei Antoniani, 7). — Acta Congressus Scholastici Internationalis, Romae 1951, pp. 379—445.



## CATECHETICAL INSTRUCTION IN THE EASTERN CHURCHES

### III. Catechetical Instruction in the Lesser Oriental Churches

The Christian Religion was introduced during the First century into Syria, Egypt, Northern Africa and Asia Minor. In all these countries the catechumenate was also established to spread christianity. In the seventh century the Church was completely destroyed in Northern Africa but the Greek church and Greek liturgy was maintained up to our times in Palestine, Syria, Northern Egypt and Asia Minor.

#### 1. The Syrian Churches

At the end of the second century Christianity had its beginning in Mesopotamia among the Syrians of the East and from there its spread into Persia and other eastern countries as far as China.

In Syria the Monophysites separated from the orthodox Greek church in the fifth century and organized an independant church commonly called after their founder Jacob al-Baradaï the Jacobite church. From that time on there were two churches in Syria: the Orthodox Greek and the Jacobite. The latter spread to India, where the Jacobite Church on the Malabar Coast is still existing.

CREED. — The Eastern Syrians accept the creed of the Council of Nice (325) and the synod of Constantinople (381) but reject the creed of the Council of Ephesus (431) which condemned Nestorius for teaching two natures in Christ and for refusing to call Mary the Mother of Christ. These Syrians go by the name of Nestorians.

The Western Syrians accept the creed of Nice, Constantinople and Ephesus but reject the creed of the council of Chalcedon (451) teaching that Christ has one composite nature and His humanity is a mere accident of the divine nature.

These heretical churches preserved the catechumenal method of the primitive church up to our times: the catechetical instruction was oral and without the aid of a booklet like our catechism.

The Nestorians were rather unanimous in the interpretation of their creed and only in rare cases leaned towards the Orthodox or Monophysite side. The Monophysites, however, were divided on many points and torn into many warring parties. Accordingly we find among them frequent revisions of creed and varying professions of faith.

The theologians of the two churches wrote extensively in defence of their particular creed as well as against each other and their common enemies: Orthodox Greeks, pagans, Gnostics, Parsees, Mohammedans among whom they lived. They agree with Catholics and Orthodox on accepting Bible and Tradition as co-ordinate sources of Revelation and Rules of Faith.

The civil language of the Nestorians is Syriac up to our time. The Monophysites began to speak Arabic in the eighth century and to write also in that language. In the twelfth century most of the Syriac speaking Nestorians wrote in Arabic.

The official teaching of the Nestorian Church was composed at the beginning of the seventh century by the monk Babai (died 628). His contemporary Hannana of Adiabene wrote a profession of faith which leans towards Monophysitism and for this reason was attacked by Babai. Jesuyab I., Patriarch of the Nestorians (d. 650), wrote a profession of faith addressed to emperor Maurice (582—602), a treatise on the sacraments in catechetical form of twenty-two questions and answers, a refutation of Monophysitism and was engaged in many debates with Monophysites. The Nestorian Paul addressed a profession of faith to emperor Justinian (d. 565).

We mention of other Nestorian theologians Acacius (d. 496) who wrote controversies against Monophysites. Honein ibn Ishak (d. 873) wrote in Syriac on the fear of God and in Arabic on the marks of the true Religion, Elias bar Schinaya (d. after 1049) wrote six treatises in defence of his creed in Arabic and a defence of the Christian Religion in Syriac. Joseph bar Melkom (d. about 1250) wrote in Arabic on faith and homilies. Barsahde (about 740) wrote against the Persian fire-worshippers, Abraham bar Daschantal (VIII<sup>th</sup> century) wrote against Judaism and Abu Nuh D'Anbar (d. 805) against Muslimism. The greatest theologian of the Nestorians is Ebedjesu (d. 1318) who in his celebrated work, entitled PEARL, both published in Syriac and Arabic, systematized the creed of his church.

The Monophysites wrote likewise a number of books in defense of their faith. Professions of faith were written in Syriac by Philoxene

of Mabugh (d. 523), John bar Cursus (d. 538), monks of Mesopotamia (about 550), Michael the Syrian (d. 1199) and Jacob bar Schakako (d. 1241). The profession of Jacob Baradaeus (d. 578), only preserved in Arabic and Ethiopic translations, is supposititious.

Explanations of faith were written by Philoxene of Mabugh, Patriarch George (d. 790), Moise bar Kepha (d. 903) and Barhebraeus (d. 1289). Apologetical works against Nestorians and Greek Orthodox were published by Jacob of Edessa (708), Nonnus of Nisibis (about 830), Jacob bar Salibi (d. 1171) and David bar Paul (d. 1220).

Both Nestorian and Monophysite theologians wrote doctrinal homilies in Syriac and Arabic prose. Yet of greater importance for the instruction of the illiterate people were the metrical homilies.

**ETHICS.** — Books on virtues and vices like those in the Orthodox Church were not according to the taste of the Syrian people. The preachers of both Churches, although stressing dogmatic points, did not neglect to explain the moral duties of Christians. Many of such sermons have been preserved. Moreover, systematic treatises on moral subjects were published. An unknown author translated into Syriac the work of Evagrius Ponticus which treats of the chief eight vices and the four cardinal virtues. The original works of the Syrian theologians did not follow this Greek model. Among Nestorian writers we find the priest Narses (d. 507) with a book on corruption of morals, Martyrius Sahdona (about 650) with treatises on virtues, John of Mossul (d. 1270) describes the practice of Christian life in a poem, Sliba (d. 900) describes the practice of penance in a poem, Ebedjesu treats in the third part of his PEARL on the duties of moral life. The Monophysites are represented by a book on ethics published in 1279 by Bar Hebraeus, by a treatise on moral theology by Severus bar Schakako (d. 1241) and Aaron bar Medani (d. 1263) with a poem on the way of Christian perfection. Philoxene of Mabugh treats in a sermon written in 495 of simplicity of heart, poverty, abstinence and fear of God as the means leading up to Christian perfection. There are found a number of treatises on monastic life.

All these books were primarily intended to serve as manuals to catechists. Powerful moral guides were also the decisions of Church law and the encyclical letters of the hierarchy. Many letters of the patriarchs and bishops of both churches are preserved which decide debated points of morals, liturgy and public morality.

Yet of great use to illiterates in mastering the principles of moral life were certain works translated from the Greek. The Gnostic tracts of the Greeks furnished to the illiterate people of the Syrian churches with a store of moral maxims consisting of but one sentence each and expressed in poetic form. Collections of such sayings were strung together and circulated under various names. This kind of moral literature has a special attraction for Syrians and other Oriental nations. Naturally Syrian writers enriched these collections by adding the principles of Christian morality. The Nestorians Abraham Katina (about 600) and Martyrius Sahdona (about 650) and the Monophysite Bar Schuschan (XI<sup>th</sup> century) compiled such gnostic books. The Monophysite Patriarch Theodose (d. 896) wrote a commentary both in Syriac and Arabic to 112 Greek gnomic sentences which he had translated from the Greek. Similar books of gnostic sentences were also compiled for the special use of monks.

Another catechetical means of spreading moral knowledge among illiterates was likewise borrowed from the ancient Greek, namely the Fable or Apologue. The Fable consists in a narrative which introduces irrational beings as acting and speaking with human interests and passions in order to convey moral lessons to the reader. Aesop's immortal fables and the fables embodied in the Greek story books of "Balaam and Josaphat" and "Joseph and King Nabuchodonosor". The Monophysite Barhebraeus compiled an original work of gnomic and fables in Syriac entitled: *Entertaining Stories* and another in Arabic entitled: *Banishment of Worries*.

A third help to spread moral knowledge among illiterates is animal typology. From the earliest times the habits and passions of beasts have been known to bear similarities with those of men. Consequently descriptions of animals were compiled for moral purposes: animals became symbols of men and were made to teach virtue and vices by their example. Thus the lion typifies courage, the goose stupidity. About fifty such descriptions of animals were written under the title of *Physiologus* in Greek and translated three times into Syriac. A Nestorian writer enlarged the work to 125 subjects by introducing trees and stones as teachers of morality.

A fourth aid for spreading both dogmatical and moral knowledge among the illiterates was the RIDDLE. Teaching through enigmas is an indigenous method of the East and is mentioned in the Old Testament as such. The Hindoos of India employed it as early as fifteen centuries



BEFORE Christ. The Nestorian Daniel bar Tubanita (about 650) wrote such riddle in Syriac and the West sometimes Bible History was taught in the same way.<sup>1</sup>

BIBLE-STUDY. — Reading of the Bible illiterate people proved a powerful means for spreading Christian doctrine in the East. With appropriate interpretation on the part of the reader such lessons became a suitable, though complicated, substitute to the catechism of the West. The liturgy offered the illiterate people more of Biblical texts. While the Latin Mass has only two Biblical readings (Epistle and Gospel) the Syriac Rite gives three and more, not counting the Biblical texts read to the illiterate people in assisting the recitation of the breviary.

During the early centuries, when the Greek liturgy was observed, the Biblical lessons were explained to the Syrians in Jerusalem, Syria and Mesopotamia in their native Syriac language. When later Arabic supplanted Syriac as a civil language, the Biblical lessons of the Syriac liturgy were likewise explained in Arabic.

Nestorians as well as Monophysites labored much in translating and explaining the Bible in Syriac for use both in church and private homes. The commentaries to the Bible written in Syriac would fill a whole library, if all works would have been preserved. Actually, however, more than two hundred volumes of them have been published in modern time. These works were primarily intended for the training of catechists and public readers, yet the illiterate people were also benefited by them indirectly.

The Syrians at an early time followed the custom observed in the Greek Church in regard to public reading of the Bible among the laity. DOCTRINE OF ADDAI, a work written in Syriac about the year 400 A. D., states that: "A great crowd of people (naturally mostly illiterates) assembled every day and took part in the prayer of the OFFICE and the reading of the Old and New Testament according to the Harmony of the Four Gospels of Tatian's Diatesseron" in Syriac. This was done at a time when the liturgy of the Syrians was still conducted in Greek. Thus extra-liturgical recitation of the Scriptures appealed to the illiterate Syrians throughout all later centuries. They were still more relished when metrical Biblical stories were later read to them.

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<sup>1</sup> The history of Syriac literature was treated by Wright (London 1894), Duval (Paris 1900) and Chabot (Paris 1934) and Baumstark (Bonn 1922). The standard work on Christian literature in Arabic is Graf (5 voll. Rome 1943—1953). Short histories of Syriac and Christian Arabic literature by Brockelmann, Leipsic 1909 and by Baumstark (2 voll. Leipsic 1911).

The Nestorians translated the Bible into Middle Persian and Sogdianese in order to promote their missionary activity in the Far East. As matter of fact the Nestorians were successful missionaries in the Middle Ages who by the year 1265 had converted twenty-five provinces and erected about seventy dioceses. Naturally these many newly converted nations necessitated also translations of the Bible into their respective languages but we have only parts of their Persian and Sogdianese translations. This unparalleled missionary development of the Nestorians could only be achieved by powerful preachers, since a book propaganda was out of place.

**LITURGY.** — The liturgy of the Syrian churches is less developed than the one used in the Greek Rite. On the other hand there is a greater variety in the use of liturgical prayers. The Nestorians use three liturgies: of Addaeus and Mari, Theodore of Mopsuestia and Nestorius. The first is the oldest and dates perhaps from a period prior to the separation in 431, because it is quite free from Nestorian influences. The two other liturgies are of later date. The Monophysites use 64 Anaphora or Masses of the Faithful but use most the Anaphora of St. James. In the Mass of Catechumens they use besides Syriac also Arabic, whilst the Nestorians always use Syriac alone. The Nestorians who still speak Syriac do not find much difficulties in following their Rite, since their civil language does differ only somewhat from the liturgical language. Yet formerly Persians, Sogdians and other nations spoke a language which had little or no affinity with the language of their liturgy. The Monophysites of Syria speaking Arabic find some affinity with their liturgical Syriac, whilst those of India speaking Indian languages will be confronted with the greatest diversity between their civil and ecclesiastical languages.

The liturgical prayers of the Mass, the breviary and the ritual were ably explained by the theologians of both churches for the benefit of the illiterates. In this regard are memorable among the Nestorians Jesu bar Nun (d. 827), George of Arbela (d. 987), Emmanuel bar Schahhare (d. 980), Patriarch Elias I. (d. 1049), Ebedjesu bar Bahriz (d. after 1028), and among Monophysites Lazar bar Sabta (d. after 829), Patriarch Cyriacus (d. 817), Jesu bar Schuschan (d. 1047), John of Harran (d. 1165), Michael the Syrian (d. 1199), Theodor bar Wahbun (d. 1193) and Aaron bar Madani (d. 1263). Thus the liturgy became a fruitful source of catechetical instruction for all classes.

PRAYERS. — The Syrian Churches followed the pattern of the Orthodox Church in regard to the various kinds of prayers. The liturgy supplied also the laity with a group of appropriate prayers for private devotion. Yet in the course of time a number of theologians composed prayers for liturgical and extraliturgical devotions. Yet of greater importance for illiterates were rhythmic prayers incorporated into the liturgy. The Monophysite bishop Maruta of Tagri (d. 649) wrote a number of rhythmic prayers but his contemporary the Monophysite Patriarch John of Antioch (d. 648) turned out such prayers in such a number that he received the surname John of Rhymed Prayers. The Monophysite monk Anthony the Rhetorician (d. about 830) wrote metrical prayers for private use.

SACRED POETRY. — The Syrian clergy invented and developed a native genre of sacred poetry which lent itself admirably to an aid in spreading Christian doctrine among illiterates and at the same time to a means for investing divine services with greater solemnity. Syriac sacred poetry consists of metrical homilies and hymns. The poetic compositions of the first class were mostly written for the celebration of the feasts of the Church and the commemorations of the saints and martyrs; they were sung during the celebration of the Office on those days by two choirs. However, metrical homilies were sometimes composed for extra-liturgical celebrations for the edification of the faithful to be read to the people. Even if the subject of the metrical homily was a secular affair, the poet turned it into a piece of sacred song. The Nestorians John bar Zubi composed metrical homilies on faith between 1226 and 1256 and Gabriel Kamsa (d. after 1281) on creation and incarnation. The productiveness of the Monophysite bishop Jacob of Sarug (d. 521) is quite astounding; he composed 760 metrical homilies and needed seventy copyists to transcribe them. These poetical compositions were very much read to the people and often re-transcribed, yet not quite half have been preserved. Likewise the length of these poetical narratives is sometimes stupendous. The Monophysite Isaac of Antioch (d. about 460) composed a large number of metrical homilies; his homily on penance comprises 1924 verses and the famous homily on the parrot which uttered the Trisagion in the streets of Antioch no less than 2136 lines. The Monophysite Jacob of Sarug (d. 521) is author of a metrical homily of 1400 lines on the chariot which appeared to Ezechiel in a vision. Poems of such length could not be read all at once and were divided into several sections.

How effective this kind of sacred poetry was in spreading the knowledge of Christian doctrine among the illiterates is best proven by the fact that the Syrian Church has produced a Caedmon, an illiterate potter, who was able to compose metrical homilies whilst engaged in his professional work. This untutored poet was a Monophysite called Simeon Kukaya. When Jacob of Sarug heard about him, he paid him a visit and found his poetical compositions so excellent that he copied some and took them with him. Nine metrical homilies of this illiterate potter are now preserved in a manuscript of the British Museum.

The hymns, called by the Syrians "instructions", represent the lyrical element of poetry; they treat of the life and passion of Our Lord, lives of saints, doctrinal exposition and moral instructions. These sacred compositions were likewise sung in church by two corresponding choirs. Writers of hymns were the Nestorians George of Arbela (d. 987), George Warda (about 1225), Massud ibn al-Kass (d. 1280) and Khamis bar Kardahe (d. 1350) and the Monophysites: Patriarch Elias I. (d. 724) and Anthony the Rhetorician (d. about 830).

A variety of the hymn is the canticle which consists in prayers or praises of God and saints. The Nestorian Narses (d. 507) composed nine canticles on the life of Our Lord, St. Joseph of Egypt and John the Baptist; they are in fact short dramas and resemble the mystery plays of the Middle Ages.

The Nestorian Ebedjesu composed in 1290 fifty metrical homilies according to the style of Arabic poetry; they treat of various religious subjects and were published under the title of: *Paradise of Eden*.

PICTORIAL INSTRUCTION. — The illiterates of the Syrian churches apparently were not so well supplied with pictorial helps as the unlettered classes of the rival Greek Orthodox Church. There was no doubt that the Syrians followed the usages of the primitive church in this matter as they had done in others. Yet prior to 1918 mural paintings were not known to exist in Syria, Excavations, however, made in 1918 at Dura-Europas brought to light mural paintings dating from about 250 A. D. These works represent Biblical subjects: Good Shepherd, Adam and Eve, healing of the paralytic, St. Peter walking on the water, David and Goliath and the three women at the sepulchre. These remnants warrant the belief that painting had placed in later centuries the truths of eternal salvation in graphic symbols before the eyes of the illiterates.



SCHOOLS. — Catechetical instruction in the Syrian Churches, like in the Greek Orthodox Church, was generally oral, without the aid of books and without scholastic training. The schools maintained were theological schools for the training of candidates for the clergy. The laity received catechetical instruction in church, catechumenal schools and private homes. Thus the usages of the catechumenate were followed up to our times.

## 2. The Armenian Church

Armenia, the MARTYR NATION, is numerically the strongest of the Lesser Churches and at the same time the most persecuted of all Eastern Churches.

There is great probability that the Christian religion was introduced into Armenia in the first century. Between the years 166 and 200 a persecution of Christians had been raging in that country. In 250 a bishop was residing there. St. Gregory the Illuminator converted about 295 the Armenian king Tiridates who granted liberty to the Christians eighteen years prior to emperor Constantine's Edict of 313: thus Armenia became the ELDEST DAUGHTER of the Church, having embraced Christianity officially and as a body.

To establish the Church on a firm basis King Tiridates gave orders to erect schools for the proper training of priests. For this purpose boys-schools were founded in which the sons of the pagan priests received a theological instruction to become later the bishops of the church. Since the priesthood had been hereditary in pagan times, it was found convenient to recruit the Christian clergy from the families of the pagan priests. Besides these theological schools there were also erected schools for the boys of the peasants to teach the elements of the Christian religion to them. The teachers of those schools were Greeks and Syrians who understood little of the Armenian language. The liturgy and the Bible used were in Syriac and the boys of the theological schools had to study them.

The schools introduced by King Tiridates were subsidized by the state and thus Armenia enjoys the unique distinction of having created the FIRST system of public schools in Christianity at a time when in the Roman empire the Christian religion was still outlawed.

Since girls were excluded from the schools and only small groups of boys scattered over a wide area could be reached, the majority of youth was left without schooling. Naturally the catechetical instruction

imparted to the boys in schools was purely oral and without the aid of catechetical books.

Gregory the Illuminator died about 332 and six years later the political disturbances of the time put an untimely end to the school movement. In 363 Armenia lost its independence and became a province of the fire-worshipping kings of Persia.

No sooner had peace been restored than the Patriarch Nerses the Great espoused the educational program of his predecessor St. Gregory the Illuminator. In the National Council of Aschtischat held in 363 or 364 it was decreed to re-open schools at various places to teach Syriac and Greek. Thus were again established theological schools for the education of prospective priests and bishops and catechumenal schools for the instruction of boys of the peasantry in the elements of religion. From these schools girls were again excluded and the boys did not receive much benefit from attending schools, where Christian doctrine was taught in a foreign language and by foreign teachers.

In the churches the liturgy was celebrated in the Syriac language which was interpreted by improvised renderings into the Armenian language. In the same way the Biblical lessons read in divine service were reproduced in the national language. In the parts of Armenia which belonged to the Byzantine empire the liturgy and the Biblical lessons were read in Greek and in the same way interpreted in Armenian. Of course in these conditions the understanding of Christian doctrine and customs remained rudimentary. Faustus of Byzanz states about 400 A. D. in his history of Armenia that the common people knew little of Christianity and the common people "despite all the preaching of the priests would understand little of Christianity". A number of theological students went to Syria or Byzantium to receive their education in Syriac or Greek but the common people, young and old, received all their knowledge by oral teaching.

Nerses the Great died in 372 or 373 and it was only thirty years later that the educational system was placed on a permanent foundation by the invention of the alphabet and the creation of Armenian literature.

In 405 or 406 Mesrop invented the present system of writing the Armenian language in letters. Thereupon the Bible was translated into the Armenian language and a liturgy was written in Armenian to displace the Greek and Syriac liturgies. Mesrop and the Patriarch Sahak (390—439) established schools both for the training of the clergy and for the laity. The text-books used in the theological schools were translations of the Bible and the Greek Fathers. The emphasis laid on the

study of the Armenian language distinguishes these schools from the earlier ones, in which Syriac and Greek were made the subjects of teaching. Grammar, writing and rhetoric were also taught in these schools in connection with the study of the liturgy and the Bible. Sacred music naturally was to be learnt as a necessary pre-requisite for carrying out the liturgy. All other branches of knowledge were rigidly excluded. In the common schools even the elementary branches were set aside and Christian doctrine formed the sole subject of studies, naturally in a less degree than in the theological institutions. It is noteworthy that the Mesrop-Sahak schools admitted also girls and women, the FIRST example of co-education in the history of Christian education.

This system of public schools came to an end with the death of Sahak (d. 439) and Mesrop (d. 440), yet the catechetical instruction was greatly aided by the books written in Armenian for the benefit of the catechists.

CREED. — The Armenian church accepts the creeds of the three oecumenical councils: Nice (325), Constantinople (381) and Ephesus (431) but rejects the creed of the council of Chalcedon (451) and officially introduced monophysitism into their church by the national council of Dwin in 506 A. D.

The catechetical instruction of the common people in the creed followed the general usages of the other Oriental churches. The creed was explained by sermons in the church, by the liturgy and by manuals written for the training of catechists but not by catechisms placed into the hands of the youth.

The first catechetical works were translations from the Greek and Syriac. Armenian literature begins with the translation of the Bible about 405 and the translations of the Greek and Syriac Fathers in the fifth century. The explanations of the creed by the Fathers Ignatius of Antioch, Gregory Thaumaturgus, Athanasius, Irenaeus, Theophilus of Alexandria, Eusebius of Gabala, Cyril of Jerusalem, Gregory of Nazianzus, Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, Epiphanius of Salamis, John Chrysostomus, Proclus of Constantinople, Zenobius of Egea, the liturgy of St. Basil and St. John Chrysostomus and others, the Greek breviary and ritual. From Syriac were translated the works of Aphraates and Ephrem. Only a few original works written by Armenians in their native language on the creed were produced in the fifth century; these are homilies of Moses of Khoren, Elisacus and an anonymous writer. However, Eznik wrote at that early period an immortal work

of apologetics against pagans, Persian fire-worshippers, Greek philosophers and Manicheans, entitled *Refutation of the Sects*.

In the sixth century, after the council of Dwin (506 A. D.), Armenian theologians began to publish original works of controversy in defence of monophysitism. Among the number of such works dating from the sixth to the eighth century rank highest the monophysite tracts of David the Invincible (about 650 A. D.). In the eighth century were translated the controversial works of Cyril of Alexandria. In the ninth century Zacharias the Catholicus wrote eloquent homilies. In the eleventh century Paul of Taron compiled a monophysite work against the Greek theologian Theopistus. In the twelfth century Gregory of Tlay produced a variety of theological works on the creed. In the fourteenth century John of Orotn (d. 1388) wrote homilies and monophysite works and his disciple Gregory of Dathev (born 1340) compiled a *Summa theologiae* in the style of the *Summa* of Thomas Aquinas which had been translated about 1330 into Armenian.

ETHICS. — The principles of moral and Christian life were taught to the common people more by practical practice than theoretical instruction. The latter, however, were also supplied by the clergy in church in sermons and in liturgical performances. The catechists were aided in their work by systematic treatises on moral duties. For their benefit were translated from the Greek the catechetical works of St. Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, John Chrysostom, Evagrius Ponticus and Nilus the Ascete and from the Syriac were translated the moral homilies of Aphraates and some tracts of St. Ephrem. From Latin were translated about 1330 the *Summa* of St. Thomas Aquinas, the most systematic work on moral theology and some time later Dathev wrote a similar work in original Armenian. Particular guides of private and public morality were the decrees of various national councils and numerous pastoral letters of patriarchs and bishops. John Catholicus (d. 728) compiled a collection of canon law and Mechithar Kosh (d. 1207) a corpus of canon and civil law. The illiterates received much moral instruction from the proverbs, fables, animal typology, enigmas, popular stories of saints and sinners which are still current among the Armenian people. The gnomonic literature apparently was not as great an instrument of moral instruction in Armenia as it was in Syria. However, the immortal story of Barlaam and Josaphat, the history of the Seven Sages and the tale of the City of Bronze were turned into verse for popular instruction. Yet of greater influence were the fables as vehicles



of instruction of the illiterates. Mechithar Kosh is the greatest Armenian poet of fables (d. 1207) and in the course of the thirteenth century a large literature of fables was produced by Armenian writers. Allegory as contained in the so-called *Physiologus* was introduced into Armenia already in the fifth century. Nerses the Graceful (d. 1165) wrote riddles for educational purposes.

**BIBLE-STUDY.** — The translation of the Bible into Armenian was the first literary work of the Armenian Church and remained the most influential book from the fifth century up to our times. From the Greek originals were rendered into Armenian the entire Bible, the commentaries to the Bible written by Basil the Great, Gregory of Nyssa, Epiphanius of Salamis, Hippolytus and Philo. Original commentaries to the Bible were written by Stephen of Asolik. Ignatius and Sargis, John of Orotin. Gregory Magistros (d. 1058) abridged the entire Bible in a rhyming poem and set a fashion to a number of later poets. Through these rhymed stories of the Bible and readings both in church and homes the illiterates were made familiar to a certain extent with the Message of God to men. The psalms were naturally the most used book of the Bible and for this reason as early as the year 1515 an edition of the Armenian psalter was printed in Venice for the use of the laity.

**LITURGY.** — The Armenian liturgy is essentially a translation of an earlier form of the Byzantine liturgy interwoven with certain parts of the East-Syrian liturgy which mark the dual missionary activity of Armenia viz. that of Byzantium and that of Mesopotamia. The Armenian language of the liturgy dating from the fifth century is widely different from the language spoken by the modern Armenians. The liturgical books are nine in number. In 1565 the second Armenian press was set up in Venice and the psalms and breviary were printed. Up to 1899 the British Museum Catalogue lists 43 editions of books of the Armenian Rite.

Commentaries on the liturgy increased the influence of the divine service on both clergy and laity. At the beginning of the eighth century Gregory Asheruni wrote an important commentary on the lectionary and John the Catholicus (d. 728) commentaries on other liturgical books. Stephen bishop of Siunik composed a commentary on the Armenian breviary at the end of the eighth century. Chosroes the Great (d. ca 972) wrote a commentary on the eucharistic rites and the breviary and Samuel Kamrdjtsoretzi towards the end of the tenth century a commentary on the lectionary based on Gregory Asheruni.

Nerses of Lambron (d. 1198) composed a commentary on the liturgy. Thus in the Armenian as in other eastern churches the liturgy celebrated in a dead language is made a perfect vehicle of teaching Christian doctrine to the illiterates.

PRAYERS. — The liturgy naturally supplied the laity with appropriate prayers for public and private use. Yet as early as the fifth century the people were supplied with a translation of very beautiful prayers of John Chrysostom. Gregory of Narek (d. 1003) wrote 95 prayers which were highly prized. However, the most popular prayers became the twenty-four prayers to each hour of the day and night which were composed by Patriarch Nerses the Graceful (d. 1165) and were printed in thirty different languages in Venice in 1869.

SACRED POETRY. — The Armenian liturgy contains some sacred hymns which are still in use in the church. John the Catholicus (d. 728) composed many beautiful hymns for the benefit of the people at large. Stephen of Siunik sometimes in the late eighth century wrote likewise hymns for extra-liturgical purposes. Gregory of Narek (d. 1003) is noted for a collection of sacred hymns which he composed. Yet these hymns were only intended for extra-liturgical and private use. The hymns used in the liturgy since the fifth century were few in number and brief in form till Nerses the Graceful (d. 1165) and his contemporaries doubled their number and the bulk. Nerses the Graceful is also noted for a long poem on Jesus Christ. Nerses of Lambron (d. 1198) left number of sacred poems. The hymns and canticles of the Armenian poets might not rank high as productions of literature, yet they exerted a great influence on the people: literate or illiterate.

PICTORIAL INSTRUCTION. — The Armenian church developed painting slowly. The earliest productions date only from the tenth century and are found as illustrations of books. Mural painting or the BIBLE OF THE ILLITERATES was used sparingly as means to spread Biblical knowledge.

SCHOOLS. — Political conditions prevented the establishment of schools after the deaths of Sahak and Mesrop for over fourteen hundred years. "It is a sorrowful fact that education for the common folks in Armenia did not have its day after Mesrop and Sahak until the eighteenth and nineteenth century".<sup>2</sup> There were always found from time to time private teachers but the numbers of students was very small. On

<sup>2</sup> Kevork, S. History of education in Armenia. La Vern, Cal., 1930, p. 57.

various occasions men tried to create opportunities for education of the common people in various localities but the results of their efforts proved to be very meagre. Theological schools were kept rather regularly but they were mainly found in the monasteries. In such conditions catechetical instruction for children in common schools was out of the question and thus the catechetical instruction of youth remained as in the time of the primitive church orally and without the aid of books.<sup>3</sup>

### 3. The Coptic Church

Christianity was introduced into Egypt in the first century by the Evangelist Marcus and by the year 451 the whole country had become Catholic. However after that date Christianity was divided: the native Christians rejected the creed of the Council of Chalcedon (451), turned Monophysites and accepted the name of Copts (i. e. Egyptians), whilst the Hellenized races retained the creed of the Greek church and received the name of Melkites (i. e. Imperials). The invasion of the Moslems (640—641) reduced the number of Christians to the small number of Copts and Melkites.

The Copts retained the ancient native language in their liturgy but in civil life since the tenth century Arabic is spoken. The Coptic language is derived from the old Egyptian tongue and between 250 and 350 was developed in five different dialects.

**CREED.** — The Coptic Church accepts the creed of the three oecumenical councils of Nice (325), Constantinople (381) and Ephesus (431) but rejected the creed of the council of Chalcedon (451); the Copts since that time embraced Monophysitism as their national creed.

During the first centuries Greek was the language of the Egyptian churches. According to the usages of the catechumenate catechetical instruction was oral and without the use of books. The people who were not familiar with the Greek language were instructed of course in their native tongue. At first the catechists would convey their lessons by improvised translations of the Greek Bible and liturgy. However, before long the need of standard translations was felt. Since there was no uniform language spoken, it was natural that the Bible and liturgy was translated into local dialects. The Bible was first translated into the Sahidic dialect of Upper Egypt about 250 A. D.,

<sup>3</sup> Sharian, B. *Armenia, her church and faith*. Atlanta, Ga., USA. 1928. English translation of the liturgy by Th. Isaac Fresno, Cal. USA., 1932. Kevork, S. *History of education in Armenia*. La Vern, Cal., USA. 1930 with extensive bibliography on pp. 312—320.

then into the Achmimic dialect of Middle Egypt about the same time, into the Fayyumic dialect of Lower Egypt about 300 A. D. and finally into the Bohairic dialect about 600 A. D. which became the official translation of the Coptic Church.

Like the Bible the explanations and apologies of the faith are all translations from the Greek Fathers from Athanasius to about the year 500 A. D. The numerous sermons and letters of the monk Schenute (d. 451 or 452) are almost all the original works on theological subjects which were written in the Coptic language and which are of any importance.

**ETHICS.** — The monastic rules form the moral code of the monks and the canons and apostolic constitutions the moral law for the clergy. The monastic rule of St. Pachomius (d. 348) is apparently the earliest original work written in Coptic. The moral guide of the laity is provided by the apostolic constitutions, the decrees and letters of patriarchs and bishops. Moral treatises are few in number and only translations from the Greek.

However, moral teaching was abundantly supplied by the great mass of apocryphal works of the Old and New Testament, lives of saints, anecdotes of holy men, sayings of the Fathers and parables as well as the animal typology of the *Physiologus*. The content of these works became the sacred folklore of the illiterate Copts and served as a practical exemplification of moral life.

**BIBLE-STUDY.** — The Bible was explained in numerous homilies which are practical in their application to the variable conditions of life. Besides the translation of the works of the Greek and Syriac writers supplied a great store of explanations of the Bible. Lay people who could read, would study the text of the Bible by heart. In 1656 a missionary wrote: "Though the Christians of the East are mostly ignorant, you cannot say the same of the Copts, because the Copts begin to study by heart in their youth the Office which is very long and which contains large lessons from the Old and New Testaments, consequently they are well versed in Scripture." This custom had been centuries-old at that time. The illiterates became acquainted with the content of the Bible to a great extent also by story-tellers.

**LITURGY.** — The Greek Bible and Liturgy remained in use in Upper Egypt till the break with the Greek church after the council of Chalcedon in 451. Then the liturgy in the Coptic language became



necessary. The substitution of Coptic to Greek in the liturgy was gradual. The Coptic Church uses three liturgies of St. Basil, St. Cyril and St. Gregory. The liturgy was read exclusively in the extinct Coptic language till the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, but parts are now read in Arabic, while the lessons have been for a long time before read in both languages: Arabic and Coptic. The services are still excessively long.

PRAYERS. — The Divine Office which was studied by heart by reading or by oral recitation supplied the people with prayers for the seven canonical hours. The eucharistic liturgy supplied the common people with short prayers for frequent repetition.

SACRED POETRY. — After the Arab conquest (641 A. D.) as a defence to the threatened church, language and nationality there were composed versifications of the Salomonic books of Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Canticle of Canticles besides other religious songs and versification of pious legends. They are mostly antiphonal and all were to be sung according to traditional church tunes which were indicated by the first word of the respective song. Besides a number of Greek hymns were translated. An original poetical composition of the Passion of Our Lord is only preserved in fragments. Seven series of hymns of the Blessed Virgin for each day of the week are mainly adaptations of Biblical sayings. In the tenth century were composed a number of paschal hymns and songs in praise of saints besides a collection of short religious songs. In the thirteenth century was composed the didactic poem TRIADON which contains moral and religious instruction including much Biblical matter. Thus the illiterates received much auditory instruction through sacred songs. Of the modern Copts it is stated that "the lay people have a remarkable knowledge of the text of their Coptic liturgy and take an active part in solemn celebration singing the traditional chant by heart with copious variations" (Attwater).

PICTORIAL INSTRUCTION. — Mural paintings depicting Old and New Testament scenes churches are preserved which date from the fourth and fifth centuries. Yet of greater importance for the religious instruction of the illiterates were the Biblical and religious representations on the sculptures in wood, ivory, bronze and clay as well as on textiles used both in church and private homes.

SCHOOLS. — It is only in recent years that schools for the common people have been established. Even theological schools were always rare and did not function properly. Yet the Christian faith and the

dead Church language with its ancient liturgy have been transmitted orally without much schooling.<sup>4</sup>

Since the tenth century the Copts published many books in Arabic, both translations and original works, which are not considered here.

#### 4. The Ethiopian Church

The Christian religion was introduced into Ethiopia about 339 A. D. by Frumentius. The church has been dependent on the Coptic Church up to our time and with the latter has rejected the creed of the council of Chalcedon (451) thereby turning monophysite up to our times. The Ethiopian Church withstood the inroads of Moslemism better than the Coptic church: Christianity remained the religion of the country and Moslemism gained only a small foothold.

The Ethiopian church in general agrees with the Copts in doctrine, ritual and customs but differs in her liturgical language of Geez; the civil language of the country being Amharic, which is entirely different from the church language.

The Ethiopic literature presents closely the same features as the Coptic but unfortunately the earlier works are preserved in later revisions and not in their originals.

Geez literature dates from the establishment of Christianity in the fifth century and ends towards the close of the seventh century. Then an interruption followed lasting 600 years. With the re-establishment of the Salomonic dynasty in 1268 the second period begins which continued to the present day.

The first work written in the sacred language of Geez was the translation of the Bible from Greek. The oldest part was the translation of the Gospels made about 500 A. D. and the latest the translation of Sirach in 678 A. D. With the Bible were also translated various apocryphal works, an ascetical work ascribed to St. Pachomius, a collection of homilies and explanations of the creed, among them a translation of St. Cyril of Alexandria on the right faith and the Physiologus.

In the second period beginning in the latter part of the thirteenth century translations were made from Arabic. The early translations of the Bible were revised from Arabic translations, and a copious literature produced on various branches of knowledge which well rivals with that of the Coptic church.

<sup>4</sup> Worrell, *Short account of the Copts*. Ann Arbor, Mich., 1945. The liturgy is translated into English in: Brightman *Liturgies*, Oxford 1896. The literature of the Copts is described by Hyvernât in: *Catholic Encyclopedia*, vol. V, pp. 356—362, vol. XVI, pp. 27—30.

CREED. — Under King Claudius (1540—1559) a vast compilation called THE FAITH OF THE FATHERS was translated from the Arabic which includes the monophysite creed of Jacob Baradaeus. The monophysite Confession of Faith of King Claudius was effective in keeping the country within the pale of monophysitism. Towards the close of the sixteenth century a collection of controversial tracts was compiled and an encyclopedia of theology was translated from the Arabic. A large number of homilies, both original and translated, sometimes after the Arabic fashion in rhymed prose, spread the knowledge of Christian doctrine. The romance BARLAAM AND JOASAPH is an apology of the Christian religion in a pleasing form.

ETHICS. — In general we find the same means of teaching moral knowledge as in the Coptic church to the illiterates: Physiologus, sayings, proverbs, civil and ecclesiastical law. Practical guides are the lives of the saints which exemplify the application of the moral principles to the various conditions of life. In this regard the most popular book of the Miracles of the Blessed Virgin was very serviceable. Systematic works are ascetical treatises of John Saba (about 1540) and the translation of the SPIRITUAL MEDICINE of bishop Michael of Adtrib (about 1687).

BIBLE-STUDY. — The Bible was transcribed and revised in a number of manuscripts dating from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. A number of apocryphical works have been transcribed together with the canonical books. The Book of Maccabees of the Ethiopic Bible is a spurious work of romance describing the martyrdom of three Jews. The commentary of John Chrysostom on the Epistle to the Hebrews was translated about 1540. There is a number of mystical commentaries to Scripture, such as the *Book of the Mystery of Heaven and Earth* by Ba-Hailu Michael (probably of the 15<sup>th</sup> century).

LITURGY. — The Ethiopic liturgy is substantially that of the Copts translated into Geez. The oldest manuscripts date from the seventeenth century. Separate parts are: *Service for the Dead* (about 1294) and: *Book of Extreme Unction* (about 1550). The first Ethiopic book printed was the liturgical Psalter together with the Canticle of Canticles and the canticles: Magnificat, Benedictus and Nunc dimittis issued in Rome in 1513 and reprinted in Cologne in 1518. Up to 1899 the Catalogue of the British Museum lists 16 printed editions of the Ethiopic liturgy.

PRAYERS. — Besides the liturgies there have been transmitted a variety of prayers which cannot be accurately dated. Other prayers are found in various compilations of theological works.

SACRED POETRY. — The chief work of Ethiopic poetry is the Hymnarium with the Antiphonarium, both with musical notation. The most popular work is an ode in praise of the Blessed Virgin. A special kind of sacred poetry is the Qene, short hymns which are inserted after certain verses of the psalms. A subdivision is formed by the rhymed Sellase i. e. six-liners. King Naod (d. 1508) composed a long song in praise of the Blessed Virgin, entitled IMAGE OF MARY. King Zara Jacob (1437—1468) compiled a collection of hymns on the saints of the Ethiopic calendar and caused the composition of an original Office of the Blessed Virgin. A long hymn on God called THE WISE ONE OF THE WISES is preserved which cannot be dated. There is also extant a biblical history in verse.

PICTORIAL INSTRUCTION. — Ethiopic art is serving religious instruction through fresco-paintings in churches. Among the finest specimens of this art are the paintings preserved in the church of Holy Trinity at Adowa and in the church at Kwarata.

SCHOOLS. — Common schools had been practically unknown in Ethiopia up to modern times. Even the clergy received no regular school training up to the last century. Yet all the time the laity as well as the clergy took great pains to memorize the text of the Bible and the liturgy.<sup>5</sup>

### 5. The Nubian Church

The Christian Religion was introduced into Nubia about the year 330 A. D. and Monophysitism about 540 A. D. The Moslems conquered the country in 640 and Christianity was maintained under greatest difficulties till the fifteenth century, when the whole country was lost to the victorious Moslems and their religion. This general defection is attributed partly to the pressure of political force and partly to amalgamation with the Moslems. The French Capuchin missionary Elzear of Samsaye on July 1, 1656 states that the main reason was loss of schools. "The people of Nubia", he writes, "were all Christians not so long ago but now they are all Moslems or rather neither Moslems nor

<sup>5</sup> Mercer, *The Ethiopic liturgy*. Milwaukee 1925. English translation also in: Brightman Oxford 1896; Hyatt. *The Church of Abyssinia*. London 1928. Harden, *Introduction to the Ethiopic Christian literature*.



Christians. When the Turks conquered the country, the Christians were given the choice to give up either their churches or their schools. The Christians believed that it would be better to keep their churches and so they sacrificed their schools, stopping teaching altogether. When the priests, deacons and the other persons who could read and serve the church had gradually died off, the Patriarch did not send any men to take their place; thus the people retained their churches but had nobody to serve them and gradually turned Moslems keeping a little of Christianity".<sup>6</sup> When in 1675 Wansleben travelled through the country, he found the churches still intact but closed, "because" as he remarked, "there were no priests there". In 1938 the ruins of churches were still to be seen there.<sup>7</sup>

The church developed in Nubia in the same way as it did in Egypt and Ethiopia. However, up to 1906 only a few fragments of the literature were known. It was only in 1906 that the first texts of the language and literature of the Nubian church came to light: sixteen leaves containing parts of the Gospels and Acts of the Apostles from the liturgical book Synaxarium and another manuscript containing an hymn on the Passion of Our Lord. Both manuscripts date from the eighth century. In 1909 W. Budge edited also Nubian texts containing lives of saints and legal documents. Remnants of mural paintings are still to be found.<sup>8</sup>

## 6. The Church of Georgia

The Christian Religion was introduced into Georgia or Iberia, a country lying between Armenia and Russia, south of the Caucasus, by Greek missionaries from Byzantium about the year 322. The Bible was translated from the Greek from the fifth to the seventh centuries. The liturgy was first celebrated in the Greek language and later translated into the Georgian language and is still in use. The Georgian church adopted the creed of the Byzantine Church and retained it to our times. Despite most severe persecutions the country clung to the Christian religion.

CREED. — The first explanations of the creed are translation from the Greek into the Georgian language and up to the eighth century a great number of such works were translated. In the eighth century begins the production of works by native scholars in the form of homilies and religious tracts.

<sup>6</sup> *Collectanea Franciscana*, 18, Rome 1948, p. 221.

<sup>7</sup> Attwater II, p. 213 note.

<sup>8</sup> *Bibliofilia* 8, Firenze 1907, p. 348.

ETHICS. — A number of moral treatises were translated from the Greek in the eleventh century.

BIBLE-STUDY. — The revision of the translation of the Bible from the eighth to the eleventh centuries was accompanied with commentaries and Biblical studies of various kinds.

LITURGY. — The liturgy was also taken over from Byzantium and presents not many changes. A KANONARION of the seventh century represents the liturgy of the middle of the seventh century.

PRAYERS. — Prayers for private devotion both translations and native compositions have been composed during the earlier centuries.

SACRED POETRY. — A collection of hymns composed from the fifth to the twelfth centuries were printed in 1913 at Tiflis. A very popular hymn consisting of sixty strophes is devoted to the praise of the Blessed Virgin. King David III. (d. 1125) composed penitential hymns and caused that contemporary productions of poets were collected and preserved.

PICTORIAL INSTRUCTION. — Mural paintings in churches have always served as teachers of sacred doctrine in Georgia from early centuries up to modern times. Of greater importance as means of Christian instruction may have served the small pictures of saints and the Blessed Virgin which were produced by gold-smiths and ivory-carvers from the eleventh century onwards.

In the eleventh century originated a profane literature in Georgia yet up to the eighteenth century the bulk of Georgian literature was religious; however during the last two centuries the character of the Georgian book production has been changed to the worldly and profane character of European literature. Since 1926 lists of all books printed in the Georgian languages are published annually.<sup>9</sup>

## CONCLUSION: LESSONS TAUGHT BY THE EASTERN CHURCHES

The history of the Eastern churches teaches the West first of all the lesson that the method of the catechumenate has been able to train Christians through thousand and more years who were willing to die

<sup>9</sup> Tamariti, *L'église géorgienne*. Rome 1910. — On early Georgian literature treat Baumstark, *Christliche Literaturen des Orients*, Leipsic 1911, and Karst, *Littérature géorgienne chrétienne*. Paris 1934. — On general history see: Wardrop, *The Kingdom of Georgia*. London 1888.

for their faith. The oral, bookless and but for few exceptions schoolless method of the catechumenate has educated through three hundred years several, some say seven, millions of Christians who sacrificed their lives in defense of their faith. In a similar way the oral, bookless and practically schoolless method of the Oriental Churches grounded millions of Christians so well in their faith during succeeding centuries that they would rather suffer death than apostatize from their faith. These churches proudly point to the countless number of martyrs of their fold as confirmation of the divinity of their faith.

It is true that those churches suffered also great losses through apostasy. In Africa whole countries turned Moslemitic. Yet comparing the present status of those churches with the Catholic church we find that the losses sustained by the Oriental churches through inroads of Moslemism are not as great as the losses sustained by the Catholic Church through the secession of Protestants. To-day Protestantism is a little more than half as strong as Catholicism, whereas the Oriental Separated Churches are considerably more than half as strong as the Moslemitic believers.

The survey of the catechetical instruction in the Eastern Churches teaches us the further lesson that we attach too great an importance to the function of the printed booklet called catechism. Protestants point with pride to the catechism first introduced into their churches. The Catholic Church of the Middle Ages had nothing like this to offer to the medieval youth. Therefore Catholic historians are apologetical when they speak about the alleged neglect of catechetical instruction during the Middle Ages. The history of the Eastern Churches teaches us the lesson that Christians can be reared without bookish instruction so that they rather sacrifice their lives than renounce their faith.

The Eastern Churches teach us likewise the lesson that the school is not essential for the propagation of faith. The church and the home trained millions of unlettered Christians in the East who kept their faith under the most trying persecutions during many centuries. The modern movement to lay the burden of religious instruction on the school has not the sanction of past history.

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## THE ALLOCATION OF POPE PIUS XII ON THE FOURTH CENTENARY OF THE GREGORIANUM

In 1551 Saint Ignatius Loyola opened a small school of humanities at the foot of the Capitolium, giving it the name of the Roman College. In the following year he founded the German College to house northern youths who were preparing for the priesthood in the Roman College. That same year Pope Julius III authorized the school to bestow academic degrees, courses for which were inaugurated in 1553. The school grew rapidly, counting a thousand students in 1567; and in 1584 moved to new buildings erected for it by Pope Gregory XIII. In his memory it was later called the Gregorian University. Though staffed by the Jesuits, it was always a Pontifical institute, and thus escaped the suppression of the Society. Restored to the Jesuits in 1824, it has continued to grow both in students and in the number of its faculties, so that it now includes an Institute of Social Studies, a faculty of church history and missiology, the Biblical Institute and the Pontifical Institute of Oriental Studies, in addition to the regular courses of philosophy and theology. As it celebrated its fourth centenary in 1953, it could proudly point to 2400 students, diocesan and religious, from fifty eight different countries.

The climax of the centennial celebrations was a solemn audience which Pope Pius XII graciously granted on October 17 to the academic body, pupils, and alumni. On this occasion the Holy Father pronounced an allocation which not only praised the past traditions of the University but also set up several important norms for Catholic teaching.

Since the words of His Holiness confirm the position taken by Father Franz Pelster, S. J., in an article recently published in *Franciscan Studies*, the Editors feel that some sections of the allocation will be of great interest to our readers. The official Latin text of the Allocation is contained in the *Acta Apostolicae Sedis*, 45 (1953), 682—690. The English text presented here is adapted from an English translation graciously furnished by the NCWC News Service; it has no official character.

THE EDITORS

### SCHOLASTIC METHOD

Laudamus scholasticam methodum, quae apud vos in usu versatur; quam alibi haud raro negligi et contemni Nos minime latet. Ut ii ab ista incuria vel despicatione desistant, meminerint Summos Pontifices huiusmodi methodum saepe commendasse,

We praise the scholastic method in use among you; nor are We unaware that elsewhere it is often neglected and looked down upon. That those who so act may desist from such neglect and contempt, let them remember that the Supreme



quin etiam hortatos esse, ut ea in philosophicis et theologicis scholis in honore semper haberetur.

Id, quod scholastica methodus assequi contendit, ut scilicet hominis ratio revelatas a Deo veritates et earum philosophica adiumenta perlustret, expoliendo illas quae eis insunt notiones et afferendo argumenta, quibus eorum certitudo solide fulcitur; utque praeterea quae contra disputantur resolvat, et veritates omnes tum naturales metaphysicas tum divinitus revelatas concorditer apteque componere conetur: hoc semper fuit et est philosophiae et theologiae certum firmumque propositum. Neque opinandum est mysteria fidei et eorum supposita philosophica ab unoquoque ita comparari posse, ut facile vel ultro ab intellectu nostro obtineantur, neque opus esse, ut diuturno studio et apta methodo ratiocinando et meditando pertractentur.

Neve timueritis, ne ob studia spectativi generis illae quae "positivae" scientiae nuncupantur et praecipue theologia "positiva" aliquid detrimenti capiant. Inter utrasque enim nulla oppositio, quin etiam illae eo securius prodeunt, quo firmiter hisce superstruuntur. Exemplo sunt vobis ipse Doctor Angelicus, qui "positivarum" cognitionum appetens erat, et ex primaevis Athenaei vestri theologis Franciscus Suarez, qui iure post Sanctum Thomam primoribus sacrae theologiae cultoribus accensendus est, recens autem — saltem unum memoria repetere fas Nobis sit — Ioannes Baptista Cardinalis Franzelin, qui utriusque ordinis disciplinis diligentissimum tribuit cultum easdemque mirabili modo in unum coniunxit . . .

Pontiffs have often recommended such a method, and indeed have exhorted that it be always held in honor in philosophical and theological schools.

What the scholastic method seeks to attain has always been and is the firm and certain goal of philosophy and theology, namely that human reason thoroughly examine the truths revealed by God and their philosophical supports by refining the notions which these contain and adducing arguments to establish their certitude; solve objections which may be urged; and achieve the harmonious and orderly disposition of natural metaphysical and divinely revealed truths. For it must not be thought that the mysteries of Faith and their philosophical presuppositions can be penetrated easily or spontaneously by our intelligence, or that there is no need to reason and meditate about them with prolonged study and suitable method.

Do not fear that studies of such a nature harm in any way the positive sciences and especially positive theology. Between these sciences there is no opposition; rather, the latter advance more safely according as they are more firmly based on the former. Take as your models the Angelic Doctor who strove after the "positive" knowledge of things, and Francisco Suarez, one of the Theologians of the early days of your University, who is rightly acknowledged as being in the front rank of Theologians after Saint Thomas, and — to mention one name in more recent times — John Baptist Cardinal Franzelin, who cultivated so diligently both the speculative and positive sciences and harmonized them in a wondrous manner.

## THE CHURCH ALONE IS THE FOUNT OF TRUTH

Quod vero ad studia vestra et ad apostolatam vestrum attinet, ne indistincte permisceantur doctrina catholica et veritates naturales illi cohaerentes, et ab omnibus Catholicis agnitae, cum eruditorum hominum conatibus ad eas explicandas itemque cum propriis elementis peculiariibusque rationibus, quibus varia philosophica et theologica systemata, quae in Ecclesia inveniuntur, inter sese discriminantur; neve umquam ita agendum est, quasi sacrarum concionum materies et religiosa institutio hinc emanent atque dependant. Nulla huiusmodi disciplina et ratio porta est, qua quis in Ecclesiam ingrediatur; maioreque ratione nefas hanc est asserere unicam portam patere. Etiam sanctissimo et praestantissimo Doctore numquam Ecclesia veluti primigenio veritatis fonte usa est neque nunc utitur. Doctores utique magnos habet et summis decorat laudibus Thomam et Augustinum; at falli nescios tantum Sacrarum Scripturarum caelitus inspiratos auctores profitetur. Ecclesia nempe Dei mandatu Sacrarum Scripturarum interpres et custos, in se viventis Sacrae Traditionis depositaria, ipsa est ad salutem adipiscendum porta, ipsa, sub tutela ductuque Spiritus Sancti, sibi fons est veritatis.

In what pertains to your studies and your apostolate, let not Catholic doctrine and those natural truths which are intimately connected with it and admitted by all Catholics be confused with the attempts of learned men to explain them, nor with the special elements and reasonings which differentiate the various philosophical and theological systems found within the Church. We must never act as though material for sermons and religious instructions derive from and depend on such theories. For no such teaching or system is the door through which one enters the Church; and much more, no one may dare assert that such is the only door that lies open. No Doctor, no matter how holy and outstanding he may be, has the Church used or does She use today as the primary fountain of truth. The Church indeed considers Thomas and Augustine as great Doctors and honors them with the highest praise, yet She acknowledges as infallible only the inspired authors of Sacred Scripture. For the Church, who by the mandate of God is the interpreter and guardian of Holy Scripture and in herself the depository of living Sacred Tradition, is herself the door whereby salvation is gained and, under the protection and guidance of the Holy Spirit, is unto herself the source of truth.

## THE PLACE OF SYSTEMS

Varia doctrinarum systemata, quae Ecclesia teneri sinit, omnino convenient oportet cum omnibus iis, quae philosophiae et antiquae et christianae ab eiusdem Ecclesiae exordiis perspecta erant. Haec vero a nullo alio doctore tam lucide, tam perspicue, tam perfecte proposita

The various systems of doctrine permitted by the Church should entirely agree with whatever has been tested by ancient and Christian philosophy from the first days of the Church. No other Doctor has accomplished this so lucidly, so clearly, so perfectly, whether one considers

sunt sive singularum mutua consensio partium ob oculos habetur, sive cum veritatibus fidei considerantur coniunctio et harum splendissima cohaerentia, a nullo tam apta solidaque structura una simul composita sunt quemadmodum a Sancto Thoma Aquinate, ut Praecessor Noster Leo XIII hisce verbis sculpsit potius quam dixit: "Rationem, ut par est, a fide apprime distinguens, utramque tamen amice consocians, utriusque tum iura conservavit, tum dignitati consuluit, ita quidem ut ratio ad humanum fastigium Thomae pennis evecta, iam fere nequeat sublimius assurgere, neque fides a ratione fere possit plura aut validiora adiumenta praestolari, quam quae iam est per Thomam consecuta."

In iis quae modo breviter attigimus, enumerentur, exempli causa, quae spectant ad naturam cognitionis nostrae; ad propriam veritatis rationem; ad principia metaphysica in veritate solidata eaque absoluta; ad Deum infinitum, personalem, Creatorem omnium rerum; ad hominis naturam, animi immortalitatem, personae congruentem dignitatem, officia, quae morum lex ei ex natura indita denuntiat et imperat.

His rebus haud dubio mentis retinendis assensu apponenda non sunt ea, quae, ad verum in natura "positivum" quod attinet, apud Sancti Thomae magnos commentatores et optimae notae discipulos adhuc in controversia sint. Neque de his loquamur, de quibus disputantur, an ad doctrinam Angelici Doctoris pertineant vel quomodo interpretanda sint; itemque utpote caduca silentio premimus ea quae reapse consecraria sunt veterum hominum cognitionis

the harmony of the individual parts or their union and wondrous coherence with the truths of faith, nor has any other Doctor formed such a solid and unified system, as Saint Thomas Aquinas. This Our Predecessor carved rather than said in His memorable words: "Distinguishing most clearly reason from faith, and nevertheless uniting both harmoniously, he preserved the rights of each and protected their respective dignity; so that reason indeed raised aloft on the wings of Saint Thomas to the highest human eminence, could scarcely soar higher, and it was almost impossible even for faith to be supported by additional or stronger aids from reason than had been already furnished by Saint Thomas" (*Aeterni Patris*, tr. Husslein).

As an example of the truths We have just mentioned, take those which pertain to the nature of our knowledge, the proper meaning of truth, the metaphysical and transcendental principles founded on truth, the teachings on God as infinite and personal, the Creator of all things, or the nature of man, the immortality of the soul, the dignity of the human person, the duties which the natural moral law reveals to man and imposes on him by his very nature.

To these things which demand unhesitating assent, however, should not be added others which, because they concern what is true in the factual order, are still matter of controversy among the great commentators and outstanding disciples of Saint Thomas, nor those points about which there is dispute whether they form part of the teaching of the Angelic Doctor or how they should be interpreted. We here pass over in silence as outmoded teachings which

et mancae et ieiunae de naturae rebus physicis, chymicis, biologicis vel alius generis.

Talem esse sensum illius legis, qua Codex iuris canonici Sanctum Thomam ducem atque magistrum omnibus catholicis scholis praeficit, felicitis recordationis Decessor Noster Pius XI hisce verbis asseruit: "Sanctum igitur unicuique eorum esto quod in Codice iuris canonici praecipitur ut 'philosophiae rationalis ac theologiae studia et alumnorum in his disciplinis institutionem professores omnino pertractent ad Angelici Doctoris rationem, doctrinam et principia eaque sancte teneant'; atque ad hanc normam ita se omnes gerant, ut eum ipsi suum vere possint appellare magistrum. At ne quid eo amplius alii ab aliis exigant, quam quod ab omnibus exigit omnium magistra et mater Ecclesia: neque enim in iis rebus, de quibus in scholis catholicis inter melioris notae auctores in contrarias partes disputari solet, quisquam prohibendus est eam sequi sententiam quae sibi veri similior videatur."

Hac prorsus ratione insignes vestri auctores et magistri pulchro consociarunt foedere fidelitatem, quam Summo Doctori continenter servabant, cum magni aestimanda libertate, quae doctrinarum pervestigationi debetur, a Decessoribus Nostri, Leone scilicet XIII et iis qui in Petri Cathedra eum subsecuti sunt, semper in tuto collocata.

Unicuique igitur professorum integrum sit, intra assignatos limites, qui praetervehendi non sunt, alicui scholae adhaerere, quae in Ecclesia domicilii iure potita est, hac lege, ut veritates ab omnibus retinendas

are based on the defective and barren knowledge of the ancients concerning physics, chemistry, biology and like natural sciences.

That such is the meaning of Canon Law (can. 1366, § 2) which makes Saint Thomas the leader and master of all Catholic schools, Our Predecessor of happy memory, Pius XI, has stated in the following words: "Let that, therefore, which is prescribed in the Code of Canon Law be inviolably observed by all: 'The studies of rational philosophy and of theology, and the instruction of students in such disciplines shall be absolutely treated by the professors according to the method, the doctrine and the principles of the Angelic Doctor, and these shall be religiously maintained.' To this end all shall conduct themselves so that they may truly be able to call Saint Thomas their Teacher. But let none exact from others more than the Church as Teacher and Mother of all exacts from all her children. Nor is anyone forbidden in those matters wherein approved Catholic doctors are wont to be divided to take a view that seems to him more probable" (*Studiorum Ducem*, tr. Catholic Mind).

Precisely in this way your eminent authors and professors have harmoniously joined constant fidelity to this Greatest Doctor with that highly-prized liberty which doctrinal investigation demands, and which Our Predecessors, Leo XIII and His successors in the Chair of Peter, have always taken care to safeguard.

For every professor it is legitimate, within the limits laid down (which are not to be overreached), to adhere to any school which possesses the right of domicile in the Church, provided that he completely distin-



prorsus distinguat ab iis, quae lineamenta et elementa peculiaris sunt scholae, et in docendo haec discrimina notet, ut bene cordatum decet magistrum . . .

guish the truths which must be held by all from those things which are the distinctive and characteristic elements of that school, and note these distinctions in his teaching, as becomes a well-balanced professor.

## THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Ad rem quod attinet, variae de re sociali scholae exortae sunt, quae pontificia documenta explanarunt, evolverunt atque in systemata redigerunt. Quod quidem iure meritoque factum esse arbitramur. At illud evitari nequibat, ut eadem scholae in principiis applicandis atque in conclusionibus deducendis aliae aliter procederent, multumque haud raro inter se discreparent. Quapropter hac etiam in re id cavendum est, quod de catholicae fidei doctrina deque theologicis scholis supra monuimus, ne scilicet vera genuinaque Ecclesiae de re sociali doctrina cum variis ac propriis cuiusque scholae sententiis permisceatur; quae duo quidem semper inter se sunt apprime distinguenda.

Various schools of social thought have arisen which have explained, developed and systematized the pontifical documents. And this, so We think, was rightly done. But it was inevitable that in applying principles and drawing conclusions these schools should proceed, some in one way, others in another, often with no little discrepancy between them. Thus in this matter too care must be taken, as We warned above concerning the doctrine of the Catholic Faith and theological schools, that the true and authentic social doctrine of the Church be not confused with different private opinions of each school; the two must always be kept separate.

## BOOK REVIEWS

*L'Immaculée Conception dans l'Écriture Sainte et dans la Tradition Orientale*, by Martin Jugie, A. A., Rome, 1952; 477 pp.

Summarily, the author, the Reverend Martin Jugie, A. A., gives a rather comprehensive treatment of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception in a chronological historical development, stressing the place of Holy Scripture and Oriental Tradition.

In the preface, the Reverend Charles Balić, O. F. M., Director of the *Bibliotheca Immaculatae Conceptionis* tells us of the thesis proposed by the author: Mary existed in a particular state (*status naturae reparantis*) having the right to each and every preternatural gift of the state of innocence. The book itself is a chronological treatment of testimonies, both favorable and unfavorable, especially from the Scriptures and from Oriental Tradition. In treating of the Immaculate Conception in the Oriental Church from its origins down to the present time, this book is unique.

The book itself is divided into three major parts. In the First Part is treated the Immaculate Conception in Holy Scripture and in the Oriental Tradition during the Patristic Period. In the Second Part, Byzantine Tradition from the Ninth to the Fifteenth Century is considered. The Third Part gives place to the Immaculate Conception in the Greco-Russian Church from the end of the Sixteenth Century up to the present day. Then follows a brief conclusion for the entire work.

After a prologue, the author spends forty pages in treating of some preliminary questions. He discusses the notion of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, the nature of original sin, the preternatural gifts and the state of innocence, the doctrine of original sin among the Greek Fathers, different methods of formulating the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, and finally, the controversy in the Oriental Church on the Immaculate Conception previous to the Sixteenth Century. All these points enumerated constitute the first chapter.

In the second chapter the author treats of the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception in the Sacred Scriptures. He states the question, and then under separate headings investigates: Mary as all holy and always holy, Mary blessed as Jesus and always blessed, the Mother of God, the victory of the woman over the serpent, and Mary redeemed. In the conclusion to the second chapter, Father Jugie asserts that Scripture is „not completely silent on the dogma defined by Pius IX.” Rather, Scripture has expressions which suggest this truth.

In the third chapter, the original sanctity of the Mother of God in Oriental Tradition of the first five centuries is proposed. The most ancient tradition from the Council of Nicea to the Council of Ephesus and the Fathers of the Fifth Century are considered.

In the last chapter, after discussing the Immaculate Conception in the Byzantine Church from the Sixth to the Ninth Century in the fourth chapter, the doctrine of the Nestorian and Monophysite Churches on the Immaculate Conception is examined, in the fifth.

Part Two deals with Byzantine Tradition from the Ninth to the Fifteenth Century. The two chapters of this Part include the Byzantine Theologians of the second half of the Ninth Century to the end of the Thirteenth (chapter one), and the theologians of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries (chapter two).

In the Third Part, the author is concerned with the Immaculate Conception in the Greco-Russian Church from the Sixteenth Century to the present day, in five chapters.

Chapter One contains the Greek Theologians in the Sixteenth and the Seventeenth Centuries, both favorable and unfavorable. In the second chapter the Greek Theologians of the Eighteenth Century, and in the third chapter the belief of the Russian Church previous to the Seventeenth Century are examined. In the fourth chapter, the Immaculate Conception in Russia during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries is presented. The final and fifth chapter concludes by proposing the Russian Theologians of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries.

The work is summarized in a five page resume, with an index of proper names and table of contents appended. In this conclusion, the author states some resulting principles, in a synthesis of the work. Holy Scripture "in its literal sense, independent of the interpretation of certain Fathers, does not furnish us with explicit affirmation or clearly and equivalently state the dogma as defined by Pius IX." The words of the Angel Gabriel and Elizabeth addressed to the Virgin give precise insinuations of this doctrine considered in a positive aspect.

In that which pertains to Oriental Tradition, an important fact to consider is that the Orient ignores all controversy on this precise point which was discussed in the West around the Twelfth Century; the Orient ignored this until the Sixteenth Century. The point that was discussed was: "Was the Blessed Virgin preserved from original sin from the first moment of Her conception in the maternal womb?" Most of those who have expressly admitted this gave equivalent expressions of it in positive terms. They maintained that Mary was "always full of grace before God, like Eve before sin, . . . blessed, always blessed". The Greek Fathers did not arrive at these same formulas until after the definition of the Divine Maternity, enunciated at the Council of Ephesus. However, shortly before and even after this Council some of the Greek Fathers attributed imperfections and even positive faults to Mary, which are reconciled only with difficulty to the dogma of the Immaculate Conception. The one chiefly responsible for this is Origen.

Two of the Fathers furnish us with equivalent affirmations of the Marial privilege, namely, Sts. Ephrem and Epiphanius. They are the precursors of those who after the Council of Ephesus celebrated Mary as the "All Holy and Always Holy", etc.

During the time after the Council of Ephesus to the Ninth Century, we have certain authors who hold that: "Mary contracted original sin and was not

delivered until the day of the Annunciation." But these dissenters are even more rare during the Byzantine Period itself (from the Ninth to the Fifteenth Century). At the beginning of the Fourteenth Century, the historian Nicephorus Callistus in commenting on a type of Mary presented by Cosmas the Hymnodist, repeats at his own risk the opinion of Severus and James of Sarugh. But immediately afterwards he is taken by remorse for having dared to discover a spot in the Immaculate One. He concludes his commentary in asking Her pardon. Another denial of the original holiness of Mary is found in Isidor, Archbishop of Thessalonica (in the Fifteenth Century). He denies explicitly, in a homily on the Assumption that which he has clearly affirmed in three other discourses. We have yet to solve this enigma. These two exceptions (Nicephorus and Isidor) rather strengthens the unanimous consent of the great Byzantine orators, who celebrate the perpetual holiness of the Mother of God. We find on their lips not only equivalent affirmations of the dogma, but also direct and explicit affirmations. Many names, of which George Scholarios is the most renown, teach the Marian privilege with Scholastic exactitude.

That Mary was an ideal type of humanity was taught by the Byzantine Church up to the Sixteenth Century. This Church did not take part in the great controversy which went on between the universities of the West (after the Twelfth Century). The Byzantine Church has followed the ancient traditions on this point.

The radical denial of the Marian privilege which seems to have crystalized after the pontifical definition in 1854 is a result of an unfounded polemic spirit.

The author concludes his work with the following extract: "The thesis of contemporary dissident theologians maintains that the Mother of God would have been purified from original sin only on the day of the Annunciation, but this thesis can claim only four or five secondary names of the Patristic Period, and still these testimonies are shrouded in obscurity and lack precision; but it is in flagrant contradiction to the Angelic Salutation in the Gospel of St. Luke. This position cannot be held, . . . Let us hope for the disappearance of this polemic spirit and may the dissident Orient come back to the Catholic unity, under the protection of Her Whom they honor in their Liturgy, today as in the past, under the titles of the 'All Holy and All Immaculate One'."

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Alberti Magni Ord. Fr. Praed. *Postilla super Isaiam*. Primum edidit F. Siepmann. *Postillae super Ieremiam et Postillae super Ezechielem Fragmenta*. Edidit H. Ostlender (S. D. E. Alberti Magni *Opera Omnia* XIX), Münster, Westfalen, 1952; XXX + 685 pp.

Though known to moderns primarily as a philosopher and heavenly patron of those who cultivate the natural sciences, Saint Albert was truly the Doctor Universalis in the breadth of his interests and the extent of his writings. He



cannot be neglected as the theologian and the student of Sacred Scripture. If the first volume of the Cologne edition presented the unedited ethical and moral treatise *De bono* (cf. *Franc. Studies*, 13, 1953, n. 2—3, 219—220), it is opportune that the second, which will be the nineteenth of the complete series, should contain hitherto unknown postillae on the Sacred Text. The bulk of the volume (pp. 1—632) is occupied by the commentary on the whole of Isaias, previously unedited; while two fragments on Jeremias (part of chapter 14) and Ezechiel (six verses of the first chapter), now edited in definitive form, fill the few remaining pages. Four excellent indices are added; there is no table of contents, since this is hardly needed.

The full doctrinal evaluation of the text must be left to the professional theologian and scriptural scholar; the *index rerum* will here provide the former with an excellent aid, while to the latter perhaps the Messianic portions of the prophet will prove the most important. At the same time, we need not hesitate to say that Saint Albert shows himself, in the words of Saint Bonaventure, *potens in expositione Scripturarum* (*Brevil.*, Prol. § 6, 2), since relying largely on Saint Jerome, somewhat on Haymo (ninth century), his earlier Dominican confrère Hugh de S-Cher, and on his own wide knowledge of the Sacred Books, he uses the whole of Scripture as an *arca spiritualis* (p. 421, line 83) from which to draw illustrations and explanations of the text at hand. All Scripture, said the Seraphic Doctor (*Hex.* XIX, 7), is like a zither: *quasi una cithara*, for as a minor or lower chord makes harmony only with others, so one text of Scripture depends on another: indeed, a thousand passages help to explain one. Such a principle, as the editors point out, Saint Albert carried almost to an extreme; sometimes only assonance of words or some slight similarity will induce him to cite such texts as parallels. The exegesis as a result is not only literal, though this is by no means neglected, since with Saint Jerome to guide him Saint Albert does try to establish the true meaning of the text; but also, with Saint Jerome, seeks the spiritual or moral meaning.

The authenticity of the text on Isaias is sufficiently evident from external sources as well as from the manuscripts and the doctrinal contents. Only two manuscripts and one short fragment have been discovered of this major work; and one codex each for the two fragments on Jeremias and Ezechiel. As a result, the editors have sometimes had to resort to emendations and conjectures which are duly noted. The *Postilla super Isaiam* is dated internally as after 1245, since Albert makes clear reference (p. 168, l. 72) to Grosseteste's translation of the *Ethics* and compares it with the *Ethica nova*. More precisely, the work must be considered as closer to 1250, as the *versio media* of the *Metaphysics* is used and contrasted to the *Metaphysica vetus* (p. 169, l. 21 ff.; l. 65 ff.). On the other hand, the fragments furnish no clues to the time of their composition (p. XXX). Perhaps later studies will lead to new discoveries on the chronology and interdependence of the works of Saint Albert. A hurried comparison between certain comments on Isaias (e. g., on fortitude, p. 171, l. 42 ff.) and the *Summa de Bono* does not reveal any extensive parallelism, though more than the editor has noted.

The edition follows the example of the previous volume in excellence of format and printing. It would perhaps improve the legibility of the notes (apart from the variants) if they were divided like the text itself into two

columns, as in the quarto-edition of Saint Bonaventure. One might also wish that the binding, especially the hinge between book and cover, were stronger for such a large volume.

A few references seem to have been overlooked: e. g., Ambrose (p. 46, 70); Homer (p. 50, 63; yet Horace is given, p. 634, 31); Jerome as the source for *Ariel leo Dei* (p. 23, 26; cf. p. 318, 32); while the note to p. 63, line 87, is not very clear. Above all, however, both editors and readers should be warned that through inadvertence two editions of the *Patrologia Latina* have been used. Thus, throughout the *Postillae* all references to Saint Jerome's commentaries on Isaias and Jeremias (*P. L.* 24) are to the second edition and not to the first edition of 1865. On the other hand, for the Prologue on Isaias of Saint Jerome (*P. L.* 28; cf. *Postillae*, pp. 5 ff.), the editors have used the first edition and not that of 1889. Since the pagination varies considerably in the two editions, some confusion will be inevitable unless a note be given to this effect.

IGNATIUS BRADY, O.F.M.

Franciscan Institute

Gilberto di Tournai, *De modo addiscendi*, Introduzione e testo inedito a cura di E. Bonifacio (Pontif. Ath. Salesianum — Facultas Philosophica — Theses ad Lauream, n. 19), Torino, (1953); 320 pp.

The literary work of Gilbert of Tournai, O. F. M., is still largely unpublished. This is one of the reasons why we are happy to review for our readers his pedagogical treatise, *De modo addiscendi*.

In his Introduction, pp. 8—57, E. Bonifacio describes the life of Gilbert, enumerates his works and analyzes the *Rudimentum doctrinae* to which the *De modo addiscendi* is related (four out of the five manuscripts containing the latter work consider it as a part of the *Rudimentum*); thereupon follow an analysis of the *De modo addiscendi* and a study of its sources; and finally there is a description of the five manuscripts used and a general evaluation of Gilbert and his work.

Gilbert was born at Tournai before 1213, probably in 1209. Around 1240 he gave up his chair of Theology at the University of Paris to become a Franciscan. As a Friar he had friendly relations with the royal family of France as well as with the family of the count of Flanders, Guy de Dampierre. According to Dr. Bonifacio, it is not really proven that he accompanied Louis IX on his crusade against Mohamedans. Gilbert died at Paris on the feast day of Saint Francis, 1284.

The extent of Gilbert's literary activity takes in works on pedagogy, oratory, hagiography, asceticism, apologetics and history. The authenticity of the theological works formerly attributed to him remains a doubtful matter.

Composed between 1264 and 1268, the *De modo addiscendi* was written for the benefit of a son of the count of Flanders, John, provost of St. Donatian's at Brugghe and later bishop of Metz and Liege. In it education is considered partly from the viewpoint of the teacher, but mainly from the viewpoint of

the pupil. The chief sources of this treatise are parallel works of classic Antiquity and the Patristic era. A number of writings of the early scholastic period are also utilized. There is a striking similitary between the *De modo addiscendi* and the work of the Dominican Vincent of Beauvais, *De eruditione filiorum nobilium*. Bonifacio, however, believes that this similarity and partial identity is actually due to the fact that both Vincent and Gilbert used the same *florilegium* of pedagogical excerpts.

Gilbert has been accused of being a perennial plagiarist. Dr. Bonifacio thinks that this accusation is an exaggeration. While Gilbert uses a large number of authors and writings, still he always indicates his sources. An originality in arranging his material is clearly evident, and as a logical thinker, Gilbert surpasses others, for instance, Vincent of Beauvais.

The present edition is based upon five fourteenth-century manuscripts: Florence, Paris, Edinburgh, and Cracou (two). The Florence and Paris manuscripts are older and more reliable than the other three, which are from the second half of the century and have less authority. The Florence codex gives the best text.

The edition of the text, pp. 59—290, is followed by four relatively short indexes, pp. 291—320. The text is quite satisfactory. The references to the sources are well done, though in some cases more recent and more critical editions could have been used. The only serious objection of this reviewer is that Bonifacio, in his critical apparatus, did not list the parallel texts of Vincent of Beauvais. A closer study of the relationship between *De modo addiscendi* and *De eruditione filiorum nobilium* is needed, since, the few pages which take up the problem, pp. 49—53, are certainly not exhaustive and leave much room for further investigation.

E. M. BUYTAERT, O.F.M.

Franciscan Institute

*Ioannis Duns Scoti doctrina de scientifica theologiae natura*, by Aegidius Magrini, O. F. M. (Studia Antoniana, n. 5), Rome, 1952; XII—118pp.

In the Introduction of his work Fr. Magrini states the problem of his investigation, namely scientific nature of Theology according to Scotus, and describes the texts which will be analyzed in the course of his study (pp. 1—6). The texts used are from the Prologue of the *Ordinatio* and *Sentences* III, Dist. 24. The topic is discussed under three general headings, which correspond to the three chapters of the book: Theology, according to Scotus, is not a science in the strict Aristotelian sense; Theology is a science in the broader sense (here the principles of Theology and the nature of a theological conclusion are treated); Theology as a science is a synthesis of the entire theological activity. Three short indexes conclude the work, pp. 111—118.

There is no gainsaying that Fr. Magrini displays an extensive erudition. But a theologian who is more or less acquainted with the problem as posed during the period of High Scholasticism, and who is familiar with the terminology and phraseology of Scotus will learn very little from reading the book. This reviewer would rather recommend reading the pertinent text of Scotus

himself, that is, the passages used by Fr. Magrini, namely the Prologue q. 4 of the *Ordinatio* and Book III, Dist. 24, and the texts which are neglected by the author: Book I, Dist. 11, q. 1, and *Quodlibet*, questions 6, 7 and 14.

This reviewer has the impression, perhaps wrongly, that the very erudition of the work is a reason why the author failed to explain adequately the central problem. The different interpretations given to Saint Thomas' solution of the question, for instance, and the ideas on the same problem of later Scotists do not make for a better understanding of Scotus' ideas. Perhaps a look at the writings of Aureoli, Francis Mayronis and Peter Thomae would have been more *ad rem*. The prolix style of the author toned down, and interesting but useless information on related topics omitted, the book could have been cut down to half its actual size without losing any of its real value.

Fr. Magrini, however, does make a notable contribution, chiefly in so far as he studied some unpublished works written during the period which separates Scotus from the predecessors he criticizes, for instance, the writings of James of Metz and William of Goudin, critics of Henry of Ghent. Still even here, Fr. Magrini could have shown more clearly whether or not Duns Scotus was aware of their criticism of the Ghentian Doctor.

E. M. BUYTAERT, O.F.M.

*Franciscan Institute*

*Der Christenspiegel des Dietrich Kolde von Münster*, edit. by Clemens Drees (Franziskanische Forschungen, n. 9), Werl, Westfalen, 1954; VII—95\*—379 pp.

This is the first volume of the Franziskanische Forschungen published since the war. The first part of the book, pp. 1\*—95\*, is subdivided into an Introduction, pp. 1\*—14\*, and a study on the *Mirror of the Christian*, pp. 15\*—95\*.

In the Introduction Dr. Drees describes the life of Dietrich and discusses the problem of the variations of the name of the author. Dietrich was born at Münster around 1435. He became an Augustinian of the Cologne Province, Stationed at Louvain, which belonged to that Province, Dietrich wrote what Dr. Drees calls the "Precursor" (Vorläufer) of the *Mirror*. The booklet was written in the Louvain dialect and published in 1470 with a dedication to "the pious burgesses of Louvain". While still an Augustinian, he wrote his *Mirror*. He became a Franciscan sometime between 1476—1479, probably at Bodendaal near Brussels, according to Drees. As a consequence, all the editions of the *Mirror* were made after Dietrich became a Franciscan (of the Cologne Province), though some of the incunabula still call him an Augustinian. During the years 1488—1489 Dietrich became famous by way of his heroism when a severe pestilence struck the city of Brussels. During the nineties he was in Cologne and vicinity. From 1502 till 1515, the year of his death, he was superior at Bodendaal, Antwerp and Louvain. Especially in Brussels and Louvain he was an ardent promoter of the Observance among the Friars, the Poor Clares and the Third Order Regular.



Though Dr. Drees makes some new contributions to our knowledge of the life of Dietrich, he does not lay claim to any notable originality in this part of his work. Neither are various interesting problems solved. Dietrich's changing from the Augustinian to the Franciscan Order, for example, remains obscure.

Dr. Drees' study on the *Mirror*, pp. 15\*—95\*, enumerates the various editions of the work and one manuscript, discusses the relationship between the editions (and the codex), pp. 44\*—90\*, and lists the rules followed in editing the texts, pp. 91\*—95\*.

It appears that the "Precursor" was edited once, the *Mirror* more than thirty five times (most of these editions are incunabula or post-incunabula), and was re-written in High German once (by Ch. Moufang, Mainz, 1881). This latter edition is rightly omitted by Dr. Drees. A re-edition of the "Precursor" is given pp. 1—27, hardly a difficult task as there exists only one old edition: that of 1470, probably printed at Louvain. The main problem of the editor concerned the publishing of the *Mirror*. He did not deem it advisable to follow just one of the many editions, nor to publish a combination of the different editions.

Upon a description of the various editions, pp. 18\*—43\*, Dr. Drees departs on a long and intricate discussion of the relationship of these editions (and the manuscript), pp. 44\*—90\*. His scholarly and patient study proves that there are two main groups: the x-group, giving an older and shortly shorter text; the y-group going back approximately to 1490. According to the dialects used, he further makes a distinction in the x-group of Low Land and Cologne groups; and in the y-group he finds a Low Land and a Lübeck group. Dr. Drees claims that Dietrich Kolde's own redaction is to be found in the Low Land groups: not in the Cologne group, since the oldest text has been written in a Low Land dialect; not in the Lübeck group, since Dietrich seemingly never knew that dialect. On the other hand Drees sees in the y-group the final redaction of the author, and consequently the Low Land representatives of the y-group ought to give the best text. Among these, Dr. Drees chooses the Deventer edition from around 1499, but corrected with the aid of the Lübeck editions of the y-group, because these appear to be closer to the original of the y-group, that is as far as the passages accepted in the original of that group are concerned. The reason for the preference of the Deventer edition is that among the Flemish and Dutch cities where the work had been edited, Deventer is the nearest to Münster, and consequently a place with a Low Land dialect closest to the Westfalian as spoken by Dietrich.

Though this part of the volume supposes an enormous amount of preparation and erudition, its final conclusions are far from convincing. 1. The preference for the Low Land group is not justified. It is true that the "Precursor" was redacted in a Brabant dialect, but that does not mean that the first draft of the *Mirror* was in Flemish or Dutch; on the contrary, if the edition of Cologne 1480 did exist — actually we have only testimony of the Seventeenth Century for it — then it would seem that the *Mirror* has been written in Low German, which would give the Cologne group a much greater authority. The oldest Low Land edition is indeed only from around 1484. 2. The preference for the y-group, because later and lengthier, is not *eo ipso*

justified. The additions were made during the life of Dietrich, but Dr. Drees actually never proves that they were made by the Franciscan. 3. The reason given for the value of the Deventer edition is invalid. We have historical evidence that Dietrich was able to speak and write the South-Brabant dialect (Louvain-Brussels), whereas there is no reason for assuming that he was acquainted with the Overijssel dialect of Deventer. Moreover, Dr. Drees admits that the differences between the x-group and the y-group is not in the phrasing but rather in the fact that the latter group has additional passages; and he admits, too, that the Deventer edition bears traces of the local editor.

Since Dr. Drees believes in the superiority of the Low Land editions of the y-group and among them prefers the Deventer edition, his text (pp. 29—321 the pages on the right side) is supposed to approach the Deventer edition; in other words, he would have it be almost a "diplomatische Herausgabe". In fact, the variant readings of the Deventer edition given in footnotes are rather numerous; this confirms the opinion of this reviewer, namely that the Deventer edition is less trustworthy than the principles of Dr. Drees suggest. On the left side of the same pages (29—321), we read the Cologne edition. Later, pp. 323—372, we find additions as given by different editions, and finally a bibliography, pp. 373—379, is added. Unfortunately the work is without indexes.

Surely, many will be happy to have the *Mirror* of Dietrich Kolde on hand. Hitherto just a few libraries had in their possession a copy of the "first catechism of the Western Church", for of the numerous old editions only a few copies have survived. Now we have several of its editions on one volume. Though we disagree with Dr. Drees on some of the editing principles he used, still we are very grateful to him, not only because he re-published the work of a rather famous Franciscan, but especially because he enabled us to understand better the condition of the Church during the decades before and after 1500. Clearly during this period, at least some individuals were zealous in bringing religious instruction to the ordinary people, and in the language of the people!

E. M. BUYTAERT, O.F.M.

*Franciscan Institute*

*Kardinal Cajetan. Eine Gestalt aus der Reformationszeit*, by J. F. Groner, O. P., Fribourg-Louvain, 1951; 79 pp.

The pace of the work, in its entirety, is already set in the Foreword, p. 7: the author purposes to rectify a historico-scientific injustice, namely the underestimation of Cardinal Cajetan in the literature covering the last decades of the Fifteenth and the first decades of the Sixteenth Century. Accordingly Fr. Groner would give us a true insight into the personality of Cajetan as seen against the background of his time. Hence in due order are treated his role in the fatal happenings of this period, pp. 9—33, the moral personality of the Cardinal, pp. 34—56, and his literary activity, pp. 57—65. A list of Cajetan's writings drawn up in the chronological order of their publication, pp. 66—73, plus an alphabetical list of the literature on Cajetan, pp. 74—78, bring the work to a close.

The first part, "Cajetan and the History of his Time", is devoted to the Cardinal's activities bearing on the reformatory movements at the beginning of the Sixteenth Century. This includes the famous meeting with Luther. In the second part, "The Personality of Cajetan", Fr. Groner details various activities of the General of the Dominican Order, such as his attempts to reform the Order, opening up missions in the New World, and his efforts to heal the wounds left by the Savonarola tragedy. Treatment is given to Cajetan in reference to the Renaissance and his relations with the Renaissance court at Rome. The third part, "The Scientific work of Cajetan", treats rather briefly of the writings of the Cardinal. Fr. Groner informs us that the main work of Cajetan is the Commentary on the *Summa* of Saint Thomas Aquinas, that his author obviously was more interested in moral problems, though neither Dogmatics, nor exegesis and philosophy were neglected. The claim is made that Cajetan had a clear style, though the impression of obscurity is sometimes left because of the Cardinal's partiality for logical but concise expressions.

As already stated, the Foreword sets the pace. Almost the entire work, with of course the obvious exception of the bibliographical lists, is apologetical, not to say eulogistic and oratorical. Fr. Groner proves too much, he grinds his axe too audibly. It would seem that Cajetan never made a mistake. The only weakness conceded is that Cajetan, though very intelligent, very farsighted, most charitable, and so forth, was not a very pleasant person to live with. For the rest, even such an obvious failure as the diet of Augsburg, in which Cajetan was supposed to do something about the incipient reformation, is glossed over and turned around to his greater glory. The Augsburg failure, it is maintained, casts no reflection on the unimpeachable abilities of the Cardinal, for he had strict orders from Rome (though Fr. Groner candidly admits that the Legate did not follow his instructions *quoad litteram*), and no one else could have accomplished more, since it was a matter of dealing with a Luther.

As another build-up for the Cardinal, it is made out that the bull "Exsurge, Domine" was mainly his work. More objective research, however, has proven that the University of Louvain and Doctor Eck had the decisive influence on the redaction of the document. We are also supposed to believe that Cajetan kept in close contact with the events of his time, though Fr. Groner concedes that the Cardinal after his return from Augsburg obviously was not interested anymore in Lutheranism as developing in Germany. We are supposed to believe that a few words from the Cardinal were all-sufficing to assure the election of Pope Adrian VI. Then we are supposed to be surprised because Cajetan considered Duns Scotus quite a bit more than the proverbial dunce. Personal contact with Trombetta certainly had convinced Cajetan that many a Scotistic view cannot be casually dismissed with a disdainful smile of superiority. Finally, we are supposed to accept without protest that Cajetan had an exceptional knowledge of patristic literature, etc., etc.

There is no doubt that the great Cardinal Cajetan truly merits enduring fame, both as a personality and as a scholar. Regretfully, however, it must be recorded here that our appreciation of his person and his achievements was in no way enhanced by the work of Fr. Groner. One just does not rectify



a historico-scientific injustice — if such there be — by committing a few more. It would appear that the only trustworthy parts of the work of Fr. Groner are the bibliographical data.

E. M. BUYTAERT O.F.M.

*Franciscan Institute*

*The Ascent of Mount Sion*, by Fray Bernardino de Laredo, O. F. M.  
Translated by E. Allison Peers, New York, 1951; 275 pp.

The translator of this book is far better known to English-speaking readers than is its author. Few scholars have contributed more to the literary history of Spanish mysticism than E. Allison Peers. His two-volume *Studies in the Spanish Mystics*, first published in 1930, has become a standard reference work in the field, and his facile translations of the works of St. Teresa of Avila and St. John of the Cross have been widely acclaimed for their admirable blending of fluency of prose with fidelity to the original text. The present translation is the first in a series being published by Harper under the general title *Classics of the Contemplative Life*. Before his death in December, 1952, Professor Peers acted as general editor of this series and supervised the publication of its first five volumes. While regretting the untimely demise of this dedicated scholar, Franciscans rejoice that his last major work was a translation of *Subida del Monte Sion*, a too long forgotten classic of the "Edad de Oro", by Fray Bernardino de Laredo, O. F. M.

Fray Bernardino, a native of Seville, practiced medicine for three years before entering the Order as a lay brother in 1510 at the age of twenty-eight. He spent most of the thirty years of his religious life at the friary of Villaverde del Río near Seville, where he served as infirmarian. Besides *The Ascent of Mount Sion*, for which he is chiefly remembered, he also wrote two medical treatises, one of which went into four editions.

*The Ascent* was completed in 1529 and published anonymously at Seville in 1535. The enlarged and completely revised edition which was published three years later has been six times reprinted, most recently in 1948 as part of Volume II of *Místicos Franciscanos*. However, it was only with the fifth reprinting, which appeared seventy-seven years after Laredo's death, that his name appeared on the title page as author. Professor Peers has employed the original 1538 edition of the revised text as the basis of his translation — the only translation into any language.

There is ample reason for assigning to *The Ascent of Mount Sion* a prominent place in the history of mystical theology. It contains the first written description of that phase of spiritual experience known as the prayer of quiet. It likewise played a very significant role in the development of the interior life of St. Teresa. In the twenty-third chapter of her *Vida*, that saint tells us that the reading of this book marked a turning point in her spiritual evolution and that it remained ever after one of the books she frequently consulted. From another Franciscan, Fray Francisco de Osuna, the great Carmelite Reformer learned the secret of recollection; St. Peter of



Alcantara was her instructor on the subject of visions and raptures; but it was Fray Bernardino who taught her the prayer of quiet.

The sub-title of Laredo's work tells us what it contains: "the knowledge of ourselves; the following of Christ; and the reverencing of God in quiet contemplation." This threefold division corresponds roughly to the three forms of prayer proper to the traditional "three ways". The first part aims at the acquisition of self knowledge through discursive meditation; the second, knowledge of Christ through affective prayer; and the third, "quiet contemplation of pure spirit and God most high". The theme of quiet runs through the entire work but receives its complete development in the third part. The function of the first two parts is to lay the ascetical foundation for the proper understanding and application of the lofty mystical doctrine of the third. Professor Peers has translated for us only this third part of *The Ascent* in the belief that it contains Laredo's chief contribution to the literature of mysticism.

Fray Bernardino does not present his readers with a concise, orderly treatment of the prayer of quiet. The third of his book consists of a series of rather loosely connected essays, in which logical progression of thought is not a distinguishing feature. For this reason it is somewhat difficult to extract his doctrine from the text. He seems to have considered quiet the highest stage of contemplation but nowhere does he claim to have attained to it himself. In that state he says, the soul is shut up within itself and occupied exclusively with God. "Silence of the understanding" is the characteristic element, although "serenity of the memory" and "tranquility of the will" also have a part. The soul is lifted up to God without any intervention of the intellect which must itself remain still and wait. "Sleep of the powers keeps the soul awake for the soaring of ardent love." The doctrine of quiet as propounded by Laredo, while it is the historical antecedent of the quietism of a later day, has no similarity to the exaggerated teaching of Molinos.

The principal merit of Fray Bernardino's style is its unaffected, conversational tone which puts him in immediate contact with the reader. His simple anecdotes have a homely quality which must charm even the sophisticated. His personal reminiscences have a naturalness and sincerity which reflect a truly Franciscan soul. But *The Ascent* is not always easy reading. It is rather repetitious, and its excessively long sentences quickly become tiresome. Several of the comparisons are somewhat inept, and paradoxes of a very artificial type are not uncommon.

Professor Peers' translation is excellent and his fifty-eight page introduction, more than adequate. Yet, as it stands, his book is incomplete in that it shows us but a part of a much greater whole. We are given Laredo's view of the lofty mystical summit of the holy mount but we are not allowed to see the steep and devious paths of asceticism by which he would lead us thither. The third part of *The Ascent of Mount Sion*, treating as it does the unitive way and the form of prayer proper to it, by itself has value for but a relatively limited group — those have attained to that sublime state and those interested in the literary history of contemplation. A rendering into English of the entire work would have served the needs of that far larger group whose

members still struggle through the lower levels of prayer and who, being still quite susceptible to illusion, easily forget that mysticism without asceticism is like faith without good works.

CYPRIAN J. LYNCH, O.F.M.

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*La nature de la théologie d'après Melchior Cano*, by Eugène Marcotte, O.M.J. (Universitas catholica Ottaviensis, Dissertationes — Series theologica, n. 2), Ottawa, 1949; 217 pp.

The present work is composed of five chapters and a conclusion, all of which are based on the famous *De locis theologicis* of Melchior Cano, O. P. In these chapters are respectively treated 1. Cano and the theologians of his time; 2. Theology in general; 3. the principles of Theology; 4. the theological conclusion; and 5. the practical procedure of a theologian at work. In the conclusion, the author draws a picture of the "perfect theologian".

To the best of his abilities — which are many — Fr. Marcotte analyzes the main work of Melchior Cano with the fairness of a beginner. The fundamental mistake of the dissertation is not to be ascribed to him so much as to those who suggested this as a topic for a thesis. Obviously, the author did not have the background to work out a satisfactory and acceptable treatment. Such a work as attempted can be adequately handled only by a scholar who, after many years of preparation has first hand information 1. on the time of Cano; 2. on F. Victoria, the master of Cano; 3. on the scholastic theological method from the Twelfth to the Sixteenth Century; and 4. in so far as claims are made that Theology from the time of the first edition of the *De locis theologicis* (1563) till our days is entirely conditioned by the work of Cano, on the theological method from the Sixteenth Century till the present time.

Since Fr. Marcotte did not have — and could not have — that background, he repeats the prejudices of one particular school of thought. In line with this restricted perspective, there are reviewed certain opinions on the theological method of Saint Thomas Aquinas, the only Scholastic, outside of Cano, who is mentioned favorably. Clearly, Fr. Marcotte fails to appreciate that Cano, though referring very often to Saint Thomas, *de facto* depends frequently on such "theologians of decadence" as Scotus and Ockham, scholastics who had a greater baggage of critical ideas on sound theological method and Fundamental Theology than any of their predecessors. Fr. Marcotte even fails to perceive a certain evolution which took place in Cano's theological conceptions, although he realizes that the *De locis theologicis* had been written over a period of years and with frequent interruptions.

A minor fault of the work stems from Marcotte's quite exceptional and conscious qualities as a writer. Especially in the introductory pages he is carried away by the beauty of his expressions, forgetting that the exactness of the idea is still more important than a nicely flowing phraseology.

E. M. BUYTAERT, O.F.M.

*Franciscan Institute*

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
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Cum permissu superiorum.



## SOME MANUSCRIPTS OF THE EARLIEST FRANCISCAN LITURGY

In various studies connected with the 13th-century Roman liturgy of the Friars Minor I have, since 1942, often referred<sup>1</sup> to liturgical manuscripts which, in one way or another, are dependent upon books compiled and issued in consequence of the Franciscan Rule of 1223, when the Order adopted the Divine Office of the papal chapel in the Lateran palace<sup>2</sup>. For want of a better terminology, they have been given the name of 'pre-Haymonian' books. The term is awkward for several reasons. For instance, it does not explain either the origin, the history or the content of the liturgy represented. Nor does it distinguish these 'Regula' books from, say, the few 'primitive' breviaries and perhaps missals that have been derived from copies acquired and used before a unified liturgy was introduced and accepted. The term only draws a line between the books issued by the Order in virtue of the Rule of 1223 and those which conform to the correction of Haymo of Faversham. In the years 1243—4, the latter compiled a threefold Ordinary, entitled *Ordo brevariarii*, *Ordo missalis* and *Ordo ad benedicendum mensam*, which henceforth became fundamental to the Franciscan and to what became known as the Roman liturgy. Thus the word pre-Haymonian is meant to indicate that such books are based upon prototypes drawn up in the period of twenty years that elapsed between the promulgation of the Rule and the correction of Haymo. However, it does not imply that all manuscripts representative of this early Franciscan liturgy were actually written during that period.

The pre-Haymonian manuscripts known today can be distinguished into 4 main groups, viz. Office books, portable missals, rituals of the Last Sacraments and orders for grace before and after meals. The first group, moreover, comprises a variety of types which can be subdivided

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<sup>1</sup> The first time was in my 'Notae quaedam de liturgia franciscana mediante saeculo xiii' in *Ephem. liturg.* liv. 1940 (published in 1942), 152, note 143; 161, note 175; see also 131, note 54.

<sup>2</sup> S. J. P. van Dijk, 'The liturgical legislation of the Franciscan Rules' in *Franciscan Studies* xii, 1952, 241 ff.

into: noted choir breviaries, choir breviaries (without music), portable breviaries and an antiphonal.

As far as their content is concerned, all these books have three points in common: a) they have been derived from the contemporary liturgy of the papal court; b) they represent a slight adaptation of this liturgy so as to render it more suitable for the friars; c) they are all rubricated books, i. e. in addition to the liturgical texts, they also contain the instructions or rubrics according to which the liturgy should be performed.

For reasons to be explained elsewhere, the various forms of Office books originate from a single prototype. The latter survives in a few copies of the noted choir breviary. The other Office books are simplifications or reductions of this standard type: the choir breviary by eliminating the chant, the portable breviary by reducing the size of the choir breviary, the antiphonal by suppressing everything that is not sung. The noted choir breviary was compiled and multiplied in the years 1227—30. The copies thus acquired were distributed among the provinces of the Order on the occasion of the General Chapter of Assisi in 1230. The ritual and the order for grace were published at the same time and distributed, either separately or together, with the noted choir breviary. The missal alone is of a later date. For external reasons, it cannot be prior to 1241—2.

Since Haymo's thorough correction (mainly of the rubrics) took place only a few years after the publication of the pre-Haymonian prototypes, and new editions of the liturgical books, representing his correction were compiled within twenty years of his death (1244), the surviving manuscripts of the pre-Haymonian liturgy are not very numerous. Those known to me can be listed in this manner:

#### Portable missals

1. Assisi, bibl. comunale, 607
2. Naples, bibl. nazionale, vi. G. 38
3. Rome, bibl. Corsiniana, 376.

#### Noted choir breviaries

4. Assisi, bibl. comunale, 693
5. Assisi, bibl. comunale, 694
6. Chicago, Newberry libr., 23817
7. Munich, Franciscan friary, cod. S. Annae
8. Naples, bibl. nazionale, vi. E. 20

## Choir breviaries

9. London, British Museum, Harley 2988 (Temporale, from Advent to the Epiphany, incl.)
10. London, British Museum, Harley 5037 (Temporale, from Advent to the 1st Sunday after Pentecost)
11. Monza, bibl. capitolare, C. 10/122
12. Padua, bibl. universitaria, 1043

## Portable breviaries

13. Assisi, bibl. comunale, 611
14. Besançon, bibl. municipale, 58 (Off. defunct.; Off. B.M.V.)
15. Rome, bibl. Casanatense, 250
16. Rome, Vatican libr., Regin. lat. 1742

## Antiphonal

17. Assisi, archives of San Rufino, 5

## Rituals

In addition to the copies to be found in the pre-Haymonian breviaries nos. 7, 13, 14 and in the pre-Haymonian missal no. 1, the ritual is also extant in the following manuscripts:

18. Assisi, archives of San Rufino, 14
19. Assisi, bibl. comunale, 620
20. Assisi, Franciscan friary of San Damiano, Breviary of St. Clare
21. Oxford, Bodleian libr., Lat. liturg. e. 14
22. Padua, bibl. capitolare, A. 66
23. Rome, Vatican libr., Ottobon. lat. 511
24. Rome, Vatican libr., Regin. lat. 1738
25. Rome, Vatican libr., Regin. lat. 2092
26. Rome, Vatican libr., Vatican. lat. 6265

## Orders for grace

In addition to the copies in the pre-Haymonian breviaries nos. 7 and 15, the order is also in a fragment of a pre-Haymonian breviary, bound up in the miscellaneous manuscript:

27. Terni, bibl. comunale, C. iv. M. 11

Few of the manuscripts listed actually belong to the pre-Haymonian period. Among the breviaries the nos. 4, 5 and 7 can, on palaeographical grounds, be assigned to the 2nd quarter of the 13th century; of the

rituals only the Breviary of St Clare (no. 20) dates from that time. Some of the books were written in the second half of the century (nos. 1, 2 (?), 3, 8, 12—7, 22). Others, however, date from the 14th century (nos. 6, 9—11, 18—9, 21, 27), while traces of pre-Haymonian liturgy even survived till far in the 15th century (23—6)<sup>3</sup>.

Taking into account that the pre-Haymonian version of the papal liturgy was officially out of date after an existence of about 30 years and that most of the manuscripts mentioned was copied at a much later date, it is clear that they owe their existence and long-drawn use to circumstances which were foreign to and independent of public worship as such. They are due to the poverty of the friars, scarcity of liturgical books, inadvertence of their scribes, etc. On the other hand, the shortness of the pre-Haymonian period and the comparatively large number of these 'antiquated' books also point to an intensive and widespread liturgical activity, following the promulgation of the Franciscan Rule. For only the presence of a great number of such pre-Haymonian books, used indiscriminately alongside the new Haymonian manuscripts, can explain why the former were copied again and again.

What is more, the small number of manuscripts so far identified suggests that more pre-Haymonian books and fragments must still be hidden away in libraries all over Europe. However, the difficulty is how to recognise them. For, although these manuscripts have definite characteristics of their own, yet, because of the supervening new versions, they contain not only much additional matter of Haymonian origin but also carefully inserted corrections by which they were brought up to date. Thus they had, more or less, the appearance of the later books. In fact, it has happened that a good number of the manuscripts listed have already been studied for detailed points of liturgical or hagiographical interest, while, nevertheless, none of them has ever been recognised as totally different from the great mass of *liturgica* which is based on Haymo's Ordinary. Hence it seems desirable to draw attention to the typical features of these pre-Haymonian books, as they are presented in the manuscripts themselves.

In the following pages, therefore, some of the most striking items have been described in detail. With the aid of the material thus obtained it is hoped, further manuscripts may come to light and, in the future, and type of pre-Haymonian missal, breviary, ritual or order for grace

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<sup>3</sup> I abstain from giving an extensive list of other manuscripts which contain such unimportant details as the title or a few rubrics of the pre-Haymonian breviary.



may duly be distinguished from its Haymonian equivalent. The early history of the Franciscan Order will thus greatly be served. Not only are these manuscripts important for the development of the Roman liturgy but also for our knowledge of the methods of writing and notation in the Order, for the provision of books among the friars, for their care and use of them, etc.

Since the pre-Haymonian books form the link between those of the papal court and those based on Haymo's correction, they should be compared with the material available from these two sources. In the case of Haymo there is no difficulty. His Ordinary exists in several manuscripts, the most ancient of which has been described in 1946 in the *Ephemerides liturgicae*<sup>4</sup>. Another copy in the bibliothèque municipale of Mende, MS 1, has been completed with practically all other *Ordines* fundamental to the corrected liturgy of the Friars Minor. In order to facilitate comparison this manuscript will be described presently. References to it will be abbreviated with the capital H.

With the books of the papal court things are different. The Divine Office and the order for grace are set forth in the Ordinary of Innocent III. This is preserved in Paris, bibliothèque nationale, lat. 4162<sup>A</sup>, copied in 1365 and representing the papal Office as celebrated about 1300. Though very defective for various reasons, this manuscript is the only surviving copy which presents a complete picture of both the structure of the Office and the instructions according to which it was performed. Being an Ordinary, however, only the opening words of the texts are indicated. The texts themselves are extant in the Breviary of St Francis, whose description is available since 1949<sup>5</sup>. Since the latter contains only fragments and extracts of the rubrics, and a complete description of the Ordinary has never been given, the necessary details for comparison are prefixed to the descriptions of the other manuscripts. References to this papal Ordinary are indicated with the abbreviation O. — The court's ritual of the Last Sacraments is contained in five *Ordines* of the pontifical, issued early in the reign of Innocent III.<sup>6</sup> The pre-Haymonian ritual of the friars has been adapted from this book. However, the adaptation not only implied detailed changes of texts and rubrics but also a new and more simple arrangement into three *Ordines*. Thus,

<sup>4</sup> 'Il carattere', appendix iv, loc. cit. lx, 353 ff.

<sup>5</sup> S. J. P. van Dijk, 'The Breviary of St. Francis' in *Franciscan Studies* ix, 1949, 13 ff. The temporale of the papal Office is also to be found in 'The Breviary of St Clare'; see *Franciscan Studies* viii, 1948, 27 ff.

<sup>6</sup> M. Andrieu, 'Le pontifical romain au Moyen-âge. ii. Le pontifical de la curie romaine au xiii<sup>e</sup> siècle', Vatican City 1940, nos. xlviiii—lii, p. 486—513.

the Franciscan ritual became a liturgical book in its own right and direct comparison with the pontifical is no longer of practical use. The new version has been published in 1923 by L. Bracaloni<sup>7</sup> from the Breviary of St Clare (no. 20). The editor, however, failed to recognise it as a pre-Haymonian document; nor did he have the material necessary to discover its dependence upon the pontifical of the court. Since the arrangement of the ritual in this Breviary is not entirely original and some irregularities crept into other manuscripts, because of the supervening revision of Haymo (?), I intend to add a few examples and explanations to that purpose. — No manuscript of the missal of the papal court is known to have survived. Though the sacramentaries of John Cajetan Orsini are closely connected with the Ordinary of Innocent III and, consequently, for years have been regarded as representing the Mass liturgy of the court towards the end of the 13th century, yet this opinion can no longer be maintained<sup>8</sup>. The missal used at court shortly before the middle of the century must have been very similar to the pre-Haimonian missal of the friars. The differences, however, cannot be traced in detail. A copy of such a Franciscan missal (no. 1) has recently been described in *Sacris erudiri*<sup>9</sup>. Thus I may limit myself to a general reference to this study.

The following abbreviations will be used:

- C Breviary of St Clare; Assisi, Franciscan friary of San Damiano<sup>10</sup>;
- F Breviary of St Francis; Assisi, protomonastery of the Poor Clares<sup>11</sup>;
- H Ordinary of Haymo, etc.; Mende, bibliothèque municipale, 1;
- O Ordinary of Innocent III, Paris, bibliothèque nationale, lat. 4162<sup>A</sup>;
- AF *Analecta Franciscana sive Chronica aliaque varia documenta ad historiam Fratrum Minorum spectantia* . . .; ed. Quaracchi;
- AFH *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* . . .; ed. Quaracchi;
- ASS *Acta Sanctorum*; ed. Bollandists, 2nd ed.;
- BHL *Bibliotheca hagiographica Latina Antiquae et Medii Aetatis*; ed. Bollandists, Brussels 1896—1901;
- BHLs *Bibliotheca hagiogr. Latina. Supplementum*, 2nd ed., Brussels 1911;

<sup>7</sup> 'Il primo rituale francescano nel Breviario di S. Chiara' in AFH xvi, 1923, 76 ff.; see *Franciscan Studies* viii, 1948, 362 f.

<sup>8</sup> S. J. P. van Dijk, 'Three manuscripts of a liturgical reform by John Cajetan Orsini (Nicholas III)' in *Scriptorium* vi, 1952, 213 ff.

<sup>9</sup> S. J. P. van Dijk, 'The Lateran Missal' in *Sacris erudiri* vi, 1954, 158 ff.; appendix.

<sup>10</sup> Described in *Franciscan Studies* viii, 1948, 351 ff.

<sup>11</sup> Described loc. cit., ix, 1949, 13 ff.

- MF Miscellanea francescana; ed. Conventual Fathers, Foligno, Rome;  
 MR Martyrologium Romanum in Propylaeum ad Acta Sanctorum  
 Decembris . . . Brussels 1940.

Paris, bibliothèque nationale, lat. 4162<sup>A</sup>

Parchm., 1 × 83 fol., 283 × 128 mm. The 9 quires, preceded and followed by a fly leaf, are composed in this way: 1 × 8 fol., 6 × 10 fol., 1 × 12 fol., 1 × 2 fol.

Italian handwriting of the second half of the 14th century (1365), derived from the *littera bononiensis*, fairly regular but with numerous mistakes in spelling and transcription; 2 col. of 35 lines, 190 × 162 mm. Rubrics in red. On fol 7—8, 60—1<sup>r</sup>, 64<sup>v</sup>—5<sup>r</sup>, 69<sup>r</sup>, 81<sup>r</sup> water washed out the rubrics and damaged rather seriously fol. 38<sup>v</sup>, 44<sup>v</sup>, 45<sup>r</sup> and 79<sup>r</sup>. Except for a few collects in the order of the Greater Litanies, fol. 60<sup>rb</sup> ff., only the opening words of the liturgical texts have been indicated; these are written with ink and not damaged.

Three margins of fol. 1<sup>r</sup> are decorated with foliage. The decoration of the inside and lower margins descends from an illuminated initial *F*(*ratres*); that of the upper margin, where more recent hands added the shelf marks Cod. Colb. 2257 and Regius 4268, rises out of a square in the top left hand corner, adorned with the arms of a cardinal which also occupy the centre of the lower margin decoration. The arms are: or, a band vert and a chief azure; over the shield a cardinal's hat with one tassel. In the lower margin the blue chief has been erased. The arms thus corrected, i. e. or, a band vert, are those of the Albornozi<sup>12</sup>. The other shield has not been touched; its chief is easily confounded with the general blue ground. The cardinal for whom the manuscript was written is Egidio Albornozi, cardinal priest of St Clement's in 1350, bishop of Sabina in 1356 and papal legate in Italy in the years 1353—7 and 1358—67<sup>13</sup>. The scribe himself dated his work in a colophon, to be found in the upper part of fol. 81<sup>v</sup>:

Explicit. Liber. Ordenarii. Deo gracias. Amen.

Qui. scripsit. scribat. semper. Com domino. Vivat. vivat.

In celis. Do[m]nus. Jacobus. In nomine. Felix. Deo gra[tia]s. Amen.

Scriptum fuit in Castron Durante. sub anno domini. m.<sup>o</sup> iii.<sup>c</sup> lxxv. Indicat. iij<sup>a</sup>. Tempore. domini. Urbani. pape.

During the cardinal's second mission, Castron Durante, nowadays Urbania, in the Marches between Florence and Ancona, was one of the cities which remained faithful to the legate, who about 1365 was occupied in pacifying the neighbouring districts<sup>14</sup>.

The manuscript is the only copy so far known of the Ordinary of the Divine Office as performed by the papal chaplains from Innocent III onwards.

<sup>12</sup> J. B. Rietstap, 'Armorial general' i, Gouda 1884, 26; 'Armoiries des familles contenues dans L'Armorial général' i, Paris-The Hague 1903, pl. xxv.

<sup>13</sup> Fr. Filippini, 'Il cardinale Egidio Albornozi', Bologna 1933, 20 ff.

<sup>14</sup> E. Emerton, 'Humanism and tyranny. Studies in Italian Trecento', Cambridge 1925; The Ordinances of Albornozi, 197 ff.

Innocent's reform of the Office was laid down after his death, during the pontificate of Honorius III, most probably about 1220. Divided into 3 parts, *temporale*, *sanctorale* and *Common*, the Ordinary gives for every day of the liturgical year the order of the Canonical Hours. On certain days this is mined up with many, at times, long rubrics for solemnities at which the pontiff presided, either in his private chapel of St Lawrence in the palace or in one of the Roman basilicas. — Andrieu, *Le pontifical* ii, 87 ff.; see also J. Brinktrine, *Consuetudines liturgicae in functionibus anni ecclesiastici papalibus observandae e sacramentario codicis Vat. Ottobon.* 356, Münster i. Westph. 1935.

fol. 1<sup>ra</sup>—51<sup>rb</sup>. In nomine domini. Incipit ordo romane ecclesie curie quem consuevimus observare tempore. Innocentij tertij. pape: et aliorum pontificum. In primo sabbato de a[d]ventu Ad vespervas. Capitulum *Fratres scientes quia hora est.* ymnum *Conditor alme* . . . Ad completorium. ant. *Salva nos domine vigilantes.* ps. *Nunc dimittis s[ervum].*

Temporale, ending with the lessons from Holy Scripture with the responsorial 'historiae' of the last months of the liturgical year, introduced, fol. 49<sup>vb</sup>, by the rubric *Sciendum quod ystorie que in kalendis mutantur* . . .<sup>15</sup>

fol. 51<sup>rb</sup>—52<sup>rb</sup>. [1.] In omnibus festivitatibus que in sabbatis veniunt <nisi si duplex offitium, et in festis apostolorum in omnibus aliis.> vespere dicuntur de eis . . .

[2.] Si festum trium lectionum in dominica venerit . . .

[3.] De omnibus vigiliis, in quibus ieiunium celebramus [si] non est festum. [dicimus] nocte a [= et] die . . .

[4.] Sciendum quod oratio *A cunctis nos quesumus domine* . . .

[5.] Sciendum est quod quam de (sic) qua[ndo]cumque aliqua festivitas . . .

[6.] Item si aliquod festum quod notatur de uno die [ad] aliud [= alium] . . .

[7.] Nota quod si festum occurrerit. sequenti die. post festum sancti Michaelis vel sancte crucis . . .

[8.] Notandum quod Quandocumque est festum duplex, vesperum incipit[ur] de ipso sancto [= festo] . . .

[9.] Et nota quod quando aliqua festivitas alicuius sancti. habet octavam . . .

[10.] Adventus domini celebratur . . . et tertio nonas eiusdem mensis. <In omnibus vigiliis apostolorum in quibus ieiunatur . . . dicimus *Gloria in excelsis deo et in terra.*>

General rubrics for Mass and Office. The texts in broken brackets are interpolated.

<sup>15</sup> The papal *Ordines* for the last three days of Holy Week have been published by Andrieu, 'Le pontifical' ii, 541 ff.; some others are printed by Brinktrine, op. cit., 9 ff., be it from another manuscript.



fol. 52<sup>rb</sup>—74<sup>rb</sup>. In festo sancti Saturnini. ad vespervas capitulum. ymnus. versus. antiphona ad magnificat de uno martire. Oratio *Deus qui beati Saturnini . . .* Ad magnificat ant. *Dedisti domine habitaculum.* Oratio. *Deus qui nos annua beati Clementis. Per.*

Sanctorale, ending with the feast of St Clement (23. Nov.), because of the omission of that of St. Grisogonus. As in F, the sanctorale has no title.

fol. 74<sup>rb</sup>—78<sup>va</sup>. Incipit commune sanctorum. In natalitijs apostolorum. Capitulum ad vespervas *Fratres iam non estis . . .* In natalitia plurimorum apostolorum . . . In natalitia evangelistarum omnia offitia sicut in comuni . . . In festo unius martiris. . . . In natalitia plurimorum martirum. . . . In festo unius martiris atque pontificis . . . In natalitia plurimorum martirum atque pontificum . . . In natalitia unius confessoris atque pontificis . . . In natalitia confessoris non pontificis . . . In natalitia plurimorum confessorum, oratio . . . In natalitia virginum . . . In dedicatione ecclesie . . . *metuendus est locus iste.* oratio ut supra.

Common of the Saints. The Common for Eastertide is to be found in the sanctorale, fol. 58<sup>rb</sup>—59<sup>rb</sup>.

In natalitijs sanctorum a passca usque ad pentecosten. sive plurimorum sive unius fuerit festivitas. Capitulum ad vespervas . . . Notantum quod si fuerit festum unius martiris vel confessoris . . . In festo virginum tres antiphone de capitibus . . . Notandum quod si festum pasce progreditur in aprili . . . In natalitia sanctorum a pascha usque pentecosten . . . In festo virginis psalmi virginum. Capitulum ymnus . . . In festo apostolorum. Invitatorium *Regem apostolorum . . .*

fol. 78<sup>va</sup>—79<sup>vb</sup>. Incipit officium beate Marie virginis quod celebratur a vespervis sabbati primi post pentecosten (et a festo purificationis usque ad vespervas iiij. ferie maioris ebdomade et) usque ad vespervas sabbati proximi ante adventum. secundum consuetudinem ecclesie romane. Ad matutinum . . . quando facimus duplex offitium. et non dicimus oratio[nem] de apostolis et de pace.

Office of Our Lady, the title damaged by water. The phrase in brackets should follow *ante adventum*, while the words *secundum . . . romane*, should be read between *Marie virginis* and *quod*; see for instance C fol. cclix<sup>rb</sup>.

fol. 79<sup>vb</sup>. <Hiis diebus non dicimus officium beate virginis quando> facimus officium duplex. In nativitate domini . . . Et basilicarum Petri et Pauli.

List of feasts with double rite, preceded by an interpolation which repeats the words of the last rubric of the Lady Office; for the exact opening words see C fol. cclx<sup>va</sup>. The list is followed by 2 more interpolations:

fol. 79<sup>vb</sup>. In a[nni]versario coronationis summi pontificis. S[cilicet] domini Bonifatii pape viij. quod fuit in die sancte Emerentiane . . .

fol. 80<sup>ra</sup>. Nonas se[p]tembris celebratur offitium pro summis pontificibus et cardinalibus defunctis . . .<sup>16</sup>.

fol. 80<sup>ra</sup>—80<sup>va</sup>. Incipit offitium pro defunctis. Invitatorium de secundo die post festum omnium sanctorum *Regem cui omnia vivunt*. In aliis diebus istum Invitatorium non dicitur . . . In ferialibus diebus dicitur *Pater noster* flexis genibus cum psalmis et orationibus.

Office of the dead.

fol. 80<sup>va</sup>—81<sup>rb</sup>. Incipit officium benedictionis mense secundum consuetudinem Romane Curie. Feria quinta in cena domini in initio cene ant. *Christus factus est* . . . cum capitulo ut supra. Oratio *Retribuere dignare*.

Grace before and after meals.

fol. 81<sup>rb</sup>. Psalmi ante missam. *Quam amabilia. Benedixisti domine* . . . Post missam ant. *Trium puerorum*. ps. *Benedicite omnia opera* . . . *preveni et adiuuando. Per dominum nostrum*. et cetera.

Psalms before and after Mass<sup>17</sup>. On the verso of this folio is the colophon quoted above.

#### Mende, bibliothèque municipale, 1

Parchm., 184 fol., 3 fol. missing in the necrology, fol. 2—24; 2 others have been torn out after fol. 163, in the Common of the *Ordo breviarii*.

French handwritings of the beginning of the 14th century. The kalender, written in a heavy script, is followed by a capitulary for prime, written in smaller characters; the latter is in 2 col. of 36 lines, 200 × 131 mm; rubrics in red and smaller still than the texts. The martyrology with the introductory treatises in 2 col. seems the most ancient portion of the collection; neat and regular script, 31 long lines, 164 × 124 mm., in red and black. The Ordinary is written in a not too regular hand; 2 col. of 37 lines, 171 × 124 mm; rubrics underlined in red; initials in the usual colours and flourished. Ferial days and longer rubrics begin with a long drawn paraph sign, very similar to an initial J without the upper stroke. Sundays and feasts have initials of various sizes according to the importance of the day. The *Ordinationes* at the end of the manuscript is written in 2 col. of 27 lines, 180 × 130 mm.

Both from the necrology and the additions in the kalender it is evident that the manuscript was made up in the Franciscan friary of Mende (Lozère). — Ancient binding in parchment on wooden boards with 5 bosses.

<sup>16</sup> See M. Andrieu, 'Le missel de la chapelle papale à la fin du xiii<sup>e</sup> siècle' in *Miscellanea Francesco Ehrle*, vol. 2, in *Studi e Testi*, vol. 38, Rome 1924, 357.

<sup>17</sup> See van Dijk, 'Three manuscripts', loc. cit., 238.

The manuscript contains an almost complete set of the liturgical documents compiled by the Franciscans about the middle of the 13th century<sup>18</sup>. They are all "Haymonian", i. e. composed either by Haymo of Faversham or by others shortly afterwards in conformity with his correction. Chronologically they succeed each other in this way:

*Ordo agendorum et dicendorum in missa*, fol. 168<sup>va</sup>, published in 1242—3, during the generalate of Haymo<sup>19</sup>;

*Ordo breviarii*, fol. 128<sup>rb</sup>, *Ordo ad benedicendum mensam*, fol. 167<sup>va</sup>, and *Ordo missalis*, fol. 93<sup>ra</sup>, compiled by Haymo in 1243—4;<sup>20</sup>

*Ordinationes divini Officii*, fol. 179<sup>ra</sup>, promised by Haymo in the *Ordo agendorum* and published in 1244—51, after his death<sup>21</sup>;

*Tabula Parisiensis*, fol. 126<sup>ra</sup>, for the ferial antiphons before Christmas, imposed by the General Chapter of Pisa in 1263<sup>22</sup>. In addition to what I wrote elsewhere<sup>23</sup>, it may be noted here that the Ateneo pontificio di Sant' Antonio, Rome, has acquired a Franciscan breviary of about 1300, where (fol. 423) this *tabula nobilissima* is said to have been made a *fratre Rubino cantore condam parisiensi*<sup>24</sup>. On the other hand, however, the British Museum possesses a Paris breviary, Add. 37399, in which (fol. 7<sup>ra</sup>—17<sup>va</sup>) a similar set of 7 tables is introduced and followed by rubrics from which it is clear that, in those days the tabula were known to be an *Ordinarium novum . . . secundum usum paris[i]ensem*<sup>25</sup>. Thus it is difficult to decide who was the author and who only the compiler. Both in the cathedral and in the Franciscan friary at Paris, the cantors asserted themselves<sup>26</sup>. Moreover, the sevenfold table for this kind of rubrical difficulties goes back, at least, to the first half of the 12th century, when it was provided in the breviaries of Brescia<sup>27</sup>.

*Rubrica Parisiensis* for the Sundays after Pentecost. So far H provides the most explicit and seemingly trustworthy testimony about its origin; see fol. 92<sup>v</sup>. The "rubric" is said to have been made by the cantors of Paris, who provided the papal court with a copy. Friar Andrew of Bologna, in his turn, copied it from the books of the court, when he held the office of papal penitentiary. He was first a companion of the Minister General John of Parma (1247—57), then guardian at Bologna and superior of the Holy Land (probably

<sup>18</sup> In addition to the liturgical statutes, issued during the generalate of St Bonaventure (1257—74), the only important document missing in this collection is the revision of the ritual of the Last Sacraments. It does not occur in any of the manuscript here described.

<sup>19</sup> van Dijk, 'Notae quaedam', loc. cit., 140 ff. The best modern edition is by V. Kennedy, 'The Franciscan Ordo Missae in the thirteenth century' in *Medieval Studies* ii, 1940, 204 ff. The introduction is mistaken in many points.

<sup>20</sup> See van Dijk, 'Il carattere', loc. cit., 329 ff.

<sup>21</sup> 'Notae quaedam', loc. cit., 145.

<sup>22</sup> van Dijk, 'The statutes of the General Chapter of Pisa (1263)' in AFH xlv, 1952, 314, no 3.

<sup>23</sup> 'Il carattere', loc. cit., 349, note 44.

<sup>24</sup> I am indebted to L. Brinkhoff, O.F.M., for this reference.

<sup>25</sup> In the 15th-century Ordinary of Paris, in the bibliothèque de l'Arsenal, Paris, lat. 114, the table has become almost an entire book.

<sup>26</sup> See, for instance, 'Notae quaedam', loc. cit., 154 ff., and presently.

<sup>27</sup> Oxford, Bodleian library, Canon. liturg. 366, fol. 54<sup>v</sup>—56<sup>r</sup>.

about 1270<sup>28</sup>). As a papal penitentiary, he died at court<sup>29</sup>. Andrew is also mentioned in the 15th-century Roman breviary in the British Museum, Add. 18194, fol. 186<sup>vb</sup>, but the cantors of Paris have disappeared: *Ista rubrica fuit abstracta de libro domini pape per fratrem*, etc. In a contemporary Franciscan breviary in the Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge, M<sup>c</sup>Clean 62, fol. 403<sup>rb</sup>, even Andrew has vanished, leaving only the book of the "Lord Pope". Together with H, these two manuscripts are the only examples known to me which represent a tradition that, in the course of time, became an almost hopeless jumble of names and authorities<sup>30</sup>. — Cl. Brunel, *Necrologium conventus Mimatensis Ordinis Fratrum Minorum Conventualium* in *Analecta Franciscana* vi, 3 ff.

fol. 1. *Cor angustum dilatemus, ut senatus exaltemus* . . .<sup>31</sup>

Fragment of a prose written on the fly-leaf.

fol. 2<sup>r</sup>—24<sup>v</sup>. Kal. [Ian.] Obitus reverendi admodum patris magistri Bonaventure . . .<sup>32</sup>

Necrology of the friary of Mende with entries from the 14th to the 18th century.

fol. 25<sup>rv</sup>. Anno domini m.<sup>o</sup> ccc.<sup>o</sup> lxxi<sup>o</sup> in die penteco[s]ten reverendus pater . . . Anno domini m.<sup>o</sup> cc.<sup>o</sup> lxxxxxiii<sup>o</sup> in festo omnium sanctorum dominus G[ulielmus] dei gratia mimatensis episcopus . . . Dominica immediate sequenti post octavam assumptionis beate virginis . . . Post hec videlicet anno domini millesimo ccc.<sup>o</sup> xx.<sup>o</sup> in festo beati Augustini...<sup>33</sup>

<sup>28</sup> Almost all information about Andrew is to be found in Salimbene of Parma, 'Chronica', ed. Holder-Egger in *Mon. Germ. Hist., Scriptores* xxxii, Hannover-Leipzig 1905—13, 551, 556. See also G. Golubovich, 'Biblioteca bio-bibliografica della Terra Santa e dell'Oriente francescano' i, Quaracchi 1906, 275, no 74.

<sup>29</sup> Andrew is not mentioned by L. Oliger 'I penitenzieri francescani a San Giovanni in Laterano' in *Studi francescani* xi, 1925—6, 3 ff.

<sup>30</sup> In the 14th-century Franciscan breviary in the bibliothèque nationale, Paris, lat. 1280, fol. 335<sup>vb</sup>, the rubric is said to be *tradita in conventu parisiensi per fratres minores*; in other words the cantors of the cathedral have become friars. In the Franciscan breviary of the end half of the 15th century, Bodleian libr., Canon. liturg. 306 (13398), fol. 199<sup>va</sup>, it is headed: *Rubrica que sequitur que exposuit extracta a libro pape postea data in capitulo generali parisius celebrato*. The anonymous pontiff soon got his name. In the Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge, M<sup>c</sup>Clean 61, fol. 352—3, a 15th-century Franciscan breviary, it is a pope Boniface who *constituit hanc ordinationem. Et istam* (sic) *observat[ur] in capella pape et in tota romana curia*. In a contemporary Augustini an breviary in the seminary of Padua, 147, pope Boniface now is the author: *fecit rubricam rectam*. The venerable John of Stroncone, defied all other scribes. In this breviary, now Perugia, bibliotheca comunale, 1038, fol. 320<sup>va</sup>, it is reported that the rubric was *facta et decretata per sanctissimum dominum nostrum, Gregorium. papam. Cum totum collegium cardinalium acceptam et plumbicatam. in Anania* (= Anagni). — Wadding, *Annales*; ed. Quaracchi ix, 18, would have us believe that it was imposed by the Chapter of 1437. Yet it occurs in many 14th-century breviaries.

<sup>31</sup> U. Chevalier, 'Repertorium hymnologicum', 3867.

<sup>32</sup> Ed. Brunel, loc. cit., 22 ff.

<sup>33</sup> Ed. Brunel, loc. cit., 34 ff.



Addition; notes on a Chapter held in the friary of Mende, on the consecration of the church and of two altars.

fol. 25<sup>v</sup>. Tabula subscripta ostendit quomodo ystorie mensis septembris ponuntur. Quando kalende septembris veniunt in dominica tunc dominica prima eiusdem mensis ponitur liber Job . . . ponitur liber Hester.

Addition; see presently fol. 128<sup>rb</sup>—152<sup>va</sup>.

fol. 25<sup>v</sup>. Ista rubrica est parisius. Notandum quod ab octava pentecostes usque ad adventum . . .

Addition in the same handwriting as the previous one; see fol. 92<sup>v</sup>.

fol. 26<sup>r</sup>—31<sup>v</sup>. Kalendar with some 14th-cent. additions and obits<sup>34</sup>.

fol. 32<sup>ra</sup>—33<sup>vb</sup>. Notandum quod in dominicis diebus ab adventu usque octavam epiphanie. et a septuagesima usque ad pascha. ac omnibus festis .ix. et trium lectionum. legitur ad capituli absolutionem capitulum quod dicitur in nona. In dominica .j. de adventu capitulum *Non in commensationibus . . . nova facio omnia. Tu autem domine miserere nobis. Deo gratias.*

Lessons for the chapter Office of prime. A third of fol. 33<sup>vb</sup> blank.

fol. 34<sup>ra</sup>—92<sup>r</sup>. De arte inveniendi qualiter sit pronuncianda luna qualibet die . . . Si autem scire volueris in quacumque die anni quota pronuncianda sit luna. vide quotus sit ciclus. si est unus sive primus. ut in anno presenti m<sup>o</sup>. cc<sup>o</sup>. l<sup>o</sup>. .iiij<sup>o</sup>. tunc numerum quod sub. a. reperies . . .<sup>35</sup>

De prologis diversis super opus martyrologii per quos patet quantam diligentiam apposuerunt sancti et antiqui patres ad compilationem huius opusculi. Notandum quod licet multi dederint operam ad compilandum martyrologium . . .

Epistola Cromatii et Helyodori episcoporum ad Iheronimum super opere martyrologii . . . *Cum religiosissimus Augustus Theodosius . . .*<sup>36</sup>

Responsio Iheronimi ad eosdem super eodem . . . *Co[n]stat dominum Ihesum Christum . . .*<sup>37</sup>

<sup>34</sup> Ed. Brunel, loc. cit., 8 ff. and 31.

<sup>35</sup> This treatise with the date 1254 is to be found in several Dominican and Franciscan martyrologies, for instance, Vatican. lat. 4774 (O. F. M., Paris, late 13th century), see Ehrensberger, 180 and Palat. lat. 836 (O. P., 1426), op. cit., 183. W. Boniwell, 'A history of the Dominican liturgy', 2nd ed., New York 1945, 88, ascribes the treatise to Humbert of Romans — *Quod probandum*. Similarly the dating of Humbert's Ordinary for the Dominican Order cannot be based upon the date of this treatise.

<sup>36</sup> 'Martyrologium Hieronymianum', in ASS Nov. ii, pars i, p. 1.

<sup>37</sup> Loc. cit., 1 f.

Rubrica. Ista prologus alicubi dicitur excerptus ex libris beati Augustini alibi videtur esse prologus martyrologio Adonis. Prefatio que in pluribus libris ascribitur Bede super opere martyrologii. *Festivitates sanctorum apostolorum* . . .<sup>38</sup>

Epistola sive prefatio Usuardi monachi ad Karolum regem super opere martyrologii. [*D*]omino regum piissimo Karolo Augusto Usuardus indignus sacerdos ac monachus . . .<sup>39</sup>.

(Brito dicit sic. Nota quod quandocumque sanctorum festa que in martyrologio recitantur. in kalendis vel ydibus annotantur . . . similiter expone de Nonis. et ydibus. Hec Brito<sup>40</sup>.)

Incipit martyrologium per anni circulum . . .<sup>41</sup>.

Collection of introductory letters and a treatise, followed by the martyrology of Usuard. Between brackets is a 14th-century addition written on the open space of fol. 36<sup>b</sup>. Many obits added in the margins<sup>42</sup>.

fol. 92. *Apud Assisium natale sacratissimi confessoris Christi Francisci. primi ducis et fundatoris Fratrum minorum* . . .

*Anno quadregesimo secundo Octaviani cesaris augusti. temporibus Herodis regis iudeorum. ablata a Iudeis omni potestate* . . .

Additions, contemporary to the martyrology; the first for the feast of St Francis, the second for Christmas<sup>43</sup>.

fol. 92<sup>v</sup>. Dominica prima post pentecosten ponitur ista rubrica. Rubrica. Notandum quod ab octava pentecostes usque ad adventum domini exclusive sunt ad plus .xxviii.<sup>or</sup> dominice et ad minus .xxiii.<sup>or</sup> Officia vero dominicalia vero sunt nisi .xxiii.<sup>or</sup> et ideo quando sunt . . . et sic numquam errabis in dominicis ponendis.

Ista rubrica fuit facta per cantores parisienses et ista utitur dominus papa et fuit abstracta de libro domini pape per fratrem Andream ordinis minorum penitenciarium domini pape.

Addition in a small 14th-century script. Rubric for the arrangement and translation of the Sundays after Pentecost, known as the *rubrica Parisiensis* and to well distinguished from the *tabula Parisiensis*; see above.

fol. 93<sup>ra</sup>—104<sup>va</sup>. [Incipit ordo missalis fratrum minorum secundum consuetudinem Romane curie.] Dominica prima de adventu. Statio ad

<sup>38</sup> PL 123, 599 ff.

<sup>39</sup> Loc. cit.

<sup>40</sup> William Brito, 'Vocabularium bibliae', s. v. *Kalendae*; Oxford, Bodleian libr., Rawl. C. 896 (12730), fol. 145.

<sup>41</sup> ASS June vii, 1 ff.

<sup>42</sup> Ed. Brunel, loc. cit., 32 ff.

<sup>43</sup> The Franciscan additions in the martyrology are published by F. Delorme in AFH xvi, 1928, 250 ff.

sanctam Mariam maiorem. Introitus *Ad te levavi* ps. *Vias tuas*. Sequitur immediate V. *Gloria patri*. Quo finito . . . Sed nullo alio tempore iungitur *Alleluia* cum *Ite missa est*.

Ordo missalis; the first part of the temporale, ending with the vespers at the end of the Mass of Holy Saturday. The title has been supplied from other manuscripts of the Ordo<sup>44</sup>.

fol. 104<sup>va</sup>—105<sup>ra</sup>. [1.] Adventus domini celebratur ubicumque dominicus dies . . .

[2.] Notandum quod feria quarta proxima post dies sancte lucie. cinerum . . .

[3.] Quandocumque festo deest aliquid proprium . . .

[4.] Si festum habens vigiliam veniat die lune . . .

[5.] De festo vero trium lectionum dicitur missa nisi eiusdem diei . . .

[6.] In vigiliis in quibus ieiunium celebramus . . .

[7.] Notandum quod quandocumque in matutinis . . .

[8.] Quandocumque *Te deum laudamus* dicitur . . .

[9.] Tres orationes dicuntur tantum in missa conventuali . . .

[10.] Oratio *A cunctis nos quesumus domine*. dicitur in missa . . .

[11.] *Alleluia* non cantatur ad missam a septuagesima . . .

[12.] *Credo in unum deum* dicitur omnibus dominicis . . . In omnibus consecrationibus ecclesiarum et altarium.

Ordo missalis; general rubrics.

fol. 105<sup>ra</sup>—110<sup>rb</sup>. Dominica resurrectionis domini. Statio ad sanctam Mariam maiorem. Introitus *Resurrexi* ps. *Domine probasti* . . . postcommunio *Concede nobis domine. per dominum*.

Ordo missalis; continuation of the temporale, ending with the last Sunday after Pentecost.

fol. 110<sup>rb</sup>—118<sup>vb</sup>. [Incipit sanctorale. In vigilia sancti Andree.] In vigilia sancti Andree apostoli. Introitus *Dominus secus mare*. ps. *At illi relictis* . . . postcommunio *Sumptis domine salutis. Per*.

Ordo missalis; Sanctorale ending with the feast of St Catherine (25 Nov.). The title seems to have been added by another hand. The original title is *Incipit proprium sanctorum de missali*<sup>45</sup>.

fol. 118<sup>vb</sup>—122<sup>rb</sup>. [Incipit commune sanctorum de missali.] In vigilia unius apostoli. Intr. *Ego autem sicut oliva* . . . In vigilia plurimorum apostolorum. Intr. *Intret in conspectu* . . . In natali apostolorum. Intr. *Michi autem nimis* . . . In natali unius martiris pontificis. Intr.

<sup>44</sup> van Dijk, 'Il carattere', loc. cit., 359.

<sup>45</sup> See 'Il carattere', loc. cit., 360.

*Statuit ei dominus . . .* In natali unius martiris non pontificis. Intr. *In virtute tua . . .* In natali unius sancti a pascha usque pentecosten ubi aliud non assignatur specialiter. Inter. *Protexisti me deus . . .* In natali plurimorum martirum a pascha usque pentecosten. Intr. *Sancti tui domine . . .* In natali plurimorum martirum. Intr. *Intret in conspectu tuo . . .* In natali unius confessoris pontificis. Intr. *Sacerdotes tui domine..* In natali unius confessoris non pontificis. Intr. *Os iusti meditabitur . . .* In natali virginum. Intr. *Dilexisti iusticiam . . .* In ipsa die dedicationis ecclesie totum officium agitur . . . Postcommunio *Quesumus omnipotens deus ut in hoc loco nomini tuo. Per dominum.*

*Ordo missalis*; Common of the Saints. The title has been completed as in the temporale.

fol. 122<sup>rb</sup>—124<sup>vb</sup>. [1.] Missa in honore sanctorum quorum corpora habentur. Oratio *Propiciare nobis quesumus domine . . .*

[2.] Missa in honore sancte trinitatis. Oratio *Omnipotens sempiterne deus . . .*

[3.] Missa ad postulandam gratiam spiritus sancti Oratio *Deus cui omne cor . . .*

[4.] Missa in honore sancte crucis. Oratio *Deus qui unigeniti filii . . .*

[5.] Missa in honore beate virginis Marie. Oratio *Concede nos famulos . . .*

[6\*.] Missa in honore angelorum. Oratio *Perpetuum nobis domine . . .*

[7.] Missa in honore apostolorum Petri et Pauli. Oratio *Deus cuius dextera . . .*

[8.] Missa ad poscenda suffragia sanctorum. Oratio *Concede quesumus . . .*

[9\*.] Alia missa ad poscenda suffragia sanctorum quam fecit dominus papa Innocentius. Oratio *A cunctis nos quesumus . . .*

[10.] Missa pro persecutoribus ecclesie. Oratio *Ecclesie tue quesumus . . .*

[11.] Missa pro pace. Oratio *Deus a quo sancta desideria . . .*

[12.] Missa pro papa. Oratio *Deus omnium fidelium . . .*

[13.] Missa pro iter agentibus. Oratio *Adesto domine supplicationibus . . .*

[14.] Missa pro infirmis. Oratio *Omnipotens sempiterne deus salus . . .*

[15.] Missa in anniversario pontificis. Oratio *Deus qui licet sis magnus . . .*

[16.] Missa pro se ipso sacerdote. Oratio *Suppliciter te deus . . .*

17\*.] Alia missa pro se ipso sacerdote. Oratio *Omnipotens sempiterne deus . . .*

[18\*.] Alia missa pro seipso sacerdote. Oratio *Omnipotens eterne deus tue gratie . . .*



[19\*.] Missa pro omni gradu ecclesie. Oratio *Omnipotens sempiterne deus cuius . . .*

[20.] Missa pro congregatione. Oratio *Omnipotens sempiterne deus qui . . .*

[21\*.] Alia missa pro congregatione. Oratio *Defende quesumus domine . . .*

[22\*.] Alia missa pro congregatione. Oratio *Deus qui nos a seculi vanitate . . .*

23\*.] Missa pro concordia fratrum. Oratio *Deus largitor pacis . . .*

[24.] Missa pro temptatione carnis. Oratio *Ure igne sancti spiritus . . .*

[25.] Missa pro peccatis. Oratio *Deus cui proprium est . . .*

[26.] Alia missa pro peccatis. Oratio *Ineffabilem misericordiam . . .*

[27\*.] Alia missa pro remissione peccatorum. Oratione *Deus qui nulum . . .*

[28\*.] Missa ad repellendas malas cogitationes. Oratio *Omnipotens et mitissime deus respice . . .*

[29\*.] Missa pro petitione lacrimarum. Oratio *Omnipotens et mitissime deus qui . . .*

[30.] Missa pro amico. Oratio *Deus qui iustificas . . .*

[31.] Alia missa pro amico. Oratio *Omnipotens sempiterne deus . . .*

[32.] Missa pro salute vivorum. Oratio *Pretende domine . . .*

[33.] Missa pro devotis amicis. Oratio *Deus qui caritatis dona . . .*

[34.] Missa ad postulandam pluviam. Oratio *Deus in quo vivimus . . .*

[35.] Missa ad serenitatem poscendam. Oratio *Ad te domine clamantes . . .*

[36.] Missa ad repellendas tempestates. Oratio *A domo tua . . .*

[37.] Missa generalis sancti Augustini pro vivis et defunctis. Oratio *Omnipotens . . .*

[38.] Alia missa generalis. Oratio *Pietate tua quesumus . . .*

[39.] Missa contra paganos. Oratio *Omnipotens sempiterne deus . . .*

[40.] Missa pro quacumque tribulatione. Oratio *Deus qui non mortem . . .*

[41\*.] Alia missa pro quacumque tribulatione. Oratio *Ne despicias . . .*

[42.] Missa pro imperatore. Oratio *Deus qui [sic] regnorum omnium . . .*

[43\*.] Missa pro rege. Oratio *Quesumus omnipotens deus . . .*

[44.] Missa contra persecutores et male agentes. Oratio *Hostium nostrorum . . .*

[45\*.] Missa pro nimis pressuris. Oratio *Deus qui contritorum . . .*

[46\*.] Missa in tempore belli. Oratio *Omnipotens et misericors . . .*

[47\*.] Missa pro quacumque necessitate. Oratio *Deus refugium nostrum . . .*

[48\*.] Missa ad postulandam sanctam sapientiam. Oratio *Deus qui per coeternum . . .*

[49\*.] Missa ad postulandam fidem, spem, et caritatem. Oratio *Omnipotens sempiterne deus . . .*

[50\*.] Missa ad postulandam humilitatem. Oratio *Deus qui superbis resistis* . . .

[51\*.] Missa ad postulandam caritatem. Oratio *Deus qui diligentibus* . . .

[52\*.] Missa ad postulandam patientiam. Oratio *Deus qui unigeniti* . . .

[53.] Missa pro stabilitate loci. Oratio *Omnipotens sempiterne deus edificator* . . .

[54\*.] Missa pro confitente peccata sua. Oratio *Omnipotens sempiterne deus* . . .

[55\*.] Missa pro inimicis. Oratio *Deus pacis caritatisque amator* . . .

[56\*.] Missa pro elemosinas nobis facientibus. Oratio *Deus qui post baptismi* . . .

[57\*.] Missa pro amico in captione posito. Oratio *Deus qui beatum Petrum* . . .

[58\*.] Missa pro navigantibus. Oratio *Deus qui transtulisti* . . .

[59\*.] Missa pro sterilitate terre. Oratio *Da nobis quesumus domine* . . .

[60\*.] Missa pro peste animalium. Oratio *Deus qui laboribus* . . .

[61\*.] Missa pro mortalitate hominum. Oratio *Deus qui non mortem* . . .  
Hanc orationem et secretam. Require supra [in missa] pro qualicumque tribulatione. Postcommunio *Exaudi* . . .

[62\*.] Missa pro infirmo qui proximus est morti. Oratio *Omnipotens sempiterne deus conservator* . . .

[63\*.] Missa in agenda defunctorum. Intr. *Requiem eternam* . . .

[a)] In die depositionis defuncti. Oratio *Deus cui proprium est* . . .

[b)] Missa in die .iij. vij. vel xxx. depositionis defuncti. Oratio *Quesumus domine* . . .

[c\*)] Alia missa in die .iij. vij. vel .xxx. depositionis defuncti. Oratio *Adesto quesumus domine* . . .

[d\*)] Missa pro defuncto episcopo. Oratio *Da nobis domine* . . .

[e)] Missa pro defunctis episcopis. seu sacerdotibus. Oratio *Deus qui inter apostolicos* . . .

[f)] Missa pro defunctis sacerdotibus. Oratio *Presta quesumus domine* . . .

[g)] Missa pro uno defuncto. Oratio *Inclina domine aurem* . . .

[h)] Missa pro defuncta femina. Oratio *Quesumus domine pro pietate* . . .

[i)] Missa pro defunctis fratribus. Oratio *Deus venie largitor* . . .

[k)] Missa pro hiis qui in cimiterio requiescunt. Oratio *Deus cuius miseratione anime* . . .

[l)] Missa in anniversario. Oratio *Deus indulgentiarum domine* . . .

[m)] Missa pro patre et matre. Oratio *Deus qui nos patrem et matrem* . . .

[n)] Missa pluralis pro defunctis. Oratio *Omnipotens sempiterne deus* . . .

[o]) Missa generalis pro omnibus fidelibus defunctis. Oratio *Fidelium deus omnium* . . .

[p]) Alia missa pluralis pro defunctis. Oratio *Propiciare. Per* . . .

[q]) Alia missa pluralis pro defunctis. Oratio *Deus cui proprium* . . .

[r]) Alia missa pluralis pro defunctis. Oratio *Animabus quesumus* . . .

[s\*]) Missa pro defuncto nuper baptizato. Oratio *Deus qui ad celeste regnum* . . .

[64\*.] Missa pro desiderantibus penitentiam. Si quis penitentiam petens dum sacerdos venerit officio fuerit lingue privatus? constitutum est ut si ydonea testimonia hoc dixerint et ipse per motus aliquos satisfacit? sacerdos impleat omnia circa penitentem ut mos est. Oratio *Omnipotens et misericors deus* [in] *cuius* . . .

[65\*.] Missa pro cuius anima dubitatur. Oratio *Omnipotens et misericors deus* . . .

Series of votive Mass, being a development of that to be found in Orsini's sacramentaries. The Masses signed with an asterisk do not occur there. — End of the *Ordo missalis*. It is followed by 23 lines of the *Ordo breviarii* but these have been deleted by the scribe, who on the following leaf started with the general rubrics instead.

fol. 125<sup>ra</sup>—126<sup>rb</sup>. [1.] Adventus domini celebratur ubicumque dominicus dies . . .

[2.] Notandum quod feria .iiij.<sup>a</sup> proxima post dies sancte lucie. cinerum . . .

[3.] Sciendum quod si festum alicuius apostoli. evangeliste. sancti Michaelis . . .

[4.] Item quodcumque festum .ix. lectionum etiam si duplex fuerit . . .

[5.] Item quodcumque festum .ix. lectionum aliud a predictis . . .

[6.] Item quando plura festa .ix. lectionum de minoribus continue . . .

[7.] Festum autem minus omne illud esse intelligitur quod non est duplex . . .

[8.] Item quodcumque festum .ix. lectionum celebratur in sabbato . . .

[9.] Item notandum quod quandocumque aliquod festum celebratur die dominico . . .

[10.] Item de festo non duplici quod celebratur .ij.<sup>a</sup> feria . . .

[11.] In secundis vesperis festorum duplicium sancte crucis. angelorum . . .

[12.] Item sciendum quod in vigilia festi duplicis vespere fiunt totaliter . . .

[13.] Item in festo duplici omnes antiphone duplicantur . . .

[14.] Item si festum .ix. lectionum venerit infra octavas. infra quas...  
 [15.] Item notandum quod quandocumque infra aliquas octavas aliquae festivitates ...

[16.] Item notandum quod infra octavam semper dicitur ad magnificat antiphona ...

[17.] Item si festum trium lectionum venerit die sequenti post festum...

[18.] Item si contingat festum .ix. lectionum transferri ad diem ...

[19.] Item si festum de quo fit tantum commemoratio ...

[20.] Item in festis que in quadragesimo celebrantur. fit semper ...

[21.] Item si festum aliquod habeat propriam hystoriam non completam ...

[22.] Notandum quod festum duplex agitur. In die nativitatis domini ...

[23.] Octavas facimus de festis nativitatis domini ...

[24.] Sciendum quod *Te deum laudamus* immediate dicitur post ultimam lectionem ...

[25.] Notandum quod quando non leguntur .ix. lectiones. leguntur tres ...

[26.] Et notandum quod *Gloria patri* semper dicitur in tertio ...

[27.] Notandum quod in omnibus festivitibus antiphone laudum ...

[28.] Notandum quod in omnibus dominicis diebus et festis .ix. lectionum ... cum cantatur antiphone maiores. scilicet *O sapientia*.

General rubrics of the *Ordo breviarii* which, as a rule, follow the temporale. Among the double feasts (no. 22) are those of St Mary Magdalen (22 July<sup>46</sup>) and of the Dedication of St Michael (29 Sept.)<sup>47</sup>. In the margin, are the feasts of the Four Doctors<sup>48</sup>, written by the scribe.

fol. 126<sup>ra</sup>—128<sup>ra</sup>. De specialibus regulis [= antiphonis] laudum que ponuntur ante nativitatem domini fiat sicut in subscriptis .vij. tabulis continetur. Prima tabula. In anno illo in quo nativitas domini in dominica eveniet. secundum sequentem tabulam procedatur. Feria .iiij.<sup>a</sup> tercie ebdomade. adventus. Ad laudes ... et per horas ant. *Judea et Jherusalem* etc.

Order consisting of 7 tables for the ferial antiphons of lauds before Christmas called *tabula Parisiensis*; see above. Half of col. 128<sup>ra</sup> is blank.

<sup>46</sup> MR 300; relics at Vézelay and venerated especially in the south of France.

<sup>47</sup> According to the general Chapter of Assisi in 1269; AFH v. 1912, 706; AFH vii, 1914, 679; MF xxxv, 1925, 235; Glassberger, 'Chronica' in AF ii, 81.

<sup>48</sup> According to the general Chapter of Lyons in 1299; MF xxxiii, 29, see 'Notae quaedam', loc. cit. 127, note 28.



fol. 128<sup>rb</sup>—152<sup>va</sup>. [In nomine domini. Incipit ordo breviarii fratrum minorum secundum consuetudinem romane curie] In primi sabbato de adventu. Ad vespervas capitulum *Fratres scientes quia hora est R̃ Deo gratias*. Et sic respondetur in fine omnium capitulorum tocius anni. Ymnus *Conditor alme* . . . et legitur de eis usque ad adventum in feriali officio.

*Ordo breviarii*; temporale, the title being supplied from the other manuscripts, where, as a rule, the breviary precedes the missal<sup>49</sup>. Among the interpolations in this copy are 2 statutes concerning the lessons of Holy Scripture during September, fol. 151<sup>vb</sup>. The first (*Dominica prima mensis septembris ponitur liber Iob*<sup>50</sup>) replaced the original rubric of the *Ordo*. The second, a corrected version, was issued by a subsequent Chapter (*Item nota quod ad hoc datur talis regula. Si kalende septembris veniant die dominica Iob et Tobias*<sup>51</sup>). Both statutes, in their turn, were superseded by a still more detailed version, to be found on fol. 25<sup>v</sup> and ascribed sometimes to Boniface VIII; see MS Besançon 58, fol. 630<sup>rb</sup>. Another interpolation is the suffrage in honour of St Anthony of Padua (fol. 128<sup>rb</sup>, 135<sup>vb</sup>, 136<sup>va</sup>, 150<sup>rb</sup>), added in consequence of the Chapter of Padua in 1276<sup>52</sup>.

fol. 152<sup>va</sup>—163<sup>vb</sup>. Incipiunt festivitates sanctorum per anni circulum. In sancti Saturnini martiris. Oratio *Deus qui nos* . . . lectio *Regnante Maxencio cesare filio Maximiani augusti*.

*Ordo breviarii*; sanctorale, ending with the feast of St Catherine.

fol. 163<sup>vb</sup>—165<sup>ra</sup>. In nataliciis apostolorum /// ad vespervas Capitulum *Fratres iam non estis* . . . [In nataliciis unius martiris . . . In nataliciis plurimorum martirum . . . In nataliciis unius confessoris pontificis . . . In nataliciis confessorum non pontificum . . .] In nataliciis virginum . . . In festo alicuius sancte virginis non martiris . . . In festo alicuius sancte non virginis nec martiris . . . In anniversario dedicationis ecclesie . . . *est locus iste*. Oratio *Deus qui nobis*.

*Ordo breviarii*; Common of the Saints, incomplete, the titles of the missing parts being supplied from the other manuscripts. Unlike in the *Ordo missalis*, the Common of the Eastertide is inserted into the sanctorale, after the feast of Sts Soter and Caius (22 April); in this codex fol. 155<sup>rb</sup>—155<sup>vb</sup>:

In festivitatis sanctorum a pascha usque ad pentecosten. psalmi et ymni consueti de communi sanctorum dicuntur . . . De pluribus martiribus sive

<sup>49</sup> The only exception is Paris, bibl. nationale, lat. 1110, which is arranged like H.

<sup>50</sup> 'Il carattere', loc. cit., 317.

<sup>51</sup> Loc. cit., 318, note 219.

<sup>52</sup> AFH vii, 1914, 681, no 6; MF xxxv, 1935, 239, no. 4; see AFH xviii, 1925, 358, no 9. — For the origin of this votive commemoration see S. J. P. van Dijk, 'Il culto liturgico di santa Chiara nel Medioevo in S. Chiara d'Assisi. Studi e Cronaca del Centenario', Comitato centrale per il vii<sup>o</sup> centenario della morte di S. Chiara, Perugia 1954.

de uno martire. ad vespervas capitulum . . . De confessoribus et virginibus fit consuetum officium preter tonum illorum ymnorum qui mutari possunt, et excepto quod ad invitatoria . . . sub propria antiphona cuiuslibet nocturni.

fol. 165<sup>ra</sup>—166<sup>va</sup>. Incipit ordo officii beate Marie virginis. Notandum quod officium beate Marie virginis non dicitur a dicto completorio ante vigiliam nativitatis domini . . . ad *Nunc dimittis* dicitur ant. *Regina celi letare alleluia. quia quem.*

*Ordo breviarii*; Office of the Virgin.

fol. 166<sup>va</sup>—167<sup>va</sup>. Incipit officium in agenda mortuorum. Notandum quod officium defunctorum non agitur secundum consuetudinem romane curie quandocumque fiunt .ix. lectiones. nec in vespers . . . Nullo alio tempore dicitur in laudibus defunctorum.

*Ordo breviarii*; Office of the dead.

fol. 167<sup>va</sup>—168<sup>vb</sup>. Incipit ordo ad benedicendum mensam per totum annum. Congregatis fratribus ad prandium in refectorio et e regione stantibus ante mensas . . . resumitur benedictio consueta. scilicet *Oculi omnium in te sperant.*

*Ordo breviarii*; Order for grace before and after meals.

fol. 168<sup>va</sup>—170<sup>vb</sup>. [Incipit ordo agendorum et dicendorum a sacerdote in missa privata et feriali iuxta consuetudinem ecclesie romane.] Indutus planeta sacerdos stat ante gradum altaris. et iunctis manibus et mediocriter elevatis dicit ant. *Introibo . . . benedicat populum dicens In unitate spiritus sancti benedicat vos pater et filius. Amen. Deo gratias.*

Order for private Mass and conventual Mass on ferial days, the title being supplied from other manuscripts. Half of col. 170<sup>vb</sup> blank.

fol. 171<sup>r</sup>—177<sup>v</sup>. *Venerabilis christi sponse deoque dicte virginis Clare . . . post tenebras ad gaudium et gloriam sempiternam quo nos perducatur rex noster et dux christus . . . secula. amen.*

*Credimus in (sic) sanctam trinitatem . . . quia hodie habuerunt me gratis.*

Legenda sancti Privati episcopi mimatensis et martiris . . .

Contemporary additions: 9 lessons for the feast of St Clare, somewhat different from those in Ms. Besançon 58, fol. 562<sup>ra53</sup>; 9 lessons for the feast of the holy Trinity, see Ms. Besançon 58, fol. 594<sup>ra</sup>; a legend for the feast of the patron saint of Mende, St Privatus<sup>54</sup>.

fol. 178. De virginibus non velatis. De virginibus non velatis si devierint a voto . . . Quam grande malum sit adulterium . . . De illis qui

<sup>53</sup> See van Dyk, 'Il culto liturgico', op. cit.

<sup>54</sup> BHL 6932.

post longam captivitatem redeunt . . . Post hec de dispari cultu videndum est . . . De coniugio fidelium et infidelium et dominorum infidelium . . .

Contemporary addition; questions about the Decreta, pars ii, causa xxvii—xxxiv. The leaf corresponds to what seems to have been the flyleaf at the end of the book. In 2 columns of 40 lines; marginal notes.

fol. 179<sup>ra</sup>—184<sup>vb</sup>. [Incipiunt ordinationes divini officii.] Ad omnes horas canonicas primo pulsetur campana maior aliquantulum pro signo . . . et sic ad loca sua revertantur. Expliciunt ordinationes officii. Deo gratias.

Slightly interpolated copy of the Franciscan *Ordinationes*, the latest addition dating from 1299<sup>55</sup>. The title has been supplied from other manuscripts.

Assisi, biblioteca comunale, 611

Parchm., 319 fol., 2 paper fly leaves; 145 × 100 mm., a leaf missing at the end.

Two different handwritings of the late 13th century<sup>56</sup>; heavy characters, similar to Italian Bolognese script. The book, however, may have been written in southern France; see below. The first hand wrote 292 folios, the second the 27 (28) last leaves. Text in 2 columns of 34 lines (103 × 60 mm) as far as fol. 305; from here onwards in long lines. The ink is faded; in the kalendar, the Common of the Saints and the Office of the Virgin the text is almost unreadable. Rubrics often in black, especially the longer ones, and red underlined.

Bound in half-leather on wooden boards; 154 × 102 mm. On the spine in gold print: *Brev antiq ORD MINOR*, and the ancient shelfmark: xxxiii/a. 340; in the lower part the actual shelf-mark: 611, written on a piece of paper.

This breviary was written for the Austin Friars. An erasure in the title of the ritual of the Last Sacraments, (fol. 315<sup>v</sup>), still has the words *fratrum heremitarum ordinis sancti Augustini*. The title of the temporale (fol. 88<sup>ra</sup>) is unreadable because of a later addition (see below), but it had the same wording. The Augustinian origin is also evident from the octave of St Augustine (4 Sept.), in the kalendar, the addition of his Translation (28 Febr.: *minus duplex*), his name in the collect *Satisfaciat* of the burial service, (fol. 319), and the statute preceding the Office of the Conception(?) of Our Lady (fol. 219), in which the feast of St Francis figures among the feasts of a lower rank.

About the middle of the 14th century, the book was into the hands of Franciscans, who completed the kalendar according to the latest changes of their sanctorale: the Translations of St Anthony of Padua (15 Febr.), St Francis (25 May) and St Clare (2 Oct.)<sup>57</sup>, the octave of St Anthony (20 June),

<sup>55</sup> 'Notae quaedam', loc. cit., 124, note 16 (cod. Z); 128, no. 11.

<sup>56</sup> In the kalendar the name of St Bernard is original (1260); see *Franciscan Studies* ix, 1949, 27, note 5.

<sup>57</sup> This addition has been made before that of St Leger, who follows against the same date. It is the only positive proof that the Franciscans used the book before it came into the hands of others.

the feasts of St Clare (12 Aug.), St Louis bishop (19 Aug.) and the Stigmatisation of St Francis (17 Sept.).

Soon, however, the book changed hands again. The Carmelites added in the kalendar the feasts of Eliseus *confessoris et heremite ordinis* ||| (14 June), St Cyril *confessoris et heremite ordinis fratribus nostris* (sic, 16 March), the third Minister General (d. 1235), whose cult, as a doctor, was introduced in 1399, and St Albert *confessoris ordinis carmelis* (17 Aug.), who died in 1306. All these additions were probably made in southern France. They are contemporary with a series of feasts which, according to their origin, can be distinguished into three groups. In the centre of a large circle of saints mainly from the north of Spain:

- St Isidore, bishop of Sevilla (4 April)<sup>58</sup>,
- St Iusta & Rufina, virgins of Sevilla (19 July)<sup>59</sup>,
- St Eulalia, virgin & martyr of Barcelona (12 Febr.)<sup>60</sup>,
- St Narcissus, bishop of Gerona (29 Oct.)<sup>61</sup>,
- St Hermengaudius, bishop of Urgel (2 Nov.)<sup>62</sup>,
- Sts martyrs of Zaragossa (3 Nov.)<sup>63</sup>.

and from north and central France, there are feasts of the region Orange, Carpentras, Avignon, Arles, Uzès and, somewhat to the east, Lodève:

- St Florence, bishop of Orange (17 Oct.)<sup>64</sup>,
- St Siffred, bishop of Carpentras (27 Nov.)<sup>65</sup>,
- St Agricola, bishop of Avignon (3 Sept.)<sup>66</sup>,
- St Genesius, martyr of Arles (25 Aug.)<sup>67</sup>,
- St Firminus, bishop of Uzès (11 Oct.)<sup>68</sup>,
- St Fulcran, bishop of Lodève (13 Febr.)<sup>69</sup>.

A special study of the history of the friaries somewhere near the lower course of the Rhône may produce some more result<sup>70</sup>.

There are definite indications that this breviary was also used by the Hospitallers of St Anthony<sup>71</sup>. The Translation of St Anthony (17 March),

<sup>58</sup> MR, 124; BHL, 4482. — Cod.: *ysidori episc. & martiris*.

<sup>59</sup> MR 296. <sup>60</sup> MR 60. <sup>61</sup> MR 483.

<sup>62</sup> MR 493 and ASS, Nov. ii, 1, 77: 3 Nov.

<sup>63</sup> MR 493.

<sup>64</sup> Not in MR; BHL 3040.

<sup>65</sup> Not in MR; BHL 7703; 29 Nov.

<sup>66</sup> Not in MR, nor in BHL; see ASS, Sept. i, 444: 2 Sept.

<sup>67</sup> MR 359.

<sup>68</sup> MR 448.

<sup>69</sup> Not in MR; BHL 3207.

<sup>70</sup> For this purpose should be studied the additions in the upper margins of fol. 312v: *Fecit (?) ista fieri dominus Esinlerius (?) astarot*, and fol. 318v: *Magister carparien. [?] — Carpentoratensis] Catherina vostra cosina. Magister Iohannes adam mollier katherina (?)* — The Carmelitas may also be responsible for the additions of St Apollinaris (7 Febr.), St. Euphemia (13 April) and Marie Salome (21 Oct.).

<sup>71</sup> R. Graham, 'The Order of St-Antoins-de-Viennois and its English commendary' in *Archaeological Journal* lxxxiv (2nd Series xxxiv), 1927, 241 ff.; separately London 1930. Idem, 'A Picture-book of the life of St Anthony the Abbot, executed for the monastery of St-Antoine-de-Viennois in 1426' in *Archaeologia* lxxxiii, 1933.



undoubtedly refers to the so called third translation of the Father's relics from Constantinople to La Motte, later known as St-Antoine-de-Viennois, between Grenoble and Valence<sup>72</sup>. The feast could be the result of local devotion along the Rhône, so could his Invention (11 June)<sup>73</sup>. However, the correction in the title of the *temporale* is conclusive:

Ad honorem . . . Incipit breviarium ordinis fratrum /// (sancti antoni)-  
[i secundum] consuetudinem romane ecclesie.

The Antonines received monastic vows under Honorius III; the house of St-Antoine-de-Viennois became an Augustinian priory under Innocent IV in 1247; the Congregation was converted into an Order of Canons Regular with the Rule of St Augustine by Boniface VIII in 1297, who gave them the official name of *Fratres monasterii sancti Antonii*<sup>74</sup>. In the 14th century, when the papal court was at Avignon, they attended to a 'portable hospital' for court officials<sup>75</sup>. The breviaries of the Order are very scarce. Probably they were derived from those of the Austin Friars, who, in their turn, had adopted the books of the Franciscans. The manuscript under discussion served all these friars. And one of the many Carmelites, who disliked the reform of Sibert de Beka, seems to have been using it for a time. After this eventful existence the volume came back to the Friars Minor. How it came to Assisi will probably remain a mystery. To the best of my knowledge, it is not mentioned in the ancient inventories of the Sacro Convento.

Though this manuscript is not Franciscan in the sense that it was written for the friars<sup>76</sup>, it was copied from one of their pre-Haymonian breviaries. And in this exemplar some additions had already been made: a collect and lessons for St Francis and St Dominic in the sanctorale, the *tabula Parisiensis* (Pisa 1263)<sup>77</sup>, and the Haymonian litany of the saints; a certain number of rubrics were corrected or suppressed in consequence of Haymo's activity. — Mazzatinti, *Inventari dei manoscritti delle biblioteche d'Italia* iv, 1894—6, 118.

fol. 1<sup>a</sup>—3<sup>vb</sup>. [In nomine domini. amen.] /// de primo libro regum.  
[Surrexit] autem [Anna] post quam . . . accesserunt [filii prophete] tarum  
qui erant in Iheri.

Addition; lessons from i Reg. 1, 9 — iv Reg. 2, 5, completing the lack in the octave of Pentecost, where a marginal note reads (fol. 175<sup>rb</sup>): Require lectiones de primo libro in primo ///

fol. 4<sup>r</sup>—9<sup>v</sup>. Kalendar; see above. All feasts in black, except for the two added dedication feasts against 9 and 18 Nov. (statute of 1302).

<sup>72</sup> P. Noordeloos, 'La translation de St Antoine en Dauphiné' in *Analecta Bollandiana* lx, 1942, 68 ff.

<sup>73</sup> ASS Jan. ii, 150.

<sup>74</sup> Registres, ed. Digard, no. 2032 f.

<sup>75</sup> J. Haller, 'Zwei Aufzeichnungen über die Beamten der Curie im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert' in *Quellen und Forschungen aus Italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken* i, 1897, 21.

<sup>76</sup> The opposite though erroneous opinion was held by M. Bihl in AFH xxvi, 1933, 344, no. 2; AF x, p. xxii, no. 2.

<sup>77</sup> See above, 12 ff.

fol. 10<sup>ra</sup>—66<sup>rb</sup>. In primo nocturno ant. *Servite domino* [ps.] *Beatus vir qui non habiit . . . vitam eternam. Amen.*

Hexapla (Gallican) version of the ferial psalter with canticles and Creed; rubric in red.

fol. 66<sup>rb</sup>—68<sup>ra</sup>. Ant. *Ne reminiscaris domine . . . Kyrieleyson. Christeleyson. Christe audi nos . . . S. Iohannes baptista ora. bis. Omnes s. patriarche & prophete. orate. S. Petre. ora. bis. S. Paule. ora. bis. . . . S. Chaterina. ora. (S. Clara. S. Elysabeth.) . . . Ut dompnium apostolicum . . . digneris. te rogamus. bis . . .*

*Oremus pro ||| nostro . . . Omnipotens sempiterne deus miserere famulo tuo ||| nostro . . . et misericors dominus. Amen.*

Litany according to the Haymonian breviary but with relics of the pre-Haymonian version in the 4 repetitions indicated by the word *bis*; see C fol. 25<sup>ra</sup>. The two additions (in curves) are in a minute script. The erasures are long enough for the word *ministro*, written in full. — The litany is followed by 3 collects for the general Office of the dead.

fol. 68<sup>rb</sup>—78<sup>rb</sup>. *Primo dierum omnium quo mundus . . . Gloria et honor dei.*

Hymnal, divided into temporale, sanctorale and Common.

fol. 78<sup>va</sup>—81<sup>ra</sup>. De specialibus antiphonis laudum que ponuntur ante nativitatem domini fiat sicut in subscriptis tabulis continetur . . . ad magnificat ant. *Dum ortus fuerit.*

*Tabula Parisiensis*; see H fol. 126<sup>ra</sup>.

fol. 81<sup>ra</sup>—88<sup>ra</sup>. In festo sancte Helisabeth. Oratio *Tuorum corda . . . lectio .j. Beata Helysabeth filia regis hungarorum in palatio et in purpura . . .*<sup>78</sup>

Addition made by the Franciscans. Haymo's *Ordo breviarii* has no indication of lessons. The end of the 9th lesson is unreadable. A note on fol. 276<sup>vb</sup> refers to this addition.

fol. 88<sup>ra</sup>—197<sup>rb</sup>. Ad honorem omnipotentis dei et beatissime virginis Marie. Incipit breviarium ordinis fratrum ||| (sancti Antoni)[i secundum] consuetudinem romane ecclesie. Sabbato primo die adventu . . . *cui iratus est dominus usque in eternum.*

Temporale, the title of which has been discussed above. At the end is a more recent addition:

Sabbato ante adventum in subscriptum modum ab isto die usque ad vigiliam natalis domini ad vespervas ant. *Missus est Gabriel angelus cum reliquis [antiphonis] que dicuntur in laudibus . . .*

<sup>78</sup> BHL 2510<sup>b</sup> (Suppl.).

fol. 197<sup>va</sup>—202<sup>ra</sup>. Lectiones infra octavam assumptionis . . . In eadem festivitate super omeliam . . . Infra octavam nativitatis virginis . . . De sermone s. Augustini episcopi *Gratulare beata virgo* . . . Lectiones infra octavam *Ideo autem ceteris pretermisissis* . . .

Additions, made by the scribe of the Office of St. Elisabeth.

fol. 202<sup>ra</sup>—280<sup>ra</sup>. Incipit solempnitas sanctorum per anni circulum. In s. Saturnini oratio *Deus qui nos . . . cum palma martirii vite ianuam introibunt*.

Sanctorale, ending with the 9th lessons of St Catherine, a feast which does not figure in the pre-Haymonian breviary, but is added in virtue of the *Ordo breviarii*. There are also:

fol. 249<sup>va</sup>. In s. Dominici confessoris. oratio *Deus qui ecclesiam*<sup>79</sup> . . . lectio .j. *Beatus Dominicus predicatorum dux . . . oriundus fuit*. lectio .ij. *Decebat sane . . . uberius irrigaret*. lectio .iiij. *Huius mater . . . incendere videbatur*. lectio .iiij. *Quo prefigurabatur . . . probavit eventus*. lectio .v. *Volens quoque . . . umbra mortis sedent*. lectio .vj. *Veterum quod ipsis . . . dubium probaretur*<sup>80</sup>.

fol. 268<sup>vb</sup>. In s. Francisci. Oratio. *Deus qui ecclesiam* . . . lectio prima. *Beatus Franciscus de civitate Assisii ortus . . . annuntiat verbum dei*<sup>81</sup>.

fol. 280<sup>ra</sup>—291<sup>ra</sup>. Incipit sanctorale commune. In nataliciis apostolorum . . . *quatenus intentio maneat in occulto*.

Common of the Saints.

fol. 291<sup>ra</sup>—292<sup>ra</sup>. Statuimus quod fratres in sabbatis faciant officium semiduplex domine nostre. ita quod in die veneris in vesperis a capitula incipiatur. et non dicantur vespere consuete domine nostre. et in die sabbati post nonam terminetur. Et hoc observetur nisi in adventu et quadragesima et festis dupplicibus et semiduplicibus et aliqua responsoris propria habentibus et octabis solempnibus. et exceptis festivitibus sanctorum Fabiani & Sebastiani. sancti Vicentii. sancti Gregorii. et sancti Benedicti. sanctorum Gervasii & Protasii. et invencionis sancti Stephani et sancti Dominici. et Sixti et sancti Bernardi. et sanctorum Cosme & Damiani. Jeronimi presbiteri. sancti Francisci. Katherine. Ambrosii. Silvestri pape. Et fiat officium novem lectionum sicut com-

<sup>79</sup> The ancient version has been erased for the new one; see B. M. Reichert, 'Acta Capitulum Generalium' i, in *Monumenta Ordinis Praedicatorum* iii, Rome 1898, 29, var. 32 (Chapter of 1244), and van Dijk, 'Il carattere', loc. cit., 212, note 135.

<sup>80</sup> Lessons taken from the legend of Peter Ferrand in *Monumenta Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum* xiv. *Monumenta historica S. P. N. Dominici* fasc. 2, Rome 1935, p. 210 ff. (nos. 2, 3, 6), except for the last lesson which is from Jordan of Saxony, 'Libellus de principiis Ordinis Praedicatorum', op. cit., 74, no. 103.

<sup>81</sup> Six lessons from Th. of Celano's *Legende chori*; AF x, 118 ff., nos. 2—4.

pilatum est in capitulo generali parisius. tamen illius festi quod sabbato occurrerit fiat tantum nonam lectionem si habet proprium.

In vesperis beate Marie. capitulum *In omnibus requiem* hymnus *Ave maris* ¶ *Sancta dei genitrix virgo semper Maria* R̄ *Intercede* ad magnificat ant. *Ave regina celorum oratio* (291<sup>rb</sup>) *Deus qui virginalem.*

Invitatorium *Ave Maria gratia plena dominus tecum* ps. *Venite exultemus* hymnus *Quem terra.* In prima nocturno ant. *Emissiones tue paradisus* . . . ant. *Pons hortorum puteus aquarum viventium* . . . ant. *Veniat dilectus meus in ortum suum* . . . Lectio prima *Castissimum Marie virginis* . . . *non seminare.* R̄ *Missus est* . . . lectio secunda *Deus solus potest metere* . . . *colligo uni non spersi.* R̄ *Vidi speciosam* . . . lectio tertia *Dicat et Maria: Ego te* . . . *vidit Ezechiel propheta.* R̄ *Stirps Iesse* . . .

In secundo nocturno ant. *Sponsa* . . .

The last portion of the text is illegible. The origin of this office *De Beata* and the preceding statute have not been identified.

fol. 292<sup>ra</sup>—295<sup>ra</sup>. In dedicatione ecclesie ad vespervas ant. *Domum tuam domine* . . . ps. *Magnificat.* Oratio ut supra.

Common of the dedication, separated from the Common of the Saints by the insertion of the statute and Office just quoted.

fol. 295<sup>ra</sup>—301<sup>ra</sup>. Incipit officium beate Marie virginis secundum consuetudinem romane curie quod celebratur ad vespervas sabbati primi post pentecosten usque ad vespervas sabbati proximi ante adventum . . . et non dicimus orationem de apostolis et de pace.

Office of the Virgin; see O fol. 78<sup>va</sup>.

fol. 301<sup>r</sup>. Duplex officium agitur. In nativitate domini . . . et basilicarum Petri et Pauli.

List of double feasts; see O fol. 79<sup>vb</sup>.

fol. 301<sup>rb</sup>—305<sup>v</sup>. Incipit officium pro defunctis. Invitatorium *Regem cui* . . . Istud invitatorium dicitur tantum secundo die post festum omnium sanctorum et in obitu fratrum . . . flexis genibus cum psalmis et orationibus.

Office of the dead; see O fol. 80<sup>ra</sup>.

fol. 305<sup>v</sup>—307<sup>r</sup>. Incipit ordo [fratrum heremitarum ordinis sancti Augustini] ad visitandum infirmum secundum consuetudinem romane curie. In primis pulsetur campana parvula et fratres . . . *qui in trinitate perfecta* . . . *seculorum. Amen.*

fol. 307. Ordo ad communicandum infirmum. In primis pulsetur campana parvula et fratres . . . *ad remedium sempiternum. Per eundem.*



fol. 307<sup>v</sup>—319<sup>v</sup>. Incipit ordo commendationis anime. primo dicantur letanie breves in hunc modum . . . *domine resuscita me in novissi[mo]* ///

Pre-Haymonian version of the ritual of the Last Sacraments; see above. The words in curves have been erased. In the 3rd *Ordo* is space for musical notation which has not been written. The whole ends abruptly in the antiphon *De terra formasti*. For the collect *satisfaciat*, in the third *Ordo*, see above.

Assisi, biblioteca comunale, 693

Parchm.; 352 fol. of irregular size, about 260 × 185 mm; incomplete. The 37 remaining quires are each of 10 leaves, except for the nos. 24 and 37 with 6 leaves, 5, 18, 25 and 36 with 8 leaves, and 26 with 13 leaves. Beside a quire missing at the beginning and, at least, one at the end, there are leaves missing in quire 5, after fol. 40 and 48, in quire 24, after fol. 224 and 230, and in quire 36, after fol. 339 and 346. A blank leaf is cut out of quire 13, after fol. 123; the text, however, is complete. Another leaf is wanting after fol. 215 (quire 23), while 2 or 3 leaves are torn out of the middle of the last quire, after fol. 350. Catchwords are at the end of all quires, in most cases also an alphabetical numbering and or one in Roman figures.

The small but clear Italian handwriting, 2 col. of 56—8 lines, 190 × 130 mm circa, dates from before the mid-13th century. The great variety of hands, mostly changing at the beginning of the quires, indicates that this manuscript (like the following, no. 694) was copied in a scriptorium, where several scribes worked on separate quires. This explains the additional leaf in quire 26, where only the 1st column of fol. 252 has been used and the other three are left blank. The text ends with *cum tetigero munda sum: cum accepero virgo sum*. The 1st page of the subsequent quire, fol. 253<sup>ra</sup>, written in a different hand, begins with the words *cum accepero virgo sum*. The scribe of quire 26 needed more space than was provided for and indicated on the quire from which he copied.

The rubrics, which are always in red, as well as the initials, now alternately in red and blue, now only in red, change both in handwriting and style according to the quires. There is no relation with the hands of the texts. The divergences in the style are worth noting. In the 1st quire they are in red and blue but plain; in the quires 2 and 35 entirely missing; in the nos. 3—5, 14—20, 26—30 and in the 2nd half of 31 (fol. 21—49, 128—86, 240—52, 262—90, 297—300) all are in red but different in drawing. Those of the quires 7—8 are coloured like the letters in the 1st quire, but different in the flourishes; they differ also from those in the quires 9 and 11 (fol. 79—89, 99—109) which are drawn by an energetic and steady hand. The quires 12—3 (fol. 109—28), with fine and long hairlines along the text, are the best of the manuscript. These initials are very similar to those of quire 10; the latter, however, are weaker.

A similar variety of hands is to be noted in the musical notation. The staves (13 to a col.) coincide with the ruling of *lineae spissae* for the text. Beneventan notation is found in the quires: 1, 3, 21, 23—37; the first 2 quires are the most typical: 2 coloured lines with 1 or 2 clefs and catch notes. In quire 21 the coloured lines are missing. Here the notation is strongly influenced by the system of point-neum notation. The coloured lines are also missing in the quires 31

and 35 (fol. 290—9, 330—40). A fine but perfect square notation is to be found in the quires 421 (fol. 31—196). The music of the 2nd quire is missing; that of no. 22 has been added. Attention may be drawn to fol. 275<sup>vb</sup>; in the resp. *Hic est precursor* the Beneventan neums are corrected with square notes.

A great number of marginal notes suggest that the manuscript (as well as no. 694) was used as an exemplar for the copying of other breviaries. First, in the quires 16—21 (fol. 148—95) there are critical notes on the text of the lessons. Many have been erased but enough material remains for a special study. A few examples may show their character:

fol. 156<sup>v</sup>: homily of St Augustine: *Domini ista verba*<sup>82</sup>:

text	notes
sed docti spiritus	m. l. docti spiritu et ii de assisio ut puto
quamlibet lucidum vel speciosum. corpus tamen	iii <sup>j</sup> <sup>or</sup> ac speciosum et ante non habent quamlibet lucidum
sed quia sic cogitat	m. l. sed quasi sic cogitat
ipse autem a nemine diiudicati.	tres iudicari alius abundari
per speculum ex (parte) percipit	m. l. et primus (assisio) perspicit
et ipse qui annuntiat. Vel tunc	m. l. non vel nec est ibi versus faciendum

Other critical notes occur, for instance, on fol. 68<sup>va</sup>, line 2, where a sign after the words *procul dubio* refers to an addition in the upper margin: *a procul dubio dimisi acquiratis exemplar*. Some 15 lines lower the same hand noted in the margin: *dimitte hic spatium pro isto toto quousque habebitur exemplar*. The same hand, moreover, often noted in the margins of the lessons: *usque huc*, especially in the quires 8—12 (fol. 41—109).

In the sanctorale marginal additions indicate the development of the Franciscan kalendar; on fol. 273<sup>r</sup> in the upper margin is: *Hic scribatur de sancto Antonio confessore*, to which another added: *de ordine minorum*; on fol. 293<sup>ra</sup>: *Hic dimittis spatium pro festo sancti Dominici*; on fol. 294<sup>rb</sup>: *pro sancto Romano .j. lectio*; on fol. 298<sup>va</sup>: *Hic scribatur de sancta Clara*; on fol. 304<sup>va</sup>: *pro sancto Lodovico*; on fol. 321<sup>va</sup>: *Hic scribatur de beato Francisco*; on fol. 335<sup>rb</sup>: *De sancta Caterina*.

Other additions, intended for further copying, are scribe at the beginning of the lessons (fol. 252—62, 270—80) or *non scribe* (fol. 256<sup>ra</sup>, 270<sup>rb</sup>, 275<sup>va</sup>) and the faint note at the foot of fol. 233<sup>r</sup>: *Scribe de Daniele unam lectionem sicut est usque In anno secundo regis vel duas lectiones si videris*.

Some marginal additions are due to the correction of Haymo of Faversham. Such are a *vacat* at the side of the text, Haymo's rubrics in the margins and the two notes: *Ista rubrica non stat secundum modum novum* (277<sup>vb</sup>) and: *Istam rubricam tantum scribe et non plus* (326<sup>ra</sup>).

Two pieces of grey cardboard protect this precious manuscript which was written, most probably in Assisi. The inventory of the Sacro Convento there, drawn up in 1381, records under no. dxxxv<sup>83</sup>:

<sup>82</sup> PL 35, 1896 ff.

<sup>83</sup> L. Alessandri, 'Inventario dell'antica biblioteca del Sacro Convento di san Francesco in Assisi', Assisi 1906, 135.

Breviarium completum magnum et grossissimum cum notis per totum. absque psalterio. Cum postibus. Cuius principium est. *Ad honorem omnipotentis dei. et beatissime virginis. Incipit breviarium ordinis fratrum minorum. secundum consuetudinem romane ecclesie.* Finis vero R̄ *Peccantem me cotidie. et non me penitentem.* In quo libro omnes quaterni sunt. R̄.

Because of the missing first quire which is identical to that of MS 694 in the same library, the editor of the inventory failed to identify this description with the manuscript under discussion. However, the last words of the last page and the description as a whole correspond, though the qualification *grossissimum* in somewhat exaggerated. In the lower margin of what actually is the first folio, on 18th-century note reads: *Breviarium anti[quum de] sancto Francisco cuius |||| diligenter custodiendum. Antiphone in cantu notatae.* In the same margin is the modern shelf-mark in pencil.

This "rubricated and noted choir breviary" without a hymnal or psalter represents the original prototype of the pre-Haymonian breviary. All responsories, antiphons and versicles have musical notation, occasionally with *Evovae*. Notwithstanding the dose ruling of *lineae spissae* and the consequently small script, the lessons, collects and chapters are in a slightly larger character than the rubrics and the texts without notation. The lessons contain the whole text of Holy Scripture, sermons and homilies. More recent hands have curtailed them by marginal notes (*finis, usque huc, hic incipe*) to about a third of a quarter of their original length. The punctuation is often thoroughly corrected. — Mazzatinti, op. cit., iv, 136.

fol. 1<sup>ra</sup>—238<sup>ra</sup>. . . [*intra*]bit assirius egiptum; et egiptus in assirios et servient . . . et timuit me. et a facie |||

Temporale, beginning abruptly in the first lesson at matins of Wednesday in the 2nd weeks of Advent, Is. 19, 23, and ending with the lessons of Holy Scripture for August—November and the corresponding responsories, fol. 196 ff. The first responsory of Easter matins, fol. 128<sup>va</sup>, begins with a large initial in black and red.

fol. 238. [1.] In omnibus festivitatis que in sabbatis veniunt . . .

[2.] Si festum trium lectionum in dominica venerit . . .

[3.] De omnibus vigiliis in quibus ieiunium celebramus . . .

[4.] Sciendum est quod oratio *A cunctis* . . .

[5.] Sciendum est quod quandocumque aliqua festivitas . . .

[6.] Item si aliquod festum commutatur de uno die ad alium . . .

[7.] Nota quod si festum occurrerit sequenti die . . .

[8.] Nota quod quandocumque est festum duplex . . .

[9.] Et notandum est quod quando aliqua festivitas alicuius sancti . . .

[10.] Adventus domini celebratur ubicumque . . .

General rubrics of breviary and missal; see O fol. 51<sup>rb</sup>. They are followed by a more recent addition: *Semper mors et passio christi sit in corde tuo et quanto ipse sustinuit* . . . Half of col. 238<sup>rb</sup> remained blank.

fol. 239<sup>r</sup>. R̃ 4. *Nos alium deum nescimus . . .* 5. R̃ *Dominator domine . . .*  
6. R̃ *Domine deus qui conteris . . . non tacebunt laudare nomen domini.*

Part of the historical responsories and antiphones for the last months of the liturgical year. Addition made by a scribe, who noted in the upper margin of fol. 216<sup>r</sup> (quire 23): *Hic deficit carta quod principium est* *Nos alium etc.*, to which another added: *Require infra in principio*, and a third one: .3. *sisterni*. Minute script in long lines.

fol. 239<sup>r</sup>. 1. In anno illo quo nativitas domini in dominica venerit. feria 4 tercię ebdomade . . . Feria .v. Vigilia. *Iudea*.

Shortened version of the *tabula Parisiensis*; see H fol. 126<sup>ra</sup>. Addition made by the same scribe; text in 3 col.

fol. 239<sup>r</sup>. Adventus domini celebratur ubicumque dominicus dies . . . commune sanctorum et incipitur a secundo responsoria.

First half of the general rubrics of the *Ordo breviarii*; see H fol. 125<sup>ra</sup>. Addition, as above, in 2 col.

fol. 239<sup>va</sup>. In sancti Ygnatii episcopi et martiris. prima lectio *Tempore Terentiani imperatoris durus in christianos persecutionis impetus . . . xv kalendas ianuarii delate*<sup>84</sup>.

Addition by a later hand, made perhaps in consequence of a statute of the Chapter of 1254, prescribing the feast of St Ignatius (1 Febr.) to be celebrated with 9 lessons<sup>85</sup>. The ones here given are foreign to the tradition of the Franciscan breviary.

fol. 239<sup>vb</sup>. Ista sunt aliqua verba a sanctis patribus instituta. Omni desiderio et corporis affectu servias infirmis fratribus sicut vellent (sic) tibi serviri et cum sacerdotibus in missis sollicitę et devote. non tantum semel in die . . . recreari una cum sanctis sanctus erit.

Addition in a heavy negligent handwriting.

fol. 240<sup>ra</sup>—335<sup>rb</sup>. Incipiunt festivitates sanctorum per [totum annum]. In festo sancti Saturnini. [ad vesp̄as capitulum hymnus et antiphone ad magnificat de uno martire. Oratio] *Deus qui nos . . . intercessione liberemur. Per.*

Sanctorale, ending with the collect of St Grisogonus. The words in brackets have been erased and the text of the *Ordo breviarii* substituted; there are several corrections at the beginning of this Proper, all by the same hand. Fol. 251, originally blank; the scribe of the addition on fol. 239<sup>vb</sup> wrote: *Eia Mater fons amoris me sentire vim doloris. Stabat mater dolorosa . . . Eia mater fons amoris*<sup>86</sup>. After this 'lauda' of Jacopone of Todi follows another addition:

<sup>84</sup> Not in BHL.

<sup>85</sup> van Dijk, 'Notae quaedam', loc. cit., 133.

<sup>86</sup> Chevalier, 19416.



*Si quis adoraverit bestiam* . . .<sup>87</sup>. The verso of this leaf was used, after 1269, for a portion of a Franciscan kalendar.

fol. 335<sup>ra</sup>—351<sup>ra</sup>. In natali apostolorum. Ad vespervas. Capitulum [F]ratres iam non estis . . . que est christo. In corpore vir //

Common of the Saints, ending abruptly in the 3rd lesson at matins of the Common of the virgins, i. e. in St Augustine's *Que sunt decem virgines*.

fol. 351<sup>ra</sup>—352<sup>rb</sup>. [Incipit officium beate Marie virginis secundum consuetudinem romane curie. quod celebratur ad vespervas sabbati] primi post pentecosten usque ad vesperum sabbati proximi . . . et non dicimus oratio[nem] de apostolis. et de pace.

Office of the Virgin, incomplete because of some leaves missing after fol. 350. The missing text has been completed from MS. 611 in the same library; see O fol. 78<sup>va</sup>.

fol. 352<sup>rb</sup>. Duplex officium agitur. In nativitate domini . . . et basilicarum Petri et Pauli.

List of double feasts; see O fol. 79<sup>vb</sup>.

fol. 352<sup>rb</sup>—353<sup>vb</sup>. Incipit officium pro defunctis. [Invitatorium] *Regem cui omnia vivunt. Venite adoremus*. Istud invitatorium dicitur secundo die post festum omnium sanctorum et in obitu fratrum. In aliis diebus non dicitur. In primo nocturno . . . *Peccantem me cotidie . . . et salva me //*

Office of the dead; incomplete. See O fol. 80<sup>va</sup>.

#### Assisi, biblioteca comunale, 694

Parchm.; 259 fol. of the same size, handwritings and working as those of the preceding manuscript, 693, except for the initials which are all in red up to fol. 231. A quire is missing after fol. 40, the text on fol. 41<sup>ra</sup> begins in the lessons in the octave of the Epiphany: *in oriente vidisse*. Alius sermo s. Leonis *Celebrato proximo die*. Several quires are wanting after fol. 209; the hiatus ranges from the lessons of September to the 3rd responsory at matins of Sts Peter & Paul. Another quire is lacking after fol. 219, the text continues here in the last lesson of the first nocturn of the Assumption. A leaf has been cut out after fol. 130; the text is complete. Some of the missing parts appear to have been lost in the 14th century (see also MS. 693), when somebody wrote in the lower margin of fol. 219<sup>v</sup>: *Hic deficit unus sexternus*. The first leaf of the last quire bears the name *Monaldus* in the lower margin.

The critical notes are more numerous and varied than in MS 693. On fol. 48<sup>va</sup> is mentioned an *originale sancti Benedicti*, probably the nearby Benedictine monastery of the slope of Mount Subasio. Several authorities too are quoted:

<sup>87</sup> Apoc. 14, 9—11.

fol. 87<sup>rb</sup>: *Montanus* and *Julianus*, fol. 94<sup>ra</sup>: *Iohannes* and *Dama[s]us* (?). The abbreviations occurring are: *Lau. ma*; *m. et lau*; *m. lau* (see *m. l.* in MS. 693) and, on fol. 118, *angti*, *agti*; *āg*.

This manuscript, like MS 693, has been used as an exemplar for the copying of other breviaries. From fol. 131<sup>va</sup> several rubrics have a *va—cat* in the margin; each time the version of Haymo has been added. Other indications are: fol. 241<sup>ra</sup>: *Hic debet scribi lectio s. Francisci*; fol. 242<sup>vb</sup>: *In festo omnium sanctorum scribantur antiphone et responsoria omnia*. The word *finis* has also the variants: *non plus (scribas)* (fol. 130<sup>v</sup>, 132<sup>rb</sup>, 151<sup>rb</sup>) or *Usque hic scribatur* (fol. 255<sup>rb</sup>) and *alia scribe* (fol. 233<sup>va</sup>, 234<sup>rb</sup>). — Mazzatinti, op. cit., iv, 136; Alessandri, loc. cit.

fol. 1<sup>ra</sup>. + Sancti spiritus adsit nobis gratia.

Ad honorem omnipotentis dei et beatissime virginis. Incipit breviarium ordinis minorum fratrum: secundum consuetudinem Sanctae Romane ecclesie. Alleluia. alleluia. alleluia. Sabbato de adventu. Ad vespas capitulum. *Fratres scientes* . . .

Beginning of the temporale; see MS 693.

fol. 255<sup>rb</sup>. In natalicii apostolorum. ad vespas capitulum *Fratres iam non estis* . . .

Beginning of the Common; only 4 leaves remain of this part which ends after the second vespers of the apostles.

### Besançon, bibliothèque municipale, 58

Parchm.; 632 leaves, 121 × 92 mm. A 16th-century numbering in red begins again with fol. 1 on the first leaf of the psalter, fol. 258. From the sanctorale onwards, fol. 342, there is a well preserved original numbering of the quires, placed in the centre of the lower margins.

Various handwritings mostly French of the 13th and 14th centuries, the bulk of the breviary being written in a small and neat character of the late 13th century; 2 col. of 32 lines, 88 × 73 mm. Initials here alternately in red and blue, flourished; fine drawings in blue, brown, red and gold; grotesques.

The binding dates from the 15th century; stamped brown leather on wooden boards, 5 cords in the spine. The tooling is identical with that of MS 59 in the same library which is a Franciscan breviary of Dole. They were bound by *Jo[hannes] de Puteo*, whose name occurs twice on the back cover. The 14th-century additions in the second kalendar, fol. 254<sup>v</sup>, indicate that this breviary was used in the friaries of Dole and Besançon<sup>88</sup>.

On the whole the content of this breviary is in accordance with the *Ordo breviarii*. However, the Offices of the Virgin and of the dead, and the ritual

<sup>88</sup> Sts Ferriolus & Ferrucius, martyrs of Besançon (16 June), see MR 239; St Antidius, bishop and martyr of the same city (17 June), see MR 255; 25 June, and BHL 566: 17 and 25 June. On fol. 632 is an almost illegible note in the margin: *vj<sup>a</sup> vel vij<sup>a</sup> februarii m. cccc. xliiij dixit S. Co. mi[chi?] bisuntij de morte* . . .

of the Last Sacraments have been copied from a pre-Haymonian breviary<sup>89</sup>. Even in the Franciscan Offices there are a few details which differ from those prescribed by Haymo. There are no Franciscan saints in the hymnal. Their hymns are to be found in the Offices themselves. The Office of St Francis, like that of St Anthony, is on its place in the sanctorale, fol. 476—501<sup>90</sup>, but it was added either by the scribe or by another similar hand. The addition is carefully made and includes parts of the previous and following feasts. The whole seems to have been rewritten together with and because of the newly published lessons of St Bonaventure's *Legenda Minor* (1260—3). In the 3rd nocturn, however, there still is the peculiar homily *Apostolus sanctus loquitur*<sup>91</sup>, ascribed to St Jerome, on the gospel of the Mass of St Francis *Confiteor tibi pater*. The book seems to be copied from a privately corrected exemplar. — V. Leroquais, *Les bréviaires des bibliothèques publiques de France* i, Paris 1934, 122 f.

fol. 1—7. Kalendar, 14th-century addition; St Anthony by a still later hand.

fol. 7<sup>ra</sup>—261<sup>vb</sup>. In nomine domini. Incipit ordo breviarii . . .

Temporale; see H fol. 128<sup>rb</sup>.

fol. 252<sup>r</sup>—258<sup>ra</sup>. Second kalendar in red, blue and black; see above.

fol. 258<sup>ra</sup>—304<sup>ra</sup>. Ant. *Servite domini*. ps. David *Beatus vir qui non abiit* . . .

Order of the ferial psalter, ending with the *Te deum*. Only the opening words of each psalm verse have been written.

fol. 304<sup>ra</sup>—306<sup>ra</sup>. *Kyrieleyson. Christeleyson* . . . *Oremus pro ministro nostro . . . et misericors dominus. Amen.*

Litany as in the breviaries founded on the *Ordo breviarii*.

fol. 306<sup>ra</sup>—317<sup>vb</sup>. Incipit hymnarium per totum annum. In dominicis diebus a kalendis octobris . . . *per immense secula. Amen.*

Hymnal without Franciscan saints.

fol. 318<sup>ra</sup>—341<sup>rb</sup>. In nativitate domini. prefatio *Eterne deus. Quia per incarnati* . . . In nativitate domin officium *Puer natus est nobis* . . .

Votive and festive missal with *Requiem* Masses and Common of the Saints, followed by some additions of less importance. On fol. 328 is the votive Mass of St Francis according to the *Ordo missalis*: Intr. *Os iusti*<sup>92</sup>.

<sup>89</sup> The Haymonian version of the *Ordo* of the Office of the dead has been added on fol. 574<sup>va</sup>—575<sup>vb</sup> (incompl.); the 1st rubric of Haymo's Lady Office is on fol. 631<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>90</sup> The composers of some parts of the Office are quoted in the rubrics; see AF x, p. xlviii, note 2.

<sup>91</sup> Also to be found in the 14th-century breviary, used by the venerable John of Stroncone, in the bibliotheca comunale of Perugia, 1038 (M 61), fol. 217 ff.

<sup>92</sup> See van Dijk, 'Il carattere', loc. cit., 211.

fol. 342<sup>ra</sup>—522<sup>ra</sup> Incipiunt festivitates per anni circulum. In s. Saturni martiris. Oratio *Deus qui nos . . .*

Sanctorale; see H fol. 152<sup>va</sup>.

fol. 522<sup>ra</sup>—547<sup>vb</sup>. In natalicijs apostolorum ad vespervas capitulum *Fratres iam non estis . . . domus dei et porta celi.*

Common of the Saints; see H fol. 163<sup>vb</sup>.

fol. 547<sup>vb</sup>—551<sup>va</sup>. De beata Maria. *Domine labia mea aperies . . . et non dicimus orationem de apostolis et de pace.*

Pre-Haymonian version of the Lady Office; see O fol. 78<sup>va</sup>. Except for the lessons, all texts have been abbreviated, almost as in an Ordinary.

fol. 551<sup>va</sup>. Duplex officium agitur . . . et basilicarum Petri et Pauli.

Pre-Haymonian list of double feasts; see O fol. 79<sup>vb</sup>.

fol. 551<sup>va</sup>—554<sup>vb</sup>. Incipit officium pro defunctis. Invitatorium *Regem cui omnia . . .* Istud invitatorium dicitur secundo die post festum omnium sanctorum . . . flexis genibus cum psalmis et orationibus.

In die depositionis defuncti Oratio *Deus cui proprium . . . Inclina domine . . . Quesumus domine ut animam . . .*

Pre-Haymonian version of the Office of the dead; see O fol. 80<sup>ra</sup>.

fol. 554<sup>vb</sup>—556<sup>ra</sup>. Ordo fratrum minorum secundum consuetudinem romane ecclesie ad visitandum infirmum. In primis pulsetur campana parvula et fratres . . . Post hec stupa proiciatur in ignem.

fol. 556<sup>ra</sup>—556<sup>va</sup>. Ordo ad communicandum infirmum. In primis pulsetur campana parvula et fratres . . . *ad remedium sempiternum. Per eundem.*

fol. 556<sup>va</sup>—561<sup>vb</sup>. Ordo commendationis anime. Primum fiant letanie in hunc modum. *Kyrieleyson . . . pietatis absterge. Per christum dominum.*

Pre-Haymonian version of the ritual of the Last Sacraments; see C fol. ccx<sup>rb</sup>, and Assisi, 611, fol. 305<sup>v</sup> ff.

fol. 562<sup>ra</sup>—578<sup>va</sup>. Incipit vita b. Clare lectio .j. *Venerabilis Christi sponse deoque dicte virginis Clare . . . per infinita secula seculorum. Amen*<sup>93</sup>.

Addition; 2 series of 9 lessons for the feast of St Clare (12 Aug.).

fol. 568<sup>va</sup>—572<sup>rb</sup>. Sancte Elisabeth. lectio .j. *Vas admirabilis opus excelsi . . . regnemus in celis. Amen*<sup>94</sup>.

<sup>93</sup> Ed. M. Bihl in AFH vii, 1914, 39 ff. See van Dijk, 'Il culto liturgico' op. cit.,

<sup>94</sup> BHL 2510; see Suppl. 2510.



Addition; lessons for the feast of St Elisabeth of Hungary (19 Nov.); the *Ordo breviarii* does not give any lessons for this feast.

fol. 572<sup>rb</sup>—572<sup>vb</sup>. In natale sancti Ignatii. *Nathale* |||| ... *in cimiterio ecclesie xv kalendas ianuarii delate*.

Addition; 3 lessons of St Ignatius martyr (1. Febr.) not to be found in the *Ordo breviarii*. Incomplete, a piece of this leaf being torn off.

fol. 573<sup>ra</sup>—574<sup>va</sup>. Adventus domini celebratur ubicumque ... antiphona maiores scilicet *O sapientia*.

Addition; general rubrics of the *Ordo breviarii*; see H fol. 125<sup>ra</sup>. St Anthony of Padua is twice referred to as St Antoninus.

fol. 574<sup>ra</sup>—575<sup>vb</sup>. Incipit officium in agenda mortuorum. Notandum quod officium defunctorum non agitur secundum consuetudinem romane curie ...

Addition, order of the Office of the dead according to the *Ordo breviarii*; see H fol. 166<sup>va</sup>. Ending incomplete on fol. 574<sup>vb</sup>; another hand continued on fol. 575.

fol. 575<sup>rb</sup>—576<sup>ra</sup>. Tabula nova pro officio mensis septembris. Quando .a. currit pro domina sic debent poni historie. Tunc enim mensis septembris ... In quarta ponitur Iudith et infra ebdomadam.

Addition; rubric for the lessons and responsories in September, different from that of fol. 630<sup>rb</sup>.

fol. 576<sup>ra</sup>—578<sup>rb</sup>. In anno illo in quo nativitas domini ... ad benedictus ant. *Orietur* ad magnificat ant. *Dum ortus*.

Addition; *tabula Parisiensis*; see H fol. 126<sup>ra</sup>. From fol. 577 onwards it seems to have been written by the scribe of the breviary.

fol. 580<sup>ra</sup>—593<sup>rb</sup>. Incipit officium de corpore Christi ad primas vespervas ant. *Sacerdos in eternum* ... lectio prima *Immensa divine largitatis beneficia* ...

Incipit officium misse de corpore Christi. Intr. *Cibavit eos* ...

Addition; Office and Mass of Corpus Christi, prescribed by the general Chapter of Marseilles in 1319<sup>95</sup>, and written by an Italian hand. It is followed by the new chapters of the Office of St Anthony of Padua, published by the Chapter of Toulouse in 1307<sup>96</sup>.

<sup>95</sup> Glassberger, 'Chronica' op. cit., 125; AFH xxiii, 1930, 121, no. 1; see also the Chapter of Perugia (1322), loc. cit., 125, no. 11. For the delay of the execution of the bull *Transiturus* see A. Lazarini, 'La mancata effettuazione della bolla "Transiturus"' (1264) in *Archivio storico italiano* cx, 1952, 205 ff.

<sup>96</sup> See van Dijk, 'Il carattere', loc. cit., 357, where the date should be corrected.

fol. 594<sup>ra</sup>—597<sup>ra</sup>. De trinitate. Ad vespervas ant. *Sedenti super solium* . . .<sup>97</sup>. De trinitate sancti Augustini lectio .j. *Confitemur et credimus sanctam atque ineffabilem trinitatem* . . .<sup>98</sup>

Addition; Office of the holy Trinity, composed by John Pecham and prescribed by the Chapter of Marseilles in 1343<sup>99</sup>.

fol. 597<sup>ra</sup>. Ludovici regis (sic) Ad vespervas ant. *Tecum principium* . . .<sup>100</sup>

Addition; rythmical Office of St Louis bishop (19 Aug.), canonised in 1317. The feast was imposed by the Chapter of Marseilles in 1319<sup>101</sup> but the Office, composed by his brother king Robert, was not prescribed before 1343<sup>102</sup>.

fol. 602<sup>ra</sup>. In transitu sancti Francisci. lectio .j. *Christo igitur iam cruci vir dei confixus* . . .

Addition; series of lessons, taken from the *Legenda Minor* of St Bonaventure<sup>103</sup>.

fol. 604<sup>ra</sup>. In festo nivis. Ad vespervas ant. *Dum esset rex* . . . lectio .j. *Cum omnium sanctorum venerentiam* [= reverentiam] *christianorum devotio* . . .<sup>104</sup>.

Addition; Office for the feast of Our Lady of the Snows (5 Aug.), prescribed by the Chapter of Genoa in 1302<sup>105</sup>.

fol. 605<sup>vb</sup>. In sancte Clare ad vespervas ant. *Iam sancte Clare claritas* . . .<sup>106</sup>

Addition; rythmical Office of St Clare (12 Aug.); for the lessons see fol. 562<sup>ra</sup>.

fol. 607<sup>vb</sup>. De stigmatibus beati Francisci. Ad vespervas [ant.] *Crucis vox hunc alloquitur* . . .<sup>107</sup>

Addition; rythmical Office of the Stigmas of St Francis (17 Sept.), instituted probably at the Chapter of Cahors; no lessons.

<sup>97</sup> Chevalier, 18779; ed. W. Lampen in *La France franciscaine* xi, 1928, 211.

<sup>98</sup> PL 12, 959; ascribed to Eusebius of Vercelli.

<sup>99</sup> Glassberger, op. cit., 182; D. de Gubernatis, 'Orbis seraphicus' iii, Rome 1684, 27.

<sup>100</sup> Chevalier, 20264.

<sup>101</sup> Glassberger, op. cit., 125; AFH xxiii, 1930, 121, no. 3; see also the Chapter of Perugia (1322) in AFH, loc. cit., 125, no. 10.

<sup>102</sup> Glassberger, op. cit., 182.

<sup>103</sup> AF x, 675, no. 7.

<sup>104</sup> 'Florilegium' in *Bibliotheca Casinatensis* i, Montecassino 1873, 254.

<sup>105</sup> MF xxxv, 1935, 238.

<sup>106</sup> Chevalier, 9372. For the origin and early history of this Office see van Dijk, 'Il culto liturgico', op. cit.

<sup>107</sup> Ed. W. Lampen, 'La liturgia delle sacre Stimate' in *Studi francescani* x, 1924, 95 ff.

fol. 608<sup>vb</sup>. [De s. Dominico. Lectio prima] *Beatus Dominicus predicatorum dux . . . incarnationis millesimo cc<sup>o</sup>xxj<sup>o</sup>* [sic.]<sup>108</sup>

Addition; lessons for St Dominic (5 Aug.) according to the *Ordo breviarii*. In the sanctorale (fol. 435<sup>va</sup>), there is only the collect (*meritis et doctrinis*). The lessons end on fol. 611<sup>ra</sup> and are followed by psalms and lessons written by later hands; on fol. 616<sup>v</sup>—617<sup>r</sup>, in the handwriting of fol. 594 ff., is the the *tabula Parisiensis*, see H fol. 126<sup>ra</sup>, which again is followed by other psalms and lessons.

fol. 622<sup>ra</sup>. In festo visitationis beate Marie. Ad vespas ant. *Accedunt laudes virgines . . .*<sup>109</sup> lectio prima *Beatissima virgo a suis priordiis consecrata domino . . .*

Addition; rhythmical Office of Adam Easton (d. 1397) with lessons for the feast of the Visitation (2 July). As a feast of the universal Church it dates from 1389<sup>110</sup>.

fol. 625<sup>vb</sup>. In vigilia inventionis sancte crucis. Ad vespas ant. *Helena Constantini mater . . . lectio prima Anno ducentesimo tricesimo sexto a destructione Ierusalem . . .*<sup>111</sup>.

Addition; proper Office for the Invention of the holy Cross (3 May), composed probably by Peter Amelius by order of Gregory xi in 1377<sup>112</sup>.

fol. 629<sup>ra</sup>. De sancto Antonio de Padua [lectio] *Instabat autem eo tempore fratrum capitulum generale . . . ex inopinato rei ||*

Addition; continuation of the lessons for St Anthony the beginning of which is to be found in the sanctorale: *In yspanis civitate Ulixbona*<sup>113</sup>. On fol. 397<sup>rb</sup> is a marginal note referring to this addition. Two or three leaves are missing.

fol. 630<sup>rb</sup>. Incipit tabula nova historiarum septembris ponendarum facta per dominum Bonifacium papam VIII. In anno illo quo kalende septembris die dominico venerit . . . proximo sequente ponitur liber Hester.

Addition; rubric for the lessons of Holy Scripture during September; see H fol. 128<sup>rb</sup>.

fol. 631<sup>v</sup>. [Ant.] *En vernant rutila . . . ¶ Eterna fac cum sanctis tuis. R In gloria munerari. Oremus. Devocionem nostram quesumus . . . tuorum*

<sup>108</sup> BHL 76; ed. in *Monumenta Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum* xvi; see above 31, note 3.

<sup>109</sup> Chevalier, 76.

<sup>110</sup> See Leroquais, 'Les bréviaires' ii, 435; Glassberger, op. cit., 219, 224 f., 274, 279, 305.

<sup>111</sup> The lessons may be related to those mentioned in BHL 4169; see Supplement.

<sup>112</sup> G. Mercati, 'Appunti per le storia del breviario romano nei secoli xiv—xv, tratti dalle 'Rubricae novae' in *Rassegna Gregoriana* ii, 1903. 424 ff.

<sup>113</sup> BHL 592.

*Ludovici episcopi Anthonij presbiteri ac Bernardini confessoris et beate Clare virginis devote commemoratione letificas . . .*

Addition; commemoration of Franciscan saints, followed by the title and introductory rubric of the Lady Office according to the *Ordo breviarii*; see H fol. 165<sup>ra</sup>.

fol. 632<sup>r</sup>. [Ad matutinum ant.] *Gloriosi principes terre* [ant.] *Hic vir in vanitatibus* [ant.] *Quasi secus alveum* [ant.] *Ludovicus equitatis* [ant.] *Hec una de prudentibus*.

Ad vespervas [ant.] *Petrus apostolus* [ant.] *Franciscus vir . . .*

Ad matutinum [ant.] *Sanctus Franciscus previus . . .*

Ad vespervas [ant.] *Cepit sub Innocentio . . .*

Ad matutinum [ant.] *Hinc predicando . . .*

Addition; written in the hand of fol. 632 ff. Commemorations of the apostles, Sts Francis, Anthony, Louis king and Clare. The antiphons of the Franciscan saints have been taken from their Offices in this order: 1st ant. of the 1st nocturn, 1st ant. of the 1st vespers, 1st ant. of lauds, 2nd ant. of the 1st vespers, 2nd ant. of lauds.

S. J. P. VAN DIJK, O. F. M.

*Oxford*



GULIELMI DE WARE, O. F. M.  
DOCTRINA PHILOSOPHICA  
PER SUMMA CAPITA PROPOSITA

(Continuatio)\*

IV. Problemata ontologica.

Cum Gulielmus de Ware quaestiones super *Metaphysicam* Aristotelis magna cum probabilitate non scripserit, vel si scripserit, tales quaestiones adhuc ignotae lateant, mens sua de ontologia in integrum restitui nequit. Ex problematibus huc spectantibus solummodo quaestionem de distinctione inter essentiam et existentiam examinat solvitque ex professo, de principio vero individuationis occasione alterius quaestionis loquitur. De proprietatibus transcendentalibus entis solum illa pauca inveniuntur quae partim iam citavimus partim vero infra afferemus. Ex praedicamentis autem quaestio nonnisi de relatione instituitur, de qua Noster multa quidem disserit, sed quaenam sua sententia definita sit cum certitudine determinare non permittit.

I. Distinctio formalis inter esse et essentiam.

Circa agitatum problema de relatione actualis existentiae creaturae ad suam essentiam Doctor Fundatus tres novit opiniones<sup>55</sup>: prima harum asserit "quod esse super essentiam non dicit quid absolutum, immo idem sunt realiter, sicut currere et cursus, vivere et vita idem dicunt" (Q. 45, f. 38r). Iuxta aliam econtra "esse actualis existentiae est aliud ab essentia, ita quod esse dicit aliquid impressum in ipsa essentia, sicut albedo in subiecto" (*Ibidem*). Tertia est opinio Henrici Gandavensis<sup>56</sup> qui, ut notum est, via quasi media procedens, inter essentiam et actualem existentiam distinctionem intentionis assignavit. Hanc ultimam positionem Noster accurate describit simul cum definitioni-

\* See *Franciscan Studies* vol. 14 (1954) pp. 155—180.

<sup>55</sup> Varias de hoc problemate opiniones vide apud E. Hocedez, *Aegidii Romani Theoremata de esse et essentia* (Museum Lessianum. — Section Philosophique N. 12), Louvain 1930, pp. 17\*—27\*.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. *Quodl.* I, q. 9 (I, ff. 101r—11v), *Quodl.* III, q. 9 (I, ff. 98v—100r), *Quodl.* X, q. 7 (II, ff. 152v—159v).

bus, divisionibus, argumentis et exemplis Doctoris Solemnis: "Propter hoc est alia opinio Gandavensis, quod esse non differt realiter ab essentia; ubi quinque sunt videnda..." (f. 38v).

Iam ab initio quaestionis apparet quod Noster distinctionem realem inter essentiam et esse non admittit, qua de causa rationes Henrici contra positionem Aegidii Romani<sup>57</sup> libenter adducit validasque agnoscit; sed alia ex parte etiam solutionem Gandavensis crisi submittit, ipsi praesertim obiciens quod inter distinctionem realem et rationis medium admisit:

„Contra istam opinionem arguitur multipliciter, et primo contra illum modum arguendi: est dare minus differentia quam secundum rem et plus quam secundum rationem etc. Si illud argumentum sit bonum tunc probabo quod illa quae differunt re non differunt re. Secundo, quod erit dare aliam differentiam a praedictis tribus, scilicet a differentia rationis, intentionis et realis" (*Ibidem*).

His expletis suam proponit solutionem, quae ex dictis supra de distinctione attributorum divinae essentiae, nobis iam bene nota est: Esse enim et essentia differunt eadem distinctione ac attributa divina, vel sicut entitas, veritas et bonitas in creaturis, hoc est ratione reali obiectiva, seu — termino scotistico — 'formaliter a parte rei', id est tali 'ratione' quam intellectus non facit sed invenit:

"Ideo dicitur aliter quod essentia, esse essentiae et esse existentiae differunt sola ratione, sicut entitas, veritas, bonitas. Cum enim quaelibet creatura secundum se comparetur ad Deum sub ratione triplicis causae scilicet efficientis, formalis et finalis; et secundum quod comparatur ad Deum sub ratione causae efficientis, sic habet esse existentiae (*marg.*: ita quod respectus ad Deum sub ratione causae efficientis est illud sine quo essentia non existit); secundum quod sub ratione causae formalis, sic habet esse essentiae; secundum quod sub ratione causae finalis, sic habet esse bonum et perfectum: *quaelibet creatura in se et ex se formaliter habet actualiter existere, nullo addito*" (f. 39r).

Post illa quae de natura huius distinctionis in capitulo praecedenti diximus, verba Auctoris "differunt sola ratione" neminem in errorem inducent; omnem enim aequivocationem tollit analogia cum distinctione inter entitatem, veritatem et bonitatem, cui Noster distinctionem suam formalem iterum atque iterum comparat.

<sup>57</sup> Controversiam inter Henricum Gandavensem et Aegidium Romanum, strenuissimum distinctionis realis defensorem, fuse illustrat J. Paulus, *Les disputes d' Henri de Gand et de Gilles de Rome sur la distinction de l'essence et de l'existence*, in *Archives d'Histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age*, XV—XVII 1940—42, pp. 325—58.

Distinctione reali reiecta argumenta Fundati ad hoc imprimis tendunt ut vulnera illius positionis detegant; sed alia ex parte non ignorat etiam suae solutioni non pauca obici posse. Nam ex. gr. si idem est in creatura esse et essentia, videretur sequi quod etiam creatura sit simplex sicut Deus, quia sine potentialitate et limitatione. — Ast iuxta Fundatum hae et similes obiectiones vel timores omni prorsus fundamento carent, nam etiamsi esse et essentia sunt idem realiter, creatura nihilominus differt a Deo et quidem praecise in hoc quod creatura est, et qua talis habet esse non a se ut Deus, sed ab alio, per consequens esse eius est contingens; et quia contingens, in se et per se habet suam potentialitatem aequae ac limitationem:

“Ad secundum dico quo dnon obstande quod sit idem esse cum essentia, *adhuc creatura dicitur esse composita ex potentia et actu*, quamquam illa duo sint in ipsa unitive, sicut . . . angelus inferior dicitur compositior quam angelus superior, non propter diversas essentias, sed quia incidit in maiorem potentialitatem, quia minus habet de intensione perfectionis. Sic creatura sibi derelicta habet potentialitatem, et actum in quantum est terminus divinae actionis. — Quod vero ultra dicitur quod esse est proprium Dei: dicitur quod verum est, quia aliter habet Deus esse et creatura, quia<sup>58</sup> <Deus> formaliter et effective, creatura solum formaliter, effective ab alio . . . Ad aliud, quod propterea creatura non est actus purus, quia dato quod sit idem esse cum essentia, adhuc est composita ex potentia et actu. — Ad aliud dicitur quod esse creaturae in se et secundum se limitatur, non quia recipitur in aliqua essentia” (f. 39v).

Tandem si in creatura idem est realiter essentia et esse, planum est quod ambo pari cursu currunt, id est pariter actualitatem vel potentialitatem sortiuntur:

“Propter quod dicendum quod sicut est de esse, ita est de essentia: sicut enim esse est in potentia et est in actu (f. 40v), sic est essentia in potentia et est in actu. Et non manet essentia positive cum decedit ab esse actualis existentiae, quemadmodum nec ipsum esse” (Q. 46, f. 40r—v).

Per hoc tamen Gulielmus non intendit negare quin essentiae, independenter ab actuali existentia extra, habeant esse ideale in intellectu divino, in quo rationes omnium rerum ab aeterno praecexistunt, ut luculenter ostendit in quaestione: Utrum ideae sint in Deo (Q. 101, f. 86r).

<sup>58</sup> Loco “quia . . . alio” cod. A, f. 30d scribit: “Deus enim habet esse formaliter et effective a se, creatura formaliter a se et effective ab alio, scilicet Deo”.

## 2. Principium individuationis

Problema individuationis Doctor Fundatus, eodem modo ac alii auctores scholastici solent, occasione quaestionis: *Utrum omnes angelis sint eiusdem speciei* (Q. 154, f. 138 v) tangit. Ad ipsam quaestionem, in quantum ad angelos spectat, Noster distinguendo respondet: si quaeris quomodo Deus de facto angelos creaverit, an unumquemque in propria specie vel omnes in eadem specie, nescio; sed si interrogas de modo possibili Deo, respondeo quod Deus potuit creasse angelos sicut sibi placuit; sufficit quod nullus istorum modorum includat contradictionem. Ideoque zelo singulari et apud ipsum prorsus insolito invehitur in S. Thomam eiusque discipulos praesertim Oxonienses, iuxta quos "angeli non sunt eiusdem speciei nec esse possunt"<sup>59</sup> (f. 139 r). Haec propositio convenit cum illa quae iam anno 1277 a Stephano Tempier, episcopo Parisiensi, prohibita et condemnata est<sup>60</sup>, quam tamen aliqui, de prohibitione minime curantes, iterum docere non verebantur:

"Item, ista opinio inter omnes opiniones immediatius et directius est contra auctoritatem Sanctorum, quia Sancti non dicunt hoc esse impossibile quod multi angeli sint eiusdem speciei. Est etiam opinio communiter contra Doctores, quia<sup>61</sup> per totum mundum tenetur quod Deus possit facere duos angelos eiusdem speciei, praeterquam in Oxonio, et hoc in aliquibus scholis solum. — Item, ista opinio innititur errori Philosophorum, qui simpliciter erraverunt circa intelligentias" (f. 139 v).

Iudicio igitur Gulielmi parum refert quaestio facti, eo magis quaestio iuris, quae ipsam Dei potentiam respicit; haec autem ubi contradictio non obstat, extendenda est potius quam coarctanda:

"Ista conclusio sustinetur quia nesciunt solvere rationes ad oppositum; et ideo opinio innititur mutabilitati imperitorum. Si enim scirent solvere rationes in oppositum, oporteret eos concedere conclusionem secundum fidem; quia non stant simul quod ego sciam solvere omnes rationes quae probant quod Deus non possit facere angelos plures in eadem specie, et quod Deus hoc non possit secundum pietatem fidei, cum non sit impossibile apud (f. 140 r) Deum omne verbum . . . Ideo, cum haec quaestio sit de potentia Dei, *magis volo errare circa abundantiam*, attri-

<sup>59</sup> *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 50, a. 4 Resp.: "Si ergo angeli non sunt compositi ex materia et forma, ut dictum est supra, sequitur quod impossibile sit esse duos angelos unius speciei".

<sup>60</sup> Propositio 81: "Quod, quia intelligentie non habent materiam, Deus non posset facere plures eiusdem speciei", apud H. Denifle - Ac. Chatelain, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, Parisiis 1889, I, p. 548.

<sup>61</sup> Loco "quia . . . solum" cod. A, f. 104 d habet: "quia ubicunque tenetur excepto Thoma(!)".



buendo sibi plus quam possit, quam circa defectum, auferendo sibi aliquid quod possit. — Unde dico ad quaestionem quod dupliciter potest quaerere(!), vel de facto vel de possibili. Si fiat quaestio de possibili, sic dico quod Deus potuit fecisse omnes in una specie, differentes solum numero, quia non includitur in tali positione aliqua contradictio. Si fiat quaestio de facto . . . si determinate asserendo, dico quod nescio quomodo se habent de facto, . . . quia omnibus his modis potuit fecisse eos; . . . Et hoc est mihi magnum argumentum quod non includit contradictionem omnes vel aliquos esse eiusdem speciei . . . Si debeam respondere probabiliter coniecturando, sic *dico quod in angelis est genus, species et individuum*; et sic differunt genere quod certo numero generum, sic specie quod certo numero specierum, et sic individuo quod certo numero” (f. 139v—140r).

Cum igitur angeli, licet non sint compositi ex materia et forma, nihilominus individuari possint, iam planum est quod individuatio etiam sine materia perfici potest:

“Ideo dicitur<sup>62</sup> . . . quod talia quae multiplicantur in eadem specie, aut producuntur ab agente praesupponente materiam in actione, et si sic, tunc verum est non quod individuatio sit per materiam, sed agens tale non potest agere nisi materia praesupponatur suae actioni. Si autem sint talia quae non possunt produci ab agente praesupponente materiam, tunc *dico quod possunt esse plura individua in eadem specie, licet non habeant materiam*. Et sic est de angelis. Et ideo signanter dicit Philosophus in VII [*Metaphysicorum*]: ‘Generans non generat aliud nisi propter materiam’; non dicit: creans non creat aliud nisi propter materiam” (f. 141r).

Sed si materia non est principium individuationis, per quid individuabitur species? Huic quaestioni, ad analogiam suae solutionis de actuatione essentiae, Noster respondet: per se ipsam. Unde problema, si hoc modo ponatur, non est problema, sed fructus imaginationis; namque individuum praecedit speciem et non e converso:

“Ad aliud, cum quaeritur per quid individuatur species, per se aut aliunde: dico quod argumentum procedit ex falsa imaginatione ac si species praecederet individuum in esse et adveniret sibi aliquid per quod individuaretur. Unde dico quod individuum praecedit speciem seu naturam specificam in esse. Et tunc dico quod *natura in angelo per se ipsam individuatur*, et tamen sibi simile potest esse in alio; quia licet

<sup>62</sup> Hunc textum omittit C, in margine habet A, f. 105c.

hoc idem numero non possit esse in alio, tamen aliud in numero potest esse in alio et individuari per se"<sup>63</sup> (*Ibidem*).

Aliis verbis: causa individuationis et causa essendi in idem incidunt; unde plane apparet quod Noster nonnisi aspectum physicum individuationis considerat, econtra alii, cum quibus disputat, aspectum metaphysicum eiusdem problematis prae oculis habent. Diversis loquuntur linguis, nil mirum igitur si dissentiunt.

## V. Creatio.

Ultima quaestione primi libri Gulielmus de Ware quaerit: *Utrum ideae sint in Deo* (Q. 101, f. 86r); quae quidem quaestio licet sit materia distinctionis XXXVI, et non ultimi, nihilominus transitum constituit ad problemata secundi libri, cuius initio agitur de emanatione rerum a primo principio. Summus enim artifex, Deus, haud creavit mundum caeca necessitate, sed sapienter et libera voluntate; quapropter necesse est, ut, sicut omnis artifex, res faciendas praecognoscat earumque exemplaria ab aeterno apud se habeat. Antequam igitur de creatione rerum ageremus, aliqua de earum exemplaribus seu de ideis divinis sunt praemittenda.

### 1. Ideaе divinae ut rationes cognoscendi et regulae agendi.

Doctor Fundatus problemata circa ideas divinas in quinque dividit articulos, ex quibus quatuor brevi absolvit, de quinto vero per longum et latum disserit: "Videre tamen est primo circa istam materiam quid est idea; secundo, quare Plato posuit ideas; tertio, ubi eas posuit; quarto, quare nos eas ponimus; et quinto, ad quid faciendum eas ponimus" (*Ibidem*).

Ad primum quaesitum, scilicet quid est idea, Noster variis auctoritatibus de hac re consultis, respondet quod idea est "forma et exemplar ad quod agens per intellectum aspicit in producendo aliquid, quod natum est imitari formam illam exemplarem ex intentione agentis" (*Ibidem*). Idea igitur, ex parte cognoscentis et agentis considerata, est ratio cognitiva et exemplaris, a parte vero cogniti sive producti ratio imitativa. Imitatio autem a parte rei productae participatio quaedam

<sup>63</sup> Cf. Gulielmus Ockham, *Sent.* I, d. 2, q. 6 Q: "Ex istis sequitur quod quolibet res extra animam seipsa est singularis, ita quod ipsa sine omni addito est illud quod immediate denominatur ab intentione singulari... Nec est querenda aliqua causa individuationis: nisi forte cause extrinsecae et intrinsecae quando individuum est compositum; sed magis esset querenda causa quomodo possibile est aliquid esse commune et universale" (ed. Lugduni 1495).

est, non tamen naturae aut essentiae, sed praecise imitativa: “quemadmodum exemplatum participat formam exemplaris” (*Ibidem*).

Iam Plato, quidquid dixerit Aristoteles in contrarium, ideas non alibi quam in mente divina esse existimavit, et quidem tamquam exemplaria aeterna secundum quae Creator fecerat mundum; minus recte tamen appellavit ideas mundum intelligibilem. Nos quoque, prosequitur Noster, ideas in mente divina esse arbitramur, pro certo habentes quod omnis rationabiliter intelligens et volens finem aliquem, habet apud se rationes rei faciendae vel rei intellectae.

Ideae in mente divina, praeterquam quod sunt exemplaria rerum ut factibilium, sunt etiam rationes rerum ut intelligibilium; non tamen se tenent in ratione quo seu principii intelligendi, velut medianes inter actum et potentiam, sed potius in ratione quod intelligitur, medianes scilicet inter actum et obiectum extra:

“Ideo dico, sicut ipsi<sup>64</sup> dicunt, propter tamen aliam rationem, videlicet quod *ideae tantum mediant inter actum et obiectum extra*, cuius ratio praecisa est, quia . . . si idea esset medium inter potentiam et actum intelligendi, potentia intellectiva Dei per ideam ferretur immediate super ideatum sicut super obiectum primum, et tunc vilesceret intellectus eius, sicut probat Philosophus XI *Metaphysicorum*. — Ideo dico quod ita proportionaliter est in Deo sicut in nobis. In nobis autem ita est quod species quae est in intellectu, non cadit media inter potentiam et actum, sed inter actum et obiectum. Quia enim obiectum per essentiam suam non potest esse praesens intellectui nostro, ideo oportet quod species eius sit praesens intellectui nostro, ut ea mediante rem extra, quam repraesentat, intelligere possit. Sic dico in Deo, quia res creatae secundum essentias et existentias proprias non sunt actualiter Deo praesentes, immo sunt absentes, isto modo oportuit Deum habere alia in se quae sibi istas res repraesentarent, non tamquam rationes formales intelligendi, quia ipsa potentia intellectiva est sufficiens principium intelligendi omnia. Talia autem voco ideas, et ideo dico quod oportet ponere ideas in Deo” (f. 87r).

Inter cognitionem tamen ideae et ideati non est nisi prioritas naturae: “Unde Deus cognoscit omnia intuitive, et ideo non prius cognoscit ideatum quam ideam, immo simul; et si sit ordo naturae, prius natura cognoscit ideam” (f. 87v).

Haec est Responsio Nostri ad quintum quaesitum, scilicet: ad quid faciendum ponendae sunt ideae in Deo. — Ad quaestiones vero laterales,

<sup>64</sup> Scilicet S. Thomas, cuius sententiam prius examini subiecit; cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 15, art. 2 Resp

videlicet utrum ideae sint speculativae vel practicae; an specierum tantum vel etiam individuorum, Fundatus paucis quidem, sed perspicue respondet:

“Dico quod non solum sunt speculativae sed practicae; et etiam dico quod ideae practicae sunt in Deo non tantum futurorum, sed possibilium fieri... Dico tamen quod verius sunt ideae speculativae quam practicae... Dico etiam ultimo quod non solum species habent ideas (f. 87 v). sed etiam individua; ... tamen credo quod per se et primo et directe sunt specierum, indirecte et improprie individuorum” (f. 87 r—v).

## 2. Creatio rerum.

a) *Possibilitas creationis*. — Primum problema circa creationem est de eius possibilitate quam Gulielmus in prima quaestione secundi libri examinat, quaerens: *Utrum multitudo creaturarum possit esse immediate ab uno principio* (Q. 102, f. 88 r). Responsio nulli catholico potest esse dubia. Deus enim, ut iam supra dictum est, habet in se unitive et ad modum principii activi omnium rerum perfectiones, qua de causa potest omnia producere, et quidem immediate et sine adminiculo causae secundae. Perfectio namque et virtus activa causae secundae eminentius et actualis continetur in causa prima:

“Ideo est alia opinio, quod cum primum principium sit quoddam pelagus omnium perfectionum, habens in se omnem perfectionem actualiter cuiuscunque creaturae, et hoc per modum activi, potest per se et immediate in omnem effectum. Si enim aliqua forma haberet in se unitive et per modum actus caliditatem, frigiditatem, humiditatem, siccitatem, posset ita perfecte calefacere, humectare, dissecare, et ita efficaciter et immediate sicut quatuor formae quarum quaelibet haberet tantum unam virtutem. Cum igitur Deus habeat in se perfectiones omnium rerum, tam corporalium quam spiritualium, et hoc unitive et per modum actualitatis, potest immediate omnia producere” (f. 88 v).

Productio autem rerum in esse non est partialis sed totalis, nam Deus, utpote agens perfectissimum, nihil praesupponit in agendo, ne materiam primam quidem, quare totum ens totaliter ad esse producit, id est creat:

“Item, ratione sic: quando aliqua agentia secundum se sunt ordinata secundum perfectius et imperfectius, illud quod est magis perfectum simpliciter, minus praesupponit in agendo... Ergo supernaturale agens, cum sit perfectissimum in tantum quod excedit alia agentia in infinitum in perfectione, in actione minus praesupponit; sed minus non potest praesupponere quam materiam primam nisi supponat nihil,



quia materia prima creata est prope nihil, secundum Augustinum, *Super Genesim*; quare nihil praesupponendo, totum ens et totaliter ad esse producit" (Q. 103, f. 89r).

b) *Creatio activa et passiva*. — Creatio dividi solet in activam et passivam; prima, utpote actus divinus, eadem est realiter cum essentia creatrice; de secunda tamen est magna quaestio, quae a Nostro his proponitur verbis: *Utrum creatio passio sit aliquid absolutum additum essentiae creaturae* (Q. 105, f. 90v). "Opinio propria" Doctoris Fundati convenit cum sententia S. Bonaventurae<sup>65</sup>: creatio-passio non differt realiter ab essentia creaturae, sed dicit solum relationem totalis dependentiae ad Creatorem:

"Dicitur<sup>66</sup> ergo aliter ad quaestionem, quod creatio-passio nihil absolutum dicit super ipsam rem, sed solum relationem. Sed an illa relatio creaturae ad Creatorem sit differens ab essentia creaturae realiter, sicut prius dictum est quod in creaturis differt relatio a fundamento, dubium est. Dico tamen ad praesens, sicut prius, quod relatio in creaturis est alia res a fundamento in comparatione ad aliam creaturam. *Non tamen relatio creaturae ad Creatorem est accidens* et alia res a fundamento, scilicet creatura, *sed ipsamet substantia creaturae*. Et ratio huius diversitatis est, quia essentia creaturae est in totali dependentia ad Deum, in tantum quod ipsa essentia in quantum comparatur ad Deum secundum se totam, non est nisi respectus quidam, ita quod ipsa tota est unum extremum relatum; ita quod sicut intelligendo extremum relationis non relatum, non est extremum relationis: sic intelligendo essentiam creaturae non referri ad Deum, non est creatura" (f. 92r).

Creatio vero passio e sua parte non differt realiter a conservatione passionis, per consequens nec conservatio passio differt a creatura: eadem enim voluntas divina dat creaturae esse et permanentiam in esse; propter quod creatura semper indiget Creatore:

"Dicitur ergo ad quaestionem quod (*conservatio-passio*) *nihil absolutum addit super creaturam*, sed sicut Deus sola voluntate ponit rem in esse, et tunc dicitur creatio et creatura, ita Deus ex sola voluntate per illud idem quod dat creaturae in principio suae creationis, conservat rem in esse et continuat quantum placet sibi . . . Ad omnes auctoritates pro alia opinione >dico< quod Deus est praesens creaturae volitione sua,

<sup>65</sup> *Sent.* II, d. 1, p. I, a. 3, q. 2 Resp. (II, p. 35a).

<sup>66</sup> Hic in margine notantur sequentia: "Opinio propria. — Improbationem huius opinionis cum positione alia probabili quaeras alibi. — Haec opinio, quam tenet hic Ware, est opinio Bonaventurae in secundo Scripti, qui ponit creationem passionem non differre secundum essentiam a creatura".

uti si velit creaturam tantum esse, tantum stabit: et ideo dicitur, et bene, quod creatura eget Creatore semper, id est divina voluntate volente ipsam stare in esse suo" (Q. 106, 93r).

### 3. Problema creabilitatis rerum ab aeterno.

Responsio theologi ad quaestionem: *Utrum mundus fuerit realiter aeternus* (Q. 108, f. 95v), non potest esse alia quam negativa, cum ex revelatione sciat mundum in tempore seu cum tempore incepisse. Ita et Fundatus respondet: "Dico igitur cum secunda opinione (id est cum Lege Christianorum) quod mundus non fuit ab aeterno" (f. 96r). Aristoteles tamen — prosequitur Noster — licet quidam aliter exponant, mundum ab aeterno fuisse arbitratus est; sed non potest dici, ut aliqui volunt, quod per hoc destruxerit sua principia, v. g. hoc quod 'impossibile est infinita esse pertransita', nam etiamsi mundus fuisset ab aeterno, infinita non essent pertransita.

Si certum est rem ita se habere de facto, non aequè planum est quomodo se habeat de iure, seu: *Utrum repugnet alicui creaturae in quantum creatura est, fuisse ab aeterno* (Q. 110, f. 98r). — Hoc problema duplici sub aspectu considerari potest: vel ex parte Dei creantis vel ex parte ipsius creaturae. Quantum ad primum Fundatus distinguit potentiam Dei absolutam et dispositivam, et concludit quod ex parte potentiae Dei absolutae mundus potuit fuisse ab aeterno, non tamen ex parte potentiae dispositive, quae est in ordine ad sapientiam et iustitiam:

"Quantum ad potentiam Dei absolutam dico quod quantum est ex parte potentiae Dei absolutae mundus potuit fuisse ab aeterno, quantum est dico ex parte potentiae Dei absolutae (*sic!*). — Si loquamur de potentia Dei dispositiva, tunc Deus non disposuit mundum fuisse ab aeterno, sic dico quod non potuit produxisse mundum ab aeterno"<sup>67</sup> (f. 99r).

Secundam partem problematis, scilicet an creature repugnet fuisse ab aeterno, Noster negative resolvit, et hoc imprimis propter auctoritates Sanctorum: "Dico tamen aliter ad quaestionem, propter auctoritates Sanctorum, quod creaturae repugnat esse ab aeterno" (f. 100v).

Praeter auctoritates adducuntur etiam rationes philosophicae et quidem satis subtiles, quas tamen nostrum non est hic exponere. Omnes in hanc redeunt conclusionem:

<sup>67</sup> Luculentius explicantur haec a S. Bonaventura, *Sent.* II, d. 1, p. I, a. 1, q. 2, ad 5 (II. p. 23b). Apparentem contradictionem inter omnipotentiam Dei et impossibilitatem mundi aeterni Patres Editores (*ib.*, *Scholion*, p. 24) sic solvunt: "Haec impossibilitas non est ex parte Dei creantis, sed ex parte mundi, qui non est creabilis ab aeterno, sive aliis verbis ab aeterno *potuit* Deus mundum creare, sed *mundus* ab aeterno creari non *potuit*".

“Restat ergo quod creatura non possit habere esse ab alio a se, nisi prius duratione habeat non esse, quod convenit ei ex se; et sic nullo modo poterit poni quod fieri potuerit ab aeterno, sed ex tempore. Non quod tempus praecedat suum esse, sed quia in primo instanti temporis recepit esse, et prius in tota aeternitate fuerit in non esse; quemadmodum modo productus est secundum prophetiam Moysi” (f. 101r).

Rationes vero Philosophorum in contrarium adductae hanc solummodo merentur responsionem: “Ad auctoritates Philosophorum: negantur, quia ipsi erraverunt in ista materia” (*Ibidem*).

## VI. Hylemorphismus

Hylemorphismus scholae augustinianae quatuor praesertim prae se fert signa characteristic: 1. materia prima non est potentia pura, sed quadam entitate pollet positiva; 2. productio naturalis novarum formarum praesupponit praesentiam rationum seminalium in materia; 3. plures formae substantiales in eodem composita adesse possunt; 4. materia prima in omnibus creaturis, tam corporalibus quam spiritualibus, invenitur<sup>68</sup>. Gulielmus de Ware primam harum positionum totis viribus defendit; secundam relinquit; tertiam ad dualitatem videtur restringere; quartam vero sine ulla cunctatione refellit.

### 1. Materiae primae entitas et potentialitas.

a) *Materia prima a Deo creata est.* — Primam quaestionem de materia prima Fundatus his verbis proponit: *Utrum materia prima sit creata a Deo* (Q. 148, f. 144r); circa quam intendit ostendere: “primo, quod materia est, secundo, quod a Deo est”. Utrumque propositum expedite resolvit; nam, quod materia prima sit, patet ex transmutatione naturali, quae cum non sit creatio nec transsubstantiatio, necessario praesupponit aliquod substratum quod maneat idem sub formis invicem succedentibus, nam: “In actione naturali non potest aliquid produci nisi aliquid idem numero maneat in producto quod praefuit in termino a quo; et illud manens quod supportat generationem est materia” (*Ibidem*).

Similiter certum est materiam primam a Deo esse creatam: est enim quaedam natura, et qua talis oportet quod sit ab eo a quo est omnis natura. Non est tamen creata de facto sine forma, sed cum forma et sub forma. Cum autem sit creatura Dei, et omnis effectus assimiletur agenti, necesse est ut etiam materia prima, quantumcumque sit imper-

<sup>68</sup> Cf. M. de Wulf, *Histoire de la philosophie médiévale*, Louvain-Paris 1936, II, p. 355.

fecta, habeat aliquam rationem similitudinis cum Creatore. Haec autem assimilatio iuxta Fundatum in entitate absoluta consistit: "Et haec ratio similitudinis in proposito de materia est ratio entis, non entitatis formalis, sed entitatis absolutae: ut materia assimilatur primo agenti in entitate, quia materia aliquam entitatem dicit positivam" (f. 144 v).

b) *Materia prima est actus imperfectus*. — Thesim eminenter augustinianam, quam Noster ultimis verbis textus modo allegati enuntiavit, sub proprio titulo diffuse pertractat eamque contra obiectiones vindicat. Solvendum igitur proponit: *Utrum materia secundum se considerata dicat aliquam naturam positivam seu aliquem actum* (Q. 151, f. 145 v). Demonstratio sententiae affirmativae a Gulielmo vigore atque alacritate alibi raro usitata perficitur. Non solum solutio, sed etiam expositio similem quaestionem Duns Scoti in mentem lectoris revocat<sup>69</sup>.

Materia prima non est potentia pura, sed aliqua natura seu essentia positiva in se, quia est terminus creationis et "ad possibile tantum non terminatur creatio"<sup>70</sup> (f. 146 r). Non obstat quod id quod creatur non sit materia prima in se sed compositum ex materia et forma, nam etiam sic prius natura est materia quam forma. Practerea, materia prima est pars compositi, quod veraciter dici non posset nisi positiva polleret entitate: "Compositum ex materia et forma habet duplicem naturam positivam, materiam et formam"<sup>71</sup>; ergo materia est aliqua substantialitas et entitas positiva, et non pura potentia, ut ipsi imaginantur" (*Ibidem*). Non est igitur verum quod materia habeat esse per formam, sed habet solum informationem: "Materia non habet esse materiam per formam, sed quod sit informata, hoc habet per formam; ergo ipsa est entitas quaedam positiva in se, circumscripta forma" (*Ibidem*). Porro, materia est illud cui innititur tota natura; non autem posset inniti super puram potentiam, immo e contrario, potentia indiget aliquo cui innitatur. Tandem, materia prima, utpote creatura, est vestigium Creatoris eique, sicut omnis effectus suae causae, in aliquo assimilatur; ratio autem huiusmodi assimilationis non potest esse nisi entitas:

<sup>69</sup> *Op. Oxon.* II, d. 12, q. 1: Utrum in substantia generabili et corruptibili sit aliqua entitas positiva, realiter distincta a forma (XII, pp. 546—74).

<sup>70</sup> Cf. Scotum, *loco cit.*, n. 16, p. 564 a: "Dico igitur quod mihi est contradictio quod materia sit terminus creationis et pars compositi, et quod non habeat aliquod esse, cum tamen sit aliqua essentia. Quod enim aliqua essentia sit extra causam suam, et quod non habeat aliquod esse, quo sit essentia, est mihi contradictio".

<sup>71</sup> Ita et Subtilis, *loco cit.*, n. 13, p. 560 a: "Primum est absurdum, scilicet quod generabile sit simplex. Secundum etiam est impossibile, scilicet quod aliquid componatur ex nihilo et aliquo; igitur sequitur necessario tertium, scilicet quod aliquid componitur ex aliquo et aliquo, sicut ex materia et forma".



“Item, omne quod est productum ab aliquo agente, aliquid habet in quo assimilatur producenti, ideo quaelibet creatura est vestigium Dei. Sed materia producta est a Deo: ergo *secundum se est aliqua entitas positiva*, in qua entitate assimilatur. Sed quantum aliquid habet de entitate, tantum habet de actualitate: ergo *materia est aliquis actus*. Sed pura potentialitas in nullo quasi assimilatur actui puro qui est Deus, sed solum dat possibilitatem alteri ut assimiletur” (*Ibidem*).

c) *Materia prima est potentia*. — Materia ergo prima est actus quidam et entitas positiva, sed hoc, iuxta Fundatum, non impedit quominus sit in potentia ad omnes formas. Non enim est actus perfectus, immo imperfectus et immanifestus, et qua talis determinabilis et perfectibilis per formam, et nonnisi per eandem fit etiam menti humanae cognoscibilis:

“Materia ergo est actus, quia est ens positivum extra mentem, et terminat creationem, et est pars realis compositi realiter et fundamentum totius naturae. Dicitur tamen *actus immanifestus et imperfectus*, quia non habet de se operationem nec potest de se movere intellectum nostrum, sed in habitudine ad actum determinatum . . . Tamen est scibilis, quia Deus et angelus intelligunt subiective materiam; intellectum tamen nostrum non immutat nisi per respectum ad formam; et defectus est ex parte nostra, quia intelligimus per immutationem”<sup>72</sup> (f. 146v).

Obiectio gravissima, quam haec positio declinare debet, est ista: si materia prima iam in se est actus, omne autem quod advenit enti in actu accidit illi, tunc unio formae cum materia non erit substantialis sed accidentalis tantum. Responsio huic obiectioni digna est attentione eo vel magis quia revelat indolem scholae cuius spiritu Noster imbutus est, quaeque experientiam speculationi anteponit. Sic ex. gr. in proposito, ubi experientia contradicit axiomati cui obiectio innitur:

“Ad primum principale [id est: quod advenit enti in actu et recedit ab eo accidit illi] dicitur quod maior universaliter accepta est falsa, quia instantiam habet in actione naturali; quia in nutritione advenit substantia substantiae, sicut in augmentatione quantum advenit quanti: et tunc accedit ens enti, et tamen fit vere unum ex eis” (*Ibidem*).

Experientia igitur exigit ut principium illud speculativum hoc modo corrigamus: quod advenit enti in actu perfecto accidit illi:

<sup>72</sup> Cf. Scotum, *ibidem*, n. 11, p. 558a: “Dico igitur quod materia est per se unum principium naturae, ut dicit Philosophus I *Physic.* et II. Quod est per se causa, ut dicit II *Physic.* et *Metaph.* Quod est pars alicuius compositi, VII *Metaph.* Quod est per se fundamentum, I *Metaph.*”; et n. 20, p. 565s: “Dico igitur quod materia, secundum se et in sua essentia est cognoscibilis, sed non a nobis . . . Habet enim idea in Deo”.

“Ita in natura, entitas realis, dummodo non sit perfecta, potest facere unum cum alio ente reali quod se habet ut forma et perfectio respectu illius. Sicut conceptus differentiae se habet ut forma respectu generis, sic forma se habet ut perfectio formalis respectu materiae, licet materia sit ens quoddam; et ideo facit vere unum cum materia. Et quod advenit enti in actu perfecto, est accidens; sed materia non est ens perfectum” (*Ibidem*).

d) *Materia prima posset fieri sine forma.* — Si igitur materia prima habet essentiam et esse circumscripta forma, nil impedit quominus per Dei potentiam possit exsistere etiam sine forma. Etenim quod Deus potest facere mediante causa secunda, id est forma, potest etiam sine illa:

“Materia secundum se aliquam entitatem positivam habet, distinctam contra formam, quia aliter corrupta forma corrumperetur materia; ergo habet aliquod esse proprium sibi correspondens, si esse sit idem cum essentia, ut dictum est in primo. Et sic habet esse reale sicut essentiam distinctam contra formam et proprium esse formae. Et hoc esse est in re extra et in materia immediate a Deo, non ab agente creato, quia immediate creatur a Deo... Item, omne quod Deus facit mediante causa secunda effective, potest per se facere sine causa secunda. Hoc patet, quia contrarium damnatur<sup>73</sup>. Similiter hoc patet, quia ipse est simpliciter primum agens, et ideo omnis ratio efficientiae salvatur in eo. Sed forma non est causa formalis materiae, sed est solum formalis causa compositi et sui ipsius, sicut albedo non est formalis causa hominis, sed hominis albi” (Q. 152, f. 147r).

Ad suam thesim probandam vel contra obiectiones vindicandam Noster circa triginta affert argumenta, quorum nonnulla fidei innituntur. Constat ex. gr. per fidem quod Deus potest facere animam intellectivam sine corpore, et accidentia sine subiecto; itaque eodem modo, immo multo fortius posset facere materiam sine forma. Unde Fundatus concludit: “Credo quod ipsi qui negant Deum non posse facere materiam sine forma, quod ipsi negarent Deum posse facere accidens sine subiecto, et anima intellectivam sine corpore, nisi esset fides in contrarium”<sup>74</sup> (f. 147v).

<sup>73</sup> A Stephano episcopo Parisiensi, anno 1277; propositio 63: “Quod Deus non potest in effectum causae secundariae sine ipsa causa secundaria”, apud *Chartularium cit.*, I, p. 547. — Idem argumentum habes apud Scotum, *loco cit.*, q. 2, n. 3, p. 576.

<sup>74</sup> Ita opinatur etiam Gandavensis, *Quodl.* I, q. 10: “Unde qui modo negant materiam Dei actione posse stare sine forma, nisi esset clarum quod fide tenendum est quod accidentia subsistunt sine subiecto in sacramento altaris, multo magis negarent Dei actione accidens posse stare sine subiecto” (I, f. 13d).

Quantum igitur ad possibilitatem creandi materiam sine forma, Gulielmus nullam admittit dubitationem; sed quomodo creata fuerit de facto, est alia quaestio nec facilis ad solvendum:

“Aliter tamen videtur esse dicendum: si enim quaestio quaerat de possibili, sic dico quod Deus potuit producere omnia simul et sub formis perfectis et sub ornatu et distinctione perfectissima, vel successive, sicut placuit sibi. — Sed si quaeratur de facto, dicitur tunc quod omnia sunt simul producta secundum rationes seminales et formas imperfectas” (Q. 150, f. 145 v).

Cum ultima sententia huius textus (etsi sub formula ‘dicitur’), mentionem faciat de rationibus seminalibus, expedit in mentem revocare quod iuxta propriam sententiam Doctoris Fundati ratio seminalis nil positivi superaddit essentiae materiae, ut apparet in quaestione ubi quaeritur utrum materia sub quantitate caeli et istorum inferiorum sit eiusdem rationis:

“Si tamen sic esset quod materia per rationes seminales esset in potentia ad formas, ita quod illae rationes essent superadditae essentiae materiae et aliud realiter ab ea, tunc posset essentia materiae in caelo et hic esse eiusdem rationis... Quia tamen *non video quod rationes seminales dicant aliquid positivi supra materia*, ideo dico, secundum alium modum, quod sunt materiae alterius rationis”<sup>75</sup> (Q. 154, f. 150 v).

Sed si ratio seminalis nil positivi dicit praeter ipsam essentiam materiae, tunc de doctrina traditionali rationum seminalium non restat nisi nomen.

## 2. Forma corporeitatis.

Iuxta Gulielmum, ut supra vidimus, “entitas realis, dummodo non sit perfecta, potest facere unum cum alio ente reali” (Q. 151, f. 146 v). Licet huiusmodi principium planam sternat viam positioni pluralitatis formarum, Noster tamen, quantum nobis constat, eam ad dualitatem limitat, in quantum in composito humano praeter animam intellectivam formam quoque corporeitatis admittit. Haec ultima per generationem producit, prima vero a Deo creatur et corpori infunditur. Ratio quae hanc positionem postulavit, si non exclusive saltem praecipue theologica erat, ut apparet ex quaestione: *Utrum corpus Christi vivum et mortuum fuerit idem numero* (Q. 190, f. 185 r), ubi Fundatus contra negantes Christum vivum et mortuum idem numero fuisse, ostendit quod illa positio “destruit sacramenta Novae Legis; secundo, quod destruit Evangelia; tertio, quod est contra Sanctorum testimonia; et quarto,

<sup>75</sup> In margine: “Opinio propria cum Thoma”. Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 66, art. 2.

quod est contra iura canonica" (f. 185 v). Sed cum nullum horum argumentorum sit philosophicum, sola conclusio nostra interest:

"Ideo est alio opinio quod corpus cuiuslibet hominis vivum et mortuum est idem numero per naturam, tam in aliis hominibus quam in corpore Christi, ita quod sicut in aliis hominibus primo secundum tempus est formatum corpus, et sic intellectiva introducit a Deo per creationem, ita corpus Christi secundum naturam prius fuit formatum de purissimis sanguinibus B. Virginis, et sic posterius secundum naturam anima fuit infusa, quia non est eadem dispositio necessitas ad utramque formam. Et sicut est talis ordo in aliis hominibus et in Christo quantum ad generationem, ita est ordo quantum ad corruptionem; ita quod primo separatur anima secundum tempus et remanet forma corporeitatis. Corpus tamen est in continua tendentia ad corruptionem post separationem, nisi aliunde teneatur, sicut fuit de corpore Christi . . . Ex his patet quod idem numero est corpus cuiuslibet hominis vivum et mortuum. Et ex hoc patet quod inconueniens est ponere tantum unam formam in homine; propter quod *pono duas formas in homine quocumque*, scilicet corporeitatis et animae intellectivae"<sup>76</sup> (f. 186 r).

Forma tamen corporeitatis non impedit quin anima per suam essentiam immediate sit perfectio materiae. Et si quaereretur, quomodo sit hoc possibile, Noster sine dubio responderet quod compositum ex materia prima et forma corporeitatis est materia propria respectu formae completivae seu animae rationalis. Quomodocumque sit, in questione: *Utrum anima intellectiva sit tota in toto corpore et tota in qualibet parte* (Q. 50, f. 42 r), haec assignatur differentia inter animae essentiam et eius potentiam intellectivam: essentia est perfectio materiae per se et immediate, potentia vero intellectiva nonnisi mediante essentia:

"Ad istud respondetur quod triplex est abstractum: . . . Quoddam, quod non habet materiam, sed est in materia nec tamen est actus materiae, ut potentia intellectiva; quia non est perfectio materiae in quantum potentia, per se dico, tamen est in materia *mediante essentia*, quae immediate est perfectio materiae. Nec ideo est potentia nobilior ipsa essentia animae, quae est perfectio materiae, quia quod potentia non sit actus materiae, hoc habet ab essentia cuius est, quae habet mediare inter istas formas abstractas quae sunt intelligentiae et non

<sup>76</sup> In cod. A, f. 138 d legitur: "Dico ergo quod fuit unum et idem numero vivum et mortuum, non ponendo solum unam formam in homine esse. Ideo dico consequenter quod in homine sunt plures formae"; sed de pluribus quam duabus formis nullibi fit mentio. — De dualismo Henrici Gandavensis videsis R. Zavalloni, *Richard de Mediavilla et la controverse sur la pluralité des formes*, Louvain 1951, pp. 287—96.



sunt actus materiae, et formas materiales, quae sunt actus materiae. Et ideo quia sic mediat, requiritur quod habeat potentias aliquas, quae non sunt actus materiae, cuiusmodi sunt intellectus et voluntas; et aliquas quae sunt actus materiae, cuiusmodi sunt potentiae sensitivae" (f. 42v).

### 3. Immaterialitas creaturarum spiritualium.

Doctor Fundatus, ut supra innuimus, in quaestione de compositione hylemorphica angelorum atque animarum scholam bonaventurianam relinquens, firmissime propugnat simplicitatem creaturarum spiritualium. Sed hic, habita ratione positionis Nostri de identitate essentiae et esse in creaturis, dubium oriri potest: si in angelis et animabus neque ex esse et essentia, ut Thomistae asserunt, neque ex materia spirituali et forma substantiali, ut S. Bonaventura eiusque schola docuit, existit compositio, nonne erunt simplices et actus puri sicut Deus? Fundatus, ac si hanc obiectionem praevidisset, opportune subnotat quod angelus et anima, sicut ceterum omnes creaturae, per se ipsos deficiunt a summa actualitate ac simplicitate quae Deus est, per consequens in se ipsis sunt limitati et admixti potentialitati. Si quis vero hanc potentialitatem extenso nomine materiam vellet nominare, Noster nihil obiciendum haberet, dummodo res nominis recte intelligatur:

*"Ideo dico"*<sup>77</sup> *quod sunt simplices substantiae, non compositae ex diversis essentiis . . . Unde etsi in angelis et animabus non sit potentia ad formam substantialem quae arguit materiam primam, et per consequens nec materia de qua est quaestio, est tamen in eis duplex potentia: potentia passiva scilicet ad ubi et ad formam accidentalem, et per consequens duplex potentia passiva correspondens et duplex materia aliquo modo, extendendo nomen materiae. Nec tamen ista materia in eis est alia realiter a forma. Sed forma talis, cum sit deficiens a prima forma quae Deus est, seipsa incidit in quamdam potentialitatem admixtam actui, eo quod non est actus purus; quae quidem potentialitas cum actu proportionantur materiae et formae, cum tamen una res sit in eis potentia et actus"* (Q. 126, f. 117v).

Ad hanc thesim probandam Gulielmus non minus quam 25 argumenta in ordinem collocat.

<sup>77</sup> In margine: "Opinio propria. Et Gandavus tenet hanc partem, Quodl. IV. q. 16". Recte quidem, nam Henricus ibidem revera docet: "Cum ergo angeli sint substantiae summe intellectuales, omnino debent esse separatae a materia, maxime ne sit materia pars essentiae suae . . . Unde etiam si compositio in ea inveniatur, illa non est ex materia et forma, sed ex aliquo se habente ad modum materiae et aliquo se habente ad modum formae, in quantum omnis creatura deficit a divina simplicitate" (I, p. 192rb).

## VII. Doctrina psychologica.

Cum auctores medii aevi compertum habuerint imaginem SS. Trinitatis in anima rationali relucere, omni cum diligentia scrutati sunt animae naturam eiusque ad potentias suas relationem. Inter potentias vero intellectus, utpote facultas cognoscendi, et voluntas, tamquam facultas libere agendi, specialem obtinuerunt considerationem.

## I. Divisio generalis potentiarum animae.

Antequam ad particularem considerationem potentiarum procedere-mus, opportunum est divisionem generalem earundem praemittere. — Doctor Fundatus in anima distinguit: potentias, vires et portiones. Potentiae dividuntur in rationales et sensitivas; hae “differunt secundum diversam immutationem per se a diverso sensibili”, illae vero “differunt secundum quod respiciunt obiecta sub diversis rationibus formalibus” (Q. 26, f. 24v), ut ex. gr. veri vel boni. — Virium alia est concupiscibilis alia irascibilis. Ambae quidem sub eadem ratione indivisa respiciunt obiectum, utpote sub ratione boni, differunt tamen propter aliquam rationem huic adnexam, ut v. gr. delectabilis vel ardui. — Portiones, inferior scilicet et superior, solummodo in parte rationali seu in intellectu et in voluntate assignari possunt; et differunt “secundum dignitatem, prout ratio quae est superior portio, respicit superiora, et ratio quae est inferior portio, respicit inferiora” (*Ibidem*).

Noster nunc has differentias, cum aliis subdivisionibus, ad intellectum et voluntatem applicat, quae sunt primae et principales divisiones animae rationalis. En primo divisiones intellectus:

“De secundo sciendum quod anima prima divisione dividitur in intellectum et voluntatem, ita quod hae sint quasi duo latera civitatis. Intellectus vero dividitur in agentem et possibilem; possibilis autem iterum dividitur in memoriam et intelligentiam. — Rursus, quodlibet istorum dividitur in speculativum, practicum et contemplativum, et portionem superiorem et inferiorem, sicut patet de quolibet per respectum ad superiora et inferiora. Intellectus vero agens prout abstrahit ab inferioribus, potest dici portio inferior, prout vero irradiat circa superiora, dicitur portio superior. Similiter potest dici speculativus prout irradiat sive abstrahit circa purum speculabile, practicus prout irradiat circa operabile, contemplativus prout irradiat circa contemplabile. — Similiter memoria potest dici portio superior prout habet habitus in se manentes sive species quibus mediantibus potest tendere in superiora, portio interior prout habet habitus quibus in inferiora potest tendere;

speculativa prout habet habitus quibus intelligentia potest speculari ipsum speculabile, practica prout habet habitus quibus potest versari circa ipsum operabile, contemplative prout habet habitus quibus intelligentia potest versari circa ipsum contemplabile. — De intelligentia, quomodo potest sic dividi, patet per se et per illa quae dicta sunt” (*Ibidem*).

Omnes hae differentiae etiam in voluntate detegi possunt, excepta una, divisione nimirum in agentem et possibilem; haec tamen compensatur divisione in irascibilem et concupiscibilem, quae econtra in intellectu deest:

“Ex parte voluntatis non potest haberi illa divisio prima, ut dicatur quod voluntas dividatur in agentem et possibilem . . . Dividitur tamen voluntas in volentiam et voluntariam, ut volentia dicatur quando est sub actu volendi, sicut intelligentia, voluntaria quando non est sub actu, sicut memoria ex parte intellectus. — Dividitur autem quodlibet istorum membrorum ex parte voluntatis in speculativum, practicum et contemplativum; et portionem superiorem et inferiorem. Ita ut voluntas volentia dicatur speculativa prout intellecta circa speculabilia et circa ipsa afficitur, similiter practica prout circa practica, contemplativa prout circa contemplabilia; voluntas tanquam portio superior prout circa superiora, inferior portio prout circa inferiora. — Invenitur una divisio ex parte voluntatis quae est per irascibilem et concupiscibilem, quae non invenitur ex parte intellectus, ita ut haec divisio respondeat illi ex parte intellectus quae est per agentem et possibilem, quae non invenitur ex parte voluntatis” (*Ibidem*).

## 2. Distinctio formalis potentiarum.

In anima rationali, ut in fine praecedentis capituli vidimus, non est compositio ex forma et materia spirituali; videamus nunc an sit ex essentia et potentia. Gulielmus de Ware in quaestione: *Utrum potentia animae sit ipsa essentia eius* (Q. 25, f. 21v), examinatis relictisque opinionibus S. Bonaventurae, S. Thomae et Aegidii Romani, sententiam Richardi de Mediavilla<sup>78</sup> recitat, quam, saltem quoad substantiam, et ipse amplectitur: “Alia est opinio, quod potentia animae est idem quod essentia, differens solo respectu ad actum, quia essentia absolute non habet rationem potentiae, sed in ordine ad actum” (f. 22v).

<sup>78</sup> *Sent.* I, d. 3, a. 2, q. 1: “Respondeo quod potentie anime non sunt accidentia, nec addunt aliquam rem absolutam super anime essentiam, sed solummodo respectus ad actus et obiecta” (f. 18b).

Et si obiciatur quod supposita identitate essentiae cum potentia anima semper intelligeret, respondetur quod ita est in Deo cuius operatio non est conditionata, sed non in anima ad cuius actionem plures requiruntur conditiones:

“Essentia animae indiget praesentia obiecti motivi quod non est semper praesens. Iterum, potentia intellectiva indifferens est ad intelligendum hoc vel illud, et ideo oportet quod per aliquid determinetur. Iterum, continetur sub imperio voluntatis et agit ad imperium ipsius. Quia multa requiruntur ad actum intelligendi praeter potentiam, ideo non semper intelligit” (f. 23r).

Neque diversitas actuum arguit potentias realiter differentes, nam una et eadem essentia animae habet in se sufficientem virtutem ut sub una ratione actum intelligendi, sub alia vero actum volendi eliciat:

“Unde dico breviter ad argumentum quod non oportet actus diversos specie habere potentias distinctas specie fundamentaliter, ita quod una potentia dicat unam essentiam et alia aliam; sed sufficit quod distinguantur virtualiter, ita quod anima ipsa secundum unam rationem potest virtualiter elicere actum intelligendi, et ipsa eadem secundum essentiam secundum aliam rationem actum volendi, et sic de aliis” (*Ibidem*).

Obiectioni vero: “si anima esset sua potentia tunc idem esset in actu et in potentia respectu eiusdem” (sui scilicet actus quem elicit et retinet), Noster respondet limitando famosum illud principium: “nihil potest esse in potentia et in actu respectu eiusdem”:

“Ideo dicendum: quod aliquid sit actu potest intelligi dupliciter: vel in actu virtuali vel in actu formali. Modo ita est quod illud quod est in actu virtuali, bene potest esse in potentia ad actum formalem<sup>79</sup> . . . Modo in proposito: anima est in actu virtualiter ut eliciat actum suum, et est in potentia formaliter ad retinendum actum suum in se, qui est ei quasi actus formalis quo formaliter est in actu; et hoc non est inconveniens” (*Ibidem*).

Et hinc afferuntur non minus quam 17 argumenta ad astruendam, explicandam vel defendendam realem identitatem animae cum suis potentiis. Verum identitas realis non excludit quamcumque distinctionem; cuius natura nunc determinanda est. Nec tamen oportet in hoc multum immorari, quia haec distinctio aliunde nobis iam bene nota est, cum eadem sit ac illa quam Fundatus inter essentiam et existentiam

<sup>79</sup> Simili modo limitatur hoc axioma a Scoto, *Op. Oxon.* I, d. 3, q. 7, n. 27: “Quod idem sit virtualiter tale in actu, et formaliter tale in potentia, nulla est contradictio” (IX, p. 374s).



in creaturis, vel inter attributa divina assignavit: distinctio rationis obiectivae, seu termino magis familiari: distinctio formalis a parte rei:

“Dicitur igitur aliter ad quaestionem, quod sicut ex parte obiecti est quod ipsum in se consideratum dicitur ens; prout vero perficit et movet intellectum per speciem suam, habet rationem veri, ut natum est adaequare sibi intellectum; prout vero habet rationem perfecti, potentis inclinare voluntatem, dicitur bonum; et ista tria per ordinem: *ens, verum, bonum, sunt idem quod ipsum obiectum; sic ex parte animae: ipsa prout in se consideratur, dicitur essentia; prout est illud quod natum est moveri a vero sub ratione veri, dicitur intellectus; prout vero consideratur ut illud quod natum est inclinari in bonum sub ratione boni, dicitur voluntas. Et sic pono quod potentiae sunt virtutes ipsius essentiae per quas elicit diversas operationes, quae tamen virtutes sunt ipsa essentia, et distinguuntur inter se sicut attributa divina*”<sup>80</sup> (f. 24r).

Ex his tamen minime sequitur quod anima per purum respectum ad actum intelligendi vel volendi evadat intellectus vel voluntas, ac si quando non vult aut intelligit actu non esset in ea intellectus et voluntas. Relatio etenim, utpote quid rationis, non facit potentiam, nec actum elicere valet. Sed in ipsa essentia animae, seu a parte rei, et independenter a quavis operatione actuali, adest virtus et ratio ad eliciendum actus differentes:

“Nec dico quod anima induit rationem potentiae formaliter per respectum superadditum essentiae... Dico igitur quod ipsa anima, non in quantum anima, sed in quantum habet virtutem intelligendi elicit actum intelligendi; in quantum vero habet virtutem volendi elicit actum volitionis. Sicut si una forma accidentalis, puta calor, haberet virtutem disgregandi et calefaciendi, ipsa immediate, sine aliquo alio quod esset sibi ratio formalis agendi, et in quantum habens unam virtutem calefaceret, et in quantum habens aliam disgregaret; tamen hoc non fieret sine respectu ad actum, tamen respectus non est ratio agendi. — Unde potentia super essentiam animae addit virtutem, non quod virtus sit aliud, sed in quantum habet virtutem intelligendi dicitur potentia <intellectiva>, in quantum habet virtutem volendi

<sup>80</sup> In hac quaestione Subtilis a Gulielmo de Ware dependere videtur; cf. *Op. Oxon.* II, d. 16, q. un., nn. 17—18: “Sicut ergo ens continet unitive rationem unius, veri et boni aliorum, sic anima continet potentias istas unitive, quamquam formaliter sint distinctae... Sic ergo possumus accipere de intellectu et voluntate, quae non sunt partes essentiales animae, sed sunt unitive contenta in anima quasi passionibus eius, propter quas anima est operativa, non quod sint essentia eius formaliter, sed sunt formaliter distinctae, idem tamen identice et unitive, ut in primo libro probatum est de attributis divinis” (XIII, p. 43s).

dicitur voluntas. Et different istae potentiae ab essentia animae et inter se sicut differunt attributa divina inter se et ab essentia divina” (*Ibidem*).

Iam aliunde certi sumus quod huiusmodi distinctio non est a nostro intellectu operata reique quasi imposita, quinimo in ipsa re inventa, ubi nempe adest “ante omnem operationem intellectus”.

### 3. Intellectus et memoria intellectiva sunt una potentia.

Licet Doctor Fundatus cum aliis theologis concordat in asserendo quod imago SS. Trinitatis in homine formaliter in memoria, intelligentia et voluntate consistit; nihilominus absolute negat intellectum et memoriam duas esse potentias diversas. Immo sunt una et eadem potentia, quae si consideratur quasi in quiete, ut detentiva habituum et specierum, vocatur memoria, si vero attenditur in actu, tanquam elicitiva actus intellectionis, dicitur intelligentia. Ratio autem huius identitatis est quia obiectum potentiae tam operantis quam quiescentis identicum est:

“Ideo dicitur ad quaestionem quod sicut eadem albedo est quae non disgregat in tenebris et quae disgregat ad praesentia et resplendentiam lucis, sic eadem potentia est quae non elicit actum, habens tamen habitum seu speciem, et quae elicit actum per applicationem voluntatis copulantis intellectum cum obiecto. Ita quod prout in se habet habitum et non elicit actum, manens quasi in quiete, dicatur memoria, prout vero per copulationem voluntatis<sup>81</sup> elicit actum dicatur intelligentia. Et hoc patet ex parte obiecti: illud enim idem verum speculor in actu quod habeo seu teneo in habitu” (Q. 26, f. 25 v).

Eadem est opinio etiam Henrici Gandavensis, cum hac sola differentia: ipse loco speciei constanter de habitu loquitur, cum non admiserit praesentiam specierum in vi intellectiva sed solum in vi sensitiva<sup>82</sup>.

### 4. Primatus voluntatis.

Voluntarismus, qui consideratur tanquam nota propria scholae augustinianae in genere, et franciscanae in specie, etiam in doctrina Gulielmi de Ware apparet.<sup>83</sup> Namque suo iudicio intellectus et voluntas, licet in una

<sup>81</sup> Fundatus non intendit hic negare quin operatio intellectus in genere operationem voluntatis praecedat. Namque copulatio voluntatis de qua hic loquitur, iam praesupponit praesentiam specierum intelligibilium aut habituum scientiarum in memoria.

<sup>82</sup> *Quodl.* V, q. 25: “Ita quod memoria intellectualis nihil aliud sit proprie dicta quam intellectus possibilis, ut est demonstrativus habitus scientialis qui virtute est omnia scibilia . . . Ut secundum hoc memoria intellectualis, sive in homine sive in angelo, non sit contentiva specierum impressarum, sicut est memoria sensitiva, sed tantummodo habituum scientialium” (I, f. 305 d—306 a).

<sup>83</sup> Cf. H. Spettmann, *art. cit.*, pp. 46—49.

eademque simplici essentia animae fundentur, non sunt aequalis dignitatis; nec sufficit dicere, ut voluit S. Thomas<sup>84</sup>, quod secundum se et simpliciter intellectus sit altior et nobilior, secundum quid vero voluntas; multo minus est admittenda quod intellectus voluntatem simpliciter et omni sub aspectu superet. Auctoritates enim tam Sanctorum quam Philosophorum evincunt quod "*voluntas est domina et imperans omnibus quae sunt in anima*, in tantum quod non possunt sibi non obedire; et per consequens sequitur quod ipsa est nobilissima potentia simpliciter" (Q. 30, f. 29r). Hoc patet iam ex eo quod actus intellectus ordinatur ad actum voluntatis, unde sequitur quod etiam ipse intellectus ordinatur ad voluntatem. Praeterea, obiectum voluntatis, ratio scilicet boni et finis, nobilior est obiecto intellectus.

Sed ut positionem Nostri hac de re accuratius intelligamus, oportet in mentem revocare illam distinctionem quam supra fecimus inter intellectum speculativum et practicum una ex parte, inter voluntatem speculativam et practicam ex alia. Nunc iam, iudicio Doctoris Fundati, intellectus quidem speculativus nobilior est voluntate practica, sed voluntas sub omnibus aliis aspectibus primatum tenet: voluntas enim speculativa superat dignitate intellectum tam speculativum quam practicum; voluntas vero practica e parte sua intellectum practicum praecellit:

"Dico ergo ad quaestionem distinguendo de intellectu et voluntate, quod sicut est intellectus speculativus et practicus, ita est voluntas speculativa et practica. Tunc dico quod intellectus speculativus nobilior est voluntate practica, quia sapientia, quae est in intellectu speculativo, est nobilior habitus quam ille qui est in voluntate practica, si tamen aliquis habitus sit ibi. Sed voluntas practica est nobilior intellectu practico, quia virtutes morales practicae in voluntate practica, si aliquae ibi sint, sunt nobiliores prudentia practica quae est in intellectu practico. Hoc etiam patet, quia melius est diligere temporalia in ordine ad finem quam intelligere; et sic respectu eorum quae sunt ad finem voluntas est nobilior. Simpliciter autem voluntas speculativa nobilior est quam intellectus speculativus, quia habitus caritatis nobilior est sapientia. Ex his patet quartum, quod voluntas speculativa nobilior est intellectu practico. — Si igitur inveniatur alicubi dictum a Philosophis quod intellectus est nobilior voluntate, intelligunt de intellectu pure speculativo et de voluntate practica pure per comparisonem ad agibilia a nobis; et sic conceditur quod intellectus est nobilior" (f. 29v).

<sup>84</sup> *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 82, art. 3. — Quoad positionem Duns Scoti vide praesertim *Op. Oxon.* IV, d. 42, q. ex latere: Utra potentia sit nobilior: intellectus an voluntas (XXI, pp. 123—70).

## 5. Libertas voluntatis.

Gulielmus de Ware libertatem voluntatis sub proprio titulo non pertractat, e quaestione tamen ubi de primatu voluntatis agit sufficienter elici potest quid de hac re senserit. Dignitas enim non solum voluntatis sed etiam totius hominis maxime in sua libertate consistit: "*Maxima nobilitas in homine est quod sit liberi arbitrii*; et hoc inest homini per voluntatem, quia voluntati secundum se et principaliter inest libertas" (Q. 30, f. 29r).

a) *Voluntas non determinatur ab intellectu.* — Voluntas, ut supra vidimus, domina est et imperatrix in anima eique omnes aliae obediunt facultates. Quod non esset verum, si actus voluntatis ab actu intellectus determinaretur. Negari quidem non potest quod actus intellectus praecedat actum voluntatis, sed inde nulla sequitur voluntatis determinatio, immo intellectus subordinatio, in quantum "actus intellectus est propter actum voluntatis" et "ordinatur ad actum voluntatis" (*Ibidem*). Falsam tamen esset ex hoc concludere solum intellectum esse rationalem, voluntatem vero nonnisi per participationem; nam "*voluntas est rationalis per essentiam* sicut intellectus, cum fundetur in eadem simplici essentia in qua fundatur intellectus . . . Unde falsum supponunt dicendo quod voluntas est rationalis per participationem, non per essentiam" (f. 29v).

Nec est verum in sensu proprio quod intellectus "moveat" voluntatem, nam non agitur de motione vera et propria sed solummodo ostensiva et metaphorica: "Ideo dicitur quod intellectus non movet voluntatem imprimendo ei speciem vel aliquid, sed solum movet ostensive, quia non potest habere actum suum nisi praevio actu intellectus, et ideo *movet solum metaphorice*"<sup>85</sup> (f. 30r). Huiusmodi autem motio non est causa determinans actus voluntatis sed tantum ratio sine qua non, nam intellectus cognoscit bonum sub ratione veri, voluntas econtra vult illud idem sub ratione boni; ratio igitur formalis unius non est ratio formalis alterius: "Bonum cognitum, sub ratione cogniti formaliter, non est obiectum voluntatis, ita quod ratio cognitionis vel cognitiva sit formalis ratio obiectiva voluntatis, sed est solum ratio adnexa, quasi ratio sine qua non" (*Ibidem*).

<sup>85</sup> Cf. Scotum, *Op. Oxon.* II, d. 25, q. un., n. 24: "Vel sustinendo et dicendo quod appetibile movet appetitum tantum metaphorice, tunc debet intelligi, quod sicut appetibile movet appetitum metaphorice, ita appetitus sic motus movet effective membra ad exsequendum, ut acquiratur illud appetibile" (XIII, p. 223a).



b) *Voluntas non determinatur ab obiecto*. — Libertas inseparabilis est a voluntate, in tantum quod suam libertatem conservat in omni casu et in praesentia cuiuscumque obiecti, etiam ipsius summi boni, si agitur de angelis et beatis in patria. Hi quoque liberi manent, ita ut quantum est ex parte obiecti, essentiae scilicet divinae praesentis, possunt eam amare, odire vel indifferenter se habere. Si nihilominus, ut fides tenet, peccare non possunt, hoc non est propter praesentiam obiecti, sed potius propter dotem specialem qua Deus ita voluit confirmare voluntates eorum ut ab eius amore nunquam postea declinare possent:

“Aliter tamen videtur mihi esse dicendum, quod voluntas in beatis dupliciter potest considerari: ut natura est, et ut libera est absolute . . . Si autem voluntas consideratur ut libera, sic non est ratio quin possit peccare nisi plus ponatur quam habitus a parte potentiae et essentia divina praesens in ratione obiecti; quia *sicut voluntas libere convertitur in Deum, sic libere potest se avertere a Deo*, non quia aliqua ratio boni deficiat in obiecto, sed ex libertate potentiae; immo quod plus est, si sibi placet, nullum actum habere respectu talis obiecti in quantum libera est, quia hoc est ex libertate eius quod potest elicere actum vel non elicere, quia non est de ratione habitus necessitare potentiam; et maxime potentiam ut libera est, sed solum facilitare. Nec (f. 135v) etiam de ratione obiecti est potentiam necessitare, sed solum inclinare. Et tunc libere convertendo se ad creaturam posset peccare nisi plus ponatur. Dicitur ergo quod completa ratio, cum aliis tamen, quare angelus beatus et similiter anima non possint peccare, est dos confirmationis per quam Deus specialiter conservat voluntatem ne possit se avertere a Deo”<sup>86</sup> (Q. 143, f. 135r—v).

c) *Voluntas non determinatur a Deo*. — Determinatio tandem voluntatis posset provenire a parte Dei qui, tamquam causa prima, in omni actione creaturarum aliquo modo concurrat. Gulielmus problema concursus divini his verbis circumscribit: Quaeritur utrum agens increatum et creatum concurrant in omni actione creata; hoc est: an omne productum hic inferius producat a Deo et ab agente creato simul, vel a Deo solum vel ab agente creato solum (Q. 141, f. 133v). De voluntate quidem nec in titulo nec in expositione est mentio, quaestio tamen, cum sit generalis,

<sup>86</sup> Idem docet Doctor Subtilis, *Op. Oxon.* IV, d. 49, q. 6, n. 10: “Dico ergo quod causa huius perpetuitatis nec est forma beatitudinis, quasi per ipsam beatitudo formaliter sit necessaria; nec natura potentiarum illarum, quasi circa obiectum necessario operentur; nec habitus in potentiis, quasi necessario determinans potentias ad perpetuo operandum; sed est ex sola voluntate divina, quae sicut perficit naturam intensive, ita conservat eam in tali perfectione perpetuo” (XXI, p. 228b).

absque dubio respicit non solum actiones naturales sed etiam humanas; conclusio igitur de utraque valebit: Deus revera in omni actione creaturarum concurrat; non elicit tamen actiones earum, sed solum dat eis formam et virtutem qua proprias operationes perficere valent<sup>87</sup>. — Notanda tamen est cautela qua haec conclusio enuntiatur:

“Nolo hic aliquid asserere. tamen non video necessitatem aliquam ponendi quod agens increatum eliciat actionem in omni actione creaturae; sed sicut generans grave movet grave non per aliquem actum elicitum a generante . . . sic Deus movet omnia et facit omnia opera creaturarum non per aliquem actum elicitum a seipso, sed quia Deus dat formam rebus et virtutem operandi, mediante qua forma et virtute res eliciunt operationes suas. Et sic Deus dicitur operari in omni operatione creaturae, non quod eliciat actum simul concurrentem cum actione creaturae, dico de necessitate, sed quia dat formam et virtutem per quam elicitur actus” (f. 133v—134r).

Pro hac positione, in quantum ad voluntatem pertinet, iure allegari possent fere eadem argumenta quibus Doctor Fundatus alibi sufficientiam luminis naturalis ad cognoscendum demonstravit theoriamque specialis illuminationis reprobavit.

### Conclusio.

Propositum erat nobis doctrinam philosophicam Gulielmi de Ware per multas quaestiones operis sui dispersam summam colligendo in ordinem redigere atque ad modum compendii lectoribus proponere. Licet huiusmodi expositio ad theses principales maiorisque momenti philosophici sit limitata, nihilominus positiones quas hic selegimus sufficientes existimamus ad ingenium philosophicum Doctoris Fundati illustrandum.

Opus quidem quod ipse posteris reliquit ex principali intentione theologicum est, per consequens magna ex parte doctrinam theologicam continet; quisquis tamen illud vel parumper volverit, facile comperiet se librum non modo theologi sed simul etiam philosophi prae manibus habere. Primo namque obtutu apparet Fundatum in problematibus philosophicis sui temporis versatissimum fuisse; et licet non omnia ex professo pertractaverit, tamen sub proprio titulo et fusius plura exposuit quam in operibus huius generis expectari posset. Philosophus erat ingenio subtilis; in positionibus adversariorum diiudicandis indolem

<sup>87</sup> Alia est quaestio theologica de concursu divino in actibus meritoriis eliciendis, de qua cf. F. Mitzka, *Anfänge einer Konkurslehre im 13. Jahrhundert*, in *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie*, LIV 1930, pp. 161—79; de sententia Gulielmi de Ware sermo est *ibidem*, pp. 171—2.

criticam ostendit, solutiones tamen proprias ut plurimum caute, immo aliquando titubanter proponit. Fatendum quoque est Nostrum in argumentationibus evolvendis perspicuitate haud praecellere: argumenta enim pro et contra non semper pari tractu currunt, sed saepe commiscuntur; opiniones opinionibus opponuntur et responsiones ad obiecta iterum alias obtinent obiectiones. — Eruditio ipsius omnem vincit exspectionem, nam — si computatio H. Spettmann<sup>88</sup> recta est — circa millies allegat Philosophos et totidem vicibus Sanctos. Inter Philosophos, qui citantur, primum locum Aristoteles, secundum Averroes, tertium vero Avicenna tenet; inter Patres autem Augustinus, deinde Anselmus et Ioannes Damascenus maiori cum frequentia occurrunt. — Non minus versatus est in sententiis magnorum doctorum qui vel suo tempore vel paulo ante floruerunt, ut S. Bonaventurae, S. Thomae, Godefridi de Fontibus, Richardi de Mediavilla, Aegidii Romani, praecipue vero Henrici Gandavensis, cuius volumina ponderosa constanter, ut censemus, ante oculos habuit. Praeter hos noverat etiam plures alios auctores paris aetatis vel forsitan socios, quorum opera nobis magna ex parte ignota sunt. — Nulli horum tamquam magistro adhaerens, omnes paratus est impugnare, aequae ac ab eisdem illa quae sibi placent eclecticorum more recipere. Eadem de causa non potest Noster sequacibus unius alteriusve scholae adnumerari, ut dicatur eum fuisse Augustinismi vel Aristotelismi sectatorem: nam quo pacto dicetur aristotelicus qui materiam prima ut entitatem positivam, intellectum vero tanquam potentiam activam considerat; et quomodo habebitur Augustinismi traditionisve franciscanae aemulus qui illuminationem, materiam spiritualem et rationes seminales e sua doctrina eliminat? Veritati idcirco magis appropinquaret qui diceret Fundatum inter has duas scholas velut medium tenere.

Quaestio utrum Gulielmus de Ware magister Scoti fuerit necne, non erat praesentis inquisitionis. Pro certo tamen affirmari potest ipsum inter omnes auctores franciscanos, quorum doctrina nobis nota est, Doctori Subtili proximius accessisse. Hoc extrinsecus in eo apparet quod ambo cum eisdem disputant adversariis, inter quos apud utrumque Henricus Gandavensis primum, S. Thomas vero secundum locum obtinent. Concordia vero doctrinalis in hoc praesertim comparet quod quasdam positiones magni momenti, quas Fundatus e traditione scholae franciscanae retinuit, ut actualitatem materiae primae, pluralitatem formarum, voluntarismum et distinctionem formalem, modo suo etiam Subtilis tenet; alias vero non minoris momenti, quas Gulielmus reiecit,

<sup>88</sup> *Art. cit.*, pp. 410—12.

ut doctrinam illuminationis et materiam spiritualem, etiam Scotus dereliquit. Haec tamen, nostro iudicio, non sufficerent ad probandum Duns Scotum lectionibus Doctoris Fundati astitisse, nisi traditioni fidem adiungeremus. Etenim indicia evolutionis scholae franciscanae ab Augustinismo ad Aristotelismum iam ante Nostrum observari possunt, ut ex. gr. apud Richardum de Mediavilla, Petrum Ioannem Olivi et Petrum de Trabibus. Maxima affinitas inter Gulielmum et Scotum in expositione atque applicatione distinctionis formalis apparet, ast Scotus etiam pro hac opinione non ad suum magistrum putativum sed potius ad "doctorem antiquum scilicet Bonaventuram"<sup>89</sup> provocat. Aliae autem theses, quibus philosophia scotistica velut columnis regitur, ut doctrina de primo obiecto intellectus, univocitas entis, via scotistica ad existentiam Dei demonstrandam, natura communis et principium individuationis, apud Gulielmum de Ware in vanum quaererentur. Unde licet negari non possit auctoritatem Nostri apud Scotum aliquid valuisse, illa tamen, quantum utique ad solam philosophiam pertinet, certe non erat tanta quae viam ac rationem philosophiae scotisticae determinaret. Quod tamen de momento Doctoris Fundati nihil detrahit, sed solum confirmat Duns Scotum ingenio suo proprio et singulari philosophiae novas vias aperuisse. Nam alia ex parte certum est auctores saeculi XIVi ad auctoritatem Gulielmi de Ware saepe appellasse et opus eius insolita frequentia divulgatum, magni aestimasse; sed quid inde hauserint, praesentis tractationis non est inquirere.

Non ignoramus sane nos hac elucubratione philosophiam Doctoris Fundati nonnisi adumbrasse; theses enim quas in singulis capitulis huius articuli raptim delineavimus, si plene et omni sub aspectu exponerentur, totidem exigerent simulac mererentur commentationes particulares. Optamus proinde ut alii, his rudimentis forsitan incitati, incepta prosequantur atque perficiant.

GEDEON GÁL, O.F.M.

*Quaracchi, Italy.*

<sup>89</sup> *Rep. Paris.* I, d. 36, q. 3, n. 20 (XXII, p. 455a). Cf. T. Szabó, *art. cit.*, pp. 399 s.



# LA PREUVE DE L'EXISTENCE DE DIEU DANS LA PHILOSOPHIE NÉOSCOLASTIQUE

## SA MÉTHODE — SA STRUCTURE

Dans la philosophie scolastique actuelle on est généralement d'accord pour admettre que l'existence de Dieu doit être démontrée, toute intuition de l'Être divin nous étant refusée.

De ce premier accord il en résulte un autre d'ordre méthodique. En effet, si toute connaissance immédiate de Dieu nous est interdite, il n'y a que notre expérience du monde qui soit capable de nous conduire à Celui dont aucune expérience immédiate n'est possible.

Mais comment l'Invisible se révélera-t-il dans le monde exploré par nos yeux ? — Comment mettre en évidence cette relation secrète mais profonde et totale de notre monde au Transcendant ? Voilà la question qui se pose dans la démonstration de l'existence de Dieu.

Toute philosophie vivante est une philosophie en évolution. Aussi, ne serait-il nullement étonnant que la réponse des auteurs néoscolastiques à la question formulée n'ait pas toujours été identique. Tout en reconnaissant en Thomas d'Aquin le Maître commun, comme leurs prédécesseurs, les plus éminents de nos scolastiques actuels ne suivent plus exactement la même méthode dans la solution au problème de l'existence de Dieu. Loin de penser que ces auteurs aient tourné le dos au docteur angélique, nous pensons au contraire qu'ils ont mieux saisi l'idée métaphysique fondamentale des maîtres du haut moyen-âge et, — chose intéressante à remarquer, — par là même, ils se sont rapprochés davantage des philosophes de leur temps.

Dans cet article nous entreprenons une brève esquisse historique et critique des différentes réponses données par les philosophes néoscolastiques du demi siècle dernier au problème que nous venons de formuler : comment mettre en évidence cette relation secrète mais fondamentale de notre monde avec le Transcendant ?

*La Structure de la Démonstration traditionnelle.*

Par démonstration traditionnelle, nous n'entendons pas la preuve empruntée par les philosophes scolastiques modernes aux grands docteurs du moyen-âge. Nous oserions plutôt prétendre que l'arbre généalogique de cette démonstration n'a pas de racines plus profondes que le rationalisme Wolfien de la fin de 18<sup>e</sup> siècle. Par démonstration traditionnelle nous entendons donc la preuve souvent considérée jusqu'il y a une vingtaine d'années, comme le pur héritage des ancêtres médiévaux.

Tout le monde en connaît la structure. Elle peut être rendue par le syllogisme suivant:

M. Le contingent est causé<sup>1</sup>.

m. Or le monde est contingent.

C. Donc le monde est causé.

Des deux prémisses de ce syllogisme la première est un principe général à priori, — le principe de causalité —, la seconde une affirmation concernant le monde existant. Ces deux prémisses sont fondées *séparément* et *rapprochées par après*, pour faire surgir de leur jonction l'affirmation de l'existence de Dieu.

Le centre de gravité de ce raisonnement se trouvait dans la majeure. Le fondement du principe de causalité était considérée comme la gond et la pièce centrale de la preuve de l'existence de Dieu<sup>2</sup>, tandis que la démonstration de la mineure ne semblait mériter grande attention. Examinons successivement la majeure et la mineure.

*La Majeure:*

Le principe de raison suffisante ou de causalité fut l'objet d'interminable discussions dans les milieux scolastiques, surtout en Allemagne. Il ne serait pas facile, par exemple, de citer un philosophe allemand d'inspiration scolastique, des années 1920—1935, qui n'ait pas eu sa part dans ses discussions. Le point central de cette controverse fut la

<sup>1</sup> La majeure de ce syllogisme peut être formulé de différentes manières: tout ce qui n'existe pas par soi existe par un autre; tout ce qui n'a pas en soi sa raison suffisante, la trouve dans un autre, etc.

Généralement on distingue entre le principe de raison suffisante et le principe de causalité. On nommera principe de raison suffisante l'affirmation: tout ce qui est, a sa raison suffisante. Le principe de causalité s'énonce au contraire sous la formule: tout ce qui n'a pas en soi sa raison suffisante, la trouve dans un autre.

Nous croyons pouvoir parler indistinctement des deux à la fois. Cela se justifie parfaitement car de ces deux principes l'un est immédiatement déduit de l'autre de sorte que finalement ils ont le même fondement.

<sup>2</sup> Le P. Descoqs écrivait à propos de la preuve de l'existence de Dieu »ex contingentia«: »tamquam cardinem totius dialecticae hujus argumenti usurpabimus principium rationis sufficientis« *Schema Theodiceae*, p. 48.

grande question: le principe de raison suffisante (ou de causalité) est-il un jugement analytique ou un jugement synthétique à priori?

A la fin de 19<sup>e</sup> siècle le caractère purement analytique de ce principe était encore généralement admis. L'existence de jugements synthétiques à priori était alors simplement rejetée et la question kantienne: „comment des jugements synthétiques à priori sont-ils possibles?“ était récusée comme un faux problème.

Ces conceptions impliquaient des difficultés insurmontables qui ne pouvaient rester latentes. En effet, comment un jugement purement analytique pouvait-il enrichir notre connaissance. Qu'est-ce que la majeure de notre syllogisme pouvait ajouter à la mineure si elle était simplement analytique? Si l'affirmation de la contingence du monde était incapable, de nous mener à l'affirmation de l'existence de Dieu, sans l'apport de n'importe quel principe, comment un jugement analytique pourrait-il nous conduire plus loin? Aussi de fait, ce qu'on appelait jugement analytique était un principe synthétique<sup>3</sup> et les réductions du principe de causalité au principe de contradiction impliquaient toutes, sans exception, une pétition de principe.

M. A. de Margerie fut le premier à mettre franchement en discussion le caractère analytique du principe de causalité. Au cours du congrès scientifique international, tenu à Paris en 1888, il se fit fort de dénoncer la pétition de principe impliquée dans toutes les soi-disantes réductions du principe de causalité au principe de contradiction, et il affirma, non sans soulever le scandale de ses auditeurs, qu'en principe, cette réduction était inconcevable puisqu'il s'agissait d'un principe synthétique, irréductible par définition<sup>4</sup>.

D'autres auteurs défendirent après lui, la même thèse<sup>5</sup>.

Mais en déclarant synthétique le principe de causalité, rien n'est encore résolu, au contraire, surgit un nouveau problème.

<sup>3</sup> Les auteurs néoscolastiques du 19<sup>e</sup> siècle distinguaient entre des jugements analytiques a priori au sens strict et des jugements analytiques a priori au sens large. Ce qu'on appelait jugements analytiques au sens large n'était, en fait, que des jugements synthétiques.

<sup>4</sup> Cfr. *Le Principe de causalité est-il une proposition analytique ou une proposition synthétique à priori?* dans: *Congrès scientifique international des catholiques tenu à Paris en 1888*, t. I. Paris, 1889, p. 276—286.

<sup>5</sup> En 1912 M. J. Laminne défendait précisément les mêmes thèses que M. A. de Margerie en 1888. Par après une grande partie des métaphysiciens se rallièrent à la thèse du caractère synthétique du principe de causalité. Citons seulement quelques uns des noms les plus connus: A. Brunner, P. Descoqs, J. de Vries, L. Fuetscher, J. Geyser, J. Hessen, J. Santeler, F. Sawicki. Le fait que nous citons presque exclusivement des noms allemands s'explique par ce que nous avons dit: c'était surtout dans les pays de langue allemande qu'on s'est occupé de ces questions.

Tant qu'on croyait à son caractère analytique, le principe de causalité n'avait, à proprement parler pas besoin de fondement. Un principe dont le prédicat est impliqué dans la notion du sujet est évident par lui-même. La problème du fondement se pose seulement à partir du moment où on déclare le principe de causalité synthétique à priori.

Où chercher ce fondement? Sur ce point, les philosophes néoscolastiques n'ont cessé de discuter sans pouvoir arriver à une solution satisfaisante. D'aucuns cherchaient une solution dans l'analyse de notre expérience de la causalité, — l'expérience de l'influence causale du moi envers ses actes, — d'autres décrétaient l'évidence immédiate du principe en question.

La dernière solution était, à n'en pas douter, la plus facile. Elle fut défendue successivement par M. A. de Margerie, M. J. Laminne et le P. J. de Vries<sup>6</sup>.

Selon ces philosophes, la comparaison des concepts „contingent“ et „causé“ nous ferait voir immédiatement que le second doit nécessairement être attribué au premier, bien que le contenu du concept-prédicat ne soit nullement inclus dans le contenu du concept-sujet. Mais comment éviter l'accusation d'arbitraire qui frappe pareil appel à l'évidence?

En reconnaissant, au moins en principe, droit de cité, aux jugements synthétiques à priori, ces auteurs croyaient faire une concession au philosophe de Königsberg. Malheureusement ce genre de jugements synthétiques à priori, immédiatement évidents par la seule analyse des notions, n'aurait certainement pas trouvé grâce aux yeux critiques de Kant; ceux des jugements synthétiques à priori ici défendus, sont rejetés par Kant comme complètement arbitraires.

Les néoscolastiques qui ont essayé l'autre voie, — l'analyse de notre expérience de la causalité, — furent-ils plus heureux dans leur tentative? Nous allons voir que non.

Cette méthode fut introduite par M. J. Geyser<sup>7</sup>, un des plus éminents parmi les scolastiques allemands de son temps. Elle connut un moment

<sup>6</sup> J. Laminne, *Le principe de contradiction et le principe de causalité*, Rev. néoscol. philos., 19 (1912), pp. 453—488. J. de Vries, *Denken und Sein*, Freiburg (All.) 1937, *Geschichtliches zum Streit um die metaphysischen Prinzipien*, Scholastik, 6 (1937); pp. 196—221.

<sup>7</sup> M. J. Geyser a consacré une bonne partie de ses publications au problème du fondement des premiers principes. A quoi bon pensait-il de construire d'élégants systèmes suspendus en l'air. Il faut avant tout s'assurer des fondements solides. La construction de ces fondements, il la considérait pour sa tâche. Ses ouvrages qui se rapportent à notre thème sont les suivants: *Erkenntnistheorie*, Münster, 1922; *Das Prinzip vom zureichenden Grunde, eine logisch-ontologische Untersuchung*, Regensburg, 1929; *Das Gesetz der Ursache*, München, 1933.



de succès et fut reprise avec de légères modifications, entre autres par le P. J. Santeler<sup>8</sup> et le P. L. Fuetscher<sup>9</sup>. Nous trouvons une solution semblable chez le P. Descoqs et le P. Picard<sup>10</sup>.

On ne saurait dénier à ces philosophes une certaine originalité quand ils estimaient devoir quitter le domaine des essences abstraites pour chercher le fondement du principe de causalité dans l'analyse du concret. Jusqu'alors régnait l'opinion que l'expérience ne pouvait nous révéler que des vérités de fait, des jugements à posteriori. C'est sous l'influence de l'idée du «Wesenschau» Husserlien que M. J. Geyser abandonnait cette conception et il allait se servir d'une espèce de réduction eidétique pour assurer un fondement solide au principe de causalité<sup>11</sup>.

Il fut, hélas; moins solide qu'il ne pensait.

Dans les considérations de M. Geyser et ceux qui l'ont suivi, on constate toujours la même extrapolation apparemment inévitable.

L'argumentation qu'ils présentaient revient en bref à ceci. Je me connais comme cause de mes propres actes, actes de pensée, de volonté, de mouvement etc. . . . Or, dit-on, si l'on pouvait parvenir à déceler par une analyse de mes «effets», la *raison formelle* pour laquelle ces actes sont «effet», sont «causés», on serait par là même arrivé à un énoncé justifié du principe de causalité. En effet, il me serait possible de dire que là où la même raison formelle se présente il doit y avoir causalité.

En analysant les produits de mon moi, mes effets ou mes actes, je constate que ce n'est pas en tant qu'acte de volonté, de pensée, d'affection ou de mémoire qu'ils sont causés. En général, leur «être-causé» n'est pas dû à leur essence. La relation de dépendance causale de mes actes envers mon moi repose uniquement sur la *contingence* de mes actes, sur le fait *qu'ils ne trouvent pas leur raison suffisante en eux-mêmes*.

On en vient de cette façon à la conclusion générale: *le contingent (ce qui n'a pas en soi sa raison suffisante) est causé*.

Nous ne pouvons ici discuter en détail ces considérations. Signalons seulement la flagrante extrapolation déjà mentionnée.

Les termes causalité et contingence ne sont pas univoques. Chaque science s'occupe d'un type différent de causalité. Mais il faut bien distinguer surtout la causalité intramondaine d'avec la causalité tran-

<sup>8</sup> *Intuition und Wahrheitserkenntnis*, Innsbruck, 1934.

<sup>9</sup> *Die ersten Seins- und Denkprinzipien*, Innsbruck, 1930.

<sup>10</sup> Le P. Descoqs s'est déclaré parfaitement d'accord avec les idées de son collègue le P. Picard, quant au fondement des premiers principes. L'ouvrage du P. Picard *Le Problème critique fondamental* peut être considéré comme l'expression des idées de ces deux philosophes à la fois.

<sup>11</sup> C'est seulement à partir de son *Erkenntnistheorie* en 1922 que M. Geyser adopte sa solution personnelle.

scendante ou métaphysique. Du fait que dans ce monde rien n'est indépendant de tout le reste, il ne suit pas sans plus que le cosmos comme tel est causé et contingent. C'est pour cela qu'à priori la tentative de fonder ce *principe métaphysique de causalité* sur l'analyse d'une relation causale de ce monde prête à de légitimes soupçons.

Voilà terminé notre voyage d'exploration à travers toutes les tentatives de fonder le principe général de causalité, majeure de la preuve syllogistique de Dieu. Le résultat est décevant car nous nous voyons obligés de rentrer les mains vides.

### *La mineure:*

S'il y avait un dissentement autour du fondement de la majeure, l'accord était unanime sur la démonstration de la mineure. Tous ces philosophes admettaient facilement la contingence du monde et pour les mêmes raisons.

Malheureusement encore, cette unanimité a semblé ne pas être une garantie suffisante du bien-fondé de leurs opinions.

Sur quoi se basait-on pour mettre en évidence la contingence du monde? Il y avait principalement deux raisons.

Fut nommé contingent, d'abord tout être dont l'existence ne formait pas un élément constitutif de la définition. En second lieu on considérait comme raison suffisante de cette contingence la fait, pour un être, de commencer ou de disparaître.

Aucun de ces deux arguments, tels qu'ils furent souvent présentés, ne résiste à la critique. Nous ne voudrions nullement prétendre par ceci que le commencement et la fin et surtout la non-coïncidence de l'essence avec l'être même, ne soient pas des signes authentiques de la contingence du monde. Nous pensons seulement que les arguments des philosophes visés suscitent les objections suivantes et le laissent sans réponse suffisante.

En effet contre les démonstrations de ces philosophes on pourrait formuler les réflexions suivantes.

Le critère de la naissance et de la disparition des êtres peut bien s'appliquer à la plupart des êtres de ce monde pris séparément, mais du monde en son entier, nous ne connaissons philosophiquement ni le commencement ni la fin. Et tout être de ce monde fût-il condamné à naître et à mourir il ne s'en suivrait pas pour autant que le monde comme tel fût soumis au même sort.

L'autre critère, semble, chez les philosophes en question, ne valoir qu'en vertu d'un présupposé typiquement rationaliste: ce que nous ne

reconnaissons pas comme existant nécessairement, n'existe pas de façon nécessaire. Cette thèse semble impliquer l'adéquation parfaite entre la connaissance humaine et l'essence des êtres.

Notre examen sur la démonstration soi-disant traditionnelle de l'existence de Dieu nous accule donc à une conclusion négative.

Avons-nous fait pour autant un effort inutile? Nous ne le pensons pas. Des résultats négatifs sont aussi des résultats, car les échecs du passé sont là pour nous indiquer une meilleure voie. Seulement pour tirer profit de notre examen il faut que nous sachions non seulement le fait mais aussi le pourquoi du double échec constaté. C'est ce que nous allons examiner dans les deux paragraphes suivants.

### *Raisons du double échec de la preuve traditionnelle.*

La raison de l'échec dans l'effort de fonder la majeure n'est pas différente de celle qui explique l'insuffisance des preuves de la contingence. Elle doit se chercher, pensons-nous, dans l'utilisation superficielle des concepts de «raisons suffisante» et de «contingence».

Attardons-nous un instant à la signification de ces termes et nous verrons ressortir immédiatement la véritable difficulté avec laquelle étaient aux prises nos philosophes. C'est justement le contraire de ce qu'ils pensaient qui est vrai: le point crucial de leur démonstration de l'existence de Dieu n'était pas le fondement du principe abstrait de causalité, mais le preuve de la contingence du monde.

D'abord, que pourrait signifier le principe abstrait de raison suffisante? Il y a moyen de pourvoir ce principe d'un sens tel que son évidence immédiate est indiscutable.

C'est le cas si nous entendons par raison suffisante, toute condition ou cause nécessaire de l'existence d'un être et sans laquelle cet être est inconcevable.

Il suffit d'attribuer ce sens au concept de raison suffisante pour que l'évidence du principe correspondant soit manifeste. En effet il est clair que l'existence de A suppose l'existence de toutes les conditions requises pour la possibilité de cette existence. Seulement nous devons nous rendre compte que ce principe ne nous apprend plus rien. Appliqué au monde, il ne dit que ceci: si le monde n'est concevable qu'en dépendance de Dieu, il faudra que Dieu soit pour que le monde puisse exister. Personne ne s'avise à discuter sur pareil principe.

On pourrait attribuer un sens plus compréhensif au concept de raison suffisante et au principe correspondant. Mais cela aura pour consé-

quence inévitable que le principe de raison suffisante n'est plus ni immédiatement évident, ni démontrable. Comment savoir en effet qu'un être A suppose comme fondement un être B, si ce n'est en relevant la contradiction impliquée dans la conception de A indépendant de B<sup>12</sup>.

En fait, on a toujours demandé au principe de raison suffisante plus qu'il ne pouvait donner. Les défenseurs du caractère analytique du principe de raison suffisante, — eux pas moins que les autres, — voulaient que, employé comme majeure dans le syllogisme cité au début de cet article, ce principe ajoutât quelque chose à la mineure, c'est-à-dire, qu'il fût synthétique avec le résultat que nécessairement il devint arbitraire.

Mais pourquoi demander à ce principe ce qui dépassait ses forces? Parce qu'il fallait bien qu'à la mineure on ajoutât quelque-chose, puisque, à elle seule, l'affirmation de la contingence du monde ne conduisait pas à l'affirmation de Dieu. Nous arrivons ainsi à la seconde notion centrale: la notion de contingence.

La définition nominale de la contingence était claire: on appelait contingent ce qui n'avait pas en soi sa raison suffisante. Mais quand ou à quelles conditions peut-on dire du monde qu'il ne trouve pas en soi sa raison d'être? A cette question, il nous semble, que la réponse était simple. Il n'y a en effet qu'un moyen pour relever la contingence du monde, c'est la démonstration que le monde est positivement inconcevable sans Dieu, en d'autres termes, qu'il devient contradictoire sans Dieu.

Mais nos philosophes n'étaient pas du même avis. Pourtant, nous ne comprenons pas comment ils ont pu affirmer la contingence du monde avant de relever la contradiction dont nous venons de parler. Moins compréhensible encore nous semble le fait que M. A. de Margerie, M. J. Laminne, M. J. Geyser, le P. L. Fuetscher et d'autres encore affirmaient la contingence du monde tout en déclarent que cette contradiction n'existait pas.

<sup>12</sup> Qu'on remarque bien ici que nous n'entendons nullement mettre en discussion le principe de raison suffisante comme tel. Il s'agit ici du principe abstrait et général de causalité tel qu'il fut formulé et démontré par de nombreux auteurs scolastiques antérieurs. Les auteurs plus récents dont nous parlons plus loin ne rejettent nullement ce principe respectable mais sont d'avis qu'il ne se laisse pas démonter à part de la preuve de la contingence. Ainsi qu'écrivait Maréchal «Le Principe transcendant de causalité exprime cette révélation complémentaire et simultanée de la contingence objective et de l'Absolu qui le fonde» Cahier I, p. 385. Cfr. J. Möller, *Der Geist und das Absolute*, 1951 p. 208: «Das Prinzip vom zureichenden Grunde und das der Kausalität sind nicht Prinzipien, die immer zunächst logisch begründet werden müssen, um dann angewandt zu werden, sondern sind Ausdruck der Struktur menschlichen Geistes selbst».



Dans ce cas il devient difficile de savoir ce qu'on entend encore par contingence.

Ne paraît-on pas attribuer à la notion de contingence un sens purement négatif: est contingent ce qui *n'a pas* sa raison d'être sans que cette insuffisance pose une exigence, un vide à remplir.

La contingence du monde *conçue de cette façon* étant démontrée, — à supposer que cela fût possible —, il resterait un pas décisif à faire avant d'arriver à l'affirmation de l'existence de Dieu.

Le pont à jeter pour arriver de la contingence du monde à l'affirmation de Dieu, c'était le principe abstrait de causalité, qui pour être utilisable devait nécessairement être synthétique.

Il n'est pas étonnant, dès lors, que le fondement de ce principe dût sembler si difficile. Il n'était pas seulement difficile, mais à la fois impossible et inutile. Si nos philosophes avaient réfléchi davantage sur la signification de la notion de contingence, ils n'auraient manqué de voir l'impossibilité de leur tentative. Ils se seraient épargné beaucoup de temps et discussions.

*Conclusion concernant la structure de la démonstration syllogistique traditionnelle.*

L'examen des prémisses de la preuve syllogistique nous a révélé son défaut de structure. L'affirmation de l'existence de Dieu, nous l'avons vu, ne saurait être la conclusion d'un syllogisme dont la [majeure] (le principe générale et abstrait de causalité), et la mineure (l'affirmation de la contingence du monde), sont *d'abord prouvées séparément et rapprochées par après*. La majeure et la mineure ne peuvent être séparées; elles ne sont pas extérieures l'une à l'autre, puisque la démonstration de la mineure conduit immédiatement à l'affirmation de Dieu. Cela revient évidemment à dire, qu'après la preuve de la contingence du monde, le recours à un principe général devient superflu.

La difficulté, devant laquelle nous met la preuve de Dieu, ne consiste donc pas, comme on le croyait habituellement, dans le fondement du principe général de causalité. Elle réside plutôt dans la question comment mettre en lumière la contingence du monde. Cela veut dire que *la preuve entière* se situe au niveau de l'analyse de la réalité concrète. Il n'y a plus qu'une chose à faire: par une réflexion sur le monde de l'expérience, relever la contradiction interne impliquée dans la conception de ce monde en dehors de sa dépendance totale de l'Etre transcendant.

Nous voilà revenus à la question dont nous sommes partis, seulement avec cette différence qu'enrichis de l'expérience d'une tentative manquée, nous maintenant sommes en état de la formuler d'une façon plus précise : comment la réflexion sur le monde concret de notre expérience nous révélera-t-elle l'insuffisance de ce monde sans Dieu ?

On pourrait craindre que ne réapparaisse ici, sous une nouvelle forme, le problème central des discussions sur le principe de causalité : le principe de causalité est-il analytique ou synthétique à priori. Cette question prendrait ici cette forme : dans la réflexion sur le monde concret la découverte de la dépendance du monde par rapport à Dieu est-elle le résultat d'une analyse ou d'une synthèse ?

Et en effet, nous voyons que de ces deux thèses, chacune a eu ses défenseurs dans la philosophie néoscolastique.

#### *La conception du P. J. Maréchal :*

Le P. Maréchal est, à juste titre, considéré comme un des philosophes les plus éminents parmi les scolastiques de ce siècle. Ses ouvrages ont largement contribué à ressusciter la philosophie traditionnelle et ont exercé une grande influence. Nous demandons au lecteur de ne pas trop juger ses idées sur les quelques mots que nous pouvons en dire ici. Nous devons forcément appauvrir sa pensée jusqu'à la réduire à l'idée centrale<sup>13</sup>.

La découverte de la dépendance du monde par rapport à Dieu est pour Maréchal le résultat d'une synthèse à priori, synthèse notamment d'une donnée à posteriori apparaissant devant notre conscience comme un fait brut, isolé et la tendance naturelle et à priori de l'intelligence humaine.

L'intelligence humaine n'est pas un tableau inerte et statique sur lequel les choses viennent s'inscrire, mais un dynamisme, une orientation ou une tendance active. Ce dynamisme intellectuel, de par sa nature, n'a d'autre terme final que l'Infini. Tout ce qui n'est pas l'Infini même n'est objet de son désir qu'en tant que lieu de passage. D'ou, l'objet de l'expérience ne saurait être connu intellectuellement, — c'est-à-dire comme étant — qu'en tant que terme intermédiaire pour l'esprit perpétuellement en quête de son terme final : Dieu. Il est donc essentiellement connu comme renvoyant à Dieu. De cette façon le dynamisme

<sup>13</sup> Le P. Maréchal S. J. (né en 1878, mort en 1946) fut l'auteur de plusieurs ouvrages remarquables. Son ouvrage le plus connu est intitulé : *Le Point de Départ de la Métaphysique* divisé en cinq *Cahiers*, formant chacun un volume. Les idées auxquelles nous renvoyons sont largement exposées dans le cinquième cahier portant comme sous-titre : *Le Thomisme devant la Philosophie critique*.

subjectif libère de leur isolement les objets particuliers en les mettant tous en rapport avec le même terme transcendant.

Mais ce lien noué par l'esprit entre l'objet d'expérience et Dieu n'est-il pas un rapport où cet objet n'entre que de force et malgré lui? Non. Le mouvement de l'esprit vers son terme est la nature même de l'intelligence et pour cette raison son terme ne saurait être une chimère. Il faut donc que Dieu existe et l'objet d'expérience n'existe qu'en dépendance de lui.

C'est donc *la saisie* intellectuelle d'un être qui révèle le rapport de dépendance de cet être envers Dieu. Et c'est l'expérience de notre tendance naturelle vers l'Infini qui dévoile Dieu comme Source transcendante de tout être fini.

La base de la démonstration Maréchaliennne, on l'a remarqué, est l'orientation naturelle active de notre esprit humain vers Dieu. L'affirmation de Dieu n'est pas tant le résultat d'une réflexion sur l'objet que sur *la saisie* de l'objet, sur *l'acte* de l'expérience.

Il s'agit donc bien d'une synthèse ici, la sensation nous livrant une donnée brute dont l'activité du sujet nous découvre l'origine transcendante.

Mais on pourrait ici poser la question de savoir si le P. Maréchal ne s'est pas laissé trop entraîner par le philosophe qu'il voulait réfuter. Tout le monde sait que la démonstration Maréchaliennne est élaborée pour défendre la philosophie traditionnelle contre l'agnosticisme kantien. De même que Kant déduisait de la structure du sujet connaissant les caractères d'universalité et de nécessité, le P. Maréchal cherchait le rapport de l'être fini à Dieu dans l'analyse de l'activité à priori du sujet. Ce fut avec raison, croyons-nous, que certains critiques de ses idées lui ont reproché de baser son argumentation sur une pétition de principe<sup>14</sup>. En effet, ne doit-on pas s'être assuré déjà de l'existence de Dieu avant d'affirmer l'existence d'une tendance naturelle vers Dieu?

*Les êtres mêmes nous révèlent leur source transcendante:*

Si nous voulons mettre en lumière la relation causale du monde à Dieu, il faudra la découvrir dans l'être (l'étant comme on dit parfois) même. L'être ne se présente pas à nous comme une donnée brute et isolée pour s'informer auprès de notre finalité intellectuelle sur son origine, mais c'est lui-même qui nous communique le secret de son fondement ultime.

<sup>14</sup> Cette critique nous la trouvons exprimée dans deux publications en langue néerlandaise H. Geurtsen, *De innerlijke structuur van het Godsbewijs*. Tijdschr. Philos., 6 (1944), p. 255; De Petter, *Voor een integrale Theodicee*. Tijdschr. Philos., 1 (1939), p. 856.

C'est donc plutôt par une analyse que par une synthèse que le rapport du monde à Dieu deviendra manifeste. Ne nous trompons pas, toutefois, sur le sens du terme «analyse». Il serait absurde évidemment de croire que l'analyse nous ferait découvrir Dieu au coeur de l'être comme on découvre le noyau à l'intérieur du fruit. L'analyse de l'être ne nous conduit jamais à l'intuition de Dieu.

Cependant, Dieu doit être présent d'une façon ou l'autre, dans le monde de l'expérience. Supposons que les êtres multiples de notre monde ne nous montrent, chacun séparément et tous ensemble, rien d'autre que soi-même, soi-même sans plus; comment dès lors pourrions-nous jamais arriver à découvrir dans ce monde sa dépendance de Dieu? Un monde qui ne révèle que soi-même ne saurait nous révéler la source dont il émane. Et pourtant pour que le rapport du monde à Dieu soit visible, il faut que, de quelque façon, Dieu soit présent dans le monde. Mais comment Celui qui se dérobe à nos yeux fait-il son apparition dans le monde? L'Être du Transcendant par définition ne pourra se laisser découvrir que comme l'Absent. Voilà le mystérieux paradoxe auquel se heurte la démonstration de l'existence de Dieu. Mais pour paradoxale qu'elle semble, cette tâche n'est pas impossible.

En fait, la supposition que nous venons de faire à propos de l'expérience humaine ne se réalise pas. «Notre activité intellectuelle, telle qu'elle se manifeste à nous, ne consiste pas simplement à capter les objets au hasard des rencontres.»<sup>15</sup> L'expérience d'un être ne se réduit jamais à la constatation d'un fait isolé; il se manifeste toujours comme enraciné dans l'absolu. En fût-il autrement, nous n'arriverions jamais à la connaissance de Dieu. L'absolu ne fût-il pas chez nous dès le commencement, écrit Hegel dans l'introduction de sa célèbre *Phénoménologie de l'Esprit*, il se moquerait de tous nos vains efforts pour l'atteindre. Mais sous quelle forme cet absolu se révèle-t-il?<sup>16</sup>

Non pas immédiatement sous la forme d'un infini transcendant, mais sous le voile d'une unité *foncière et mystérieuse, englobant tous les êtres* en une synthèse transcendente.

C'est dans le jugement comme affirmation que nous saisissons l'être comme étant. Or une affirmation ne porte jamais uniquement sur une donnée isolée, mais aussi sur l'absolu, sur la totalité de l'être.

Prenons un exemple: Pierre est homme. Ce jugement n'a pas seulement comme terme Pierre en tant qu'homme. Son sens peut se transposer comme suit: la totalité de l'être (l'absolu) est telle que l'existence

<sup>15</sup> A. Grégoire, *Immanence et Transcendance*, Paris, 1939, p. 99.

<sup>16</sup> Trad. Jean Hyppolite, t. I, p. 66.



de Pierre en tant qu'homme y trouve sa place ineffaçable, s'y est inscrite en caractères indélébiles. La réalité de Pierre est donc affirmée comme étant en harmonie avec tout le reste et tout le reste est en harmonie avec Pierre.

Tout jugement «pose» donc l'unité foncière de tous les êtres, foncière parce qu'elle n'est pas surajoutée aux êtres mais gît dans l'être même: *ens et unum convertuntur*.

Cette unité, nous la nommons mystérieuse, parce qu'elle nous place devant un gros problème, le problème de l'être même: c'est l'être même qui réunit tous les êtres en une unité transcendente. Or cette fonction essentiellement unifiante de l'être est précisément le côté par où l'être devient problématique. En effet on doit nécessairement se poser la question: qu'est-ce donc l'être pour qu'il puisse réunir des êtres si différents, voire irréductibles et ce d'une façon aussi foncière. Car malgré leur unité fondamentale, les êtres de l'expérience sont apparemment irréductibles et cette irréductibilité n'est pas moins radicale que l'unité. D'aucune façon mon autonomie libre ne se laisse affaiblir jusqu'à n'être qu'une modalité d'un substrat universel.

Radicalement divers, les êtres comment pourraient-ils rester «un» par l'être?

En effet, l'être des êtres particuliers ne saurait lier chaque être à tous les autres. Ce qui est divers jusqu'à sa plus profonde racine, ne saurait remplir une fonction unifiante.

Mais si, d'une part, l'être des êtres particuliers ne peut expliquer cette unité et si d'autre part l'être unifie indubitablement, c'est que dans l'être particulier nous n'atteignons pas le fond ultime des êtres. Au delà des êtres particuliers il doit y avoir une source unique et transcendante dont tous les êtres particuliers émanent. L'unité des êtres particuliers ne pouvant être en dernière instance immanent doit être conçue comme transcendante.

La synthèse transcendente des êtres particuliers doit donc être conçue comme le reflet d'une source unique et transcendante; elle est la voie qui nous achemine vers Dieu.

Ces idées, que nous ne pouvons qu'indiquer, nous pensons qu'elles sont celles des plus éminents métaphysiciens néoscholastiques de l'heure actuelle: citons seulement Mgr. L. De Raeymaeker<sup>17</sup>, le P. J. B. Lotz<sup>18</sup>,

<sup>17</sup> *Philosophie de l'Etre, Essai d'une Synthèse métaphysique*. Louvain 1946.

<sup>18</sup> *Sein und Wert. Eine metaphysische Auslegung des Axioms: "Ens et Bonum convertuntur" im Raume der Scholastischen Transzendentalienlehre, Erste Hälfte, Das Seiende und das Sein*, Paderborn, 1938.

le P. K. Rahner<sup>19</sup>, le P. L.-B. Geiger<sup>20</sup>. Quant à l'essentiel ce sont aussi les idées centrales, à notre avis, d'un L. Lavelle<sup>21</sup>.

Est-ce que les considérations que nous venons d'esquisser satisfont aux exigences que nous nous sommes posés plus haut? Pouvons-nous dire que dans l'unité transcendente des êtres Dieu se manifeste dans le monde comme l'Absent?

L'unité des êtres est bien l'aspect par lequel l'Invisible entre dans notre monde. Cette unité n'est pas Dieu, elle n'est que l'unité des êtres. Mais elle est divine. Car quoiqu'elle se manifeste dans le monde comme une qualité des êtres particuliers, elle n'y a pas sa source et doit nécessairement nous apparaître comme «l'empreinte de Dieu sur son ouvrage». L'unité des êtres particuliers révèle l'unité de la source transcendente perçant à travers la pellicule transparente des êtres multiples.

### *La métaphysique des maîtres du Moyen-âge.*

L'évolution que nous avons constaté au sein de la philosophie néoscholastique doit être caractérisée, comme nous disions dans notre introduction, comme un retour aux idées fondamentales de la métaphysique du moyen-âge. Nous croyons bien faire pour terminer de développer un peu cette assertion. Nous montrerons qu'il y a une parenté frappante entre les idées des métaphysiciens actuels pour lesquels nous n'avons pas caché notre préférence, et la doctrine de l'illumination de S. Bonaventure d'une part et l'idée de l'«esse» comme «actus essendi» de S. Thomas d'autre part.

La parenté entre la métaphysique actuelle et les idées de S. Bonaventure est frappante<sup>22</sup>.

Auparavant les néoscholastiques se sentaient visiblement embarrassés devant la vénérable doctrine de l'illumination divine. Celle-ci, défendue par trop de grands philosophes tels que S. Augustin, S. Bonaventure, Matthieu d'Aquasparte, était trop profondément enracinée dans l'histoire

<sup>19</sup> *Geist in Welt. Zur Metaphysik der Endlichen Erkenntnis bei Thomas von Aquin.* Innsbruck, 1939. *Hörer des Wortes. Zur Grundlegung einer Religionsphilosophie*, Munich, s. d. (1941).

<sup>20</sup> *La Participation dans la Philosophie de S. Thomas d'Aquin*, Paris, 1942.

<sup>21</sup> *La Présence Totale*, Paris, 1934.

<sup>22</sup> Le P. Descoqs ne faisait-il pas le reproche au P. Maréchal et d'autres philosophes qui suivaient sa piste, d'être plutôt bonaventurien que thomiste. Et en effet, si le thomisme devait être identifié avec la philosophie du P. Descoqs, on devrait bien dire que le P. Maréchal a abandonné le docteur angélique pour prendre comme maître S. Bonaventure. Mais nous pensons qu'en devenant plus bonaventurien, le P. Maréchal s'est rapproché en même temps du véritable S. Thomas.

de la philosophie pour être qualifiée de fausse. Pourtant on n'arrivait pas à l'apprécier à sa juste valeur, encore moins savait-on l'introduire au cœur de la métaphysique. Deux éminents néoscolastiques sont même allés jusqu'à la rejeter: Le Card. Mercier<sup>23</sup> et le P. Descoqs<sup>24</sup>. Mais à l'heure actuelle on saisit mieux le véritable sens de cette doctrine séculaire et ce qu'on présente comme le problème central de la métaphysique s'oriente dans la même direction.

A quel problème la doctrine de l'illumination prétend-elle donner la solution et en quoi consiste-t-elle?

Reportons-nous au texte de la quaestio IV du «De Scientia Christi» de S. Bonaventure. Nous n'allons pas abuser de la patience du lecteur en donnant une longue exégèse de cette question. D'ailleurs, cette exégèse n'est plus à faire. Quelques lignes suffiront pour bien marquer son contenu.

Le problème traité est bien énoncé dans la première phrase: «utrum quidquid certitudinaliter cognoscitur a nobis, cognoscatur in ipsis rationibus aeternis.»<sup>25</sup> Il s'agit donc de la connaissance certaine et de toute connaissance certaine, aussi bien des jugements énoncés à propos de réalités contingentes que des vérités générales telles que les premiers principes.

Et qu'est-ce qu'on se demande concernant cette connaissance? On se demande si l'objet de cette certitude doit être connu en Dieu, «in rationibus aeternis», et si, par conséquent la connaissance de Dieu est impliquée dans la connaissance certaine de n'importe quel objet d'expérience. Cette question, étrangère peut-être à première vue, s'impose pourtant à quiconque réfléchit sur ce qui est requis pour une connaissance certaine, c'est-à-dire une connaissance universellement valable. Les conditions de possibilité de toute connaissance certaine nous sont clairement signalées par S. Bonaventure: «Cognitio certitudinalis esse non potest nisi sit ex parte scibilis immutabilitas et infallibilitas ex parte scientis»<sup>26</sup>. Les exigences d'une certitude étant si hautes, la question surgit: d'où l'esprit humain tire-t-il son infallibilité et où l'objet connu prend-il son invariabilité. Le fait de l'infaillibilité de notre esprit et de l'invariabilité des choses est aussi sûr que la connaissance certaine elle-même. Mais il est sûr aussi que notre esprit ne saurait posséder cette infallibilité «ex propria virtute» et que l'objet particulier ne saurait-

<sup>23</sup> *Metaphysique générale ou Ontologie* (Cours de Philosophie, vol. II), 5<sup>e</sup> édit., Louvain, 1910, pp. 31 et suiv.

<sup>24</sup> *Praelectiones Theologiae Naturalis*, t. I, p. 564.

<sup>25</sup> *Quaestiones disputatae de Scientia Christi*, q. IV, vol. V, p. 17a.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.* p. 23b.

être invariable «simpliciter», mais seulement «ex suppositione.»<sup>27</sup> Et pourquoi? «Cum utraque sit creata et prodierit de non esse ad esse.»<sup>28</sup>

Dans la quaestio IV S. Bonaventure donne l'explication de l'invariabilité de l'objet; il nous explique comment l'objet particulier, qui, *considéré isolément* comme être particulier, ne saurait se présenter avec l'invariabilité requise, en sera pourtant revêtu par le fait qu'il est connu «in ratione aeterna».

Que veut dire cette «cognitio in ratione aeterna»?

L'invariabilité de l'objet connu, caractère absolu avec lequel il s'impose, doit être considéré comme l'immutabilité divine, se manifestant à nous à travers l'écran de la donnée d'expérience. Dans toute donnée d'expérience nous atteignons donc, non seulement cette donnée même, mais aussi Dieu en tant qu'il se manifeste à travers elle. Nous y connaissons Dieu «in speculo», dans le miroir des êtres particuliers.

Mais cette présence de Dieu même en tout être n'est pas immédiatement claire. Il faut la mettre au jour par une analyse attentive de la connaissance certaine et même après cela «pauci sunt qui velunt hoc credere.»<sup>29</sup> L'existence de Dieu n'est donc pas démontrée à proprement parler, on ne saurait faire que *montrer* sa présence: tout ce que le métaphysicien doit faire c'est se rendre compte par une analyse attentive, que la caractère absolu de la donnée est en fait l'apparition de Dieu dans le domaine de l'expérience ou que l'universalité de l'objet de notre expérience est «l'empreinte de Dieu sur son ouvrage.»<sup>30</sup>

Ne peut-on pas dire que le problème dont s'occupe la quaestio IV est le véritable problème métaphysique? L'être se manifeste à nous dans le jugement certain, et il s'y manifeste avec des caractères antinomiques: limité et variable il est revêtu en même temps d'infinitude et de stabilité éternelle. Or, nous explique S. Bonaventure cette infinité et cette stabilité, se manifestant dans l'être particulier comme ses propres qualités ne lui appartiennent pourtant pas «simpliciter». Il doivent être d'origine divine et, à la réflexion, ils nous révèlent leur source. Rien qui pourrait rappeler la soi-disante démonstration syllogistique traditionnelle.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., p. 26b.

<sup>30</sup> Dans les quaestiones disputatae de Mysterio Trinitatis q. 1, a 1, ad 12 nous trouvons affirmé explicitement qu'à proprement parler il n'y a pas de «preuves» de l'existence de Dieu: «hoc verum (Deum esse) non indiget probatione propter defectum evidentiae ex parte sua, sed propter defectum considerationis ex parte nostra. Unde huiusmodi ratiocinationes potius sunt quaedam exercitationes intellectus, quam rationes dantes evidentiam et manifestantes ipsum verum probatum.»



Quant à S. Thomas il est inutile d'insister. Il suffit de renvoyer le lecteur à l'ouvrage magistral et bien connu du P. Geiger *La Participation dans la Philosophie de S. Thomas d'Aquin*. Ce travail à la fois historique et systématique démontre bien quelle est la pensée du docteur angélique.

Qu'il nous soit permis pour terminer de citer un seul passage comme confirmation de la critique que nous avons faite à la preuve «traditionnelle».

Traitant de la dialectique par laquelle l'esprit s'élève de la considération des degrés à l'affirmation d'un maximum, le P. Geiger écrit : «La dialectique n'est pas davantage une *démonstration syllogistique*. On peut assurément se servir de la forme du syllogisme pour l'exprimer. On dira dans la majeure que partout où il y a des degrés de plus et de moins il existe un maximum. Puis on énoncera dans la mineure le cas des degrés de l'être, du bien, de la noblesse. En réalité il y a là une grande part d'illusion. Non seulement la majeure n'est pas une proposition universelle, nous l'avons montré plus haut, mais elle ne peut se vérifier que dans le cas particulier énoncé par la mineure, nous l'avons démontré également. C'est donc que nous avons affaire à un syllogisme d'exposition, c'est-à-dire à un procédé artificiel qui fait emprunter la forme syllogistique à une démarche de l'esprit qui n'en reçoit aucun accroissement de certitude.»<sup>31</sup>

G. SCHELTENS

*Vaalbeek-Louvain*

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<sup>31</sup> p. 352—353.

# HENRICI DE WERLA, O.F.M. TRACTATUS DE FORMALITATIBUS

## Introductio

### § 1. *De tractatus "De formalitatibus" argumento ac momento.*

Varii auctores scolasticae Franciscanae saeculi XIII., XIV., XV. tractatus "De formalitatibus" composuerunt vel de distinctione formali egerunt. Licet nomen Ioannis Duns Scoti doctoris subtilis inseparabiliter cum distinctione formali coniunctum sit<sup>1</sup>, quaestio de illa distinctione iam saeculo XIII. agitari coepit et potius originem theologicum quam philosophicum duxit, postquam illud capitulum "Credimus et confitemur"<sup>2</sup> a S. Bernardo Claravallensi compositum et approbante Eugenio III. papa anno 1148 a synodo Rhemensi promulgatum errores Gilberti Porretani († 1154) distinctionem realem inter esse Dei et essentiam ac inter personas divinas asserentis ac proinde simplicitatem divinam negantis confudit<sup>3</sup>. Iterum concilium oecumenicum Lateranense IV. anno 1215 celebratum capitulis "Firmiter credimus"<sup>4</sup> et "Damnamus et reprobamus"<sup>5</sup> similes errores famosi abbatis Florentis Ioachim reprobavit, qui unitatem personarum divinarum quasi collectivam et hac in re tritheismum docuerat atque contra magistrum Sententiarum Petrum Lombardum († ca. 1160) defenderat<sup>6</sup>.

Difficultates ergo mere theologicae de mysterio SS. Trinitatis causa totius litis de distinctione in divinis fuerunt. Qua in lite saeculo XIII. currente schola sic dicta Thomistica doctrinam S. Thomae Aquinatis sequens<sup>7</sup> et schola Franciscana inter se dissensiere, praesertim cum capita laudata tantummodo distinctionem realem in divinis reiecissent

<sup>1</sup> E. Longpré, *La philosophie du B. Duns Scot*, Paris 1924, 239.

<sup>2</sup> H. Denzinger-I. B. Umberg, *Enchiridion Symbolorum, Definitionum et Declarationum de rebus fidei et morum*, nn. 389ss, Ed. 26, Friburgi/Br. 1947, 181s.

<sup>3</sup> B. Roth, *Franz von Mayronis OFM. Sein Leben, seine Werke, seine Lehre vom Formalunterschied in Gott*, in: *Franziskanische Forschungen*, hrsg. Ph. Böhner-J. Kaup, Heft 3, Werl/W. 1936, 283 ss.

<sup>4</sup> H. Denzinger-I. B. Umberg, *Enchiridion* nn. 428ss, 199s.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.* nn. 431ss, 200ss.

<sup>6</sup> B. Roth, 286 ss.

<sup>7</sup> V. g. S. theol. I. q. 13. a. 4. concl. (Ed. Leon. IV 144 s); q. 26. a. 2 concl. (IV 302); q. 28. a. 2. concl. (IV 321).

nec qualis sit distinctio diiudicassent; schola Thomistica distinctionem rationis ratiocinantis seu virtualem cum fundamento in re ibidem adesse affirmavit, schola vero Franciscana ibidem esse distinctionem formalem seu inter a ratione distincta et realiter eadem existere aliquod medium tenuit. Quos theologos huius scholae si excipias Alexandrum Halensem O. Min. († 1245), Ioannem Pecham O. Min. († 1292), Richardum de Mediavilla O. Min. († ca. 1308), Guilelmum Guarrae O. Min. magistrum Scoti Oxonii nec quoad rem nec quoad terminos distinctionem formalem docentes<sup>8</sup>, primus novam opinionem in hac materia S. Bonaventura O. Min. († 1274) proposuit docens personas divinas independentes ab omni rationis actione ab essentia divina distinctas esse non obstante summa divinae essentiae simplicitate<sup>9</sup>. Illam distinctionem, licet eam termino tecnico "distinctio formalis" non nominaverit, tamen cum identitate reali in divinis congeneam esse implicite et reapse verificavit. At advertendum est S. Bonaventuram illam distinctionem ad casum memoratum limitare, ad differentiam nempe inter proprietates personales et divinam naturam et inter proprietates personales ipsas<sup>10</sup>. Qua in doctrina S. Bonaventuram Matthaeus ab Aquasparta O. Min. († 1302) secutus est, qui circa annum 1280 scripsit et doctori Seraphico circa terminologiam nutuanti et haesitanti adhaesit<sup>11</sup>.

Petrus Ioannis Olivi O. Min. († 1298) distinctione formali pariter usus est ad difficultates theologicas circa mysterium SS. Trinitatis solvendas<sup>12</sup>. Attamen speculationibus abbatis Ioachim Florentis non solum circa aevum Spiritus sancti seu Evangelium aeternum secutus est, sed et eius influxum quoad opinionem circa mysterium SS. Trinitatis subiisse videtur, nam a fratribus sic dictae Communitatis de tritheismo accusatus est<sup>13</sup>. De cetero cum S. Bonaventura docuit aliquod medium inter a ratione distincta et realiter eadem esse, sed eo modo ut Olivi magis identitati reali quam differentiae formali insistat. Insuper illam opinionem

<sup>8</sup> B. Jansen, *Beiträge zur geschichtlichen Entwicklung der Distinction formalis*, in: *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* 53 (1929) 344.

<sup>9</sup> V. g. I. Sent. d. 5. a. 1. q. 1 (I 111 ss.); d. 13. a. 1. q. 3 (I 235 ss); d. 24. a. 1. q. 2 (I 423 s); d. 26. q. 1 (I 451 ss); d. 31. q. 1—2 (I 533 ss); d. 33. a. 1. q. 1 (I 571 ss); d. 34. a. 1. q. 1 (I 586 ss); De myster. Trinit. q. 3. a. 1—2 (V 71 ss); Brevil. p. 1. c. 4 (V 213). — Cf. T. Szabó, *De distinctionis formalis origine Bonaventuriana disquisitio historico-critica*, in: *Scholastica ratione historico-critica instauranda. Acta congressus internationalis Romae anno sancto MCML celebrati* (Bibliotheca Pontificii Athenaei Antoniani 7) Romae 1951, 379—445.

<sup>10</sup> B. Jansen, 333 ss; cf. A. Stohr, *Die Trinitätslehre des hl. Bonaventura*, Münster W. 1923, 161.

<sup>11</sup> Ib. 529 ss.

<sup>12</sup> *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. B. Jansen (Bibliotheca franciscana scholastica medii aevi IV), Ad Claras Aquas 1922.

<sup>13</sup> B. Roth, 238—290.

secus ac doctor Seraphicus non ad mysterium SS. Trinitatis limitavit, sed illa et quoad res philosophicas usus est, ad transcendentalia nempe et universalia; naturam et personam; motum et cetera accidentia; diversas formas substantiae; potentias animae et eius essentiam; materiam et eius potentias; actum cognitionis et species; virtutes et earum habitus; creationem activam et passivam eiusque continuationem seu conservationem ceterasque relationes creaturarum ad Deum finem, creatorem, exemplar suum<sup>14</sup>. Doctrinam Petri Ioannis Olivi circa distinctionem formalem secutus est Petrus de Trabibus O. Min., qui saeculo XIII. floruit, discipulus fidelis sui magistri Olivi<sup>15</sup>.

Doctor subtilis Ioannes Duns Scotus O. Min. († 1308) doctrinam de distinctione formali opiniones suorum praecedentium doctorum scholae Franciscanae assumens clarius concepit et consequentius tractavit, praesertim commentans Sententias Petri Lombardi<sup>16</sup>; insuper inter quaestiones miscellaneas q. 1. et 2.<sup>17</sup> idem problema tractant, quin tamen authenticitatem harum quaestionum decidere velimus ac possimus. Scotus sicut et antecessores eius mysterium SS. Trinitatis considerans ac difficultates ex revelatione huius dogmatis resultantes enodare cupiens distinctionem formalem ut aliquod tertium inter unitatem ex parte rei et puram distinctionem rationis ratiocinantis clare pronuntiat asserens singulis conceptibus rationis ratiocinantis aliquas formalitates reales correspondere. Proinde distinctio formalis a doctore subtili propter mysterium SS. Trinitatis introducta non mere theologi interest, sed etiam philosophi, tum quia et in rebus philosophicis datur talis differentia, tum quia cum realismo criteriologico ac opinione de universalibus huius doctoris intime cohaeret. Emolumentum istius doctrinae a Scoto contra scholam Thomisticam defensae in hoc consistit illum hanc opinionem systematice ex suo systemate philosophico et theologico eliminasse ac terminologiam ulterius ita aperuisse, ut in historia philosophiae distinctio formalis non nominetur, quin et doctoris subtilis nomen occurrat, licet iam quoad rem ante

<sup>14</sup> B. Jansen, 518—528; T. Szabó, 405 s.

<sup>15</sup> F. M. Delorme, *Pierre de Trabibus et la distinction formelle*, in: France Franciscaine 7 (1924) 255—269; A. Teetaert, *Pierre de Trabibus*, in: DThC XII 2049—2064; T. Szabó, 404 s.

<sup>16</sup> V. g. Oxon. I. d. 2. q. 4 n. 41 (Ed. Paris. VIII 547 s; ed. Vatican. II 355 ss); d. 8. q. 4. n. 6 (IX 642 s); d. 35 n. 12 (X 553 s); II. d. 16. n. 17 (XIII 43); Report. Paris. I. d. 33. q. 2. n. 10 (XXII 403); d. 36. q. 3—4 (XXII 446 ss); II. d. 16. n. 18 ss (XXIII 74ss). — Cf. T. Szabó, 391 ss.

<sup>17</sup> (V 338—357); cf. P. Glorieux, *Répertoire des maîtres en Théologie de Paris au XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle* II n. 344 t, Paris 1933, 209. — Inter opera dubia habetur: Tractatus de formalitatibus incipiens: "Quaeritur utrum pluralitates formalitatum possint stare cum simplicitate", cf. P. Glorieux, l. c. an, 213.



Scotum in schola Franciscana inveniatur, ut dictum est; etsi Scotus distinctionem formalem docuerit ac suam mentem ulterius praedecessoribus suis explanaverit, negari nequit suam terminologiam aliquantulum fluctuare ac illum aliquando verbis uti, quae et Thomae et Suaresii opiniones sapere possint<sup>18</sup>. Coaevus Scoti Alexander Alexandrinus O. Min. hanc rem philosophicam non solum profundis, modo perfectiore ac terminis clarioribus Petro Ioannis Olivi absolvit ac tam criteriologice quam metaphysice fundavit, et plus doctore subtili facto insistit, quod conceptibus rationis ratiocinantis diversis etiam res omni actione intellectus praeviae in rebus ipsis correspondent, ita ut terminis "formalitas" et "esse quidditativum" synonyme utatur<sup>19</sup>.

Deinde Franciscus de Maironis O. Min. († post 1328) commentans Sententias Petri Lombardi<sup>20</sup>, quo ex commentario compositus tractatus specialis "De formalitatibus" falso Francisco tribuitur<sup>21</sup>, occasionem historicam totius quaestionis innuens non solum contra opiniones Gilberti Porretani et Ioachim Florentis pugnabat, quorum tritheismum quodammodo magister Ioannes O. P. Parisius anno 1321 innovaverat<sup>22</sup>, sed et doctrinam doctoris subtilis in terminologia, non in re ipsa ambiguum et ea de causa inter discipulos disputatam ulterius enodavit, clarius aperuit, contra adversarios, imprimis contra Herveum Natalem O. P. Thomistam († 1328) et Petrum Aureolum O. Min. Conceptualistam († 1322), defendit. Eius pondus hac in re super ista facta innititur: Primo terminum "formalitas" ab altero "forma" distinguit negans formalitatem esse terminum abstractum formae ac tenens sicut essentiam plura essentialia continere pariter unitatem formae formarum pluralitatem; secundo docuit formalitatem idem esse ac quidditatem generice sumptam et quidditatem specialissimam, subalternam, generalissimam transcendentiaque complectere; tertio doctrinam Scoti circa formalitatem doctrina de modis intrinsicis complevit, nam novem modi intrinseci — finitas nempe et infinitas et actus et potentia et necessarium et contingens et existentia et realitas et haecceitas — formalitati adveniunt vel desunt, quin eius alterent essentiam; quarto theoriam de quattuor gradibus abstractionis addidit, quibus ratio abstrahens realizatas graduatim apprehendit<sup>23</sup>. Franciscus de Maironis quaestionem

<sup>18</sup> B. Jansen, 317 ss.

<sup>19</sup> Ib. 523 ss.

<sup>20</sup> I. Sent. d. 8. q. 1 (Ed. M. de Hibernia, Venetiis ap. L. de Giunta 1519, 431 ss).

<sup>21</sup> Ib. 299r ss; cf. E. d'Alençon, *Meyronnes François de* in: DThC X 1639. Attamen hic tractatus inter opera dubia recensendus est, cf. B. Roth, 279.

<sup>22</sup> B. Roth, 371 ss; 403 s.

<sup>23</sup> Ib. 290—321.

primario theologicam et secundario philosophicam tenens ac a mysterio SS. Trinitatis incipiens et doctrinam doctoris subtilis perficit et omnem nutantem terminologiam clariorem reddidit et systemati philosophico-theologico perfectus inseruit. Simile quid de cetero dicendum est de Petro Thomae O. Min., qui saeculo XIV. vixit et bis tractatum de formalitatibus composuit<sup>24</sup>.

Saeculo XV. currente saepius de hac materia tractatur. Quin omnes, praesertim sine auctoris nomine relictos enumerare possimus ac velimus, tantummodo Antonium Sirectum O. Min. (scripsit ca. 1470)<sup>25</sup>, Stephanum Pillet Brulefer O. Min. († ca. 1500), qui Guilelmi de Vorillon fuit discipulus<sup>26</sup>, Nicolaum Lakmann O. Min. (scripsit 1442), cuius tractatum L. Meier in sequentibus publici iuris faciet<sup>27</sup> Petrum de Castro O. Min. (scripsit 1478)<sup>28</sup> enumeramus. Quibus operibus et ille tractatus "De formalitatibus" inferius edendus et quinque codicibus asservatus addendus est, cuius sunt

*Incipit*: "Sicut ex multis granis unus efficitur panis . . ."

*et Explicit*: "Ex istis concluditur, quod illud dicitur simpliciter simplex, quod omni genere compositionis caret".

*Codices manuscripti* tractatum continentes quinque hucusque noti sunt<sup>29</sup>

*Va* = Vaticanus lat. 1109, fol. 137ra—144rb,

*Se* = Senensis Bibl. comm. lat. G. VII 40, fol. 255ra—260vb,

*Ve* = Veronensis Bibl. comm. 1365, fol. 114ra—121rb,

*Ox* = Oxoniensis Bodl. Can. Class. lat. 205, fol. 113ra—114rb (fragm.),

*St* = Stuttgartiensis Bibl. regiae (hodie Landesbibliothek) H. B. X 10, fol. 133r—v (fragm.).

Materiam huius tractatus auctor secundum sequentem *dispositionem* ordinavit, quae dispositio textui in sequentibus publici iuris faciendo

<sup>24</sup> a) *Formalitates breves*, quae incipiunt: "Ad evidentiam formalitatum et modorum"; b) *Formalitates conflantes*, quae incipiunt: "Ad evidentiam distinctionis praedicamentorum sic intendo procedere" (Ed. Venetiis 1520), cf. A. Teetaert, *Pierre Thomas*, in: DThC XII 2048.

<sup>25</sup> A. Trombetta, *Expositio ad formalitates Scoti ab Antonio Syrecto edita*, Venetiis 1501, cf. B. Geyer, *Die patristische und scholastische Philosophie*, 11. Aufl., in: F. Überweg, *Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie II*, Berlin 1928, 624.

<sup>26</sup> *Magistri Stephani Brulifer Formalitates in doctrinam Scoti*, Parisiis 1490, cf. E. d'Alençon, *Brulefer Etienne*, in: DThC II 1146.

<sup>27</sup> L. Meier, *Quibusnam codicibus manuscriptis editio Formalitatum Nicolai Lakmann O. Min. hucusque fulciatur*, in: *Miscellanea Giovanni Mercati* (Studie testi 122), Città del Vaticano 1946, 1—34.

<sup>28</sup> A. Teetaert, *Pierre de Castrol*, in: DThC XII 1896.

<sup>29</sup> S. Clasen, *Walram von Siegburg, OFM., und seine Doktorpromotion an der Kölner Universität* (1430—1435), in: AFH 45 (1952) 124 s.

numeris latinis et arabicis litterisque maiusculis, minusculis, Graecis a nobis indicata est ad lectoris utilitatem. Tractatus nempe in *tres partes principales* dividitur, quarum prima terminos philosophicos adhibitos declarat (I), secunda distinctionum genera investigat (II), tertia tres difficultates in oppositum eorum, quae de distinctionibus auctor explanaverat, motas declarat (III).

Data definitione termini “distinctio” ac declaratis singulis partibus definitionis (I A 1) distinctionis tanquam communis cuiusdam *divisio* ponitur (I A 2). Tunc, viso quid sit distinctio *in communi* et quomodo dividatur, auctor de distinctione *in speciali* (I B) transit. Primo inter quas tractat *distinctionem rationis*, quam definit ac dividit (I B 1b) secundum definitionem et divisionem superius de termino “ens rationis” positam (I B 1a); secundam *distinctionem ex natura rei* definit (I B 2a) ac contra argumenta in oppositum allata (I B 2 b) defendit (I B 2 c); tertio ad *distinctionem modalem* declarandam definitionem modi intrinseci praemittit (I B 3a) ac argumenta huic definitioni contraria (I B 3b) solvit (I B 3c) necnon indicat divisionem modorum (I B 3d), priusquam distinctionem subnectat (I B 3e); quartae *distinctionis realis* definitionem praebet (I B 4c) declaratis terminis “realitas” (I B 4a) et “res” (I B 4c) ac obiectiones contra definitionem prolatas confundit; quinto investigat, quid sit quidditas (I B 5a), quid formalitas (I B 5 b), quid forma (I B 5 c) ac formale (I B 5d), quibus praemissis definitio *distinctionis formalis* sequitur; sextae et ultimae *distinctionis essentialis* definitio (I B 6c) elicitur, postquam termini “essentia” (I B 6a) et “natura” (I B 6 b) patuerunt.

Declaratione terminorum sic absoluta tractantur *investigationes distinctionum* (II), primo quidem *in communi* secundum decem modos seu vias (II A a 1—10) et duas dubitationes enodat (II A b, c). Dein *rationes distinctionum singularum* exsequitur (II B), primo triplici via *distinctionem rationis* proprie dictam indagando (II B 1), dum distinctionem rationis obiectivam eodem modo inquirendam esse dicit ac *distinctionem ex natura rei*, videlicet quattuor viis secundum quattuor vias, quibus oppositiones obviantur (II B 2); tertium locum investigatio *distinctionis modalis* obtinere debuisset, quam auctor in divisione generali quidem in initio huius partis secundae principalis data indicaverat (II), cuius hoc loco tamen oblitus esse videtur; quarto quattuor viis invenit *distinctionem realem* (II B 4); quinto quintuplici via inquirat *distinctionem formalem* (II B 5) ac sexto pariter quinque viis *distinctionem essentialem* (II B 6). Quae investigationes exemplis apposis uterius patefiunt.

Tertia et ultima pars *tres obiectiones* ad modum quaestionis disputatae tractat (III 1—3), ponendo primo argumenta pro “videtur quod sic” (III 1 $\alpha$ —2 $\alpha$ ) vel “arguitur quod non” (III 3 $\alpha$ ), secundo argumenta contraria (III 1 $\beta$ —2 $\beta$ ), tertio solutionem argumentorum in oppositum adductorum (III 1 $\gamma$ —3 $\gamma$ ). Et hoc tantum de contentu ac dispositione istius opusculi.

Huius tractatus “De formalitatibus” contentum intuenti statim *emolumentum* huius opusculi consistere in eo, quod quaestionem de distinctione formali plus philosophicam quam theologicam considerat. Qua de causa rem pure philosophice investigat neque res theologicas adducit nisi exempla et confirmationes hacque in re ille tractatus evolutionem huius materiae Scotisticae posteriorum quam ceteri auctores nominati praebet. Quoad doctrinam et terminologiam deinde potius discipulus Francisci de Maironis dicendus quam Ioannis Duns Scoti. Licet tamen saepius doctoris illuminati Francisci de Maironis Commentario in I. Sententiarum<sup>30</sup> usus sit, tractatus nominatus “De formalitatibus” mera compilatio vocari nequit nec auctor compilator, sed discipulus huius capituli scholae Scotisticae. Praeterea tractatus maximi momenti est philosopho studenti *ontologiae Scotisticae* utpote terminos fundamentales ontologiae declarans, essentiam videlicet, quidditatem, formalitatem, realitatem, naturam, rem, etc., ex quibus laudatus auctor doctrinam Scotisticam circa distinctiones secundum sex suos modos derivat. Cuius opinio de distinctione formali, etsi semel tantum Thomistis eorumque sequacibus obiiciat illos formalitatem male intellexisse (I B 5c), tamen per totum opusculum doctrinae Thomisticae circa hanc materiam non sequitur, quare Fr. Simon de Angelis O. P. “formalitates fantasticas” vituperat<sup>31</sup>, quin econtra auctor opusculi nominalismi sic dicti obnoxius fiat. Praeterea passim lumen theoriae de universalibus ad mentem Scoti (v. g. I B 1a), de ideis in divinis (v. g. I B 2c), de univocitate entis (I B 3c; III 3 $\gamma$ ) apparet.

Attamen et *rebus theologicis* aliquibus lumen infunditur, ut sunt — pauca tantum adducere volentes — distinctio formalis in divinis, i. e. distinctio inter essentiam et proprietates in Deitate (II B 2; III 1 $\beta$ ; III 3), origo trium personarum divinarum (I B 3c; II B 3), absoluta dependentia creaturarum a suo creatore (II B 4—5), voluntas divina respectu contingentium (I B 1b), sublata substantia remanentibus accidentibus in sacramento Altaris (I A a6; I B 3). Nemo tractatum nominatum inspiciens erit, qui pondus non parvipendendum illius ignoret.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. not. 20.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. infra.



§ 2. De Henrico de Werla O. Min.  
tractatus "De formalitatibus" auctore.

Henrico de Werla O. Min., qui "saecularis philosophiae non ignarus" a Ioanne Trithemio<sup>32</sup> praedicatur, praeter theologica etiam varia opera philosophica attribuuntur. Sic Lucas Waddingus<sup>33</sup> eum "Quaestiones in Universalia Porphyrii" scripsisse asserit et V. von Berg<sup>34</sup> opera Physicam et Logicam tractantia illius auctoris esse pronuntiat dicens: "Physicam in Commentariis et Logicam in Quaestionibus enodavit", quin aliquis illorum vel unum tantum codicem manuscriptum vel unam tantum editionem haec opera impressa continentem indicet. Dum neque "Quaestiones in Universalia Porphyrii" neque "Commentarii in Physicam" neque "Quaestiones in Logicam" ut dictum est nobis innotuerunt pariter in litteratura nullum testimonium alicuius opusculi ontologiam tractantis occurrit ideoque testimonia externa auctorum nec contemporaneorum nec posteriorum adsunt nominatum Henricum tractatum "De formalitatibus" scripsisse<sup>35</sup>.

At aliter res se habet, si inspiciantur *codices manuscripti*. Codicibus enim manuscriptis Senensi, Veronensi, Oxoniensi illud opusculum continentes auctoris nomen penitus tacentibus solus *codex Vaticanus* Henrico Werlio Ministro provinciali provinciae Colonieniss attribuit in fine scribens: "Gaude felix Colonia semper. Expliciunt formalitates egregiae doctoris de Colonia, scl. Fratris Henrici de Werla necnon Ministri dignissimi."<sup>36</sup> Codices manuscriptos saeculi XV. speciatim quoad tractatus "De formalitatibus" nomina auctorum saepe confundere<sup>37</sup> ac codicem

<sup>32</sup> *Catalogus illustrium virorum Germaniae*, Moguntiae 1495, 42 b; cf. H. Hamelmann, *Geschichtliche Werke*. Kritische Neuausgabe von K. Löffler, in: Veröffentlichung der historischen Kommission für Westfalen, Heft 3, Münster/W. 1908, 11.

<sup>33</sup> *Scriptores Ordinis Minorum*, Romae 1650, 169a; cf. J. A. Fabritius, *Bibliotheca latina medii et infimae latinitatis*, ed. Mansi, Florentiae 1858, 216; F. Hueber, *Dreyfache Chronickh von dem Orden des Seraphischen Ordensstifters Francisci*, München 1866, 442; P. Schlager, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Kölnischen Franziskanerordensprovinz*, Köln 1904, 241 s.

<sup>34</sup> V. von Berg, *Ratiocinium iuventutis franciscanae sive disquisitiones historico-theologicae super regulam, constitutiones et statuta ordinis nostri seraphici fratrum Minorum S. Francisci Conventualium*, Coloniae Agrippinae 1740, 325; cf. J. Hartzheim, *Bibliotheca Coloniensis, in qua vita et libri typographici et manuscripti recensentur omnium Archidioceseos Coloniensis...*, Coloniae Agrippinae 1747, 130; J. S. Seibert, *Westfälische Beiträge zur deutschen Geschichte I*, Darmstadt 1819, 272; P. Schlager, 242.

<sup>35</sup> S. Clasen, *Heinrich von Werl O. Min., ein deutscher Skotist*. Beiträge zu seinem Leben und seinen Schriften, in: Wiss Weish 10 (1943) 69.

<sup>36</sup> Vat. lat. 1109, fol. 114rb.

<sup>37</sup> V. g. in Codice Cracoviensi Bibl. Univers. 2030, fol. 302 r Formalitates Petri Thomae O. Min. recensentur "Tractatus de distinctionibus et modis

Stuttgartiensem auctorem huius opusculi Franciscum de Maironis nominare nullatenus negare intendentes<sup>38</sup> maioris tamen ponderis codicem Vaticanum censemus, cuius scriptor optime notus plenam fidem meretur. Qui Henrici de Werla tractatum "De formalitatibus" eiusdem in I. Sententiarum Petri Lombardi Commentario subnectit, ut ipse in fine Commentarii asserit: "Et sic est finis huius primi libri Sententiarum editum et compilatum per reverendum Patrem Fratrem Henricum de Merla [!], Ordinis Fratrum Minorum, sacrae Theologiae magistrum necnon Coloniensem provincialem Ministrum, cui sit merces regnum Dei possidere. Amen, dicat omnis homo. Scriptum per me Fratrem Helffericum de Babenhusen, Ordinis Fratrum Minorum conventus Dyppurgensis, in venerabili conventu Bononiae anno Domini 1455."<sup>39</sup> Sed iste Helfericus scriptor codicum et alias apparet existente olim codice, qui hodie deperditus esse videtur<sup>40</sup> eiusdem Commentarii aliam posteriorem copiam eiusdem amanuensis continente, sicut in fine Commentarii legebatur: "Primus liber Sententiarum compilatus secundum Scotum doctorem subtilem Ioannis Duns per Henricum de Werle, scriptus per me Fratrem Helffericum de Babenhusen, Ordinis Minorum provinciae Argentinae, Custodem Rheni, de conventu Dyppurgensi, pro tunc magistrum studentium in Cesena. Octo vicibus scripsi eleganter"<sup>41</sup>, necnon altero codice Ioannis Duns Scoti Commentarium super IV. Sententiarum tradente: "Expliciunt quaestiones magistri Ioannis Duns Scoti de Ordine Fratrum Minorum super IV. Sententiarum. Istius liber Domino succedat ut opto. Scriptum per me Fratrem Helffericum de Babenhusen Ordinis praedicti 1461 die 16. mensis Iunii"<sup>42</sup>. Helfericus ergo de Babenhausen ortus provinciae Argentinae et quidem conventui Dieburgensi nomen dedit Frater Minor factus. Studia in Italia absolvisse videtur, quia se alias discipulum Fratris Marini de Castineano O. Min. fuisse testatur: "Explicit brevis tractatus De inventione medii secundum

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intrinsecis Scoti et Francisci Maronis" ac in Codice Wratislaviensi Bibl. Univers. I Qu. 72, fol. 278r Formalitates Nicolai Lakmann O. Min. falso attribuantur Francisco Maironis secundum Explicit: "Et sic est finis tractatus De formalitatibus et distinctionibus Francisci Maronis scripti par me Guntherum A. D. 1445 in die Judoci Confessoris hora duodecima finiti", cf. L. Meier, *Quibusnam* 148; 25.

<sup>38</sup> Stuttgart, Landesbibliothek H. B. X 10, fol. 133r, cf. L. Meier, *Quibusnam* 19.

<sup>39</sup> Vat. lat. 1109, fol. 133v, cf. A. Pelzer, *Bibliothecae Vaticanae codices manu scripti recensiti*, Codices latini II, pars prior, Vatic. 1931, 725.

<sup>40</sup> Clm 23965, fol. 1—175, cf. S. Clasen, *Walram* 117.

<sup>41</sup> Ib. fol. 175.

<sup>42</sup> J. Valentinelli, *Bibliotheca manuscripta ad S. Marcum Venetiarum* II, Venetiis 1868 ss, 65.

famosissimum magistrum meum, scl. Marinum sacrae paginae doctorem de Castignano provinciae Marchiae, cuius discipulus ego sum minimus"<sup>43</sup>. Et: "Explicit brevis tractatus syllogismorum secundum egregium sacrae Theologiae doctorem scl. magistrum Marinum Castignanensem, Ordinis Minorum provinciae Marchiae Anconitanae, cuius pauper discipulus ego sum, videlicet Frater Helffericus de Babenhusen, qui manu propria hunc librum scripsi ad mei usum et non alterius ullo pacto; quod promisi servare usque ad diem beneplaciti valeat sua benigna paternitas videlicet magistri Marini et cum ipso summa felicitas"<sup>44</sup>. Ibique probabilior et Henricum de Werla Petri Lombardi I. Sententiarum commentantem audivit, qui saltem anno 1428 istum librum complevit<sup>45</sup>. Helffericus in conventibus Ordinis diversis commorantem invenimus, in Bononiensi, ubi anno 1455 dictum Commentarium Henrici de Werla et paulo post "De formalitatibus" ac magistri Marini de Castineano O. Min. duos nominatos tractatus copiavit atque magistro Francisco de Savona, qui postea Sixtus IV. Pontifex maximus factus est, amicitia coniunctus erat, nam ipse fatetur: "Nota, quod nunquam erat intentionis meae vendere vel dare librum istum, nisi esset amicissimus. Nunc ergo commutavi librum istum ab amore reverendi et eximii doctoris magistri Francisci de Savona"<sup>46</sup>. Interea Custos Rheni provinciae Argentinae factus postea in Italiam reversus esse dignoscitur, cum in conventu Cesenae Fratrum Minorum munus magistri studentium obtinuisse, octava vice Commentarium Henrici de Werla in I. Sententiarum scripsisse et adhuc die 16. Junii 1461 ibidem fuisse narret. Quibus dictis inspicienti rem satis apparet testimonium istius Helfferici de Henrico Werlio auctore tractatus "De formalitatibus" in sequentibus publici iuris facti tanti ponderis esse, ut nec contradicente codice Stuttgartiensi nec tacentibus aliis codicibus in dubium vocari possit.

De loco et tempore, quo Henricus de Werla saepe laudatum tractatum composuit, licet non omnino constet, tamen non improbabile videtur illud opusculum ab Henrico conceptum esse, dum adhuc in Italia versaretur, tum quia ille Helffericus per longum tempus in Italia commoratus est, tum quia fere omnes codices I. Sententiarum Henrici de Werla continentes ibidem scriptos esse constat<sup>47</sup>. Qua de causa concludere

<sup>43</sup> Vat. lat. 1109, fol. 145v.

<sup>44</sup> A. Pelzer, 726.

<sup>45</sup> Patavii, Bibl. Antoniana 236, fol. 60vb: "Explicit 1428".

<sup>46</sup> A. Pelzer, 726 s.

<sup>47</sup> S. Clasen, *Walram* 117 s.

liceat Henricum de Werla adhuc in Italia versantem suum "De formalitatibus" tractatum complevisse, i. e. ante annum 1430, quo inter baccalarios sententiariorum facultatis theologiae universitatis Coloniensis adscriptus est<sup>48</sup>.

§ 3. *De codicum manuscriptorum tractatum "De formalitatibus"*  
*Henrici de Werla tradentium valore ac de ratione edendi.*

De codicum manuscriptorum supra iam memoratorum indole ac pondere pauca tantum addemus.

*Va = Codex Vaticanus lat. 1109, fol. 137ra—144rb.*

Omnium codicum manuscriptorum meliorem certioreque lecturam nobis paravit Fr. Helfericus de Babenhausen O. Min., qui probabiliter anno 1455 in studii generalis sui Ordinis conventu Bononiensi et tractatum Henrici de Werla "De formalitatibus" in codice nominato Vaticano asservatum scripsit<sup>49</sup>. Helferici textus valde commendatur, tum quia discipulus magistri Henrici de Werla in aliquo studii generalis Ordinis italico librum I. Sententiarum commentantis fuisse videtur<sup>50</sup>, tum quia textum scribens non mendas nisi quae ut tales faciliter et primo oculo cognoscuntur subiit. Qui textus melior unum ramum principalem huius tractatus traditi facit, quare et in sequenti editione generaliter illum secuti sumus.

*Se = Codex Senensis Bibl. communalis G VII 40, fol. 255ra—260vb.*

Frater Simon de Angelis O. P., qui ab anno 1462 usque 1463 hunc codicem miscellaneum scripsit, omnino doctrinae S. Thomae Aquinatis adhaerebat; dum enim magistrorum sic dicta scholae Thomisticae tam doctrinae praestantiam laudat quam professionem sui Ordinis diligenter indicat, opus "De formalitatibus"<sup>51</sup> Henrici Werlii despicit et fol. 260vb "formalitates fantasticas" nominat et nomen auctoris omnino ommittens opusculum absolute incipiendo et Henrico Werlio de Thomistis et eorum sequacibus agenti ludum suggerens<sup>52</sup>. Textum "De formalitatibus" a Simone de Angelis traditus multis mendis superabundat non aliter ac in ceteris opusculis in illo codice Senensi contentis, ut inspicienti descrip-

<sup>48</sup> H. Keussen, *Die Matrikel der Universität Köln*, in: Publikationen der Gesellschaft für rheinische Geschichtskunde VIII Bd. I (1389—1475) 167, 1 Bonn 1928, 330.

<sup>49</sup> A. Pelzer, 725 ss.

<sup>50</sup> S. Clasen, *Walram* 115.

<sup>51</sup> L. Ilari, *La biblioteca pubblica di Siena* V, Siena 1846, 98.

<sup>52</sup> Senis Bibl. Commun. G. VII 40, fol. 257r.



tionem codicis luculenter apparet; tamen gravi pondere non caret, quia alterum ramum traditionis huius textus praestat atque una cum illo fragmento Oxoniensi longe meliorem lecturam illius rami habet, duobus locis tamen textum omnino confundit, sicut intuenti apparatus criticum textui edito adiunctum plenius innotescet.

*Ve* = *Codex Veronensis Bibl. communalis* 1365, fol. 114<sup>ra</sup>—121<sup>rb</sup>.

Alius codex opusculum "De formalitatibus" integrum continens est Codex Veronensis<sup>53</sup>, et quidem sine ullo titulo immediate incipit nec etiam in fine aliquid de isto opere dicitur, cum sic finiat: "Et est finis. Laudetur Deus et sanctus Anthe[r]us. Amen"<sup>54</sup>. Cum iste tractatus litteris quidem gothicis librariis ultimi quadrantis saeculi XV., sed magna cum negligentia scriptus sit, nec mirandum est textum plurimis mendis ac ommissionibus corruptum esse; tamen dubitari nequit, quin illa traditio textus ad eundem ramum traditionis pertineat ac codex Senensis necnon italicæ originis esse.

*Ox* = *Codex Oxoniensis Bodl. Can. Class. lat. 205*, fol. 113<sup>ra</sup>—114<sup>rb</sup>.

Quarto codex Bodleianus Oxoniensis<sup>55</sup> fragmentum opusculi "De formalitatibus" continet pariter saeculo XV. mediante scriptum. Ex Commentario in Praedicamenta Aristotelis incerti auctoris constat illum ex Italia provenisse, nam in fine legitur<sup>56</sup>: "Ego Frater Benedictus de Jadra scripsi hunc librum sub anno Domini 1446, dum fui studens in conventu almae civitatis Anchonae". Textus scriptus perpulchra littera gothica ac littera depicta initiali ornatus similiter pertinent ad alterum ramum textus traditi una cum traditione codicum Senensis ac Veronensis.

*St* = *Codex Stuttgartiensis Bibl. Regionalis H. B. X 10*, fol. 133<sup>r</sup>—v.

Codex Stuttgartiensis<sup>57</sup> parvum fragmentum scriptura gothica cursiva saeculi XV. mediantis scriptum continet atque schema praebet divisionis entis. Falso tractatum "De formalitatibus", quem de cetero et mendose copiavit et valde fragmentarie, Francisco de Maironis O. Min. tribuit, cum sit revera Henrici Werlii. Ceterum textus iam distinctione definita

<sup>53</sup> G. Biadego, *Catalogo descrittivo dei manoscritti della Biblioteca comunale di Verona*. Verona 1892, 604 ss.

<sup>54</sup> Veronae, Bibl. Comm. 1365, fol. 121<sup>b</sup>.


<sup>55</sup> H. O. Coxe, *Catalogi codicum manuscriptorum Bibliothecae Bodleianae pars tertia codices Graecos et Latinos Canonicianos complectens*, Oxonii 1854, 199 s.

<sup>56</sup> Oxonii, Bibl. Bodl. Can. Class. lat. 205, fol. 112<sup>vb</sup>.

<sup>57</sup> L. Meier, *Quibusnam* 18 ss.

et divisa in communi (I A 2) desiit ita, ut certo ramo textus traditi attribui nequit, licet probabiliter ad ramum eundem cum codicibus Senensi, Veronensi, Oxoniensi pertineat.

Quibus de valore codicum manuscriptorum dictis sequens *stemma* codicum declaramus:



Valore codicum eorumque stemmate descripto en pauca de *ratione editionis* addemus. Quia codex *Va* inter omnes alios *maxima auctoritate* gaudet, illum secuti sumus rariusque, praesertim ubi mendae evidenter ex negligentia amanuensis profluentes habetur, a lectione eius discessimus. *Lectiones autem variantes* ceterorum codicum ac ipsius *Va*, ubi a lectura eius evidenter erronea deviandum erat, in apparatu critico posuimus. Et non omnes lectiones cuiusque codicis variantes — permultae cum minimi valoris sint — enumerandas censuimus, sed tantummodo in initio, deinde autem tantummodo *sensum adulterantes* indicavimus. Praeterea *numerationes foliorum*, prout singulis codibus correspondent, ad legentis utilitatem ex eodem apparatu critico patent. *Usus scribendi hodiernum*, prout in plurimis operibus scholasticis publici iuris factis inolevit, adhibuimus, cum tractatui Henrici Werlii potius philosophorum atque theologorum intersit. Praeterea *numeros* tam cardinales quam ordinales a textu codicum adhibitos non numeris indicandos, sed litteris scribendos censuimus. Attamen *dispositionem tractatus* ab auctore quidem indicatam, sed non semper omnibus plane notam *ulterius resolvendam* esse credidimus. Qua de causa indicationes et ab indicationibus ipsius auctoris deviantes et ulterius textum dividentes apposuimus ad lectoris utilitatem adhibendo litteras maiusculas, minusculas, Graecas, numeros latinos necnon arabicos iuxta dispositionem tractatus superius declaratam<sup>58</sup>.

(Continuabitur)

SOPHRONIUS CLASEN, O.F.M.

*M.-Gladbach*

<sup>58</sup> The text of the "Tractatus de formalitatibus" will be edited in the next issue of the *Franciscan Studies*. — The Editors.

## BOOK REVIEWS

*Le Geste du Sang*, textes choisis et traduits par A. Hamman, O.F.M. (Textes pour l'Histoire Sacrée, Daniel-Rops), Paris, 1953. Pp. 412.

In the Introduction (pp. 7—23) Daniel-Rops, the Director of the collection, gives some general ideas on Christian martyrdom. Then follow some 57 Acts of Martyrs (pp. 25—390) from St. Polycarp (156 A.D.) to James the Notary (about 422 A.D.). The disposition of the Acts in the book is chronological: first the martyrs of the Roman emperors, then those of the Persians. In both series the chronological order is again adopted. Those Acts originally written in Latin or Greek are translated from the best editions of the original. If we understand correctly, the Acts concerning the victims of the Persian emperors are not translated from the original Syriac, but from the German version done by A. Braun and published in the *Bibliothek der Kirchenväter*, second series, vol. 22, Kempten and Munich, 1915.

The choice of the Acts is excellent; the translation fluent. The annotated bibliography (pp. 391—401) clearly shows that the translator is possessed of a solid erudition. The addition of the two maps at the end of the collection (pp. 407—410) is another commendable feature, very helpful and convenient in locating the places mentioned in the Acts.

E. M. BUYTAERT, O.F.M.

*Exegetica in Prologum Joannis secundum maximos ecclesiae doctores antiquitatis christianae* by Julianus Gennaro, O.F.M. (Studia Antoniana, n. 4), Rome, 1952. Pp. XIX—191.

Fr. Gennaro intends to give us an analysis of the exegesis of John, I 1—15, as found in eight great Fathers of the Church, four Greeks and four Latins. The study (pp. 1—181) is preceded by a Preface, a list of the abbreviations used, and a bibliography (pp. VII—XIX). From the list of abbreviations it would appear that the author checked the periodical literature only up to 1944, if that far. The bibliography (pp. XVII—XIX) gives too much and yet not enough; in other words, we find in it book not mentioned in the rest of the work, whereas some which are quoted are not included in the list.

As his four Fathers of the two churches, Fr. Gennaro has chosen among the Greeks Saints Athanasius, Basil the Great, Gregory of Nazianzen, and John Chrysostom; among the Latin Fathers Saints Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine, and Gregory the Great. From the very beginning the reader feels that this choice is partly commendable, partly regrettable and certainly artificial. Since the Greek Church of that era was the more intellectual part of christianity, it is easier to find a number of great Greek scholars or writers there than among

the Latins. Secondly, a great Father is not necessarily a great writer, and an outstanding writer in one field is not always a good interpreter of St. John. Some lesser Fathers are sometimes, on particular points, more important than the greater Fathers. Thirdly, it seems to the reader of the book that Saint Gregory has been added to complete the Latin foursome without demanding much extra work. Gennaro's analysis of St. Gregory's texts on the Prologue of St. John does not cover more than a quarter of a page. To make our objection clear, let us make a comparison with modern theology. Some scholars are authorities in Mariology; still that does not make them important when occasionally they write something about the sacraments. The medieval theologians were aware of such distinctions much more than it is realized in certain quarters. For instance, it has been proven recently by D. Van den Eynde that for a number of years the *Commentarius in psalmos* of Letbert of Lille was a strong competitor of the corresponding part of the *glossa ordinaria*. And in the latter part of the thirteenth century the commentaries of St. Bonaventure on Ecclesiastes and St. John were able to compete with and win out over the corresponding commentaries of Hugh of St. Cher. Still the latter was much more of an over-all exegete than St. Bonaventure. In the case of the book of Gennaro, if there had to be four Latin Fathers, one would have preferred to find St. Hilary of Poitiers or even Leo the Great instead of Gregory.

But let us examine the book as it was conceived by Gennaro. The main part is divided into four chapters: the eternal generation of the Word, the Word and the creation, the mission of John the Baptist, and the incarnation of the Word. Each chapter is subdivided into two to four articles. In nearly every article we find two unrelated little monographs: the first one, usually very short, describes the opinion of some modern scholars on the topic under consideration; the second one gives the exegesis of all eight Fathers, or of the ones of their number who have written about it. The description of the doctrine of the Fathers is usually quite fair, though in a number of cases the texts are taken out of their normal context, since most of the eight Fathers did not write a running commentary on the Prologue of St. John, but referred to one or more of the verses when needed. This reviewer objects mainly against the fact that Fr. Gennaro deemed it necessary to list a number of modern interpretations, and yet does not point out the relationship, identity, discrepancy etc. between the exegesis of the antiquity and modern times. Indicating the historical relationship between modern exegesis and patristics would have required a book of a completely different type. But since the author does not make any connection at all between the two little monographs of each article, one wonders if it would not have been better and simpler to omit the modern opinions entirely.

Three Indices conclude the book (pp. 185—191). The "Index nominum" is incomplete.

One learns much reading the book. However the lack of unity and the artificiality of structure characterize it too much as the work of a beginner.

E. M. BUYTAERT, O.F.M.



Sancti Caesarii Arelatensis *Sermones*, edid. D. Germanus Morin, O.S.B., 2d edit. (Corpus Christianorum, *Series Latina*, vol. CIII & CIV), Turnhout, Belgium, 1953. Pp. CXXII—1131 (continuous pagination).

We have here the first complete volumes of the *Corpus Christianorum* or the so-called New Migne (see *Franciscan Studies*, vol. 13, n. 4, pp. 130—131 and vol. 14, n. 1, pp. 106—107). They are a faithful reproduction of the edition of Maredsous, 1937. Actually Dom C. Lambot, who supervised the reprint and intends to complete it, kept it so close to the *editio princeps* that we find in the text of the Sermons and in the Indices (not in Morin's scholarly Preface) the pagination of the Maredsous edition. In the Sermons and the corresponding apparatus even the original numbering of lines has been retained, which in turn allowed for a simple reproduction of the Indices of Morin.

This method of publication has a number of disadvantages. It will be harmful, we fear, to the uniformity of the *Corpus Christianorum*. But, since the Maredsous edition, as critical editions go, was still very recent, we understand that the "Editions de Maredsous" had some rights in the matter. At any rate, references to the older edition will be found easily in the recent one, and through it the masterful work of Morin will now reach still more people than before.

The edition of the *Corpus* is less luxurious than the one of 1937. However, the printer ought to be congratulated for the fine job he is doing.

E. M. BUYTAERT, O.F.M.

*Le Peri Hermeneias en Occident de Boèce à Saint Thomas*, by J. Isaac, O. P., Paris, 1953. Pp. 192.

The history of scholastic logic is still to be written; but important sources for that history are gradually becoming accessible. If it is true that scholasticism originated from an attempt to penetrate into the mysteries of revealed faith and to illuminate them as much as possible by human reason, then logic certainly has played a decisive role in its development. Our ignorance of the *Organon* as it was known to the Scholastics and our ignorance of its history is one of the chief reasons why serious misinterpretations of scholastic speculative philosophy and theology have been cropping up among us.

An important contribution toward a part of the history of logic before Saint Thomas — and this is a main part — is the book under review. Its title suggests that it has only a limited goal; the actual elaboration and development of the topic, however, proves to be almost a history of logic within the indicated period. Beginning with Boethius, it not only traces the fate of *Peri Hermeneias* during the following centuries, but also treats, in connection with it, the other tracts — since *Peri Hermeneias* did not come to the Latins only through Boethius, but also through Apuleius of Madaura (in his *Peri Hermeneias*, also called *De Syllogismis Categoricis* I—VI, he deals with problems of this tract).

The first chapter of the present work treats of Boethius and the transmission to the Latins of *Peri Hermeneias* together with Porphyry's Introduction,

and the Categories of Aristotle. The importance of Cassiodorus as the man who preserved the work of Boethius is nicely brought out.

The second chapter outlines the development of logic up to the twelfth century. Though we can speak of a discovery of the tracts under discussion, there was practically no interruption of the tradition in the Occident, since they were preserved at the Lateran and in England, whence they spread, through Alcuin, to France and Germany. An intensive study of these tracts, however, began at the end of the tenth century, with Gerbert, the pope-philosopher, as pioneer. The ninth chapter of *Peri-Hermeneias*, concerning the truth of future contingent facts, strongly influenced Saint Anselm's theology, and later, Abelard's. In fact, it was at the time of Abelard that textbooks of logic began to appear. These gradually led to the *Summullae* of Petrus Hispanus.

"The Reign of the *Organon*" is the theme of the third chapter. This sovereignty lasted until the first half of the thirteenth century — the *Logica Vetus* (*Porphyry, the Categories, and Peri Hermeneias*) now being enriched or completed by the other tracts of Aristotle on logic (the *Logica Nova*). Around 1240, in spite of prohibitions, the *Organon* receded into the background, giving place to Aristotelian physics and metaphysics. This section of the book is particularly interesting for its inclusion of the plan of studies and readings from various sources followed at the leading universities of the period. It would seem that before Saint Thomas only Saint Albert the Great had published a commentary on *Peri Hermeneias* — as well as on the other treatises on logic.

The fourth and fifth chapters are entirely devoted to the commentary of Saint Thomas on the *Peri Hermeneias*, which commentary was made not on the old translations, but on that of William of Moerbeke, who also used the Greek commentaries. This extensive study, comprising practically half the book, is a masterpiece of literary analysis and criticism.

This excellent work deserves the attention of everyone interested in the history of scholastic philosophy and even of theology, because of the theological problems involved. The darkness covering the history of logic for centuries has been so enlightened by this study that we can say that its broad outlines are now clear and will stand the test of further research, which, it would seem, can only correct and add minor details.

PHILOTHEUS BOEHNER, O. F. M.

San Anselmo, *Proslogion*, Spanish by Beatriz Maas, Preface by Guillermo Blanco (Publicaciones de Instituto de Filosofia, Seccion Textos I), La Plata, 1950. Pp. 139.

Seemingly intended for use in seminars, the booklet has a short introduction, written by G. Blanco (pp. 7—15), describing the proof of the existence of God according to a number of Christian thinkers, plus the Latin text a Spanish translation of the *Proslogion*, *Pro Insipientia*, and *Liber apologeticus* of St. Anselm (pp. 16—137) — consequently containing more than the title of the book suggests. Neither B. Maas nor G. Blanco mention which Latin text has been used. It is not the one of the *Patrologia Latina*. It seems to be taken from one

of the editions of F. S. Schmitt, OSB. (*Florilegium Patristicum* fasc. 29, or the great edition of Edingburgh, vol. I, 1946), with changes in punctuation and division into paragraphs. The critical apparatus is limited to short references to Anselm's sources; Anselm's "Tabula Capitulorum" of the *Proslogion* has been dropped. As for the Introduction, we regret that Blanco does not even mention the very interesting proof of the existence of God as found in Scotus, nor the critique of the *quinque viae* of St. Thomas Aquinas as expounded e. g. by F. Van Steenberghen.

E. M. BUYTAERT, O. F. M.

S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi *Monologion* et *Proslogion*. Accedunt Gaunilonis *Pro Insipientia* et Anselmi *Responsio*, edit. F. S. Schmitt, O.S.B. (Collana di Testi Filosofici, Prima Serie, vol. 1), Padua, 1951. Pp. VIII—115.

Fr. Schmitt, the renowned editor of the critical edition of the *Opera omnia* of St. Anselm, reproduces here, for the benefit of students in philosophy, parts of volume I of his complete edition. A restriction, however, is made in presenting Anselm's final redaction only. While the variants of the main edition are dropped, short references to the sources are given. In the Introduction (pp. V—VII) the nature of the works published is briefly described and a selected bibliography is to be found in footnotes.

The present booklet will be very useful in seminars. Compared with the edition of B. Maas reviewed above, our preference goes for this edition of Schmitt, though, of course, it does not dispense scholars of utilizing the edition of Edinburgh.

E. M. BUYTAERT, O. F. M.

*Wadding Papers 1614—38*, edited by Brennan Jennings, O.F.M. (Irish Manuscripts Commission), Dublin, 1953. Pp. XVI—700.

Fr. Luke Wadding, OFM., left a great amount of papers which, with a number of exceptions, were later bound to make up ten volumes. After a migration from Rome to Dublin in 1872, they were taken to Dun Mhuire, Killiney, in 1947 and have been preserved there since. These varied documents, dealing with political and ecclesiastical aspects of Irish history of Wadding's time, were not all written by the renowned Franciscan. Some are letters and various notes sent to Wadding; a great number are documents, copied or in the original, which somehow had reached him while he was in Rome, from 1618 till his death in 1657. Fifty years ago some of the political documents were published in an unfaithful English translation. The ecclesiastical documents, which mainly cover the period of 1614—1640, were simply calendered on this occasion, but never edited. Since the latter are important for a knowledge of Irish history of that time, both as to Irish life in the homeland and abroad, Fr. Jennings has now undertaken their publication.

All the documents of Jennings' edition are presented in the original languages: Latin, Spanish, English, Italian (a few), and Gaelic (two small pieces).

They are taken mainly from volumes II and III of the manuscript set. After the presentation of each individual document, references are given to the manuscripts. Fr. Jennings, however, does not follow the order of the latter. The documents are arranged chronologically, and actually cover, in the main, the years 1620—1632. And their importance is chiefly historical. We garner much general information about the Irish Church of those years: it is largely a story of poverty and repression. One also gets an insight into the struggles between secular and regular clergy, which center about such questions as the administration of the sacraments, the granting of dispensations for marriage, the payment of funeral dues, and the right of precedence at ecclesiastical functions. In view of their claims, the Irish regulars got a seemingly unjust condemnation from the University of Paris. The papers concerning appointments to bishoprics are worthy of attention. Likewise interesting are those informing us about the situation of the Irish in exile at Douai, Louvain, Antwerp, Rome, and in Spain. Other documents have a certain importance for positive theology. Scholars interested in Jansenism will regret to find no texts about the infortunate attitude of Wadding in favor of Jansenius. Probably, however, there are no such documents among the papers of Wadding, or Fr. Jennings omitted them as belonging to a later period in Wadding's life.

The Introduction contains a concise but instructive biography on Wadding. Notes accompanying the text-edition are kept to a minimum. Perhaps a number of readers would have welcomed more such historical notes. But all in all, the impression left by the present edition is most favorable.

E. M. BUYTAERT, O.F.M.

*Charles S. Peirce und der Pragmatismus*, by Jürgen v. Kempfski, Stuttgart u. Köln, 1952. Pp. 115.

Peirce could be aptly called the Socrates, the Great Instigator, of American Philosophy. Only for a short time was he a professor, yet several trends in contemporary philosophy, especially logic, trace their origins to him. He wrote no books, but his collected papers aggregate six spectacular volumes, patiently edited by Paul Weiss and Charles Hartshorne. As an ardent searcher for truth, Peirce was little concerned with a system of philosophy — the elaboration of systems he left to the Epigones. Therefore, to define Peirce's system of philosophy is an almost hopeless task. Evidence thereof is Feibleman's *An Introduction to Peirce's Philosophy Interpreted as a System*, 1946.

The present book under review purposely avoids any attempt to systematize Peirce's thought; rather, it tries to clarify certain ideas of Peirce in connection with pragmatism, of which he has been called the father. There can be no doubt that Peirce's pragmatism cannot be equated with the practical, that is, the utilitarian, value of thought. In order to understand the basic idea behind Peirce's pragmatism (a word coined by Peirce himself) Jürgen von Kempfski has devoted to it four mutually integrating essays. First he analyzes the pragmatic maxim of Peirce in connection with his philosophy, especially with his logic of abduction (the term goes back to Aristotle). The second essay



investigates the origin of Peirce's pragmatism in reference to an aporia arising from the relation between formal logic and — in part — the Kantian doctrine on the categories. The exposition of the logic of abduction is critically examined in the third essay, and in the fourth essay a systematical exposition of abductive conclusions is presented.

There is no doubt that Kempski's study is a most important contribution to the help toward an understanding of Peirce. Although the present reviewer does not feel competent to evaluate it in detail, nevertheless there is one aspect of this study in particular, and of Peirce's philosophy in general, that merits the attention of the readers of *Franciscan Studies*. This great American philosopher, like Faber in England, was an ardent admirer of Scotus. Although it appears that his study of Scotus was not especially thorough, nevertheless, Kempski asserts, he was influenced by the Subtile Doctor — as far as he knew him — in at least three directions: 1. Scotus' Realism impressed Peirce and he joined forces with him against Nominalism. It seems that Peirce correctly understood Scotistic Realism in that form which brings it close to Conceptualism, not in the exaggerated form sometimes attributed to Scotus. However, Kempski's exposition here is not clear. 2. Scotus' teaching concerning the *haecceitas* and individual existence likewise caught the attention of Peirce. 3. Peirce was deeply impressed by the *Grammatica speculativa* falsely ascribed to Scotus. In addition to the above influences, one more, perhaps more far-reaching than the others, should be mentioned, namely that knowledge, according to Scotus, has a practical goal — the highest praxis, which is charity.

This excellent study cannot help but produce a better understanding of this great American philosopher. We believe that it yields important results not only for Europeans but also for students in this country. Nevertheless, a study of Peirce's relation to Duns Scotus still awaits a competent scholar.

PHILOTHEUS BOEHNER, O.F.M.

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
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
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Cum permissu superiorum.







*Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.*

## DEDICATION TO THE VERY REVEREND MATHIAS FAUST, O. F. M.

Not infrequently it happens that a man who himself disclaims the title of scholar is nevertheless the guiding spirit behind genuinely scholarly projects. This is true of the man in whose honor this issue of *Franciscan Studies* is dedicated. Although burdened throughout his life with responsible administrative positions, he has always retained an active interest in Franciscan learning and has made every effort to promote research scholarship among the Friars. Because of his outstanding achievements in this regard, *Franciscan Studies* salutes with pride and gratitude the Very Rev. Mathias Faust, O. F. M., on his seventy-fifth birthday.

Father Mathias was born in Oberbimbach, near Fulda, Germany, on December 30, 1879. In 1892, after completing his elementary studies, he entered the Seraphic Seminary in Harreveld, Holland, and four years later, October 1896, he sailed for the United States. On Christmas Eve of the same year he was invested with the habit of the Friars Minor. After pronouncing his vows, Frater Mathias continued his studies in the humanities and in philosophy, then proceeded to Washington, D. C., where he received his theological training from Paschal Robinson, O. F. M., the noted scholar-diplomat, who was later to become Apostolic Nuncio to Ireland, and from the esteemed Bishop Shahan of the Catholic University of America. Father Mathias was ordained to the priesthood on June 1, 1906, and in the following year was appointed *socius* to the Master of Novices.

Although he had shown himself an apt student, Father Mathias had also exhibited the qualities that distinguish the natural leader and moulder of men, and it was in this direction that his talents were to be turned. Appointed Master of Novices in 1910, he was elected Minister Provincial in 1919 at the age of thirty-nine. He held this office for twelve years (1919—1925; 1931—1937), and under his prudent and foresighted administration, Holy Name Province made rapid progress. One of his first acts as Provincial was to call attention to the need of a new house

of theological studies. Ten years later his plans were realized in the erection of Holy Name College, Washington, D. C.

Frequently the Minister General appointed Father Mathias Canonical Visitor of different Franciscan provinces in various parts of the world. When World War II made communication with the General Curia of the Order almost impossible, Father Leonard Bello, then Minister General, appointed Father Mathias Delegate General for North and Central America. During this time Father Mathias devoted his efforts primarily toward helping the over-burdened Franciscan provinces of Mexico and Cuba, and in 1944, partly as a consequence of vital interest in Latin America, he founded the Academy of American Franciscan History. During the ten years of its existence, the Academy has produced works of outstanding scholarship in its field, besides publishing the well-known historical journal, *The Americas*.

Truly world-wide in his interest, Father Mathias was instrumental in establishing in the United States a community of Franciscan belonging to the Byzantine-Slavonic Rite, hoping to see it develop into a province in the Eastern rite.

The war being ended, the office of Delegate General was terminated February 8, 1947. Meanwhile, the sudden death of the then Minister General, Father Valentine Schaaf, left open the post of Procurator General, vacated by Pacificus Perentoni who *ipso facto* succeeded to the office of Minister General. The General Definitorium elected Father Mathias to the vacated post, the second highest in the Order. He remained in office from December 15, 1946, until Pentecost, 1951. Upon his return to the United States he was appointed Delegate General for the Franciscan Commissariats in this country, which office he holds at present.

Although occupied primarily with administrative work, Father Mathias was always alive to the value of solid learning, and did all in his power to promote and support scholarly activities among the Friars. World-wide contacts made in discharging his administrative duties enabled him to procure hundreds of precious incunabula and rare books pertinent to the Franciscan Order. The excellent *Franciscana* section of Holy Name College, and the equally library of the Academy of American Franciscan History, are both monuments to his zeal and discernment as a collector. The library of the Franciscan Institute, which has been recognized as one of the finest research libraries in this country, is another tribute to Father Mathias' generous and efficient patronage. In fact, the existence of the Franciscan Institute itself is



largely due to his efforts, and the international reputation it now enjoys is at least in part the result of his whole-hearted cooperation. It was through his personal interest that the Institute obtained assurance of its continuance by being established as a *studium generale* and placed under the direct protection of the General Curia in Rome. Father Mathias personally and often at great inconvenience collected rare volumes for the Institute's library, and he has continued to show a warm and paternal concern for its development.

Because of Father Mathias' life-long service to Holy Name Province and his achievement in promoting and supporting scientific endeavor, *Franciscan Studies* is proud to pay tribute to this truly Franciscan priest and patron of learning.

THE EDITORIAL BOARD

## STEPHEN LANGTON'S PRINCIPLE OF DETERMINING THE ESSENCE OF A SACRAMENT

At the time of Stephen Langton, several definitions of the sacraments were undergoing severe tests of their accuracy and were being subjected to various interpretations<sup>1</sup>. Not to be outdone by his contemporaries, Langton joined in the criticisms leveled against two of these definitions, *invisibilis gratiae visibilis forma*, and *signum sacrae rei*<sup>2</sup>.

One of the gravest charges brought against the former definition<sup>3</sup> arose from the opinion of many authors that an invisible element constituted the essence of certain sacraments. Examples of this doctrine are the invisible *character* in baptism and in holy orders, and the *qualitas animae* in extreme unction and matrimony<sup>4</sup>. The big problem for the theologians

<sup>1</sup> Cf. D. Van den Eynde, *Les définitions des sacrements pendant la première période de la théologie scolastique (1050—1240)*, (Rome, 1950), pp. 68—96.

<sup>2</sup> The main place devoted by Langton to this controversy is his *quaestio theologica, de descriptione sacramenti*. There are two redactions of this question. One (redaction C) is in four manuscripts: in C, *Cambridge, St. John's College ms.* 57 (c. 7), ff. 262d—263b and in CH, *Chartres ms.* 430, ff. 7v—8v, under the title, *de descriptione sacramenti*; in L, *Oxford, Bodleian, Lyell ms.* 42, f. 27c—d, and in V, *Paris Nat. Lat. (S. Victoris) ms.* 14556, under the title, *de sacramento in generali*. The other (redaction A) is in the family of A, *Avanches ms.* 230, f. 248b—c, Ar, *Arras ms.* 394 (965), ff. 102c—103a, R, *Vaticano (Roma) lat. ms.* 4297, ff. 44d—45b, and S, *Paris nat. lat. (Sorbonne) ms.* 16385, f. 50a—b. In this family the question bears no title, and is joined immediately to a question *de confectioe eucharistiae in Parasceve*. In our exposé, we shall follow the manuscripts C, CH, L, and V, which contain the better redaction. Redaction A is quite similar to redaction C. In fact, we believe it is either an early redaction by Langton himself, or at least a *reportatio* of one of his disputations.

<sup>3</sup> We shall limit our study to the definition, *invisibilis gratiae visibilis forma*. Langton's critique of *signum sacrae rei* simply brands it as too broad a definition. A study of this topic would lead to a discussion of what constitutes a sacrament in the strict and in the broad sense.

<sup>4</sup> Cb 134, f. 262d: "Sacramentum sic describitur ab Augustino: Sacramentum est invisibilis gratiae visibilis forma. Sed si est descriptio, ergo convenit cuilibet sacramento; et hoc fere falsum in omnibus sacramentis: quia character est sacramentum in baptismo, non tamen est visibilis forma, sicut nec character ordinis. Sic Corpus Christi est sacramentum unitatis ecclesiae; non tamen est visibilis forma, quia non est forma. Similiter in circumcissione, quia ablatis passio non est visibilis, nec character, si dicatur quod character ibi sit sacra-

who held this opinion was to reconcile the invisible essences of the sacraments with the term, *visibilis forma*, in the definition. They resorted to various circumlocutions and *subintelligenda* in the definitions. An instance of this is Stephen Langton's phrase, *visibilis non in se sed per causam*. Langton saw the incongruity between the *visibilis forma* of the definition and the invisible essences of certain sacraments. To get around the difficulty and still save the definition, he grants that the essences are not in themselves visible. On the other hand, he claims that they are somehow made visible by their necessary union or concomitance with the truly visible elements of the sacraments. His technical phrase for this is *visibilis non in se sed per causam*<sup>5</sup>. For the sake of illustration, the essentially invisible *character* in baptism is in a sense visible because it is necessarily united to the visible elements of the ablution in baptism.

But whatever may have been the various solutions offered, it is our aim in this study to investigate the root-causes of the problem. If the long-accepted definition speaks of the sacraments as *visibilis forma*, how did the invisible element ever insinuate itself into the picture as the essence of the sacrament, as *the* sacrament? To put it concretely, what made the authors turn to such invisible elements as *character* in baptism and orders, to the Body of Christ in the eucharist, etc., as the essences of the respective sacraments, in spite of the definition which designates the sacraments as something visible? Do they give any reason for doing so?

Since Langton is one of the main figures in this controversy, we shall examine his writings<sup>6</sup> to see what he regards as the essences of the

mentum." The text presented here is based on the four manuscripts of redaction C as indicated in note 3 above.

Cf. also D. Van den Eynde, *Les définitions*, pp. 79—80, 82—87, for a more complete study of the question.

<sup>5</sup> Cb 134, f. 262d: "Solutio. Descriptio illa data est per causam. Sicut dicitur: Dies est sol lucens super terram, quia ubi est dies ibi est sol, etc., ita dicitur quod sacramentum est visibilis forma, quia ubi est sacramentum est aliqua visibilis forma. Illa est causa sacramenti sicut sol est causa diei. Et ideo dixi, quasi in baptismo sine forma aquae visibili non imprimeretur character."

Cf. also D. Van den Eynde, *op. cit.*, pp. 85—87. Van den Eynde seems to understand the word *causa* in too strict a sense, apparently limiting it to an efficient cause. We believe it is rather a necessary concomitant, meaning simply that one thing is not had without the other, whether there be a relation of efficient causality or not. It is something akin to the causality spoken of by moralists in treating of the *voluntarium in causa*.

<sup>6</sup> We shall limit ourselves to the *quaestiones theologicae* in the manuscripts mentioned above in note 3. We have not yet been able to make a thorough investigation of the theological questions scattered in Stephen's scriptural commentaries.

various sacraments. While doing this we will also search for the reason he gives for considering any given element as *the* sacrament. Once we have found out where he stands, we shall see whether his opinion agrees with the teachings of his immediate predecessors and followers. These investigations will show that Langton determines that the principal element or essence of a sacrament is the one which has a similarity to the principal *res* of the sacrament (*similitudo cum re principali sacramenti*). Certain authors arrive at the very same essential elements as Stephen, but by way of a different principle. They hold that the essence of a sacrament consists in whatever element is permanent (*sacramentum manens*)<sup>7</sup>. Yet the principle of *permanentia* is not as widely accepted and used as our author's line of reasoning.

The beginnings of his formula, *similitudo cum re principali*, can be detected in the writings of his predecessors, but Stephen stands out as the first to crystallize it and to apply it extensively to the sacraments. That his disciples faithfully copy their master is evident from several statements in their writings<sup>8</sup>.

The doctrine of invisible essences of sacraments has not been embodied in the official doctrine of the church. Nor has Langton's basis of determining the essence of a sacrament been thus honored. Still the study of this problem brings into relief how Stephen Langton was an alert and progressive theologian. He had a great deal of influence on his immediate successors, who in turn influenced some of the great lights of the golden era of Scholasticism. The question we are treating here is representative of many others in our author's writings which deserve careful study.

### LANGTON'S PRINCIPLE

Langton's position becomes clearer when we realize that he followed the theologians of his day in considering each sacrament as composed of various elements. He joins his contemporaries in using the now

<sup>7</sup> This principle is not as universally applicable as Stephen's *similitudo cum re sacramenti*.

<sup>8</sup> Since access to the manuscripts of these authors was practically out of the question, we have limited ourselves to a study of published texts. Though our study is not exhaustive, we believe it is sufficiently indicative of the trend of thought of the medieval authors in question. For our non-Langtonian texts we have depended especially on A. Landgraf, "Die früh-scholastische Definition der Taufe", in *Gregorianum*, XXVII (1946), pp. 200—219, 353—383; N. M. Haring, "Berengar's Definitions of *Sacramentum* and Their Influence on Mediaeval Sacramentology", in *Mediaeval Studies*, X (1948), pp. 109—146; D. Van den Eynde, *Les définitions*. For the sake of uniformity, we have taken liberties with the spelling and punctuation in these works.



familiar terms, *sacramentum tantum*, *sacramentum et res*, *res tantum*, in reference to the several elements of the eucharist and penance<sup>9</sup>. Advancing a step beyond them, he hints at their application to baptism<sup>10</sup>.

<sup>9</sup> We give here the texts found in Stephen Langton's *quaestiones*. In citing texts, we shall give the letter-symbol for the manuscripts and the number of the question according to A. Gregory, "Indices of Rubrics and Incipits of the Principal Manuscripts of the Questiones of Stephen Langton", in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, V (1930), pp. 221—244. We have made our own numberings for the questions in manuscript L, which is not in Gregory's list.

Cd 198, f. 312b: "Et sicut in sacramento eucharistiae sunt tria, quorum primum est sacramentum, secundum est res et sacramentum, tertium vero res tantum, ita hic [in contritione] sunt tria: contritio exterior, contritio interior, remissio peccati."

A 93, f. 267d: "Est ergo similitudo exterioris contritionis ad interiorem, et interioris ad remissionem peccati. Prima est sacramentum tantum, tertia res tantum, medium(!) sacramentum tertii et res primi, — sicut in forma panis et Corpore Christi et unitate ecclesiae."

Stephen Langton's words bring to mind those of Peter Lombard in his *Sententiae*, Lib. IV, Dist. VIII, Cap. VII (Ed. Quaracchi, p. 792): "Sunt igitur hic tria distinguenda: unum, quod tantum est Sacramentum; alterum, quod est Sacramentum et res; et tertium, quod est res et non Sacramentum. Sacramentum et non res est species visibilis panis vel vini; Sacramentum et res caro Christi propria et sanguis; res et non Sacramentum mystica eius caro."

Lib. IV, Dist. XXII, Cap. II (Ed. Quaracchi, pp. 888—889): "Et sicut in Sacramento corporis, ita etiam in hoc Sacramento [poenitentiae] dicunt aliud esse tantum Sacramentum, scilicet exteriorem poenitentiam, aliud Sacramentum et rem, scilicet interiorem poenitentiam, aliud rem et non Sacramentum, scilicet remissionem peccatorum. Interior enim poenitentia et res est Sacramenti, id est exterioris poenitentiae, et Sacramentum remissionis peccati, quam et signat et facit. Exterior quoque poenitentia et interioris signum est et remissionis peccati."

For further information on the use of these terms by other authors, cf. D. Van den Eynde, *Les définitions*, p. 70; N. M. Haring, "Berengar's Definitions", pp. 126—129.

<sup>10</sup> Stephen's ideas on this subject were far from definite. The three elements to which the terms are applied are not always the same. We shall simply cite the texts without extensive comment, since this question has no direct bearing on the matter we are now treating. The more obscure texts are given first.

1. Cb 60, f. 219c: "Item, ex quo in baptismo imprimitur character, quare non eodem modo in sumptione eucharistiae . . . ?"

"Responsio. Cum tria sint in sacramento altaris, quoddam quod est sacramentum tantum, quoddam quod est sacramentum et res sacramenti, quoddam quod est res sacramenti tantum, et nullum eorum remanet in homine . . . , ideo non est mirum si nullus character imprimatur in sumptione eucharistiae. Secus est in baptismo. Principalis enim res remanet in homine semper, quantum in se est, scil. impressio gratiae; et ideo non est mirum si sacramentum illius rei sit in homine, scil. character."

2. Cd 198, f. 308c: "Item, cum sacramentum eucharistiae sit dignius sacramento baptismi, quaeritur quare potius character imprimitur in baptismo quam in eucharistia."

"Solutio. In eucharistia tria attenduntur principaliter, quorum nullum est in homine, scil. forma panis et vini, quae est sacramentum tantum, Corpus Christi sumptum de Virgine, quod est sacramentum et res sacramenti, et Corpus Christi mysticum, scil. unitas ecclesiae, quae est res tantum et non sacramentum."

"Similiter in baptismo tria principaliter attenduntur, scil. character, infusio gratiae, et remissio peccati. Et constat quod infusio [gratiae] et remissio peccati

However, he does not use them in speaking of the component elements of the other sacraments.

By way of illustration, let us follow Langton's method of determining the essence of a sacrament as we find it in his treatment of baptism. There are three elements in this sacrament: water, ablution, and character. Upon examining them, Stephen finds that each one is a sign of a *res sacra*<sup>11</sup>, and therefore meets the requirements of the current sacramental definition, *signum sacrae rei*. Water is the sign of spiritual refreshment or of grace; ablution, the sign of a spiritual cleansing; and character, the sign of the impression or infusion of grace. Consequently, each one of the elements deserves in a sense to be called a sacrament in its own right.

The question now arises: Which one of these three *sacramenta* is the *principal* one in baptism? Which one constitutes the *essence* of the *sacramentum baptismi*? To find the answer, Langton turns to the respective *res* of each of the three elements, and decides that the impression of grace is the principal one. From this he concludes that the character impressed in baptism must be the essence of the sacrament because it has a similarity to the *res principalis*, the impression of grace.

But why should our author look to the *res* to determine the principal *signum* of the sacrament? This procedure does not seem unreasonable, since a sign (*sacramentum*) is by nature less than the thing it signifies (*res*). To find out the main *significans*, then, why not determine the

*sunt in homine; ergo eadem ratione tertium, scil. character, est in homine; ideo character potius imprimitur in baptismo quam in eucharistia.*"

3. Cd 2051, f. 317b—c: "In sacramento eucharistiae tria attendimus: formam panis, Corpus Christi et unitatem ecclesiae. Primum sacramentum est tantum, secundum sacramentum et res sacramenti, tertium res tantum, *sicut in baptismo tria: aqua, character, et gratia* data ex virtute sacramenti. Sed in hoc est differentia, quod forma panis sacramentum est, aqua non. Sed ablutio aquae exterior materialis sacramentum est ablutionis interioris. Et haec est ratio primi: sub ipsa forma panis latet Corpus Christi quod ex multis membris est sicut panis ex multis granis; sed aqua materialis nihil clausum in se habet, sed est materia, ut in aqua fiat sacramentum baptismi."

In the third text, the parallel between *forma panis*, *Corpus Christi*, *unitas ecclesiae* on the one hand, and *aqua*, *character*, *gratia* on the other, is much better than the *character*, *infusio gratiae*, *remissio peccati* of the second text. It is also in fact to *aqua abluens*, *character*, *infusio gratiae*, that Hugh of St. Cher later applies the terms, *sacramentum tantum*, *sacramentum et res*, *res tantum*. Cf. A. Landgraf, "Die fröhscholastische Definition", p. 372.

<sup>11</sup> The link between the sacrament and its *res*, is, of course, its similarity to it. The sacrament is a *sign*, and its *res* is what it *signifies*. This idea runs through sacramental theology since the time of St. Augustine and is clearly reiterated by Peter Lombard. Moreover, a sacrament must be naturally similar to its *res*. The theologians presumed that Christ chose for his sacraments only natural signs, as opposed to merely arbitrary or artificial ones. For further details, cf. D. Van den Eynde, *Les définitions*, p. 192, under the term, "similitude".

main *significatum* first, since that is more important? Once this is found, seek out the corresponding *significans*. This must be the principal *sacramentum ibi*. Unfortunately, Langton never develops this line of reasoning explicitly. He merely sets forth his principle that the essence of a sacrament is determined by its principal *res*<sup>12</sup>.

Before attempting to interpret the texts of Stephen Langton, we should inform the reader that he expresses the notion of the essence of a sacrament in several ways: *sacramentum in essentia*, *essentia sacramenti*, *sacramentum in baptismo*, *confirmatione*, etc., *sacramentum ibi*, *sacramentum baptismi*, etc., or simply *baptismus est*. Note here that he does not use the phrase, *de substantia sacramenti*, in this same meaning, as do some authors of his day<sup>13</sup>. According to Stephen, *esse de substantia sacramenti* means *esse conditio sine qua non* for a valid sacrament<sup>14</sup>.

At times Langton very explicitly enunciates his principle of determin-

<sup>12</sup> Even this principle is not explicitly applied to all the sacraments. Yet, whenever Langton explains why a certain element is *sacramentum in essentia*, he follows the same line of reasoning.

<sup>13</sup> *Quaestiones, Cod. British Museum Royal 10 A VII*, q. 16: "Sed quaeritur quid sit *substantia baptismi*: vel ipsa aqua vel verba vel virtus verborum vel mixtum ex eis. — Responsio: Baptismus est character quidam invisibilis impressus baptizato per ablutionem exteriorem et per formam verborum cum intentione prolatam, et inseparabiliter adhaeret baptizato." Cf. A. Landgraf, "Die frühcholastische Definition", p. 359.

In a text of Petrus Cantor on baptism, it is not clear whether he refers the *substantia* to the *quiddam surgens* or to *ea ex quibus surgit*, or perhaps to both, since he seems to identify them. *Summa de sacramentis et animae consiliis, Cod. Paris Nat. lat. 9593*, f. 152: "Ad hoc dicimus, quod baptismus est *quiddam surgens* ex aqua et verbo et intentione baptizantis et intinctione baptizati. *Ista enim sola et sufficienter exiguntur ad substantiam baptismi*, et *iste baptismus* dicitur consecrari verbis evangelicis ratione unius partis exigitivae, id est aquae." Thereafter, he speaks of *ille baptismus, qui conflatur ex IIII<sup>or</sup>*, and says it can be called a *qualitas in baptizato, ex qua surgit character*. Cf. A. Landgraf, *op. cit.*, p. 366.

<sup>14</sup> This is evident from several texts. In the question *de extrema unctione*, we read: Ca 53, f. 214a: "Item, quaeritur utrum oratio sit *de substantia* huius sacramenti, ita scil. quod *sine ea non possit conferri*. Satis probabiliter videtur quod oratio non sit *de substantia* huius sacramenti, per hoc quod in ordine cisterciensi aliae quam hic dicuntur orationes, quod non fieret si orationes essent *de substantia*. Sed revera concedimus quod illae magnae orationes non sunt *de substantia*, sed illae parvae quae in singulis unctionibus sic dicuntur: 'per istam unctionem dimittat . . .'"

In the question *de circumcisione et differentia inter sacramenta novae legis et veteris*, Ca 54, f. 215c, we find the following: "Sed quaeritur utrum in articulo necessitatis licitum esset praevenire octavam diem, ita quod infra octavam parvulus circumcideretur. Nobis videtur quod non, — immo si decederet infra octavam damnaretur — et quod octava dies sit *de substantia* circumcisionis, unde propter sabbatum non differebatur . . ."

"Sed si dies octava est *de substantia* circumcisionis, nihil est quod fecit Iosue in Galgalis circumcidendo, nec etiam proselyti poterant circumcidi . . . Sed cum dictum sit Abrahae: Circumcidetur ex vobis omne masculinum, et infans octo dierum circumcidatur, hoc praeceptum transgrediebatur qui diem octavam praeveniebat. Sed *nihilominus circumcidebant*." Here, with regard



ing the *elementum principale*, the *sacramentum in essentia*. In other passages he may speak of a certain element as the chief one, but does not mention how he arrives at it. For circumcision<sup>15</sup>, baptism, and holy orders, he expressly uses the principle, *similitudo cum re principali*; in connection with extreme unction, he does not mention *cum re principali*, but merely *cum re sua*, though later in the same question he distinguished a secondary *res* from a principal one, which actually coincides with the *res sua*. However, the texts are too far apart for us to conclude that he applies the complete principle, *similitudo cum re principali*. As regards confirmation and matrimony, he determines the essence, but says nothing about the principle. In the question *de descriptione sacramenti*, he seems to take for granted that the essence of the eucharist is *Corpus Christi*. Apart from this one reference, he is silent about the sacrament in the eucharist, and prefers to speak of its elements in the current terminology, *sacramentum tantum*, *sacramentum et res*, *res tantum*. He does the same for the sacrament of penance.

According to different ways Langton treats them, we shall group the sacraments as follows: 1. circumcision, baptism, and holy orders, for which our author uses his principle explicitly; 2. extreme unction, confirmation, and matrimony, whose main element is determined, but without the use of the principle, *similitudo cum re principali*; 3. eucharist and penance, to which Stephen applies the technical terms, *sacramentum tantum*, *sacramentum et res*, *res tantum*<sup>16</sup>.

to the eighth day, the author distinguishes between *esse de substantia seu esse ad validitatem* and *esse de praecepto seu ad liceitatem*.

This same doctrine is more clearly stated in the question *de circumcissione*, where, after the arguments of Ca 54 are neatly arranged, we read the solution. Cd 195, f. 310d: "Solutio. Octavus dies non erat de substantia sacramenti. Si tamen aliquis praeveniebat eum vel praeteribat, nisi ex necessitate, peccabat."

In the light of these clear texts, we can interpret Cd 189, f. 308b & c. First in the very orderly and non-Langtonian introduction, we read: "Circa quem [baptismum] quinque considerantur: primo, quid sit sacramentum baptismi et *essentia*, et quid sit *de substantia* ipsius." That *essentia* and *de substantia* are opposed to each other becomes clear from what follows. After showing that character is the essence of baptism, the author writes: "Item, *de substantia* baptismi sunt quattuor, forma verborum, aqua, intentio, persona baptizantis et baptizandi." This is a throwback to the text of Petrus Cantor quoted in the preceding note. However, Stephen does not wish to identify character (*essentia*) with these four things (*de substantia*). The four are rather *conditiones sine qua non* for valid baptism.

<sup>15</sup> At Stephen Langton's time, the Old Testament sacraments were treated together with those of the New Dispensation. Various co-divisions of all the sacraments were given, such as *stricte et large dicta*, *Veteris et Novae Legis*, *efficacia et inefficacia*, etc. Cf. D. Van den Eynde, *Les définitions*, p. 184, under "Classifications des sacrements signes".

<sup>16</sup> Though we could omit these last two groups of texts, for the sake of completeness we offer Langton's treatment of all the sacraments under the aspect of their *sacramenta* and *res*.



## I. First Group of Sacraments

A. Circumcision. Of the three texts that deal with the essence of circumcision, only two explain what constitutes its essence<sup>17</sup>. The third merely mentions in passing that the essence of circumcision is one of the *sacramenta invisibilia* which stand in the way of the definition, *sacramentum est invisibilis gratiae visibilis forma*.

The first text shows us the author proposing the question with one of his usual expressions.

Ca 54, f. 215a: Item, quaeritur quid sit *sacramentum* in circumcissione.

Thereupon, two possible answers are discussed, *character* and *passio circumcisi*. The subsequent objection touches upon Stephen's principle by saying that character has no similarity to the *res* of circumcision, the remission of sin. The argument against *passio circumcisi* is a mere comparison with baptism: If you say that the *passio* is the sacrament in circumcision, you should have to say that the *ablutio-passio* is the sacrament in baptism.

Ca 54, f. 215a: Si character, quae erat similitudo inter sacramentum et rem sacramenti? In remissione peccati, quae erat res eius, non est nisi ablutio; et character non est nisi impressio. Sed inter ista duo nulla est similitudo. Sed inter rem et sacramentum debet esse similitudo; et hic nulla est. Ergo character non erat sacramentum.

<sup>17</sup> Outside of Langton's collected *quaestiones theologicae*, the complete doctrine concerning the sacrament in circumcision, is in his commentary on the Lombard's *Sentences*.

"Quaeritur ergo quid in circumcissione sit sacramentum. Videtur quod character, sicut in baptismo.

"Contra. Nulla est similitudo characteris ad rem sacramenti, scilicet peccatorum remissionem, quia character alicuius rei impressionem aliquam notat, et sic ponit; peccatorum remissio ablationem notat, et nullius rei impressionem.

"Responsio: Secus in circumcissione quam in baptismo. *Principalis effectus* circumcissionis est tollere, et significat ablationem peccatorum. Si ergo *similitudo sit inter sacramentum et rem*, circumcisio, id est ipsa passio circumcisi, est sacramentum, non character, quia in circumcissione nullus est character; et ipsa circumcisio-passio, in qua tollitur praeputium, signum est remissionis peccatorum, ubi tolluntur peccata, sicut ibi praeputium.

"Sed quare potius circumcisio-passio quam actio est *ibi sacramentum*?

"Responsio: Quia in circumcissione nihil repraesentatur agens. Non enim repraesentat circumcisio gratiam tollentem peccata, quia hoc facit baptismus, sed repraesentat ablationem peccatorum, passionem scilicet, quia peccata ibi auferuntur, — non dico quod aliquid auferat ea. Hoc, inquam, ut large dicatur passio. Baptismus vero characterem habet pro sacramento, *quia principalis eius effectus* est dare gratiam ex virtute sui. Et ideo character est sacramentum in baptismo." *Der Sentenzenkommentar des Kardinals Stephan Langton*, ed. A. Landgraf (*Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters*, Bd. XXXVII, Heft I, Münster, Westf., 1952), pp. 149—150.

Si dicatur quod passio circumcisi, scil. ablatio cutis, erat ibi sacramentum, eadem ratione in baptismo passio baptizati, scil. exterior ablutio, est sacramentum.

In the next few lines, Langton seems to try to reestablish character as the essence of circumcision on the grounds of some similarity between it and the remission of sin. In the last analysis, however, he prefers *passio circumcisi* to character, specifically because of its greater similarity to the remission of sin.

Ca 54, f. 215a: Vel dic quare non posset bene dici quod in circumcisione sacramentum esset remissionis peccati character, quia, licet tollatur peccatum, tamen remissio peccati erat quoddam bonum quod manebat, cuius sacramentum erat character.

Sed melius est ut dicatur quod passio circumcisi fuit ibi sacramentum, quia sicut exterius dum patiebatur tollebatur cutis, sic interius culpa.

Then, to refute the argument taken from baptism, he explains that the *ablutio-passio* is not the sacrament there (*sacramentum ibi*), because it does not bear a likeness to the principal effect of baptism. Though he does not use the word *res* in this text, the foregoing context clearly indicates that the *duo quae baptismus facit* are its *res*.

Ca 54, f. 215a: Non tamen passio abluendi exterius est in baptismo sacramentum, quamvis expressam habeat similitudinem cum ablutione interiori. Sed ideo non est sacramentum, quia cum baptismus duo faciat, scil. collationem gratiae et remissionem peccati, *illud debet esse ibi sacramentum quod habet similitudinem cum principali*, scil. cum gratia, quae est principalior quam remissio peccati. Sed cum gratia habet expressam similitudinem character, quia utrumque imprimitur et distinguit, et ideo character est sacramentum in baptismo.

Putting together all the elements in this discussion, we may word Langton's principle as follows: „Sacramentum in essentia est illud elementum quod habet similitudinem cum re principali sacramenti.“

Another slightly shorter text is more polished and developed doctrinally. It contains substantially the same solution as above. In the little systematic introduction to the question *de circumcisione* we read:

Cd 195, f. 310b: Et primo videndum est quid fuerit *sacramentum* circumcisionis *in essentia*.

The present text surpasses the first one by offering three possible solutions instead of two: *cultellus*, *abscisio-actio*, *abscisio-passio*. A comparison with baptism occasions the first objections.

Cd 195, f. 310b: Sacramentum circumcisionis aut erat cultellus aut abscisio-actio, aut ablatio pellis passio sacramentum ibi erat.

Si cultellus, ergo eadem ratione aqua in baptismo est sacramentum. Si abscisio-actio vel passio, ergo eadem ratione actio ablutis vel passio abluti in baptismo est sacramentum.

The solution contains a clear statement of the criterion of judging the essence of a sacrament. This serves as a sort of major premise. The minor which follows is twofold. The first part states that the principle is not verified in the analogous elements of baptism, and thus eliminates the objections made above. Thereupon the second part shows that the *ablutio pellis passio* truly meets the requirements of the principle.

Cd 195, f. 310b—c: *Solutio. Principalis effectus baptismi est infusio gratiae. Unde ad hoc quod aliquid sit ibi sacramentum exigitur quod illud signum habeat similitudinem cum principali effectu.*

Sed ablutio exterior, sive actio sive passio, nullam habet similitudinem cum infusione gratiae; character vero ( f. 310c ) similitudinem habet cum ea. Ideo in baptismo solus character est sacramentum.

In circumcisione vero, principalis effectus est peccati remissio, cum qua similitudinem habet ablutio pellis passio, et ideo est sacramentum ipsius.

Commenting on the first text, we worded the principle thus: „Sacramentum in essentia est illud elementum quod habet similitudinem cum *re principali* sacramenti.“ Here, however, the author speaks of the sacrament's principal *effectus*. Is there a contradiction? Not at all, because Langton is dealing with sacraments which produce what they signify (efficiunt quod figurant). In such cases, the principal effect is actually identical with the principal *res*<sup>18</sup>. As we examine the expression of the principle in other texts, we shall find Stephen using both *res* and

<sup>18</sup> Cf. H.-M. Féret, “‘Sacramentum, Res’, dans la langue théologique de S. Augustin”, in *Revue des sciences philosophique et théologique*, XXIX (1940), p. 218.

It may be objected that only sacraments of the New Testament were considered to produce what they signify. Cf. D. Van den Eynde, *Les définitions*, p. 92. Accordingly it would not be proper to refer to the effect of circumcision, an Old Testament sacrament. But we must remember that circumcision was considered an exception, and was believed to produce what it signified, the remission of sins. Like the other Old Testament sacraments, however, it did not by its own power (*ex vi sua*) confer grace, as do the sacraments of the New Law. Cf. D. Van den Eynde, *ibidem*, pp. 92—95.

We present here some passages from Langton's *quaestiones* in which we can see that he believed circumcision produced what it signifies, and that he also saw a difference between the efficacy of circumcision and that of baptism.

Cd 195, f. 310c: “In circumcisione vero *principalis effectus* est peccati remissio, cum qua similitudinem habet ablutio pellis passio.”

Ca 54, f. 215a: “. . . sicut exterius dum patiebatur [circumcisu] tollebatur cutis, sic interius culpa.”

Ca 54, f. 214d: “. . . in circumcisione conferebatur gratia, sed *non ex vi* circumcisionis.”

Cd 195, f. 310c: “Haec est enim differentia inter circumcisionem et baptismum, quod ex virtute baptismi remittuntur peccata *et* infunditur gratia, et *ex virtute* circumcisionis *dimittebantur* peccata sed *non infundebatur* gratia.”

*effectus* in his formula. Still, there is no doubt that *res* is the more basic concept, because of its intrinsic relation to *sacramentum* and *similitudo*. *Effectus*, on the contrary, enters into the formula only *per accidens* because it happens to be identical with the *res* in the sacraments which produce what they signify.

The third mention of the essence of circumcision occurs in the question *de descriptione sacramenti*. Though the word *essentia* does not appear, Stephen uses one of his ordinary expressions, *sacramentum ibi*.

Cb 134, f. 262d: Similiter in circumcissione, quia ablatio-passio non est visibilis, nec character, si dicatur quod character *ibi sit sacramentum*.

This doctrine is an exact echo of the first text examined above, even to the point of recognizing the less preferable opinion, which places the essence of circumcision in character.

B. Baptism. Through the analogy between circumcision and baptism, we have already learned a good deal about baptism. To repeat briefly, baptism has two *res* or effects, the remission of sin and the infusion of grace. Of these two, the infusion of grace is the more important (*principalior*). The ablution, one of the elements of baptism, has a similarity to the remission of sin, the lesser effect of baptism (*effectus minus principalis*). Hence the ablution is not the principal element, it is not *the* sacrament. Character, on the other hand, is similar to the infusion of grace, the more important *res* (*principalior res sive effectus*), and therefore it constitutes the sacrament *in essentia*. The doctrine on baptism found elsewhere always follows this same pattern. At times it is more developed, but it always comes to the same conclusion.

We meet an analogy between baptism and another sacrament in the question *de extrema unctione*. The objection is made that if the *inunctio qualitas* is *the* sacrament in extreme unction, *ablutio qualitas* should likewise be *the* sacrament in baptism. In answer, the author makes it clear that character is *the* sacrament in baptism because it alone has *similitudo cum re principali baptismi, scil. gratiae impressione*.

Ca 53, f. 214a: Sed eadem ratione qua dicis quod inunctio qualitas est sacramentum unctionis extremae, quare non similiter dicis quod qualitas est sacramentum baptismi, scil. ablutio? Quod si est, in baptismo non confertur character.

Dicimus quod omne sacramentum *similitudinem debet habere* cum eo cuius est sacramentum, sive *cum sua re principali*. Sed principalis res baptismi est gratia vel impressio gratiae, cuius similitudinem habet character impressus. Sed cum hac re non habet similitudinem ablutio qualitas, licet habeat similitudinem cum ablutione interiori, quae est secundaria res baptismi.



Elsewhere, our author discusses at length the elements of baptism. Once he has enumerated the three, *aqua*, *ablutio*, *character*, he explains why each one is a sacrament in a certain sense. There follows the crucial question: Which of the three constitutes baptism itself? Omitting the involved argument concerning water as the essence of baptism, we shall quote only the synthetic objection which follows.

Cb 60, f. 219b: Sed contra. Quare potius dicitur character baptismus ablutio vel quam aqua, cum aqua significet gratiam et ablutio remissionem peccati?

In reply, Stephen denies water and ablution the honor of being *the* sacrament, because they do not signify the principal effect of baptism. Note in the following passage the fine distinction between *gratia simpliciter* and *impressio gratiae*.

Cb 60, f. 219b—c: Responsio. Principalis effectus ( f. 219c ) baptismi est infusio gratiae, secundarius remissio peccati. Ablutio autem non debet esse baptismus, cum *non significet principalem effectum* baptismi. Item, aqua non debet baptismus, cum non significet *impressionem* gratiae, licet significet gratiam.

It is left to the reader to conclude that character is *the* sacrament in baptism, since it signifies the impression of grace, the principal effect of baptism.

Under the title, *de baptismo*, in Cd 189, a similar treatment begins by enunciating the question.

Cd 189, f. 308b: . . . primo, quid sit sacramentum baptismi in essentia?

As the discussion goes on, question Cd 189 apparently reunites in itself more or less systematically many points from other questions, particularly Cb 60, *de baptismo*<sup>19</sup>. By comparison, the terminology in Cd 189 is more technical and the treatment more extended than in Cb 60<sup>20</sup>. For brevity's sake, we shall cite only the passages which differ slightly from Cb 60. Besides adding two arguments in favor of *ablutio exterior*, the present question also develops to a high degree Cb 60's simple answer to the problem of the essence of baptism.

Cd 189, f. 308b: Solutio. In baptismo sunt tria, scil. character, aqua, exterior ablutio. Character significat infusionem sive impressionem gratiae, et infusio gratiae est principalis effectus baptismi. Unde cum character *simili-*

<sup>19</sup> The first part of Cd 189 is certainly based on the first part of question Cb 60, and a piece of Cb 134 is put in besides. For a comparative study, cf. Appendix A.

<sup>20</sup> Whether the form and wording of Cd 189 are the work of Langton himself or of a compiler, we cannot say for certain. But the doctrine is substantially his, as well as the tendency to use technical terminology.

*tudinem habeat cum principali effectu baptismi*, quia per hoc quod imprimitur animae datur intelligi quod gratia infundatur animae, — per hoc inquam patet quod character proprie est sacramentum baptismi. Aqua est sacramentum remissionis peccati quoad culpam, et hoc est *secundarius effectus* baptismi. Ablutio exterior est sacramentum remissionis peccati quoad poenam, et hoc est *secundo secundarius effectus* baptismi.

Noteworthy here are the formula, *similitudo cum principali effectu*, and the technical expression, *secundo secundarius effectus*. Moreover, the *res* of water and ablution differ considerably from the ones in the other text. In place of grace and the remission of sin, we find the remission of sin *quoad culpam* and *quoad poenam* as the *res* of *aqua* and *ablutio* respectively<sup>21</sup>.

To complete the picture, recall to mind that character in baptism is one of the invisible sacraments in question Cb 134, *de descriptione sacramenti*, which stands in the way of the definition, *invisibilis gratiae visibilis forma*.

After hearing all these testimonies, we must admit that the accidental differences in the arguments for and against water and ablution are lost in the strong chorus of texts which favor character as the essence of baptism on the grounds that it is similar to the principal *res* or effect of the sacrament, the impression or infusion of grace (quia significat seu similitudinem habet cum re sive effectu principali sacramenti, scil. cum impressione sive infusione gratiae).

C. Holy Orders. Outside of the explanation of the essence of orders in the question *utrum character conferatur in ordine*, there is but the slightest mention of it in Cb 134, *de descriptione sacramenti*.

Cb 134, f. 262d: . . . quia character est sacramentum in baptismo, non tamen est visibilis forma, sicut nec character ordinis.

The explanatory text opens with a very simple question:

Cd 206, f. 318a: Postea quaeritur quid sit in ordine sacramentum.

There follow three objections against character as the answer. The solution counters the objections by proclaiming character as the *sacramentum ibi*.

Cd 206, f. 318b: Solutio. Dicimus quod *character est ibi sacramentum*, et iste character est ad excellentiam et alio respectu forte ad distinctionem.

<sup>21</sup> At the end of this same question, we read a passage which seems to unite these two interpretations of *aqua*. Cd 189, f. 308d: "Et aliter: Oportet sacramentum habere similitudinem cum re cuius est signum. Sed aqua baptismi aliquid tollit, scil. sordes, et per hoc significat remissionem peccatorum; et aliquid ponit, scil. humectationem, et per hoc significat infusionem gratiae."

Then the three objections are answered in succession. For greater convenience, we shall change the order of Langton's text and join each answer to its respective objection.

(1<sup>st</sup> objection) Cd 206, f. 318a—b: Si dicatur character, contra: sacramentum est forma visibilis invisibilis gratiae. (f. 318b) Sed character non est visibilis; ergo non est sacramentum.

This objection is the reverse of the one made in Cb 134<sup>22</sup>. There, the invisibility of character was used against the definition, *invisibilis gratiae visibilis forma*; here the definition combines with the invisibility of character to argue against character as the essence of holy orders.

(1<sup>st</sup> answer) Cd 206, f. 318b: Ad illud autem quod inducit contrarium, dicimus quod illa descriptio *data est per causam*, id est, ad hoc quod sit ibi sacramentum *oportet quod* ad conferendum [gratiam] *sit aliqua forma visibilis*.

Quite evidently the answer is the same as in Cb 134<sup>23</sup>. The *causa* is taken as a necessary concomitant, a sort of *conditio sine qua non*, of the sacrament. In other words, you cannot have a sacrament without a visible element, though this element itself is not the essence of the sacrament.

The second objection arises from an analogy with extreme unction.

(2<sup>nd</sup> objection) Cd 206, f. 318b: Item, cum in extrema inunctione sit unctio sacramentum, quare non est hic similiter consecratio?

The comparison is poor, because consecration takes away something, whereas anointing confers something.

(2<sup>nd</sup> answer) Cd 206, f. 318b: Ad illud quod postea dicit, dicimus quod consecratio non est sacramentum, quia consecratio tollit, sed sacramentum confert; unctio vero confert. Et ideo non est simile de consecratione.

Finally, Langton objects to character on the basis of the principle of determining the essence of a sacrament. If holy orders are instituted principally to distinguish the ministries of the church (*signum distinctionis ministeriorum*), that is their principal *res*. How then can character be *the* sacrament, since it is a sign of grace (*signum gratiae*), and has no similarity to the *res principalis*?

(3<sup>rd</sup> objection) Cd 206, f. 319b: Item, ordo principaliter institutus est ad discretionem ministerii ecclesiae, et non ad conferendum gratiam vel ad augmentandum, cum per alia sacramenta satis conferatur; ergo cum character sit signum gratiae, non videtur in ordine quod sit sacramentum character.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. note 4 above for Langton's text.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. note 5 above for Langton's text.

To reinstate character as the essence of holy orders, the author replies that grace is in a way the *res principalis sacramenti*, because it is higher in dignity than the other *res* (in quantum est *res dignior*). Accordingly, character is after all *the* sacrament, by virtue of its similarity to grace, the *res principalis dignior*.

3<sup>rd</sup> answer) Cd 206, f. 318b: Ad tertium dicimus quod distinctio minorum est principalis res sacramenti. Haec duplex: id est „dignior“, falsum est; immo gratia est dignior. Si „principalis“, id est „ad hoc fuit institutum“, verum est.

## II. Second Group of Sacraments

With the foregoing, we conclude the explicit testimonies concerning Langton's principle, *similitudo cum re principali*. The second group is made up of the sacraments whose essence is determined, but without the use of the principle enunciated above. Speaking of extreme unction, Stephen does not set forth the complete principle, but merely says *similitudo cum re sua*. When referring to confirmation and matrimony, however, he simply tells us that a certain *qualitas* is *the* sacrament, and that it is a *signum sacrae rei*, without ever mentioning the *res principalis*.

A. Extreme Unction. The discussion of extreme unction, which follows the general pattern of the questions on baptism, begins with the statement of the problem.

Ca 53, f. 213d: Sed quaeritur *quid ibi sit sacramentum*, utrum character an oleum an ipsa unctio.

After quickly deciding that neither character nor oil can be the essence of extreme unction, the author makes a distinction between *unctiones active et passive sumptae*.

Ca 53, f. 213d: Si character, ergo hoc sacramentum non est iterabile, sicut nec baptismus. Sed constat quod iteratur.

Si oleum, ergo etsi nullus inungatur, nihilominus est hoc sacramentum quod falsum.

Si unctio, active vel passive . . .

There follows a barrage of objections and counter objections<sup>24</sup> leading up to the final question: „Quid ergo ibi est sacramentum?“

By way of necessary clarification, the distinction is made between the word *inunctus* used as a participle and as a noun. In the participial

<sup>24</sup> This text is in Appendix B, under Ca 53, nos. 2—4.



sense, it refers to the anointing as something received or undergone (inunctio-passio); in the nominal sense, to a certain quality of the body (qualitas corporis). Of these two, only the latter is *the* sacrament of extreme unction, just as a certain *qualitas* is the sacrament of matrimony. Moreover, this quality in extreme unction is similar to the *res* of the sacrament, the internal *unctio* of the soul<sup>25</sup>.

Ca 53, f. 213d—214a: Dicimus quod sicut haec vox “positum” quandoque est *nomen*, et secundum hoc interdum aliquid est positum, licet nihil ponatur, et quandoque est *participium*, sic haec vox “inunctus” in una significatione est *participium copulans passionem*; et secundum hoc, inunctio non est sacramentum. In alia significatione est *nomen copulans qualitatem corporis*, quae surgit ex omnibus illis inunctionibus passive, quae exiguntur ad conferendum hoc sacramentum. Et *illa qualitas est sacramentum* unctionis extremae, et incipit esse *in corpore* cum consummantur illae unctiones passive, sicut sacramentum (f. 214a) matrimonii surgit ex duobus consensibus, quorum neuter est sacramentum; et est matrimonium *qualitas* quae est in duobus ita quod *in neutro*. Potest autem percipi *sensu corporeo* quod illa qualitas [extremae unctionis] sit *in corpore*; et habet *similitudinem cum sua re*, scil. cum unctione interiori.

This last statement, *et habet similitudinem cum sua re*, with its simple *et*, seems too matter of fact to be the reason for determining the *qualitas* as the essence of the sacrament. However, such an interpretation is at least possible in view of the explicit statement of Langton’s principle in the subsequent context<sup>26</sup>.

Ca 53, f. 214a: . . . omne sacramentum similitudinem debet habere . . . cum sua re principali.

Relative to the present question, it is worth noting the determination of the principal *res* of extreme unction which occurs further on in the *quaestio*. The author starts with a twofold *res*: one is the remission of sins, which he calls *unctio spiritualis*; the other, the alleviation of the body. He maintains the remission of sins is the most important *res* by reason of its dignity, but insists that the *alleviatio corporis* is the principal *res* for which the sacrament was instituted.

Ca 53, f. 214c: Unde haec locutio est duplex: “Eius principalis res est remissio peccati sive sanitas mentis.” Potest enim dici “principalis”, id est

<sup>25</sup> This *unctio interior*, judged from the subsequent context, should mean the *remissio peccati, gratia mediante*. Cf. Appendix B, under Ca 53, no. 13. This interpretation is confirmed by two other passages further on in the same question, where the author speaks of *unctio spiritualis* and *sanitas mentis* as synonymous with *remissio peccati*. Cf. Appendix B, under Ca 53, nos. 16 and 17.

<sup>26</sup> The text is found near the bottom of page in text, p. 346 above; also in Appendix B, under Ca 53, no. 8.

dignior, et sic est vera; vel "principalis res", id est propter quam est hoc sacramentum principaliter institutum, et secundum hoc falsa, — immo principalis est sanitas sive alleviatio corporis.

Another redaction of the same question in almost exactly the style of Cd 196, *de sacramento confirmationis*<sup>27</sup>, is found in V 171. It agrees with Ca 53 in placing the essence of extreme unction in *unctione qualitate*, making the recipient of the sacrament an *unctus* in the nominal sense. Nevertheless, V 171 departs from Ca 53 in putting the *qualitas* in the soul and not in the body of the *unctus*<sup>28</sup>.

V 171, f. 265c: Sed paucis nos expedientes dicimus quod illud sacramentum non est oleum vel aliqua actio, sed quaedam qualitas quae innascitur animae et surgit ex illis unctionibus, actionibus et passionibus quae fiunt ex (!) diversis membris. Et talis qualitas copulatur et praedicatur de hoc termino "unctus" quando ponitur nominaliter. Et quando idem terminus ponitur participialiter praedicatur uno termino "passio".

Thereafter the author of V 171 brings up other problems related to the effects of the sacrament. He suggests several solutions to the problems which arise if extreme unction produces only one of its two effects<sup>29</sup>. He also speaks of the *effectus principalior sive ratione dignitatis* (remissio peccati) *sive ratione finis propter quem inventum est hoc sacramentum*<sup>30</sup>. Strangely enough, he does not use the term *res* in these passages, as does Ca 53. Consequently, Ca 53 is not only more Langtonian in flavor, but also more explicit concerning the *res* in extreme unction. This brings it closer to the enunciation of the oft-repeated principle Langton uses for determining the essence of a sacrament: *similitudo cum re principali sacramenti*.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Appendix B, under Ca 53, no. 5, and V 171, no. 3, for a comparative study.

<sup>28</sup> This *qualitas animae* runs side by side with the doctrine expressed in Cd 196, f. 311b: "Item, hoc sacramentum [confirmationis] est quaedam qualitas animae, sicut extrema unctio." Which of these redactions is to be attributed to Langton? The arguments are in favor of Ca 53. It is in Ca, supposedly the best section of the Cambridge manuscript, and it has been corrected quite carefully. Another copy of redaction Ca 53 is in ms. CH. The redaction V 171, on the other hand, is found only in V. Moreover, it betrays the style of the introduction of Cd 196, which was probably rewritten by a compiler. The evident similarity of subject matter, order, and doctrine in V 171 and Ca 53 make them substantially the same question, but there are such accidental differences in doctrine and in the mode of treatment, that we believe that the two redactions were made by two different persons. From the arguments given above, we can safely say that redaction Ca 53 is closer to Langton than the other one. For a comparative study of the texts, cf. Appendix B. The appendix does not contain the entire question, Cd 196, but only the parts which run parallel to Ca 53.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Appendix B, under V 171, nos. 4—8.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Appendix B, under 171, nos. 13—14.

B. Confirmation. A question in Cd treats briefly of confirmation *sine disputatione*. A still shorter exposition of the same topics is found near the end of CH. It is questionable whether Langton himself wrote either of these questions, but the doctrine does not disagree with his. According to both texts, *inunctio qualitas* is the sacrament. They also use the analogy between *qualitas* in confirmation and extreme unction to argue against this point. Still, neither text expresses the formula for the essence of a sacrament, though the author of Cd 196 apparently knew of it. He seems to know of the question *superius*, which treats of the matter fully.

Cd 196, f. 311a

Circa sacramentum confirmationis:  
quid sit ibi sacramentum . . . ?

Omnes *obiectionis superius factae*,  
"quid sit sacramentum in baptismo,  
an aqua, an ablutio exterior, an  
character", possunt hic fieri.

Dicimus absque disputatione quod  
quaedam *qualitas animae*, quae copu-  
latur per hunc terminum "unctus"  
nominaliter positum, — ut cum  
dicitur: Iste est unctus — est sacra-  
mentum confirmationis. Unctio vero  
passio copulatur hoc termino "unc-  
tus" participialiter posito.

Several paragraphs later:

Cd 196, f. 311b: Item, hoc sacra-  
mentum est quaedam *qualitas ani-  
mae, sicut extrema unctio*.

CH 189, f. 153b

Sed quaeritur quid sit sacramen-  
tum confirmationis.

Si chrisma, pari ratione aqua in  
baptismo. Si inunctio, pari ratione  
ablutio in baptismo.

Solutio. Sacramentum confirma-  
tionis est inunctio non actio sed  
*qualitas*, et illa *signum* est unctionis  
gratiae.

CH 189, f. 153b: Item, sicut in  
extrema unctione sacramentum est  
*unctio qualitas, ita in confirmatione*.

C. Matrimony. There is only one extended explanation of the essence of matrimony. An echo of the same doctrine is heard in Ca 53, *de extrema unctione*. Langton places the essence of matrimony in a certain quality arising from the mutual consent of the two parties. It consists of a bond (*vinculum*), which, though double, constitutes but one matrimony.

Cd 207, f. 318d: Item, quaeritur quid sit matrimonium in essentia, utrum unum sit vel plura, et utrum *qualitas* vel *relatio*. Si unum est, utrum sit in duobus, ita quod in neutro vel ita quod in utroque.

Cd 207, f. 318d

Dicimus quod matrimonium est  
*qualitas* quae nascitur ex mutuo con-

Ca 53, f. 213d—214a

. . . sicut matrimonium surgit ex  
duobus consensibus, quorum neuter

sensu; et est duo vincula quae insunt      est sacramentum; et est matrimonium  
duobus; non tamen duo sunt matri-      qualitas quae est in duobus ita quod  
monia sed unum.      in neutro.

Then he asks *cuius rei sit sacramentum*. Throughout the answer, however, there is no explicit reference to a similarity to the principal *res* for determining the essence of the sacrament.

Cd 207, f. 318d: Item, quaeritur cuius rei sacramentum sit matrimonium.

Dicimus quod ante carnalem copulam est sacramentum, *id est signum*, Christi et ecclesiae militantis; post carnalem copulam est sacramentum Christi et ecclesiae triumphantis, quia, sicut in matrimonio corporali sunt tria, scil. consensus animorum, carnalis copula, et matrimonium, ita in sacramento spirituali Christi et ecclesiae fuit consensus animorum a primo Abel, carnalis copula a tempore incarnationis; matrimonium erit in iudicio.

The distinction of the three elements is interesting, even though the argumentation itself is none too clear<sup>31</sup>.

### III. Third Group of Sacraments

Nowhere does Langton explain how he arrives at the essence of the eucharist or of penance. We can infer that he considered *Corpus Christi* the essence of the eucharist<sup>32</sup>, because in Cb 134 he mentions it among several other sacramental essences.

Cb 134, f. 262d: . . . quia character est *sacramentum in baptismo*, non tamen est visibilis forma, sicut nec character ordinis. Sic Corpus Christi est sacramentum unitatis ecclesiae; non tamen est visibilis forma, quia non est forma. Similiter in circumcisione, quia ablatio passio non est visibilis, nec character, si dicatur quod character ibi sit sacramentum.

For the rest, he favors the terminology, *sacramentum tantum*, *sacramentum et res*, *res tantum*, for the elements of eucharist and penance<sup>33</sup>. He calls the Body of Christ *sacramentum et res*, but this does not seem to influence his choice of it as *the* sacrament.

Finally, Langton's collected questions tell us nothing at all about the essence of the sacrament of penance.

\*      ■      \*

The resulting picture of Langton's determination of the essence of the sacraments, based on his *quaestiones theologicae*, may be drawn as

<sup>31</sup> In some of the manuscripts, there are blanks in the place of the words, *a primo Abel* and *matrimonium*. Apparently, this is an unclear passage in the original, and we have here possible interpolations.

<sup>32</sup> For an explanation of how it came to be considered as such, cf. D. Van den Eynde, *Les définitions*, pp. 79—80.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. note 9 above.



follows. He uses many expressions to designate *the* sacrament: *sacramentum in essentia*, *essentia sacramenti*, *sacramentum proprie* (as opposed to *large*), *sacramentum ibi*, *sacramentum in baptismo*, etc., *sacramentum baptismi*, etc., *baptismus*, etc., *est*<sup>34</sup>. When he tells us how he determines the essence of a sacrament, he starts from its principal *res* and works back to the element which bears the greatest similarity to it. This element is the essence of the sacrament. We do not pretend that Langton applied this reasoning to all the sacraments, but generally when he explains his choice of the essence, he starts from the principle as explained above.

His complete doctrine on the principal elements of the sacraments may be seen at a glance in the following diagram.

Sacrament	Principal Element	Relation to <i>Res</i>
Circumcision	<i>Ablatio-passio (character)</i>	<i>Similitudo cum re principali</i>
Baptism	<i>Character</i>	<i>Similitudo cum effectu principali</i>
Confirmation	<i>Qualitas animae</i>	* <i>Signum gratiae</i> <sup>35</sup> ( <i>similitudo cum gratia</i> )
Eucharist	<i>Corpus Christi</i>	* <i>Signum unitatis ecclesiae</i>
Penance	— — —	— — —
Extreme Unction	<i>Qualitas corporis (animae)?</i>	<i>Similitudo cum re</i> <sup>36</sup> <i>(unctione interiori)</i> <i>de facto principali</i>
Holy Orders	<i>Character</i>	<i>Similitudo cum re principali</i>
Matrimony	<i>Qualitas</i>	* <i>Signum unionis Christi et ecclesiae</i>

## PRINCIPLES OF OTHER AUTHORS

The next step in our investigation is to compare Langton's doctrine with the position of some of the authors who wrote shortly before and after him. Not all of them have the same point of departure in determin-

<sup>34</sup> For the secondary elements, the *quaestiones* use the terms, *sacramentum large*, *res sacramentalis*, *sacramentale*. We hope to develop this point at some future date.

<sup>35</sup> Those marked with an asterisk are not given by Langton as the basis of the *sacramentum in essentia*. They are merely mentioned by him in close connection with the essences.

<sup>36</sup> This may be considered by Langton as the reason why *qualitas corporis* is the principal element.

ing the essential element of a sacrament. Ignoring the principal *res*, some of them begin with the permanent quality of the sacraments, especially of baptism.

### I. *Permanentia*

During the latter half of the 12th century, scholars gave more and more attention to *sacramentum* as a permanent reality<sup>37</sup>. As a result, some saw in this permanent reality the essence of certain sacraments, beginning with *character*, or *signaculum*, in baptism<sup>38</sup>. From baptism, the notion of *sacramentum manens* was extended to other sacraments, notably confirmation and holy orders, and even in some sense to extreme unction and matrimony<sup>39</sup>.

A very clear exponent of the theory of permanent essences was Praepositinus, who wrote:

*Summa, Cod. Erlangen lat. 353, f. 49v: Contra: Aqua desinit esse, qua iste baptizatur, et ablutio de quocumque intelligens sive active sive passive. Sed baptismus non desinit esse. Ergo baptismus nullum istorum est.*

Item, iste non potest esse et non habere baptismum. Ita enim dicit Augustinus, quod illa nota magis *adhaeret* quam alia corporalis nota, et quod aliud est non habere, aliud pernitiose habere, aliud salubriter habere. Quod non habetur, dandum est; quod pernitiose habetur, agendum est ut salubriter habetur. Ubi dat intelligere, quod *nemo potest amittere* baptismum. Ergo baptismus *non potest desinere esse* in isto; sed aqua desinit esse et ablutio, ut supra<sup>40</sup>.

Thereupon follows the solution.

Solutio. Dicimus quod in hoc sacramento tria considerantur: unum, quod est significans et non manens; aliud, quod est significans *et manens*; tertium, quod est significatum. Significans et non manens: ipsa aqua. Significans *et manens*: *signaculum*, quod inest homini ex hoc quod baptizatur in forma ecclesiae. Significatum: gratia mundans... Ubi auctoritates dicunt quod baptismum *non potest quis amittere, de secundo intelligatur*... Sed *medium proprie dicitur baptismum*<sup>41</sup>.

<sup>37</sup> N. M. Haring, "Berengar's Definitions", pp. 121—126; D. Van den Eynde, *Les définitions*, pp. 80—81.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. A. Landgraf, "Die fröhscholastische Definition", pp. 353—383; N. M. Haring, *op. cit.*, 133—134; D. Van den Eynde, *op. cit.*, p. 81. Landgraf treats the point from the angle of the definition of baptism. Haring follows closely upon his idea when he writes about the sacrament *defined* as character. Continuing from there, Van den Eynde makes the necessary distinction between defining a sacrament and determining its principal or essential element.

<sup>39</sup> D. Van den Eynde, *ibidem*. Whether it was applied to all these sacraments as a criterion of determining their essence is a point which has not yet been established to our satisfaction.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. A. Landgraf, "Die fröhscholastische Definition", p. 356, note 88.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. *ibidem*, pp. 357—358.

In this passage, as in other writings<sup>42</sup>, we find that permanence is used with particularly good effect in disqualifying water and ablution as the essence of baptism. And yet, when the writers come to *signaculum* or *character* as the sacrament, most of them suddenly become quite matter of fact. They merely state that baptism is character *et permanet*. They do not say, *quia permanet*<sup>43</sup>.

## II. *Similitudo cum re principali*

This creates a striking contrast with the way Langton employs his principle, *similitudo cum re principali*. His argumentation is replete with *quia*, *unde*, etc., all indicating the *reason why* this or that element is the *sacramentum ibi*. Add to this Stephen's comparative silence about *permanentia*. Some of the times that he does mention it, he is not at all concerned with the principal element of the Sacrament, but rather with *reviviscentia*<sup>44</sup>. What is more significant, when he mentions per-

<sup>42</sup> E. g., *Cod. British Museum Harley lat. 3855*, f. 13v:

"Sed opponitur: aqua est baptismus. . . Item, id quod est baptismus isti inseparabiliter adhaeret." Cf. A. Landgraf, *op. cit.*, p. 355, note 87.

In the same *Codex Harley*, f. 13v: "Item, illis qui dicunt quod tinctio est baptismus, sic obicitur: baptismus est tinctio: ergo actio vel passio. Quod sit actio non potest dici, *quia non durat* nisi quantum aliquis immergetur. Quod sit passio non potest dici, *quia non durat* nisi quousque iste siccetur." Cf. A. Landgraf, *op. cit.*, p. 356, note 88.

Again in *Codex Harley*, f. 13v: "Magister noster dicit quod baptismus est gratia quae confertur homini quando immergitur in nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti, qua *carere non potest*, quae ei *inseparabiliter adhaeret*, et est donum gratuitum, *nec deserit* quando mortaliter peccat nec post, sicut nec scientia deserit istum cum peccat, licet sit donum gratuitum. — Nota quod gratia baptismi duplex est, scilicet alia separabilis, alia inseparabilis. Inseparabilis, quod baptizatus numquam potest dici vere non baptizatus, sive apostataverit sive non. Separabilis triplex est, scilicet delectio peccati, collatio gratiae, et conservatio eiusdem." Cf. A. Landgraf, *op. cit.*, pp. 353—354.

Landgraf says that the *Magister* is most probably Paganus of Corbeil, who introduced the term *character* in its modern meaning into sacramental theology.

The *Notulae super IIII<sup>m</sup> librum sententiarum*, *Cod. Vat. Reg. lat. 411*, and the *Glossa in sententias*, *Cod. Bibl. Roy. de Belgique (Bruxelles) lat. 1539*, f. 182v, copy Praepositinus quite closely. Cf. A. Landgraf, *op. cit.*, p. 358. However, the latter does not set up permanence as a reason for calling character the essence of the sacrament.

<sup>43</sup> In the *Harley ms.* citation in note 42 above ("Magister noster dicit", etc.), we have searched in vain to find *permanentia* given as the reason for designating character as the sacrament in baptism. In fact, the only phrase which can in any way be construed as a reason is the one which speaks of *signum*, which has at best some implicit connection with Stephen's *similitudo*.

However, in the light of what we read in Praepositinus, it is hard to imagine that a statement as clear and definite as his should be the only one of his time which alleges permanence as the criterion of the essence of a sacrament. It is hoped that some scholar who has access to the primary sources of this period will check this point more closely to see how many near contemporaries of Praepositinus shared his view and expressed it clearly.

<sup>44</sup> For example, in the question *de fictione*, he writes: Cb 61, f. 219d: "Cum baptismus mortuus sit in fide accedente, et tamen postea reviviscat, quare non eodem modo opera mortua reviviscunt?"

manence while determining the essence of a sacrament, far from basing his argument on it, he merely considers *permanentia* as a trait which makes character similar to its *res*, grace<sup>45</sup>. By virtue of this similarity, character fulfils the demands of his principle, *similitudo cum re principali*.

Though Langton's *elementa principalia* frequently coincide with those of other authors, we do not believe he had in mind the *sacramentum manens* as such when he opposed the *sacramenta invisibilia* to the Augustinian *visibilis forma*<sup>46</sup>. He leaves no doubt that he was led to some of the invisible essences not by their permanence, but *because* they had a similarity to the principal *res* of the sacrament.

But where did Langton get his idea? There are a few passages which may have furnished the elements of his theory<sup>47</sup>. Peter of Poitiers decides upon *exterior corporis ablutio facta sub forma verborum praescripta* as the essence of baptism. To defend his position, he writes:

*Sententiarum libri quinque*, V c. 4: Nec est aliquid, quod expressiorem habet similitudinem cum illa interiori mundatione quam illa corporis ablutio. Unde et illam dicimus ecclesiae baptismum. (PL 211, 1230)

Though his conclusion differs from Stephen's, all he lacks is the distinction of a multiple *res*, and the determination of a *res principalis*. The multiple *res* is found in a question in the group of Odo of Ourscamp (d. 1171)<sup>48</sup>.

"Responsio. In baptismo imprimitur character qui remanet, et ideo non est mirum si adveniente caritate reviviscat."

And elsewhere we read: Ca 8, f. 178c: "Praeterea, sicut nec perceptio eucharistiae vivificatur, nec unquam habebit effectum, sic nec perceptio, actus scil. baptismi. Baptismus autem, scil. character, semper manet in homine, sed non eucharistia, nec sacramentum eucharistiae, et ideo secus est hic quam ibi."

<sup>45</sup> Cb 60, f. 219c: "Item, ad hoc quod aliquid sit sacramentum, oportet quod habeat similitudinem cum re significata . . . Et hoc etiam verum est hic, quoniam character . . . habet similitudinem cum re significata, quoniam sicut character imprimitur inseparabiliter, ita et gratia imprimitur inseparabiliter."

<sup>46</sup> Van den Eynde seems to imply this in his treatment, though he does not say so explicitly. He is speaking as of a general doctrinal trend, in general terms. Actually, however, he gives the opinion of only one group of authors concerning the basis of invisible sacramental essences. To include the other opinion as well, one could say simply *sacramentum principale* or *sacramentum in essentia*, instead of using the term *sacramentum manens*. Cf. D. Van den Eynde, *Les définitions*, pp. 82—83, 88.

<sup>47</sup> The texts which follow have been presented by Landgraf and Haring with the remark that this different idea is noteworthy, but they have not traced it from author to author. This is understandable because it would be difficult to trace without the texts from Langton's *quaestiones theologicae*.

<sup>48</sup> Haring places the first mention of a multiple *res* in Godfrey of Poitiers, whose writing he dates at ca. 1231. Godfrey, in speaking of *gratia* as the *res principalis* of baptism, at least implies that there is more than one *res* in baptism, and that the *ablutio sordium* is the *res minus principalis*. N. M. Haring,



*Quaestiones, Cod. Vat. Reg. lat. 135, f. 90v*: Res baptismi triplex est remissio peccatorum, collatio gratiae, et augmentum gratiae<sup>49</sup>.

This text does not yet determine which *res* is principal, and which are secondary.

A much closer approach to Langton's doctrine appears in the *Notulae super IIII<sup>m</sup> librum sententiarum* (1207—1215), which credit a certain Magister Ernaldus with the doctrine that character is *the* sacrament of baptism, because it has a greater similarity to grace than either of the other two elements, water and ablution<sup>50</sup>.

*Cod. Vat. Reg. lat. 411, f. 63*: Ideo dicit m[agister] Er[naldus] quod tria sunt sacramenta in baptismo: aqua et ablutio, quia(!) significat gratiam, et character. Et hic solus dicitur sacramentum quod est baptismus, quia aqua significat gratiam *large et vage*. Sed character, cum sit impressus animae, sicut et gratia, *maiozem habet convenientiam* cum gratia quam aqua. *Et ideo aqua et ablutio sunt sacramenta, sed tamen character est sacramentum baptismi*<sup>51</sup>.

This is Langton's conclusion, and the idea of *similitudo* is there, but he reverts to Peter of Poitiers, with only one *res*. Ernaldus chooses *gratia* on place of Peter's *remissio peccati*.

In these three texts, we have nearly all the ingredients of Langton's principle: *similitudo* (Peter of Poitiers, Ernaldus), a multiple *res* (*Cod. Vat. Reg. lat. 135*). The designation of a principal *res* as the starting point of the determination seems to be the step which Stephen took beyond them. He surpasses them by far in his very frequent and explicit application of the whole principle to more than one sacrament.

Eminent among Langton's close followers are Godfrey of Poitiers and Guy of Orchelles. As usual, Godfrey is faithful to his Master, Stephen, when he writes of character in baptism.

*Summa, Bruges Ville, Cod. lat. 220, f. 112*: Ablutio autem aquae signum est ablutionis sordium. Sed impressio characteris est *signum* appositionis

"Berengar's Definitions", p. 137. The text is in note 52 below. For an explanation, cf. D. Van den Eynde, *Les définitions*, p. 89, note 1.

After examining Langton's *quaestiones theologicae*, we can easily see that Godfrey in his *Summa* (1214!) is copying from his *Magister*, Langton. Moreover, in the Ourscamp text, we see that the idea of the multiple *res* was in existence long before Langton's questions.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. A. Landgraf, "Die Wirkung der Taufe im 'Fictus' und im 'Contritus' nach der Lehre der Frühscholastik", in *Acta Pont. Academiae Romanae*, VIII (new series) (1943), p. 301.

<sup>50</sup> We made passing mention of this doctrinal similarity while speaking of a certain Arnulldus in the *Cambridge ms.* of Langton's question. Cf. L. Antl, "An Introduction to the *Quaestiones Theologicae* of Stephen Langton", in *Franciscan Studies*, XII (1952), p. 160, note 68.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. A. Landgraf, "Die frühscholastische Definition", p. 359, note 92.

gratiae, quae est *principalior res* baptismi. Et ideo dico quod character est sacramentum in baptismo<sup>52</sup>.

Guy of Orchelles sounds like Langton in his use of *potissimus effectus* and *dignior effectus*, as well as of *principalis effectus*. He reminds us of Stephen's distinction between the *effectus principalior ratione dignitatis* and the *effectus principalior ratione finis propter quem institutum est sacramentum*.

*Summa de sacramentis*: Ad hoc dicimus quod hoc argumentum non valet: "Passio circumcisionis est sacramentum in circumcisione; ergo passio baptizati est sacramentum in baptismo." Nam penes *potissimum effectum* baptismi debet accipi sacramentum. Cum ergo infusio gratiae sit *dignior effectus* quam remissio peccati, dicimus quod penes illam debet sumi sacramentum. Unde character, qui habet similitudinem cum infusione gratiae, sacramentum est ibi. In circumcisione vero *principalis effectus* est remissio peccati; unde, cum depositio pelliculae similitudinem habeat cum illa, ibi est sacramentum<sup>53</sup>.

It appears, then, that Langton's doctrine is the link that was missing in the chain of texts presented by Landgraf and Haring. Whether anyone preceded him in the clear statement of the principle of determining the essence of a sacrament remains to be seen from a more extensive search of the texts of his day. For the present, it is safe to say that he probably was the first to state it clearly and use it extensively. This position is strengthened by the fact that Magister Ernardus, a contemporary of his, does not do so, though he does approach it.

\* \* \*

From this brief study of one simple point of Langton's sacramentology, we gain a fair appreciation of his theological attitude. Basically he is traditionalist in his approach to doctrine. He evidenced his high regard for St. Augustine by respectfully refusing to change the wording of the sacramental definition, *invisibilis gratiae visibilis forma*. Nor did he reject the position of his fellow theologians who held the invisible essences of certain sacraments.

Counterbalancing his traditionalism was a healthy spirit of progress. He tried to reason out the basis of the invisible sacramental essences,

<sup>52</sup> Cf. *ibidem*, p. 369, note 117. Practically the same words occur in the same manuscript on f. 127c: "Ablutio autem aquae signum est ablutionis sordium. Sed impressio characteris est signum appositionis gratiae, quae est res principalior. Et ideo dico quod character est sacramentum in baptismo." Cf. N. M. Haring, "Berengar's Definitions", p. 137, note 85, and D. Van den Eynde, *Les définitions*, p. 89, note 4.

<sup>53</sup> *Guidonis de Orchellis Tractatus de Sacramentis ex eius Summa de Sacramentis et Officiis Ecclesiae*, ed. D. and O. Van den Eynde, (Franciscan Institute Publications, no. 4, St. Bonaventure, N. Y., 1953), p. 18.

and advanced his principle, that the essence of a sacrament is the element which is similar to the sacrament's principal *res*. (*Essentia sacramenti est elementum quod habet similitudinem cum re principali sacramenti.*) His reasoning was acceptable to some of his followers and seems to have enjoyed considerable prestige, even though, as we pointed out, the church did not incorporate it into her official body of doctrine.

To judge Stephen Langton or any scholastic fairly, we must bear in mind that they did not have the decrees of a Council of Trent or of the Vatican to guide them on many points. They were seeking the truth by applying themselves to the data of revelation as they knew and understood it at the time. It would do them a great injustice to pass judgment on their teachings according to our present knowledge of revelation. Hence, we like to think of Stephen Langton as a balanced theologian who clung to doctrinal tradition, but was not afraid to advance further clarifications and explanations of the things he knew.

## APPENDIX A

Cd 189

1. In baptismo tria sunt, scil. aqua, intinctio sive ablutio aquarum exteriorum(!) et character impressus animae.

2. Dicimus autem quod ille character est sacramentum et essentia baptismi. Illo enim characterē distinguuntur baptizati a non baptizatis, sicut pulli equitii signati a non signatis.

3. Quod autem aqua sit sacramentum sic probatur. Dicit Augustinus: Detrahe verbum et quid est aqua nisi aqua? Accedit verbum ad elementum et fit sacramentum. Ergo elementum fit sacramentum; ergo aqua.

4. Solutio. Non est sacramentum nisi large intelligas sacramentum, id est sacramentale, et in praedicta auctoritate iste terminus, "sacramentum", non debet poni ex parte apppositi sed suppositi. Et est sensus:

Cb 60

1. In sacramento baptismi tria sunt, et quodlibet illorum est sacramentum: aqua, ablutio, character.

2. Aqua significat gratiam quae mundat hominem a peccato et eum reficit, sicut aqua reficit et mundat. [Ablutio], quia signum est sacrae rei: significat enim interiorem ablutionem, scil. peccati remissionem. Character autem significat impressionem gratiae. Sicut enim character impressus, inseparabiliter imprimitur [gratia] nisi homo reiciat eam per peccatum.

3. Quaeritur ergo quod istorum trium, scil. aqua vel ablutio vel character sit baptismus.

6. Responsio. Ipsa aqua non est baptismus proprie, sed character qui imprimitur in anima, quo discernitur anima baptizati ab anima non baptizati, sicut characterē distinguitur pullus in equitio.

4. Videtur quod aqua, quia dicit Augustinus: Accedit verbum ad elementum et fit sacramentum. Et maxime per hoc quod sequitur: Detrahe verbum, et quid est aqua nisi aqua? Acsi diceret: ex quo verbum cum aqua concurreret ipsa aqua est sacramentum.

7. Quod ergo dicitur: "Accedit verbum ad elementum et fit sacramentum", id est sacramentum fit non aqua, sed istis duobus concurrentibus, aqua cum verbo, fit sacramentum.



"Accedit verbum ad elementum et fit sacramentum", id est, sacramentum fit character.

5. Item, quod ablutio exterior sit sacramentum sic probatur. Dicit auctoritas: Verbo baptisma consecratur. Baptisma idem est quod intinctio exterior; ergo illa consecratur verbo; ergo est sacramentum.

6. Solutio. Descriptio data est per causam, ut sit sensus: "Verbo baptisma consecratur", id est, verbum exigitur ad hoc ut fiat baptismus.

7. Item, hoc idem probatur ratione, sic: Principalis effectus baptismi est ablutio interior, scil. remissio peccati. Sed ad hoc ut aliquid sit sacramentum exigitur ut habeat similitudinem cum effectu illius sacramenti, et in baptismo nihil est quod habeat similitudinem cum remissione peccati nisi exterior ablutio. Ergo exterior ablutio est sacramentum baptismi. Nihil enim est sacramentum alterius rei nisi habeat similitudinem cum re cuius est sacramentum.

8. Solutio. In baptismo sunt tria, scil. character, aqua, exterior ablutio. Character significat infusionem sive impressionem gratiae, et infusio gratiae est principalis effectus baptismi. Unde cum character similitudinem habeat cum principali effectu baptismi, quia per hoc quod imprimitur animae datur intelligi quod gratia infundatur animae; per hoc, inquam, patet quod character proprie est sacramentum baptismi. *Aqua* est sacramentum remissionis peccati quoad culpam, et hoc est secundarius effectus baptismi. *Ablutio* exterior est sacramentum remissionis peccati quoad poenam, et hoc est secundo secundarius effectus baptismi.

10. Sed contra. Quare potius dicitur character baptismus quam ablutio vel quam aqua, cum aqua significet gratiam et ablutio remissionem peccati?

11. Responsio. Principalis effectus baptismi est infusio gratiae, secundarius remissio peccati. *Ablutio* autem non debet esse baptismus, cum non significet principalem effectum baptismi. Item, *aqua* non debet esse baptismus, cum non significet impressionem gratiae, licet significet gratiam.

9. Item opponitur: "Accedit verbum ad elementum et fit sacramentum", non quia dicitur, [sed quia creditur]; ergo si baptizans vel baptizatus non credat, non fit (f.308c) sacramentum baptismi, et hoc manifeste falsum est. Haereticus enim et quilibet criminosus baptizat.

10. Sic ergo expone auctoritatem: "Non quia dicitur, sed quia creditur", id est, non ex vi verbi prolatilis, sed ex vi verbi credibilis, id est Christi. Quod autem sic sit intelligendum habes ex Glossa super Ioannem: Iam vos mundi estis propter sermonem quam locutus sum vobis. Dicit Glossa: Propter sermonem, id est, propter me.

11. Vel sic expone: "Non quia dicitur, sed quia creditur", id est, non ex virtute vocis sed ex virtute significati per vocem, scil. ex virtute Trinitatis. Si enim istae voces, Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, significent tres lapides vel alia, et non Trinitatem, non fieret baptismus sub forma illorum verborum.

12. Item, sacramentum est invisibilis gratiae visibilis forma. Sed character non est visibilis forma; ergo non est sacramentum.

13. Solutio. Haec descriptio data est per causam, ut superius expositum est.

14. Item, signum est res quae praeter speciem visibilem quam ingerit sensibus facit aliud in cognitionem venire. Sed character non ingerit speciem visibilem sensibus; ergo non est sacramentum.

5. Sequitur: non quia dicitur sed quia creditur. Ergo si credatur et non dicatur, est baptismus, vel: ergo, si non credatur est baptismus.

8. Sequitur: "Non quia dicitur, sed quia creditur", id est, non agitur hic de verbo prolatibili sed credibili, id est, Filio Deo. Et secundum hoc, haec dictio, "verbum", supponit pro Filio Dei.

9. Vel aliter: "Non quia dicitur", id est [non] propter vocem, sed propter id quod voce significatur, quod scil. est subiectum fidei.

16. Item, sacramentum est invisibilis gratiae visibilis forma.  
(Also in Cb 134.)

17. Haec descriptio non est convertibilis sed data est per causam.

#### Cb 134

Item, omne sacramentum est signum, sed non convertitur. Sed Augustinus sic describit signum: Signum est quod praeter speciem quam ingerit sensibus aliud facit in cognitionem venire; ergo sacramentum ingerit speciem sensibus; ergo proprie est visibilis forma; ergo character ingerit speciem sensibus et est visibilis forma.

15. Solutio. Haec auctoritas data est per causam. Et sic expone: "Signum est res quae praeter speciem visibilem quam ingerit", etc., id est, ad hoc ut sit signum oportet quod speciem visibilem ingerat sensibus.

Solutio. Sicut illa descriptio, "Sacramentum est visibilis forma invisibilis gratiae", data est quasi per causam, ita et ista; quia ubi est signum, ibi ingeritur species sensibus, non ipso signo semper, sed in suo adiuncto.

Cb 60

16. Item, character est sacramentum impressionis gratiae. Sed ad hoc ut aliquid sit sacramentum aliquius rei exigitur ut signum habeat similitudinem cum re quam significat. Quaero ergo in quo character habeat similitudinem cum infusione gratiae.

14. Item, ad hoc quod aliquid sit sacramentum, oportet quod habeat similitudinem cum re significata et eius causa existat.

17. Solutio. Character est inseparabilis, et distinguit baptizatos a non baptizatis. Ita gratia inseparabilis est quantum in se est, quia numquam recedit nisi homo ei sponte se subtrahat. Unde Isaias in persona malignorum spirituum dicit ad fidelem animam: Incurvare ut transeamus. Non enim possunt transire nisi homo se incurvet et faciat eis viam. Similiter gratia distinguit iustos ab iniustis. Per hoc ergo quod character est inseparabilis et distinguit, similitudinem habet cum gratia, quae similiter inseparabilis est et distinguit.

15. Et hoc etiam verum est hic, quoniam character causa est infusionis gratiae; et habet similitudinem cum re significata, quoniam sicut character imprimitur inseparabiliter, ita et gratia imprimitur inseparabiliter.

18. Item, cum sacramentum eucharistiae sit dignius sacramento baptismi, quaeritur quare potius character imprimitur in baptismo quam in eucharistia.

12. Item, ex quo in baptismo imprimitur character, quare non eodem modo in sumptione eucharistiae, cum sit dignius sacramentum, et etiam aequè sumitur pro salute hominis?

19. Solutio. In eucharistia tria attenduntur principaliter, quorum nullum est in homine, scil. forma panis et vini, quae est sacramentum tantum, Corpus Christi sumptum de Virgine, quod est sacramentum et res sacra[menti], et Corpus Christi mysticum, scil. unitas ecclesiae, quae

13. Responsio. Cum tria sint in sacramento altaris, quoddam quod est sacramentum tantum, quoddam quod est sacramentum et res sacramenti, quoddam est res sacramenti tantum, et nullum eorum remanet in homine; ipse enim homo non est unitas ecclesiae sed de unitate eccle-

est res tantum et non sacramentum. Similiter in baptismo tria principaliter attenduntur, scil. character, infusio gratiae, et remissio peccati. Et constat quod infusio et remissio peccati sunt in homine; ideo character potius imprimitur in baptismo quam in eucharistia.

siae, et ideo non est mirum si nullus character imprimatur in sumptione eucharistiae. Secus est in baptismo. Principalis enim res remanet in homine semper, quantum in se est, scil. impressio gratiae; et ideo non est mirum si sacramentum illius rei sit in homine, scil. character.

These questions then go on to treat of the *forma* and the effects, etc., of baptism.

## APPENDIX B

Ca 53

V 171

Cd 196

I. Solet quaeri unde initium habuit sacramentum extremae unctionis. Dicitur a quibusdam quod ab Apostolis post Christi resurrectionem vel a solo Iacobo, dicente in Canonica: Infirmatur quis ex vobis, inducat super se presbyteros orantes et ungant eum oleo in nomine Domini, et alleviabitur eum Dominus, et si in peccatis est dimittentur ei. Sed constat ex serie (I)

I. Circa sacramentum extremae unctionis primo videndum est quid sit ipsum sacramentum in essentia. Secundo quid sit eius effectus vel res. Tertio quam similitudinem habeat signum cum effectu. Quarto a quibus detur. Quinto quae sit forma. Sexto quando habuit initium. Septimo an sit iterandum.

II. Item, quaeritur utrum hoc sacramentum fuerit institutum ante passionem.

12. Dicimus quod sic. Quidam dicunt quod post passionem, quando Iacobus ait: Infirmatur quis ex vobis, inducat presbyteros, etc. Sed verius est quod ante passionem fuit institutum. Legitur enim in Evangelio Marci quod Apostoli euntes praedicabant et oleo ungebant

I. Circa sacramentum confirmationis: quid sit ibi sacramentum, quae sit forma verborum, quis est effectus, cuius rei signum, et a quo debeat dari.



Marci quod institutum fuit ante passionem. Cum enim Dominus mittens ad praedicandum discipulos dixisset eis: "Nihil nisi virgam tuleritis" et "excutite pulverem de pedibus", statim sequitur: "Euntes autem praedicabant et multos aegrotos sanabant oleo et ungebant". Ubi dicit Glossa: Hinc patet hunc morem ab Apostolis tractum, ut energumeni et alii inungantur oleo ab episcopis consecrato. Ex hoc patet unde habuit exordium.

2. Sed quaeritur quid ibi sit sacramentum, utrum character, an oleum, an ipsa unctio. Si character, ergo hoc sacramentum non est iterabile, sicut nec baptismus. Sed constat quod iteratur. Si oleum, ergo etsi nullus inungatur, nihilominus est hoc sacramentum, quod falsum. Si unctio, active vel passive; ergo aut una sola earum, aut quaelibet, aut omnes unctiones simul sumptae, ita quod nulla. Si una sola, quid prosunt aliae? Si quaelibet, quem effectum habuit secunda vel tertia quem non habuit prima?

3. Praeterea, suntne idem sacramentum an diversa? Si omnes in-

firmos et curabantur. Et super hunc locum dicit Glossa: Hinc patet morem tractum ab Apostolis ungendi infirmos oleo ab episcopo consecrato.

2. Circa primum, scilicet quid sit ibi sacramentum, possunt fieri omnes obiectiones quae fiunt de baptismo: utrum oleum vel unctiones, actiones vel passionis, sint ibi sacramentum.

2. Omnes obiectiones superius factae: quid sit sacramentum in baptismo, an aqua, an ablutio exterior an character, possunt hic fieri.

simul sumptae, ita quod nulla, ergo sicut in tertia immersione contrahitur sacramentum baptismi, et non ante, ita in ultima unctione.

4. Contra. Illae actiones vel passionες non sunt continuæ nec umquam simul; ergo in nullo instanti poterit vel potest nec potuit vere dici: Istae actiones vel passionες sunt, vel ex eis efficitur unum. Ergo numquam potest vere dici: Sunt unum sacramentum. Ergo non sunt futurae unum sacramentum. Quid ergo ibi est sacramentum?

5. Dicimus quod sicut haec vox, "positum", quandoque est nomen, et secundum hoc interdum aliquid est positum, licet nihil ponatur, et quandoque est participium, sic haec vox, "inunctus", in una significatione est participium copulans passionem; et secundum hoc inunctio non est sacramentum. In alia significatione est nomen copulans qualitatem corporis, quae surgit ex omnibus illis inunctionibus passive, quae exiguntur ad conferendum hoc sacramentum; et illa qualitas est sacramentum unctionis extremae, et incipit esse in

3. Sed paucis nos expedientes dicimus quod illud sacramentum non est oleum vel aliqua actio sed quaedam qualitas quae innascitur animae et surgit ex illis unctionibus, actionibus et passionibus, quae fiunt ex(!) diversis membris. Et talis qualitas copulatur et praedicatur de hoc termino, "unctus", quando ponitur nominaliter. Et quando idem terminus ponitur participialiter, praedicatur uno termino passio.

3. Dicimus absque disputatione quod quaedam qualitas animae, quae copulatur per hunc terminum, "unctus", nominaliter positum, — ut cum dicitur: iste est unctus — est sacramentum confirmationis. Unctio vero passio copulatur hoc termino, "unctus", participialiter posito.

*corpore* cum consumantur illae unctiones passive, sicut sacramentum ( f. 214a ) matrimonii surgit ex duobus consensibus, quorum neuter est sacramentum; et est matrimonium qualitas quae est in duobus ita quod in neutro. Potest autem percipi sensu corporeo quod illa qualitas sit in *corpore*, et habet similitudinem cum sua re, scil. cum unctione interiori.

6. Concedo tamen quod oleum est sacramentum sicut aqua baptismi, id est sacrae rei visibile signum, quia significat gratiam. Sed non est sacramentum extremae unctionis, immo qualitas praedicta sicut character est sacramentum baptismi et non aqua.

7. Sed eadem ratione qua dicis quod inunctio qualitas est sacramentum unctionis extremae, quare non similiter dicis quod qualitas est sacramentum baptismi, scil. ablutio? Quod si est, in baptismo non confertur character.

8. Dicimus quod omne sacramentum similitudinem debet habere cum eo cuius est sacramentum sive cum sua re principali. Sed principalis res baptismi est gratia vel impressio

gratiae, cuius similitudinem habet character impressus. Sed cum hac re non habet similitudinem ablutio qualitas, licet habeat similitudinem cum ablutione interiori, quae est secundaria res baptismi.

9. Sed quaeritur quid sit res sacramenti extremæ unctionis. Ut habetur ex Iacobo et IV<sup>o</sup> Sententiarum, remissio peccatorum et sanitas corporis.

10. Ex quo sic: Hoc est sacramentum Novi Testamenti usu et institutione; ergo efficit in homine quod figurat in homine. Istud enim est addendum propter sacramentum altaris, quod non efficit Corpus Christi, nec unitatem ecclesiae, sed efficit in homine quod figurat in homine, scil. unitatem ecclesiae, quia eum qui digne accedit facit magis de unitate ecclesiae. Et istud sacramentum figurat in homine sanitatem corporis; ergo efficit eam in eo qui digne accedit. Sed constat quod multoties moritur talis digne accedens.

11. Quomodo ergo baptismus semper facit duo in eo qui digne accedit, scil. confert

4. Forma huius sacramenti . . .

(A small section is omitted.)

4. Item, effectus huiusmodi(!) sacramenti duplex est, scil. remissio peccati vel augmentum gratiae, et collatio sanitatis vel debilitatio morbi.

5. Effectus confirmationis duplex est, scil. augmentum gratiae et debilitatio fomitis in adultis; in pueris vero tantum debilitat fomitem et non auget gratiam. (f. 311b) Datur quidem hoc sacramentum ad robur, et hic est etiam eius effectus.

5. Contra hoc sic obicitur: Sacramentum Novae Legis est, et figurat sanitatem. Ergo eam vel(!) efficit. Ergo quicumque suscipit hoc sacramentum consequitur sanitatem nisi per eum steterit. Et hoc manifeste falsum, quia per eum non steterit, quia pluries moriuntur.



gratiam et tollit culpam, et istud non semper duo facit digne accedenti? Cum tamen duo sint eius effectus, scil. remissio peccati et sanitas sive alleviatio corporis, quomodo ergo sortitur unum sine altero, vel quomodo impeditur?

12. Praeterea, quae est similitudo inter hoc sacramentum et corporis sanitatem?

13. Hic duplex est exitus. Nam potest dici quod unica est res huius sacramenti, scil. remissio peccati, gratia mediante, et tamen duplex est eius effectus, scil. remissio peccati et sanitas corporis, et ita aliquid est eius effectus quod non est eius res. Et illum effectum quandoque habet, quandoque non, in eo qui digne accedit. Secundum hoc potest dici quod unica est res baptismi, scil. gratia; remissio vero peccati non est eius res sed eius effectus.

14. Vel potest dici quod duae sunt res sacramenti extremae unctionis, et in eo qui digne accedit semper efficit alteram, scil. remissionem peccati, si tamen habeat peccatum; alteram vero rem, scil. alleviationem corporis, efficit conditionaliter, scil. si Deus

9. Item, quaeritur quam similitudinem habeat signum sacramenti huius cum re sua.

6. Solutio. Sacramenta Novae Legis efficiunt quod figurant, sed non semper.

7. Vel aliter: Hoc sacramentum duos habet effectus, et unum illorum, scil. remissionem peccati vel augmentum gratiae facit simpliciter nisi per eum steterit suscipientem; alterum ef-(f. 265d)fectum, scil. collationem sanitatis vel debilitationem morbi ha-

scit eam homini prodesse; et forte sine omni conditione, quia qui digne accedit aut citius corporaliter sanatur aut moritur citius et ita evadit assultus morbi. Unde quidam versuti rustici nolunt recipere hoc sacramentum quia timent inde citius mori.

15. Habet autem hoc sacramentum similitudinem cum corporis sanitate in eo quod olei natura est ut morbos mitiget et sanat, et ita unctio olei in hoc similis est cum corporis sanitate.

(Here we omit some paragraphs on the substance, the subject, the minister, etc., of extreme unction.)

16. Item, principalis res huius sacramenti est remissio peccati, sive unctio spiritualis, et secundario alleviatio corporis. Sed propter solam corporis sanitatem confertur hoc sacramentum alicui, quia sciatur quod nulum habeat peccatum et infirmetur, nihilominus est inungendus, si petat. Ergo multo magis est inungendus propter solam animae sanitatem. Quod si est ergo aliquis in corpore

bet conditionaliter, scil. si Deus viderit aegroto, scil. expedire.

8. Vel, hoc sacramentum efficit quod figurat, id est, quando morbum sanat vel debilitat, et hoc fit ex virtute huius sacramenti sicut dictum est de baptismo.

10. Dicimus quod si cut sanitas aufert corporalem morbum, ita remissio peccati spirituales.

13. Item, cum duo sint effectus, scil. remissio peccati et alleviatio morbi, sed dignior est remissio peccati, ergo principalior. Sed hoc sacramentum potest dari propter effectum minus dignum, scil. propter alleviationem morbi, etiam si infirmus nullum habeat peccatum. Propter effectum magis dignum ergo potest dari, scil. propter remissionem peccati. Ergo, si aliquis sanus indiget pec-

sanus et incolumis est inungendus, quod abest.

17. Hoc enim sacramentum propter infirmos est institutum. Unde haec locutio est duplex: "Eius principalis res est remissio peccati sive sanitas mentis." Potest enim dici "principalis", id est dignior, et sic est vera; vel "principalis res", id est propter quam est hoc sacramentum principaliter institutum, et secundum hoc falsa, — immo principalis est sanitas sive alleviatio corporis. Unde, ubi nulla est infirmitas corporis, non est hoc sacramentum adhibendum. Sicut dicitur quod pronomen possessivum significat personam possessoris principaliter, id est digniori modo, et personam possessionis principaliter, id est propter illam principaliter fuit institutum.

cati remissionem propter hunc effectum potest ei dari.

14. Solutio. Iste effectus, scil. remissio peccati, principalior est quia (sic) propter ipsum est inventum hoc sacramentum. Et ideo hoc sacramentum potest dari pro isto effectum tantum, et pro illo non tantum. Et ideo non debet dari sano. Simile. Pronomen possessivum "hic"(!) significat duas personas, quarum scil. una persona, possessoris, est principalior, id est dignior, altera, scil. possessionis persona est principalior, quia ad ipsum significandum principaliter inventum fuit illud pronomen.

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## THE HYPOTHETICAL FIRST REDACTION OF OCKHAM'S *EXPOSITIO AUREA*

**I**n 1947, Anneliese Maier, noted for her scholarship in the field of scholastic philosophy and especially of scholastic physics, published an article<sup>1</sup> in which she called attention to an already-known manuscript of the Vatican Library, Borgh. 151. Besides the *Summa Logicae* and the second tract on *De Sacramento Altaris* of Ockham, this codex also contains *Notabilia Porphyrii*, *Notabilia libri Praedicamentorum*, and *Notabilia libri Perihermenias*. A preliminary study convinced Dr. Maier that the *Notabilia* are either an abbreviation or a first redaction of the *Expositio aurea* of Ockham. She also advanced a few reasons in favor of the possibility that the *Notabilia* are an original work of Ockham. These reasons were linked up with the idea that the *Expositio aurea* might be the work of an editor other than Ockham. In my reply<sup>2</sup> to Dr. Maier's article, I "energetically" rejected the opinion, repeatedly refuted by others as well as by myself, that the *Expositio aurea* as represented by the edition of 1496 is not substantially the work of Ockham. Again I called attention to the fact that Prantl's statement to the contrary was due to a superficial reading of the old edition, the only text, by the way, that he consulted. The "hypothesis" (*Annahme, Vermutung*, etc., Dr. Maier called it) that the *Notabilia* are the first redaction and an original work of Ockham, I did not take too seriously, since the only concrete evidence that Dr. Maier produced in support of it — the lack of two rather long passages of the *Notabilia* in the *Expositio aurea* — was easy to eliminate, since the lack was obviously due to an oversight on the part of the author. On the other hand, the differences between the texts of the *Notabilia* and the *Expositio aurea*, which Dr. Maier showed by publishing extensive parts of both in parallel columns, were not pronounced enough, in my opinion, to eliminate the probability that the *Notabilia*, as their name indicates, are noteworthy extracts,

<sup>1</sup> Zu einigen Problemen der Ockhamforschung in *A. F. H.* 46 (1953) 161—194, cf. especially 191—192; however, the ms. Miss Maier is referring to is rather 151 (not 150); cf. her catalogue *Codices Burghesiani* (Rome 1952) 197—198.

<sup>2</sup> *Franciscan Studies* VIII (1948) pp. 69 ff.



or a kind of *abbreviatio* made by a compiler from the *Expositio aurea*. Hence I believed that this chapter on the textual criticism of Ockham's works could be considered closed. This belief, however, proved too optimistic. Very soon after the publication of my article, Anneliese Maier answered in a long footnote in the *Gregorianum*<sup>3</sup>. My insistence that "*notabilia*" in medieval manuscripts usually means excerpts of noteworthy texts from longer works, did not convince her. In my article I remarked that if anyone says he leaves out or omits "*notabilia*" — as the author of the *Notabilia* repeatedly does — then he must have something (that is, "*notabilia*") to omit, for it is hardly believable that "*possible notabilia*" were left out. To this remark I received the surprising answer that the author of the *Notabilia* left out only possible *notabilia*. This, according to Dr. Maier, is proved by the following passage found toward the end of the *Notabilia Perihermenias*:

Alia notabilia quae possent notari circa oppositionem propositionum obmitto ad praesens, quia non sunt nisi puerilia et occurrunt prima facie inspicienti textum.

Dr. Maier continues: „Hier ist doch ohne Zweifel an *mögliche notabilia* gedacht.“

I am afraid that I shall be blamed for deflecting the discussion into logical subtleties. A remark rather jokingly made was taken seriously. Hence for me the penalty of having to refute it. This, however, is not too difficult. For to say that in the text quoted above there is "without any doubt" the thought of "*possible notabilia*" is hardly sound logic. There are not doubts but very good reasons to believe positively that in the text quoted there is no question at all of "*possible notabilia*". The *possent* of the text obviously does not refer to *notabilia* but to *notari*. And *notari* is the typical activity of a scribe or a compiler. The compiler of the *Notabilia*, therefore, merely said that other *notabilia*, that is, other noteworthy passages, could be noted, that is, could be copied. It is most likely that he said this with "*notabilia*" before him. In fact, it is quite possible that he had a manuscript before him — I know of at least one — where the *notabilia* were clearly and neatly marked on the margins as *Primum notabile*, *Secundum notabile*, etc. That he copied such *notabilia* becomes even more probable when we consider that he qualifies some of them as childish (*puerilia*). How could he call "*possible notabilia*"

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Literarhistorische Notizen über Aureoli, Durandus, und den 'Cancellarius' nach der Handschrift Ripoll 77<sup>bis</sup> in Barcelona*, in *Gregorianum* XXIX (1948), p. 250.

childish? Now, if Ockham were the author of the *Notabilia*, then we would have to imagine the strange situation of Ockham's first considering certain possible ideas or glosses (the "possible notabilia" of Anneliese Maier) as childish and not worth writing down, but later, when revising this text of his, inserting the childish *notabilia*. For at every place where the *Notabilia* mention the omission of *notabilia puerilia*, there are *notabilia* in the *Expositio aurea*. Is it not more natural and more in line with sound psychology to say that some man other than Ockham and probably one not too well disposed toward him — the manuscript originally belonged to the Pontifical library at Avignon — had these *notabilia* in a manuscript of the *Expositio aurea* before him, but did not consider them worth copying, since he thought them too childish?

Indeed, the usual sense of *notabilia*, when found in medieval manuscripts, designates excerpts of noteworthy passages from larger works. Such *Notabilia* collections were quite often made by a student or by an abbreviator. Our libraries contain many of them. Even Anneliese Maier has dealt with such *Notabilia*, which she unhesitatingly proves to be excerpts or abbreviations, viz., the *Notabilia Cancellarii*. Charles Balić writes of them:

"Il faut bien remarquer, tout d'abord, que notre document n'est qu'un abrégé, une sorte de compte rendu sommaire, que le reportateur a fait pour son usage. Il l'indique déjà clairement en l'intitulant "Notabilia": de ce qui s'est passé, il a relevé ce qui lui a paru "notable"<sup>4</sup>. This statement is made more precise by Anneliese Maier when she shows that these *Notabilia* are notes made by or for the "Cancellarius" taken from other works. In this case, therefore, she takes *Notabilia* in the commonly accepted medieval sense and not in the unique sense she postulated for the *Notabilia* of Borgh. 151<sup>5</sup>. With just reason, then, it can be asked why the *Notabilia* of Borgh. 151 should be given Dr. Maier's highly unusual meaning. In her replies to me — even in the

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Les Commentaires de Jean Duns Scot sur les quatre livres des Sentences* (Biblioth. de la Rev. d'Hist. Eccl., Fasc. I, Louvain, 1927), p. 187.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. *art. cit.*, p. 246: „Diese Vermutung stimmt auch zu dem, was Glorieux für den anschließenden Teil der *Notabilia* festgestellt hat: es handelt sich hier um Aufzeichnungen nach einer Quaestio des Thomas von Wylton, bei der der „Kanzler“ interveniert hat. Glorieux vermutet, daß die Notizen der Worcester Handschrift für Thomas hergestellt worden sind; aber es ist natürlich ebenso gut möglich — und wie uns scheint, wahrscheinlicher — daß sie für den Kanzler abgeschrieben wurden und dann gleichfalls ein Stück seines persönlichen Materials bildeten, das dann später in Bausch und Bogen als „*Notabilia Cancellarii*“ bezeichnet worden ist.

last one —<sup>6</sup> she always shifts to me the burden of proving that the *Notabilia* of Borgh. 151 are not excerpts. This is rather strange, to say the least. What reason is there for me to prove that *Notabilia* are *Notabilia* in the ordinary sense, as we know them, for instance, for works of Scotus, Ockham, and Burleigh? Since Dr. Maier is pleading for a most uncommon sense of the term "*notabilia*" as the title of an independant work, the burden of proving her opinion or suspicion or hypothesis lies with her.

With good reason and in all justice to the requirements of sound scholarship, I could rest the case here — and confidently wait for more objections to appear in footnotes. Nevertheless I shall try to advance a few reasons why the *Notabilia* must be considered *Notabilia*, that is, why they must be regarded as being exactly what their title says they are, and not an original work of Ockham. First, there is the fact that the *Expositio aurea* is a running commentary on the classical texts of logic, the *Ars Vetus*. The *Notabilia* exactly follow the division of the text that occurs in the *Expositio aurea*. Hence it appears fairly obvious that the *Notabilia* must go back to a commentary on or an exposition of some text, or other, and not vice versa. If, however, the *Notabilia* are an exposition, and if they are not *Reportationes* — as Anneliese Maier has correctly conceded — then it is quite remarkable that they should be only "*notabilia*", that is, only notations concerning ideas that came to the mind of the author after the explanation of the text. Equally remarkable is the fact that there is no real exposition of any text, nor is there any division of texts<sup>7</sup>. But textual divisions were necessarily required and textual exposition was precisely the aim of such works. The complete lack of textual divisions and textual expositions are, in my opinion, the best proof that the *Notabilia* are not an original work but are simply that which their name indicates — "*notabilia*".

Furthermore, at the time of Ockham many *Abbreviationes* were being made at Avignon. Anneliese Maier informs us that the MS. Borghese 151 is mentioned in a list of books of the Pontifical library at Avignon

<sup>6</sup> „Zu einigen Problemen der Ockhamforschung“, *Arch. Franc. Hist.* XLVI (1953). „... Boehner ... hat die *Notabilia* ohne weiteres als spätere *Abbreviation* erklärt, ohne wirkliche Beweise für diese Behauptung anführen zu können ...“ P. 32, footnote.

<sup>7</sup> When Dr. Maier mentions „die langen, meist sehr pedantischen und schwerfälligen Textenteilungen und -erklärungen ...“ (Cf. *art. cit.*, p. 132). I am at a loss to understand this. The text divisions of Saint Thomas in his commentaries to Aristotelean writings are as „pedantisch und schwerfällig“ (if not even more) as those of Ockham. This is the style of the *expositiones* or running commentaries.

under the date 1396<sup>8</sup>. In the same volume of *Gregorianum* in which Dr. Maier published her first article concerning this question, Z. Alszegehy, S. J., mentioned that John XXII introduced at the Papal Court a new office, that of *Abbreviator originalium*. Since the manuscript of the *Notabilia* which we are discussing comes from Avignon, it is quite possible, if not most probable, that it goes back to an *Abbreviator* belonging to the Papal Court in Avignon. For, as Dr. Maier has pointed out, the scribe who wrote Borgh. 151 also wrote the first part of Borgh. 68, which is an *abbreviatio* of Ockham's *Ordinatio*. It seems very likely that the scribe and the abbreviator were one and the same person. In any case, it is certain that the *Notabilia* originated in a milieu that was interested in *abbreviationes* and had them made and copied.

I may mention here a fact that would seem to place the manuscript in the first half of the Fourteenth Century, for it represents an excellent textual tradition. When the abbreviator introduces a new *notabile*, usually by the stereotyped formula: *Item notandum*, adding a few words that place the *notabile* in the context of the *Expositio aurea*, he then gives a text which rates among the best of the manuscripts of the *Expositio*. A comparison of many parallel texts proved that the *Notabilia* of Borgh. 151 is most closely related to the oldest dated manuscript, that of Firenze B. Nat. B. 4. 1618, written in 1331, and that it has remarkably few single variants. Other and especially later manuscripts have many more deviations from the text that will be adopted by the critical edition. Now, if the *Notabilia* were a first redaction or a first draft of Ockham's exposition of the *Ars Vetus*, we could justly expect more variants in the *Notabilia* than we actually find. In fact, the text of the *Expositio aurea* could stand an improvement. There is, for instance, the long discussion at the beginning of the *Expositio libri Perihermenias* on the nature of the universal. The complete text, which I have published in *Traditio*<sup>9</sup>, is also in the *Notabilia*. Now in this lengthy text there is an arrangement that is by no means well-ordered. First Ockham deals with four kinds of theories about the nature of the universal in the mind — the *habitus*, the *species*, the *intellectio*, and the *fictum* theories. At the end of long discussions concerning the *intellectio* and the *fictum* theories, Ockham writes:

Igitur propter istas rationes magis debet poni, quod tales passiones animae, de quibus loquitur hic Philosophus, sunt qualitates mentis, quam quod sint talia idola sive ficta.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. *art. cit.*

<sup>9</sup> *The Realistic Conceptualism of William Ockham*, in *Traditio*, IV (1946), pp. 320—335.



And then he starts again:

Dico igitur, quod Philosophus passiones animae vocat illa, ex quibus componitur propositio in mente vel syllogismus vel componi potest. Sed quid sit, potest esse triplex opinio in genere.

Following this, Ockham enumerates three theories concerning the nature of the universal. But this time the first is the *res*-theory, that is, that the universal is a real universal thing and the concept is the conception of a universal thing. This is briefly refuted. After the refutation follows the unqualified *qualitas*-theory (*habitus-species-intellectio*-theories). Finally the *fictum*-theory is discussed, and objections raised against it before in the first presentation of it are answered.

It can hardly be denied that this arrangement is somewhat disorderly; in fact, it is definitely confused and confusing. The only explanation I can offer for this is that the first part of the discussion was added later. But this need not concern us here. The point I wish to make is this, that the same poor arrangement is in both the *Notabilia* and in the *Expositio aurea*. If the *Expositio aurea* were a second redaction, we would surely find a better and more logical arrangement of the matter under discussion, and the needless repetitions omitted. Ockham did exactly this later, in the *Quaestiones super libros Physicorum*. It would seem that the obvious explanation for lack of good order in the *Expositio* is that it is the original redaction of Ockham, and since the *Notabilia* has the same confused arrangement, it seems equally obvious that it was copied from the *Expositio*.

This explanation is further strengthened by an interesting passage in the discussion of the second opinion of the second part of the *Expositio*. I shall present here in parallel columns corresponding passages taken from the *Notabilia*, from Manuscript A (the oldest one known) and from our critical edition.

Notabilia	Ms. A	Final text
Alia est opinio opinio quam reputo probabilem, quod passiones animae sunt quaedam qualitates mentis existentes subiective in mente ita vere et ita realiter sicut albedo existit in pariete vel frigus in aqua. Et pro ista opinione videtur esse Commentator 7 <sup>mo</sup>	Sed alia potest esse opinio quam reputo probabilem, quod passiones animae sunt quaedam qualitates subiective in mente ita vere et ita realiter sicut albedo existit in pariete vel frigus in aqua. Et ista opinio videtur esse Commentatoris 7 <sup>o</sup> Metaphysi-	Alia potest esse opinio quam reputo probabilem, quod passiones animae sunt quaedam qualitates mentis existentes subiective in mente ita vere et ita realiter sicut albedo existit in pariete vel frigus in aqua. Et pro ista opinione videtur esse Commentator 7 <sup>o</sup> Meta-

Metaphysicae commen-  
to [follows a blank of  
about two words]. Ubi  
videtur dicere quod  
universalia sunt quali-  
tates mentis et non  
sunt de substantia . . .

cae\* [two and a quarter  
of a line free]. Et ita  
secundum Commenta-  
torem universalia sunt  
qualitates mentis et  
non sunt de substan-  
tia . . .

physicae [commento 23°  
ubi dicit: Sanitas dicitur  
duobus modis etc.] Ita  
secundum Commenta-  
torem universalia sunt  
qualitas mentis et non  
sunt de substantia . . .

\* Here the marginal note:  
Hic solum deficit auctori-  
tas Commentatoris.

This passage suggests that when Ockham wrote the *Expositio aurea* he left space for the quotation from Averroes in order to supply it later — a procedure which is encountered in other works of his — but he never added it. The later scribes tried to cover the lacuna. The *Notabilia* has a faint trace of this lacuna; the space has been partially filled — only about two words are omitted. But the filling of this lacuna in the *Notabilia* is quite individual, different from all the known manuscripts. This would indicate that the compiler of the *Notabilia* did not have a text where the lacuna was intelligibly filled. Hence he supplied the lack by writing: *Ubi videtur dicere quod*.

All the differences between the final text of the *Expositio* and the *Notabilia* are of a similar nature. They can be easily explained as the changes that an abbreviator would naturally consider necessary to provide a smoothly reading text; they never introduce new ideas. This is true even of the Prologue to which Anneliese Maier has recently shifted the burden of carrying the main evidence for her hypothesis. I freely admit that the differences here are more pronounced than in other parts of the *Notabilia*; however, I cannot convince myself that they are of such a nature as to corroborate Dr. Maier's claim that they are two different redactions by the same author. The differences are within the boundaries of *Notabilia* characteristics. Although Dr. Maier has published both Prologues in parallel columns, for the benefit of the reader, I shall publish them again, but completely, using the final text of the critical edition and also a better text of the *Notabilia*. For the former text I owe thanks to Professor Ernest Moody, editor of the *Expositio super Porphyrium*; for the latter text, to Fr. Julius Reinhold, of the Scotus Commission in Rome, who has checked my transcription from photostats against the original manuscript. The reader may judge for himself whether the differences between these two Prologues are sufficient for considering the *Notabilia* an original work of Ockham. I am not able to convince myself that Dr. Maier's hypothesis is in the

least tenable. Therefore the forthcoming critical edition of the *Expositio aurea*, the first volume of which is already going through the press, will not consider the *Notabilia* to be a first redaction but only a collection of excerpts from Ockham's work.

## Notabilia

Quia propter errorem in logica multi antiquorum in errores varios inciderunt ut testantur *Philosophus* et *Commentator* eius *primo Physicorum*, ad memoriam logicalium promptius habendam sunt quaedam notabilia memoriter retinenda.

Primo igitur nota quod logica non est unus habitus numero nec unum individuum sicut *Sortes* vel *Plato* vel ista albedo vel illa nigredo; sed est una collectio multorum habituum quibus syllogismus in communi et partes suae tam subiectivae quam integrales et passionibus earum cognoscuntur; ita quod in una parte logicae cognoscitur syllogismus et suae passionibus, in alia parte cognoscitur syllogismus demonstrativus et suae passionibus, et in alia parte cognoscitur (rep. cognoscitur) propositio et suae passionibus et sic de

## Expositio aurea

Quoniam omne operans, quod in suis operationibus et actibus potest errare, aliquo indiget directivo, et intellectus humanus in acquirendo scientiam et suam perfectionem ab ignotis ad nota discurrit necessario, circa quod directivum errare potest multipliciter, necessario fuit aliquam artem inveniri, per quam evidenter cognosceret veros discursus a falsis, ut tandem posset certitudinaliter inter verum et falsum discernere. Haec autem ars est logica, propter cuius ignorantiam testante *Philosopho* primo *Physicorum*, multi antiqui in errores varios deveniunt.

Circa autem istam artem sunt aliqua generalia primo praemittenda; secundo est ad expositionem diversorum librorum logicae accedendum. Circa primum, primo videndum est de istius scientiae entitate et quidditate, secundo de ipsius subiecto, tertio de ipsius utilitate, quarto de ipsius ad alias scientias differentia essentiali, quinto cui parti philosophiae supponatur.

Circa primum breviter dicendum est quod logica non est unus habitus numero, nec unum individuum sicut *Sortes* et *Plato*, vel iste asinus vel iste bos vel ista albedo vel ista nigredo, sed est una collectio multorum habituum quibus syllogismus in communi, et partes suae tam subiectivae quam integrales, et passionibus earum, cognoscuntur; ita quod una parte logicae cognoscitur syllogismus et suae passionibus, et alia parte cognoscitur syllogismus demonstrativus et suae passionibus, alia parte cognoscitur

*aliis. Et similiter in alia parte logicae cognoscitur propositio enuntians hanc passionem de syllogismo in communi et in alia parte propositio enuntians aliam passionem de eodem syllogismo in communi, ita quod secundum quod praedicata vel subiecta propositionum notarum in logica variantur, secundum hoc partes logicae variantur, quae tamen omnes partes unam logicam constituunt, non quidem tamquam unam rem numero sed ad modum quo multi homines faciunt unum populum et diversae civitates faciunt unum regnum.*

Et pro isto potest adduci talis ratio: *Quandocumque aliqua sic se habent quod aliquid stat cum uno illorum et non stat cum alio, illa non sunt eiusdem rationis; sed cum scientia qua scitur una conclusio libri Posteriorum, puta A, stat error circa aliam conclusionem eiusdem libri, puta B, et cum scientia qua scitur B non stat error circa B, igitur scientia qua scitur A et scientia qua scitur B non sunt eiusdem rationis. Et ultra per Philosophum 7<sup>o</sup> Metaphysicae ex illis quae sunt alterius et alterius rationis numquam fit per se unum numero, nisi unum sit actus et aliud potentia; igitur ex talibus notitiis non fit una scientia numero.*

Item nota quod scientiae logicae sicut et cuiuslibet alterius scientiae sunt tantum duae causae essentiales

propositio et suae passionis, et sic de aliis. Et non tantum hoc, immo alia parte cognoscitur propositio enuntians hanc passionem de syllogismo in communi, et alia parte enuntians aliam passionem de eodem syllogismo in communi, ita quod secundum quod subiecta vel praedicata propositionum notarum in logica variantur, secundum hoc partes logicae variantur; quae tamen omnes partes unam logicam constituunt, non quidem tamquam unam rem numero, sed ad modum quo multi homines unam populum faciunt et civitates diversae unum regnum, et sic de aliis diversis; de quibus dicimus quod aliquando ex multis eiusdem rationis aliquod unum constituitur, et aliquando ex multis diversarum rationum constituitur aliquod unum.

Pro praedicta conclusione ad praesens sufficit ratio ista, quia quando aliqua sic se habent quod aliquid stat cum uno illorum et non stat cum alio, ista non sunt eiusdem rationis. Sed accipio scientiam qua scitur una conclusio libri Posteriorum et scientiam qua scitur alia conclusio eiusdem libri, et sit una A et alia B; tunc cum scientia qua scitur A stat error circa B, sed cum scientia qua scitur B non stat error circa B, ergo A et B non sunt eiusdem rationis. Ex hoc arguo ultra: quandocumque aliqua sunt alterius rationis, ex eis non fit per se unum numero nisi unum sit actus et aliud potentia, secundum Philosophum 7<sup>o</sup> Metaphysicae; sed nulla scientia componitur ex talibus, quia secundum Philosophum ibidem nullum accidens componitur ex partibus talibus sed tantum ex partibus eiusdem rationis; igitur ex talibus notitiis non fit una scientia numero.

Secundo videndum est de istius scientiae causis essentialibus. Circa quod sciendum quod istius scientiae,



*proprie loquendo de causa, scilicet efficiens et finalis. Cuius ratio est quia scientia est quaedam res simplex non composita ex partibus alterius et alterius rationis, et nulla talis res potest habere plures quam duas causas proprie loquendo, scilicet efficientem et finalem.* Cuius probatio est, quia omnis causa vel est intrinseca rei et sic materia vel\* forma, vel extrinseca et sic efficiens vel finis. Sed nulla res simplex quae est simplex per carentiam compositionis ex partibus alterius rationis habet materiam et formam tamquam causas intrinsecas, quia si haberet, componeretur ex eis sicut ex partibus alterius rationis, igitur nulla scientia potest proprie loquendo habere plures quam duas causas [not readable] et finalem.

*Et quod dicitur communiter quod [not readable] scilicet materialis, formalis etc. non est verum proprie loquendo de causa, quomodo loquitur Philosophus 2<sup>o</sup> [not readable] et 5<sup>o</sup> Metaphysicae capitulo de causa. Sed illud dictum vulgare solum habet veritatem extendendo nomen causae et improprie loquendo. Unde illud quod vocatur causa materialis magis deberet vocari subiectum scientiae vel praedicatum vel obiectum quam causa. Et sic accipiunt homines si bene intelligant causam materialem pro obiecto, quod tamen si sit causa non potest esse causa nisi in genere causae efficientis vel forte finalis.*

Item nota, quod causa efficiens logicae usitatae fuit Aristoteles; unde ipse fuit primus traditor istarum collectionum vel librorum logicae modo quo nos utimur. Tamen de causa efficiente logicae tuae vel meae dicendum est proportionaliter sicut de causa efficiente aliorum habituum intellec-

sicut et cuiuslibet scientiae, tantum sunt duae causae essentialis, proprie loquendo de causa; cuius ratio est quia nulla res simplex, non composita ex partibus alterius et alterius rationis, potest habere nisi duas causas, scilicet efficientem et finalem; sed quaelibet scientia est simplex per carentiam compositionis ex partibus alterius rationis; ergo nulla scientia habet plures quam duas causas. Maior est manifesta, quia omnis causa rei vel est causa intrinseca et tunc est pars rei sicut est materia et forma, vel est causa extrinseca sicut efficiens et finis; sed nulla res simplex per carentiam compositionis ex partibus alterius rationis habet materiam et formam tamquam causas intrinsecas, quia si haberet componeretur ex eis sicut ex partibus alterius rationis; igitur nulla res simplex potest habere plures quam duas causas.

Et ideo quod dicitur communiter, quod cuiuslibet scientiae sunt quatuor causae, scilicet materialis, formalis, efficiens et finalis, non est verum proprie loquendo de causa, quomodo loquitur Philosophus 2<sup>o</sup> Physicorum et 5<sup>o</sup> Metaphysicae, sed extendendo nomen causae, et improprie loquendo de causa. Et ideo illud quod vocatur causa materialis magis deberet vocari subiectum scientiae vel praedicatum vel obiectum, quam causa; et sic accipiunt, si bene intelligant, causam materialem pro obiecto; quod tamen, si sit causa, non potest esse causa nisi in genere causae efficientis vel forte finalis.

Viso igitur, quod scientia non habet nisi duas causas, sciendum quod causa efficiens logicae usitatae vocatur Aristoteles, quia ipse primus eam tradidit et fuit primus traditor istarum collectionum vel librorum, quibus utimur; tamen de causa efficiente logicae tuae vel meae est dicendum

*tualium, quod ad librum De Anima pertinet magis.*

*Item nota, quod causa finalis logicae, accipiendo logicam pro collectione habituum vel pro habitu est actus cognoscendi, ex quo actu vel quibus actibus talis habitus generatur. Et finis illorum actuum qui est finis mediatuſ habitus, est ille, propter quem eliciuntur. Sed de hoc pertinet tractare ad scientiam naturalem.*

*Item nota, quod scientiae logicae multae sunt utilitates, quarum una est facilitas discernendi inter verum et falsum. Nam ista scientia perfecte habita faciliter iudicat quid verum et quid falsum, et hoc quantum ad illa quae per propositiones per se notas possunt sciri. Cum enim in talibus non oporteat nisi ordinate procedere a propositionibus per se notis ad ultima quae sequuntur ex eis et talem processum et discursum docet logica, sequitur quod per eam in talibus faciliter verum invenitur et eadem ratione faciliter verum a falso discernitur.*

*Alia utilitas est promptitudo respondendi. Nam per istam artem docetur quid est proposito repugnans, quid consequens, quid antecedens.*

*Per istam etiam artem solutio omnium argumentorum peccantium in forma docetur, nec est possibile in quacumque scientia ex veris inferre falsum, quin per regulas certas in ista scientia traditas talis defectus faciliter deprehendatur, et sine arte logicae et usu illius impossibile est hoc facere. Et ideo logicam ignorantes multas demonstrationes sophismata reputant,*

*proportionaliter, sicut de causa efficiente aliorum habituum intellectualium; quod ad librum De anima pertinet magis. Causa finalis logicae, accipiendo logicam pro habitu vel collectione habituum, est actus cognoscendi ex quo talis habitus generatur. Finis autem istorum actuum, qui est finis mediatuſ habitus vel habituum, est ille propter quem eliciuntur; de hoc tamen pertinet tractare ad scientiam naturalem.*

*Tertio videndum est de istius scientiae utilitate. Circa quod sciendum quod istius scientiae sunt multae utilitates, inter quas una est facilitas discernendi inter verum et falsum. Nam ista scientia perfecte habita, faciliter iudicatur quid verum et quid falsum, et hoc quantum ad illa quae per propositiones per se notas possunt sciri. Cum enim in talibus non oporteat nisi ordinate procedere a propositionibus per se notis ad ultima quae consequuntur ex eis, et talem discursum et processum docet logica, sequitur quod per eam faciliter in talibus verum invenitur, et eadem ratione faciliter verum a falso discernitur.*

*Secunda facilitas est promptitudo respondendi. Nam per istam artem docetur quid est proposito repugnans, quid consequens, quid antecedens; quibus notis faciliter repugnans negatur, consequens conceditur, et ad antecedens secundum sui qualitatem, sicut ad impertinens, respondetur.*

*Per istam etiam artem solutio omnium argumentorum peccantium in forma docetur, nec est possibile in quacumque scientia ex veris sophisticè inferre falsum, quin per regulas certas in ista scientia traditas talis defectus faciliter deprehendatur, et sine ista arte vel usu ipsius est hoc impossibile; et ideo istam scientiam ignorantes, multas demonstrationes sophismata*

*et econverso multa sophismata tamquam demonstrationes acceptant.*

Tertia utilitas huius scientiae — et est consequens ad primam — *est facilitas percipiendi virtutem sermonis et proprium modum loquendi, quid, scilicet, ab auctoribus dicitur proprie et de virtute sermonis et quid improprie et secundum usitatum modum loquendi.* Unde multa dicta auctorum intelligenda sunt non de virtute vocum sed secundum usitatum modum loquendi auctorum et ad intentionem dicentis, et illud percipere est valde necessarium omni studenti in dictis auctorum, quia qui omnia verba auctorum de virtute sermonis et proprie accipiunt, incidunt in multos errores ex hoc et in difficultates inexplicabiles.

Item nota, quod ista scientia seipsa distinguitur ab omni alia, quia de aliis est ista scientia et scientiae aliae. Nam ista scientia tradit primam(?) scientiam sive notitiam conceptuum vel intentionum per animam fabricatarum. Et hinc est quod ista scientia dicitur rationalis. Ista autem scientiae dicuntur reales non quin ista scientia sicut et ceterae sit vera res et vera qualitas perficiens intellectum sicut aliae scientiae, sed quia determinat de his, quae sine ratione esse non possunt, sed aliae scientiae de rebus existentibus extra animam.

reputant, et econverso multa sophismata tamquam demonstrationes acceptant, nescientes inter syllogismum sophisticum et demonstrativum distinguere.

Alia utilitatis logicae est facilitas virtutem sermonis et proprium modum loquendi percipiendi. Nam per istam artem faciliter scitur, quid ab auctoribus de virtute sermonis profertur, quid non de virtute sermonis sed secundum usitatum modum loquendi vel secundum intentionem dicentis; quid dicitur proprie, quid metaphorice; quod est maxime necessarium omnibus studentibus in dictis aliorum, quia qui semper omnia dicta auctorum de virtute sermonis et proprie accipiunt, incidunt in multos errores et inexplicabiles difficultates.

Quarto videndum est de istius scientiae ab aliis differentia et distinctione. Circa quod sciendum quod ista scientia seipsa distinguitur ab omni alia, quia de aliis est ista scientia et de aliis aliae scientiae. Nam ista scientia, saltem principaliter, tradit notitiam conceptuum vel intentionum per animam fabricatarum, non extra se, quomodo fabricantur res artificiales, sed intra se. Verumtamen qualia sunt ista fabricata, scilicet conceptus et intentiones, cuiusmodi sunt syllogismi, propositiones, termini et huiusmodi an scilicet sint realiter et subiective in anima existentes, an aliquo alio modo, non ad logicam sed ad metaphysicam pertinet; et ideo hic est pertranseundum. Et hinc est quod ista scientia dicitur rationalis, ceterae autem scientiae demonstrativae dicuntur scientiae reales; non quin ista scientia sit vera res et vera qualitas perficiens intellectum, sicut aliae scientiae, sed quia determinat de his quae

Item nota, quod logica dici potest scientia practica, quia ut dicit Avicenna in 1<sup>o</sup> Metaphysicae suae, distinctio est inter scientias practicas et speculativas, quia practicae sunt de operibus nostris, sed speculativae non sunt de operibus nostris. Cum igitur logica tractet de syllogismis, propositionibus argumentis, discursibus et huiusmodi, quae non possunt fieri a nobis, sequitur quod est de operibus nostris non de exterioribus nisi forte secundario, sed de interioribus, quae vera sunt opera nostra, et per consequens logica erit scientia practica, non speculativa.

Item nota quod liber Porphyrii non habet unum subiectum tantum sicut nec aliquis alius liber traditus . . .

sine ratione esse non possunt, aliae autem scientiae de rebus existentibus extra animam determinant.

Ultimo videndum est, cui parti philosophiae supponatur logica, an scilicet ista scientia sit notitia practica vel speculativa. Et dicendum est, quod sicut dicit Avicenna in principio suae Metaphysicae, quod distinctio est inter practicas et speculativas scientias, quia scientiae practicae sunt de operibus nostris, scientiae autem speculativae non sunt de operibus nostris. Ex quo patet quod logica practica est dicenda, quia cum scientia logicae tractet de syllogismis, propositionibus et huiusmodi, quae non nisi a nobis fieri possunt, sequitur quod est de operibus nostris; non quidem exterioribus nisi forte secundario, sed de interioribus quae vere opera nostra sunt; et per consequens ista scientia est practica et non speculativa.

Cum sit necessarium Grisatori . . .

Iste liber est primus secundum ordinem doctrinae inter omnes libros logicae, cuius notitia non est una secundum numerum, sed est collectio multarum notitiarum; nec etiam habet unum subiectum sicut nec aliquis liber traditus . . .

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## AN EARLY LETTER OF FRATERNITY

**A**n article by the late Dr. A. G. Little, posthumously published in a recent issue of the Bodleian Library's journal<sup>1</sup>, drew attention to the fact that no letter of fraternity granted by the English Province of Friars Minor before the end of the fourteenth century had hitherto been discovered. Examples of such letters are abundant for the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries; it seems, therefore, remarkable that there should be such a dearth for the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and the more so since it is known that letters were being granted by the Provincial Minister as early as 1301<sup>2</sup>. As Little observed, the practice of issuing provincial letters of fraternity had become, by the time the *Vision of Piers Plowman* came to be written, thoroughly established within all the orders of friars.

The time seems accordingly appropriate to publish the text of an original Franciscan letter of fraternity which, granted in 1363, antedates by some forty years the earliest instance which Little had discovered. This letter was first noted by Mr Neil Ker about five years ago whilst he was examining the manuscripts belonging to the Baptist College at Bristol; it had been inserted in a twelfth century psalter originally belonging to the priory of Augustinian nuns at Harrold, in Bedfordshire<sup>3</sup>. The parchment on which it is written has been folded in half vertically, and pasted into the psalter so that it now forms two preliminary leaves immediately preceding the Kalendar — it appears

<sup>1</sup> 'Franciscan Letters of Fraternity', in *Bodleian Library Record*, V., (April 1954), pp. 13—25. The article, which is concerned principally with English letters of fraternity rather than with those granted by the Minister General, concludes with a list of all extant Franciscan letters relating to England known to Little at the end of his life.

<sup>2</sup> That is to say, indirect evidence appears, and is cited by Little, which proves that letters were obtained by individuals although the originals have been lost or destroyed.

<sup>3</sup> The psalter is now Ms. Z. c. 23 in the library of Bristol Baptist College, by permission of whose Librarian I am enabled to publish the text of the letter. (I must also record my debt to Mr P. L. Hull of the Bedford County Record Office for first drawing my attention to the existence of the document.) The manuscript contains no further material relating to the Franciscans; other documents inserted in the psalter have been made the subject of an article by Professor G. R. Cheney, 'Harrold Priory: a twelfth century dispute', *Bedfordshire Historical Record Society*, vol. XXXII.

that this was done in the late fourteenth or early fifteenth century, but for what reason it is impossible to say, since it is not known that either the recipient of the letter or the Franciscan Order had any connection with Harrold Priory. In order to fit the letter into the psalter the lower portion must have been sheared, for no trace of the seal or its attachment remains. The text, which is interlined throughout in red, is written in a bold book-hand in black, the initial V being purple and decorated with gold floriation. The space at the foot of the letter has been filled up with a fifteenth century copy of a letter from the prioress and convent of Harrold presenting one John Fretter to the vicarage of Harrold, dated 27th March 1415: it has no obvious relevance to the letter of fraternity, and was doubtless copied in this space for reasons of economy.

A transcript of the letter itself is given below, and — since Dr. Little was at some pains in his article to analyse the contents and phraseology of the Franciscan letters available to him — I have taken the opportunity to print in parallel columns both this and the text of another unpublished letter of fraternity of the year 1427. A comparison of the two will show that, although the form and content of letters issued by the Provincial remained essentially unchanged, the later letters are somewhat less economical in verbal expression — this, indeed, being a characteristic feature in the evolution of all ecclesiastical records in the later middle ages.

## 1363

Venerabili viro domino Nicolaio rectori ecclesiae de Northzeuele<sup>4</sup> frater Symon fratrum Minorum in anglia Minister et seruus salutem. Et per presentis vite merita gaudia percipere sempiterna. Devocionem quam ob dei reuerenciam ad ordinem nostrum habes affectu sincere caritatis acceptans ipsam que aliorum beneficiorum vicissitudinibus compensare

## 1427

Christo pro deo devoto Magistro Thome Lymyngtone Frater Johannes Fratrum Minorum in anglia Minister et servus salutem et per presentis vite merita gaudia percipere sempiterna. Devocionem quam ob dei reverenciam ad ordinem nostrum habes sincere caritatis affectu considerans et acceptans, cupiensque tibi vices rependere salutare; Te ad universa

<sup>4</sup> This is probably Northill, on the border of the counties of Bedford and Buckingham. Mrs. J. Varley, Archivist for the diocese and county of Lincoln, has kindly supplied the following information about the cleric in whose favour this letter was issued. Nicholas de Markele, or Merkelay, priest, was presented to the church of Northzeuele, in the diocese of Lincoln, on 14th July 1354 (Lincoln Episc. Reg., ix., fol. 432); he remained there until September 1369 when he was presented by the Duke of Lancaster to the rectory of Toresby, in exchange with Mr John de Longedon, canon of Lichfield (Reg. ibid., X., fol. 38 v; cf. Le Neve, *Fasti Ecclesie Anglicane*, ed. T. Duffus Hardy, I., p. 596). According to the ms. *Fasti Ecclesie Bedford.* in the County Record Office at Bedford, Nicholas returned to Northill from Toresby on 18th November 1375, and died some time before 5th May 1377, when his successor was appointed.

Christo acceptabile fore credens; Te ad fratrum administracionis<sup>5</sup> anglicane suffragia recipio tenore presencium in vita pariter et in morte. Adiciens<sup>6</sup> insuper de gracia speciali ut cum obitus tuus cum representatione presencium in nostro prouinciali Capitulo fuerit nunciatus pro te fiat per totam administracionem anglie quod pro nostris fratribus et amicis ac benefactoribus ordinis nostri defunctis recommendatis ibidem fieri consuevit. Vale feliciter in domino ihesu christo matreque eius virgine gloriosa. Datum in nostro prouinciali Capitulo Bristollie celebrato in festo assumptionis Virginis memorate, Anno domini Millesimo Trecentesimo Sexagesimo Tercio.

(Bristol Baptist Coll. Ms.)

et singula fratrum administracionis Anglicane suffragia recipio tenore presencium in vita pariter et in morte, Plenam tibi participationem bonorum omnium spiritualium quantum deo placuerit concedendo que per eosdem fratres mee cure commissos operari dignabitur clemencia salvatoris. Adiciens insuper de gracia speciali ut cum obitus tuus una cum representatione presencium in nostro prouinciali capitulo fuerit nunciatus pro te fiat per totam administracionem anglie quod pro nostris fratribus et amicis ac benefactoribus ordinis nostri defunctis recommendatis ibidem fieri consuevit. Vale feliciter in domino ihesu Christo Matreque ejus virgine gloriosa. Datum Wygornie in nostro Prouinciali Capitulo Anno domini Millesimo vicesimo septimo celebrato.

(Brit. Mus. Ms. Add. 4790, f. 49.)

It will readily be appreciated that the fourteenth century letter presents several points of interest, apart from its early date and its testimony to the continuity of mediaeval Franciscan usage. The Fr Symon who issued it was Simon Tunstede — and here for the first time we have, in the granting of this letter of fraternity, the only known act and the first positive date of Tunstede's provincialate: Little himself, in his list of Provincials, puts his term of office conjecturally between the dates 1360(?) and 1369(?)<sup>7</sup>. The letter itself was sealed at a hitherto unrecorded Provincial Chapter held at Bristol on 15th August 1363.

But it is the fact that in the year 1363 a secular priest was admitted to confraternity with the English Province of the Friars Minor that has the most noteworthy significance for historians, for at this date the

<sup>5</sup> The term *administracio* was early appropriated to Franciscan usage, denoting the jurisdiction of a Provincial Minister: cf. Eccleston, *De Adventu Fratrum Minorum in Anglia*, Coll. VIII (*Monumenta Franciscana*, I., p. 31). It was probably adopted owing to its philological derivation from the word *Minister*.

<sup>6</sup> It is interesting to notice that the *adiciens* clause was an established feature of the provincial formula as early as the middle of the fourteenth century, confirming the suggestion of the will of 1301 cited by Little that it was even then the normal practice for letters to be returned to the local or provincial chapter the recipient's death: vide Little, *Bodl. Libr. Record*, loc. cit., pp. 14—15.

<sup>7</sup> *Franciscan Papers, Lists and Documents*, p. 196: 'No authority has been found for the statement of Bale and Pits that he died in 1369.'

long-standing dissension between the seculars and the mendicants had recently been revived by *Armachanus*. It was but a few years earlier, in 1356, that Richard FitzRalph, Archbishop of Armagh, had launched his virulent attack on the mendicants with his sermon preached at St. Paul's Cross, and thereby brought the great controversy as to the true interpretation of Apostolic Poverty preeminently onto English soil. The outlines of the controversy are well enough known<sup>8</sup>, but it is worth noting that much still remains to be done on the manuscript sources before anything approaching a definitive conclusion can be reached: it will suffice for the present to recall that FitzRalph ranked second only to Wyclif amongst the medieval antagonists of the mendicant orders. His challenge was quickly taken up, notably by the Franciscan Roger Conway<sup>9</sup>, who procured the Archbishop's citation before the papal curia at Avignon. The proceedings were still in the preliminary stages when FitzRalph died (1360), but the spate of dissension thus revived had not died down when the advent of Wyclif broadened the issue<sup>10</sup>. The present letter of fraternity, however, serves as a timely reminder that the whole affair should be kept carefully in perspective: it must be realised that the dispute was very largely on an academic plane, and that the secular disputants were not as representative of the rank and file of the parochial clergy as our historians have in the past been disposed to believe<sup>11</sup>. Throughout the later middle ages, members of every class of secular cleric appear in wills and other deeds as benefactors of the orders of

<sup>8</sup> The best general account is given by Aubrey Gwynn, *The English Austin Friars in the Time of Wyclif*, pp. 80—89.

<sup>9</sup> Conway's *Contra Armachanum in materia confessionis* is printed in Goldast, *Monarchia*, II., pp. 1410 *seqq.* Other writers on the mendicants' side were the Franciscan William Woodford, the Dominican William Jordan, the Carmelite Richard of Maidstone, and the Provincial of the Austin Friars, Geoffrey of Hardeby. The controversy was quickly expanded by FitzRalph to comprehend most of the points at issue between the friars and the secular clergy.

<sup>10</sup> The tracts of *Armachanus* against the mendicants were frequently republished in the fifteenth century, as the number of manuscripts extant shows. But a remarkable recrudescence of the controversy in the seventeenth century seems to have escaped general notice: in 1629 the Irish Franciscan Fr Thomas Strange wrote to Luke Wadding at Rome 'to bring to your Pater-nity's notice . . . that a reprint has appeared at Paris of the Tract and Articles of Richard of Armagh against the Mendicants'. The reprint was sponsored by secular priests (Historical Manuscripts Commission Reports, series 65: *Franciscan Manuscripts at Merchants' Quay, Dublin*, p. 10).

<sup>11</sup> It may be observed in this connection that amongst the principal supporters of FitzRalph — *viz.* James the Cistercian, Uhtred Boldon, Nicholas Hereford, John Ashwardby, and the Cistercian Henry Crump — the secular clergy are not prominently represented save by those who later became noted for their heterodox teaching. In other words, it is true to say that comparatively few of the friars' opponents were *representative* of the secular clergy as a whole.



friars<sup>12</sup>; and, while undoubtedly the privileges of the mendicant orders were the cause of much friction between the friars and the unprivileged clergy until the second quarter of the fifteenth century (when a *modus vivendi* appears to have become established)<sup>13</sup>, it is no less certain that good relations could and did exist, and that theoretical disputation was rather to be expected from the homes of theoretical disputation, the universities and the ecclesiastical courts.

Dr. Little did not pretend that his list of letters of fraternity could be exhaustive; there are certainly many more awaiting discovery. For the sake of the record I here append, in chronological order, reference details of the four letters which I am able to add to the list. It will be noticed that two of them were granted to a religious house; Little had discovered only two other letters held by communities.

- I. 1363: granted by Simon Tunstede, Provincial Minister, to Nicholas, rector of Northill, Bedfordshire. (Bristol Baptist Coll. Ms. Z. c. 23.)
- II. 1412: granted by Antony de Pereto, Minister General, to Dom John Sudbury, Abbot, and convent of Burton upon Trent, admitting them to participation in the prayers of the Minors; given at London. (Marquess of Anglesey's Charters, no. 631.)
- III. 1470: granted by Silvester de la Noe, procurator of the Holy Land, to Dom William Brouston, Abbot, and the abbey of St. Modwenna, Burton (Marquess of Anglesey's Charters, no. 725.)
- IV. 1492: granted by William, guardian of Reading, to Katherine Goddarde and William her son (Berkshire County Records, Ms. D/EBz T 1/6.)

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<sup>12</sup> A study of any collection of medieval wills will yield examples. As an instance of friendly relations roughly contemporary with the present letter of fraternity we may mention Robert de Huxelee, parson of Tatenhale church, who in 1360 wished to give a message to the Franciscans of Chester (*The Black Prince's Register*, III., p. 386).

<sup>13</sup> Vide A. G. Little, *Studies in English Franciscan History*, chapter III.: 'Privilege; Relation of the Friars to Monks and Parish Priests.'

## ZUR ÜBERLIEFERUNG DES QUODLIBET UND ANDERER SCHRIFTEN DES PETRUS AUREOLI O. F. M.

Der Franziskaner und spätere Erzbischof von Aix ist kein Unbekannter in der theologischen und philosophischen Welt. Er gilt als bedeutender Lehrer nominalistischer Richtung. Es finden sich bei ihm die Kennzeichen des neu emporstrebenden Nominalismus: scharfe Kritik an den Meinungen früherer Lehrer, Leugnung jeglichen Unterschiedes in den Dingen zwischen Allgemeinem und Individuellem, sei dies ein realer oder formaler, Anwendung des Ökonomieprinzips, Verschiedenheit des unmittelbar erkannten Objektes und des Dinges an sich. Er ist aber kein Skeptiker, sondern baut positiv auf. Ein Ruhmesblatt ist für ihn, daß er in seiner Zeit einer der ersten und glorreichsten Verteidiger der Unbefleckten Empfängnis Mariens war<sup>1</sup>. Auch sein verbreitetes Compendium sacrae scripturae und ebenso sein Traktat De usu paupere offenbaren ihn als einen tief frommen und dabei maßvollen Sohn des hl. Franz von Assisi<sup>2</sup>. So verdient er gewiß ein eingehendes Studium. Vorbedingung dafür sind die unumgänglich notwendigen literar-historischen Arbeiten.

<sup>1</sup> Die Traktate De conceptione B. V. Mariae und das sich anschließende Repercussorium sind von den Patres in Quaracchi zum 50jährigen Jubiläum der Erklärung des Dogmas neu herausgegeben: Fr. Guilelmi Guarrae, Fr. Ioannis Duns Scoti, Fr. Petri Aureoli Quaestiones disputatae de Immaculata Conceptione B. M. V., Quaracchi 1904 (Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi 3). Es ist nicht uninteressant, daß eine spanische Übersetzung des ersten Traktates in der Bischöflichen Bibliothek von Brügge (Theca 11 b n. 1) sich findet: Tratado de Concepción conpuesto, sacado a luz e defendido en conclusiones publicas en la Universidad de Tolosa de Francia per muy reverendo P. Pedro Aureolo del Orden de S. Francesco en el año de mil treientos quatorze, siendo rey de Francia Luis ed Obispo de Tolosa Galhardo, hallando se vacante en este tiempo la silla apostolica. Concuerta este traslado con el original que esta en la santa iglesia de Osma entre otros escritos a la verdad, apreciabiles debidos al Ill<sup>mo</sup> S. D. Pedro de Montaya Obispo que fue de dicha Santa Iglesia. 'Nondum erant abyssi et ego iam concepta sum'. Die Unterschrift mit all den genauen Angaben geht offenbar irgendwie auf eine gleichzeitige Hs zurück.

<sup>2</sup> Nach zahlreichen vorausgehenden Ausgaben (S. Überweg-Geyer, Die Patristische und Scholastische Philosophie, Berlin 1928, 518) hat P. Philibert Seeboeck eine neue besorgt: Compendium sensus litteralis totius Scripturae a clarissimo theologo Fr. Petro Aureoli O. Min., Quaracchi 1896. Der Traktat De usu paupere ist von Bonifacius Ceva im Firmamentum trium ordinum S. Franc. Paris 1512 veröffentlicht.

Zwar ist Aureoli ungleich besser gestellt als manche andere Autoren. Für die wichtigsten philosophisch-theologischen Werke, die Editio des ersten Buches seines Sentenzenkommentars, die Reportata der drei folgenden Bücher und das Quodlibet besitzen wir die römische Ausgabe von 1598 bis 1605. Allerdings ist diese heute recht schwer zugänglich und, wie Dreiling<sup>3</sup> gezeigt hat, voll von argen Textverderbnissen. Die von Dreiling als unumgänglich notwendig geforderte Neuausgabe beginnt nunmehr dank dem Wagemut des Franciscan Institute St. Bonaventure New York Gestalt zu gewinnen<sup>4</sup>. Der erste Band mit dem wichtige Einleitungsfragen behandelnden Prolog und der ersten Distinktion ist bereits erschienen. Eine Ausgabe des philosophisch interessanten, bisher ungedruckten Traktates *De principiis naturae*, der m. W. nur in 4 Hss überliefert ist, wird angekündigt<sup>5</sup>.

Um die notwendige Feststellung der Lebensdaten und der handschriftlichen Überlieferung haben sich besonders N. Valois<sup>6</sup>, R. Dreiling<sup>7</sup> und nach ihnen A. Teetaert<sup>8</sup> reiche Verdienste erworben. Mir gelang es, einen von der Editio 'Expandit librum' verschiedenen Kommentar zum ersten Buch 'Quia disciplinati hominis' wieder aufzufinden<sup>9</sup> und ihn neben den gedruckten Kommentaren zum zweiten, dritten und vierten Buch als Frucht der Pariser Vorlesung 1316—1318 nachzuweisen<sup>10</sup>.

<sup>3</sup> Der Konzeptualismus in der Universalienfrage des Franziskanerbischofs Petrus Aureoli, Münster 1913, 62—69 (Baeumker Beiträge 11, 6).

<sup>4</sup> E. M. Buytaert, Peter Aureoli, *Scriptum super primum Sententiarum* 1, The Franciscan Institute St. Bonaventure New York, Louvain, Paderborn 1953.

<sup>5</sup> Die Hss sind aufgeführt bei A. Teetaert, Pierre Auréol DThC 24, 1819 f.

<sup>6</sup> Pierre Auriol, *Histoire Littéraire de la France* 34, Paris 1906, 479—527.

<sup>7</sup> Der Konzeptualismus 1—69.

<sup>8</sup> DThC 24, 1838—40.

<sup>9</sup> Estudios sobre la transmisión manuscrita de algunas obras de Pedro Aureoli O. F. M. († 1322): Estudios Ecclesiasticos 9 (1930) 462—479; 10 (1931) 449—474.

<sup>10</sup> Nur der letzte Teil im dritten Buche des Druckes muß einer früheren Reportation angehören. Vgl. a. a. O. 10, 470 f. Ich benutze diese Gelegenheit, um eine wichtige Korrektur zu meinen Angaben von 1931 mitzuteilen. Frau Professor A. Maier hat nachgewiesen, daß die Editio 'Expandit librum' nicht, wie man erwarten sollte und ich angenommen hatte, nach der Pariser Vorlesung 'Quia disciplinati hominis' anzusetzen ist, sondern daß sie ihr vorausgeht. Denn in Cod. Vat. Borgh. 329 trägt sie die Unterschrift: Explicit scriptum super primum sententiarum editum a fratre Petro Aureoli ordinis fratrum minorum. Finitus est liber iste in Caturcio per manus Iohannis Eltati de Frisia Anno domini M<sup>o</sup> CCC XVII, XIII kalendas iunii. Petrus war aber erst im Jahre 1317 Baccalarius in Paris und aus dieser Zeit stammt die Vorlesung des ersten Buches mit der vorausgehenden Collatio 'Ingredere in medio rotarum'. Es ist daher unmöglich, daß die im Juni 1317 völlig ausgearbeitete und sorgfältig abgeschriebene Editio auf 'Quia disciplinati hominis' folgt. Vgl. A. Maier, Diskussionen über das aktuelle Unendliche in der ersten Hälfte

Die Neuausgabe der Edition<sup>11</sup> und einige neuere Ergebnisse erinnerten mich an eine früher ausgesprochene Absicht, die Überlieferung des Quodlibet und einzelne andere Fragen zu behandeln. Allerdings ist unterdessen für die Überlieferung des Quodlibet das meiste durch die wertvollen Ergänzungen Teetaerts zum bereits genannten Artikel von Noel Valois getan. Etwas mehr bleibt zu sagen über die Reste eines Reportatum des Quodlibet, über die zitierten Autoren und eine bisher unbekannte Quaestio. Weiterhin soll eine unter dem Namen des Exegeten Nikolaus von Lyra veröffentlichte Frage als die zweite Redaktion eines im Firmamentum trium ordinum 1514 veröffentlichten Traktates *De usu paupere Aureolis* nachgewiesen werden. Endlich wird ein 'Correctorium Petri Aureoli' aus der Hand des Dominikaners Raymundus Bequini neu eingeführt, wobei auch die ersten Nachrichten über den Widerhall, den Aureoli bei seinen Zeitgenossen fand, übermittelt werden<sup>11a</sup>. Leider war es mir zur Zeit unmöglich, die vor vielen Jahren gemachten Notizen aus Hss noch einmal zu überprüfen und zu erweitern. Hoffentlich werden andere diese ersten Hinweise vervollständigen oder auch korrigieren.

### 1. Das Quodlibet Aureolis

Das Quodlibet Aureolis ist durch den 1605 in Rom bei Alois Zanetti erschienenen Druck seit langem bekannt, aber heute nicht leicht zugänglich. A. Noel<sup>12</sup> und in erweiterter Form A. Teetaert<sup>13</sup> haben die

des 14. Jahrhunderts: Div. Thom. (Fr.) 24 (1947) 319 f. M. E. ist die Editio 'Expandit librum' eine Frucht der Tolosaner Vorlesung bald nach 1314. — In einem anderen Artikel macht A. Maier die wichtige Mitteilung, daß Aureoli in manchen Punkten von Durandus abhängig ist. Vgl. Literaturhistorische Notizen über Petrus Aureoli, Durandus und den Cancellarius nach der Hs Ripoll 77<sup>bis</sup> in Barcelona: Greg 29 (1948) 213—222.

<sup>11</sup> Die Bezeichnung Editio oder Scriptum für Buch 1 'Expandit librum' dürfte hier besser am Platz sein als Ordinatio, die bei Scotus mit Recht gebraucht wird. Denn in unserem Fall handelt es sich nicht um Ordnung früherer Arbeiten, sondern um ein neues, selbständiges Werk. Auch die ersten drei Quästionen des dritten Buches sind im Gegensatz zu den folgenden reportierten Quästionen eher eine Editio. Die Frage, wie es möglich sei, daß hier Editio und Reportatio im gleichen Buch nebeneinander stehen, dürfte auf folgende Weise gelöst werden. Aureoli hatte die drei ersten Fragen für die Editio vorbereitet, nicht aber die folgenden. Man nahm daher bei der späteren Veröffentlichung diese Fragen aus der Reportatio. In Cod. Paris. Nat. 17484 f. 7v heißen die ersten Fragen f. 7v: Expliciunt 3 questiones 'composite'. Quod sequitur est reportatum. Die gleiche Bemerkung findet sich im Cod. Toulouse 243 f. 8v Expliciunt tres questiones ordinarie composite. Quod sequitur est de reportacione, und ebenso in Cod. Plut. 32 dext. 12 der Laurentiana Florenz f. 7r.

<sup>11a</sup> Cf. F. Pelster, Zur ersten Polemik gegen Aureoli: Raymundus Bequini O. P., seine Quästionen und sein Correctorium Petri Aureoli, das Quodlibet des Iacobus de Apamiis O. E. S. A., in *Franciscan Studies* 15 (1955).

<sup>12</sup> Hist. Littér. 33, 504 f.

<sup>13</sup> Pierre Auriol DThC 24, 1838 f.



handschriftliche Überlieferung dargelegt. Teetaert nennt folgende Hss<sup>14</sup>: Paris Nat. 14566 (P<sub>1</sub>) ff. 7—81; ebenda 15667 ff. 141—208 und 17485 (P<sub>2</sub>) ff. 3—84; Toulouse 180 ff. 129—?; ebenda 739 (T) ff. 189r—224v; 744 ff. ?; Clermont-Ferrand 109 ff. 23—90; Florenz Laurentiana Plut. 32 dext. 12 (L) ff. 95r—137r; Assisi 136 (A) ff. 58r—111v; Vat. Borgh. 123 (V) ff. 199r—268v. Sämtliche Hss gehören dem 14. Jahrhundert an.

Hinzu kommen folgende 2 bzw. 3 Hss.:

1. Neapel Nationalbibliothek Cod. VII B. 31 [membr. ff. 119, 31, 2×25 cm (2 col.) saec. 14]. Die Hs stammt aus dem Konvent von San Domenico und enthält ff. 1r—60v das Quodlibet<sup>15</sup>.

2. München Staatsbibliothek Cod. lat. 26309 (M) [membr. ff. 230, 27,8×19,6 cm (2 col.) saec. 14 in.]. Er enthält, soweit Aureoli in Betracht kommt, die folgenden Fragen des Druckes und der nachher gegebenen Liste: Q. 1 ff. 207r—208v; Q. 2 ff. 209v—210v; Q. 6 ff. 210v—212r; Q. 7 ff. 212r—214v; Q. 16 ff. 214v—216r; Q. 9 ff. 216r—218v; Questio 3a de quolibet Petri de Aureoli ff. 220r—222v. Die Heimat der Hs ist S. Victor in Paris. Sie muß wegen anderer Stücke in der ersten Hälfte des 14. Jahrhunderts, vielleicht schon um 1320 geschrieben sein<sup>16</sup>.

3. Oxford Balliol College Cod. 63 (B). Die Hs wurde nebst anderen von Wilhelm Gray, Bischof von Ely (1454—1478), dem Kolleg geschenkt. H. Coxe<sup>17</sup> hat schon 1852 die schwierige Hs gut, aber heute

<sup>14</sup> Für die Hss habe ich die später gebrauchten Siglen beigegeben. Die Folioangaben sind den von mir nicht eingesehenen Hss Teetaert entnommen.

<sup>15</sup> Aus dem übrigen Inhalt sei hervorgehoben das Correctorium 'Sciendum' des Robert von Orford ff. 61r—80v; ein Bruchstück der Widerlegung Heinrichs von Gent durch Herveus Natalis ff. 81r—106v: 'Querit in primo quolibet XIII questione, que sit alcior potencia, utrum voluntas vel intellectus . . . f. 106vb Postea querebatur de voluntate utrum quoad motum . . . esset libera, si moveretur a beatitudine; eine kurze Inhaltsangabe der Sentenzen des Lombarden; verschiedene Principia 'Super tota theologia', 'Super Mathei evangelium', 'Super scriptum sacre pagine', 'Super Ioannem', 'Super Ysaiaem' ff. 114r—117r. Vor allem sind interessant die Principia 'Ad licenciandum aliquem in medicina: Elegit Nicholaum Antiochenum' ff. 117v—118r; ein Principium super medicinam <eines Baccalarius>: 'Disciplina medici exaltabit capud' ff. 118r—119r; die Ansprache eines Schulmeisters an seine Schüler: 'Audite filii disciplinam' f. 119r. Die letzten drei wären bei ihrem historisch-methodischen Inhalt einer Veröffentlichung wert.

<sup>16</sup> Eine nähere Beschreibung der zumal für Scotus und Durandus wichtigen Hs findet sich im Artikel: Handschriftliches zu Skotus: Franz Stud 10 (1923) 17—19. Noch eingehender ist die Beschreibung bei J. Koch, Durandus de Porciano, Münster 1927, 31—33 (Baeumker Beiträge 26, 1). Koch berichtigt auch meinen Irrtum, als stamme die Hs aus einem rheinischen Kloster.

<sup>17</sup> Catalogus codicum mss, qui in collegiis aulisque Oxoniensibus hodie adservantur 1, Oxonii 1852, Collegium Balliolense Cod. 63, 16 sq. Eine wichtige Ergänzung zu Coxe, die fast gleichzeitig von C. Smith und mir gemacht

nicht mehr ausreichend beschrieben. Eine eingehende Beschreibung wird später gegeben. Die auf Aureoli sich beziehenden Stücke werden in späterem Zusammenhang genannt werden.

Da das Verzeichnis der Fragen des Quodlibet vielen nicht zur Hand sein wird und ich mehrfach auf einzelne zurückkommen muß, so scheint es angebracht, dasselbe nochmals abzdrukken. Ich lege den Wortlaut des alten gut verbesserten Cod. 136 Assisi zu Grunde und gebe dabei die entsprechenden Foliozahlen auch anderer Hss an, soweit mir diese bekannt sind und ebenso wichtigere Varianten aus V und dem Druck. Bemerkte sei, daß die Titel und ihre Varianten nicht dem Inhaltsverzeichnis und auch nicht den Überschriften entnommen wurden, sondern den Einleitungsworten 'Querebatur utrum'. Denn dieser Wortlaut stammt sicher von Aureoli selbst.

Folgende Hss wurden benutzt: Cod. Assisi 136 (A); Cod. Vat. Borgh. 123 (V)<sup>18</sup>; Cod. Neapel VII B. 31 (N); Cod. Laur. Flor. (S. Croce) Plut. 32 dext. 12 (L); Cod. Toulouse 739 (T); Cod. Paris Nat. 14566 (S. Victor) (P<sub>1</sub>); Cod. Paris Nat. 17485 (P<sub>2</sub>); Cod. 26309 München (M).

### Quodlibet Petri Aureoli

1. Utrum in aliqua re formalitas et realitas distinguantur. A 58r—60v; V 199r—202r; N 1r—3r; L 95r—97r; T 189r—191v; P<sub>1</sub> 7v—10v; P<sub>2</sub> 15r—17v; M 207r—208v.

2. Utrum accio agentis differat realiter ab agente. A 60v—63v; V 202r—205v; N 3r—6v; L 97r—99r; P<sub>1</sub> 10v—14r; M 209r—210v.

3. Utrum alius et alius modus unitatis seu indivisionis sufficienter tollat<sup>19</sup> contradicciones, que videntur occurrere in divinis. A 63v—75v; V 205v—220v; N 6v—19v; L 99r—108v; M 220v—222v.

wurde, sei auch hier angeführt: Bisher kannte man nur Fragen und ein Quodlibet des Robert von Winchelsea, Kanonikus von St. Paul in London und Kanzlers von Oxford (1288) und später Erzbischofs von Canterbury (1293—1313) nur aus Cod. 217 des Magdalen College Oxford ff. 341r—364v und Cod 158 Assisi f. 75v, 117v art. 3, 194r—233v (vgl. Little-Pelster, Oxford Theology and Theologians, Oxford 1934, 103). Cod. 63 Balliol hat nicht nur anonym ff. 112r—131v die Fragen von Assisi und Magdalen College, sondern zwei anonyme Quodlibeta Winchelsea: Quodl. 1 ff. 132r—154v (24 Fragen), Quodl. 2 ff. 155r—161v (11 Fragen unvollständig). Quodl. 2 ist das bei Glorieux, La Littérature Quodlibétique 2 n. 33 angeführte Quodlibet. Es hat aber nicht 2 sondern 11 Fragen. Das bei Glorieux als anonym bezeichnete Quodlibet n. 34 ist jenes von Magdalen College, mit dem 7 andere Fragen Winchelsea verbunden sind. Vgl. über die ganze Frage jetzt C. Smith, Some Aspects of the Scholastic Career of Archbishop Winchelsey: Dominican Studies 6 (1953) 101—126. S. führt den vollgültigen Beweis für die Echtheit und verspricht eine weitere Behandlung der Lehre Winchelsea.

<sup>18</sup> Weder Cod. Vat. Borgh 123 noch Cod. Paris N. 17485 (a. 1320) sind verbessert.

<sup>19</sup> Tollat omnes V Dr. Dr. hat nach contradictiones durch ein Versehen die folgenden Worte bis 'de predicto' ausgelassen, so daß der Satz sinnlos wird.

4. Utrum sola<sup>20</sup> distincio secundum quid vel inconvertibilitatis inter proprietatis et essenciam sufficiat ad tollendas contradicciones in divinis non ponendo alium modum unitatis vel indivisionis. A 75v—77r; V 220v—223r; N 19v—21v; L 108v—110r.

5. Utrum sola distincio rationis sufficiat ad tollendam omnem contradiccione in divinis. A 77r—81r; V 223r—228r; N 21v—25v; L 109r—113r.

6. Utrum anima intellectiva sit immediate principium sue operacionis. A 81r—83r; V 228r—231r; N 25v—28r; L 113r—115r; M 210v—212r.

7. Utrum anima constituta ex duabus realitatibus esse possit forma corporis A. 83r—86v; V 231r—237r; N 28r—32v; L 115r—118r; M 212r—214v<sup>21</sup>.

8. Utrum ad visionem beatificam requiratur aliqua similitudo creata. A 86v—89r; V 237r—239r; N 32v—35r; L 118r—119v.

9. Utrum ad visionem beatificam requiratur aliquis habitus vel lumen creatum. A 89r—92v; V 239r—245r; N 35r—39v; L 119v—133v; M 216r—218v.

10. Utrum videns divinam essenciam videt necessario quicquid representatur per eam. A 92v—95v; V 245r—247v; N 39v—42v; L 122v—125r.

11. Utrum virtus moralis, in quantum virtus<sup>22</sup>, sit ens per accidens. A 95v—98r; V 247v—252v; N 42v—46r; L 125r—127r.

12. Utrum virtus moralis consistens circa unam materiam habeat unitatem forme simplicis naturae<sup>23</sup> constitute. A 98r—100v; V 251v—255r; N 46r—49r; L 127r—129v.

13. Utrum virtus moralis in appetitu sensitivo sit qualitas media essentialiter constituta ex habitibus, que inclinant ad passiones extremas. A 100v—102r; V 255r—257r; N 49r—50v; L 129b—130v.

14. Utrum virtus moralis dividatur in 40r cardinales tanquam in species subalternas<sup>24</sup>. A 102r—105v; V 257r—261r; N 50r—54r; L 130v—132v.

15. Utrum speculativa et practica distinguantur penes esse et non-esse activum principium in agente respectu sui obiecti. A 105v—109v; V 261r—266r; N 54r—58v; L 132v—135v; Ba 21r—v.

16. Utrum forme miscibilium qualitatuum differant realiter a sua actualitate. A 109v—111v; V 266r—268v; N 58v—60v; L 135v—137r; T 223v—224v; P<sub>1</sub> 78v—81v; P<sub>2</sub> 82v—84v; M 214v—216r.

Allen Fragen, mit Ausnahme von M, das ja nur eine Auswahl bietet, geht der Prolog voraus: 'Proposui in animo meo querere et investigare

<sup>20</sup> Utrum distincio Dr. — sufficienter tollasque in divinis occurrunt absque alio modo unitatis vel indivisionis Dr.

<sup>21</sup> Utrum ponens quod in anima intellectiva sint due realitates intrinsece, quarum una est pure possibilis in genere intellectivo et reliqua actualis, possit salvare quod sit per se et essentialiter forma corporis Dr. Der Unterschied ist hier nur scheinbar. A hat den eigentlichen Titel der Frage ausgelassen und gibt nur die gekürzte Überschrift, die auch im Druck neben dem Haupttitel angegeben wird.

<sup>22</sup> Virtus in quantum V Dr.

<sup>23</sup> Simplicis non constitute ex multis L V.

<sup>24</sup> Subalternas comprehendentes omnes virtutes V L Dr.

sapienciam. Ecclesiastes 1<sup>o</sup>, Augustinus 2<sup>o</sup> De libero arbitrio cap. 3<sup>o</sup>; alle beschließen die Quaestio 16 mit den Worten: 'sunt una quantitas indivisa in actu'.

Wir beginnen nun mit Cod. 63 des Balliol College Oxford, der eine eigene Stellung einnimmt. Er hat mehrere Fragen Aureolis, deren Charakter ich zu bestimmen suche, soweit dies meine Aufzeichnungen erlauben. Schon Coxe, dem Noel Valois und A. Teetaert gefolgt sind, hat 3 von ihnen genannt. Da die schwierige, aus vielen Bruchstücken zusammengesetzte Hs des 14. Jahrhunderts auch für Thomas von Wilton, den in Paris lebenden Kanzler der Kathedrale in London und Gegner Aureolis, und einzelne wenig bekannte Oxforder Lehrer von Interesse ist, so gebe ich eine etwas vollständigere Beschreibung als Coxe.

Cod. 63 des Balliol College Oxford [membr. ff. I + 165, 34 × 23,5 cm (2 col. oder 1 col.) saec. 14. engl. Schrift]. F. 11 Liber domus de Balliolo in Oxonia ex dono Reverendi in Christo patris et domini Willelmi Gray Eliensis episcopi.

1. Incipiunt conclusiones magistri Petri Haureoli super secundum sententiarum 11—17v (18v).

Q. 1. Utrum temporis preterito secundum suam formalem rationem repugnet convenire rationem infiniti. Quod non Philosophus novit naturam temporis 4 Phisicorum. 11—v. <cf. Com. 1. 2 d. 2 q. 1>.

Q. 2. Utrum secundum opinionem Aristotelis mundus de facto est a Deo et contingenter 1v <cf. Com. 1. 2 d. 1 a. 1>.

Q. 3. Utrum mundum esse ab eterno repugnet ex hoc quod effective est a Deo et contingenter 1v <1. 2 d. 1 a. 2>.

Q. 4. Utrum repugnet creature produci ab eterno ex hoc quod ponitur realiter differre a producente 2r <Deest in libro 2 d. 1>. Dist. 17 Q. 8 7r Hic de origine anime etc. Quero primo utrum unus intellectus numero sit in omnibus hominibus. Quod sic. Intellectus est natura et quiditas intellectualis subsistens 17r <cf. D. 18 Utrum in materia sit incohacio formarum 17v>.

Q. ultima. Utrum mulier fuerit producta de costa viri secundum rationes seminales 17v <cf. 1. 2 d. 18 q. unic>. Tabula questionum Petri Aureoli super 2<sup>m</sup> sententiarum f. 18v.

2. Determinacio fratris Aureoli. Utrum virtus, in quantum virtus, sit ens per accidens. 19r—v. Quod sic. Quod includit res duorum predicamentorum est ens per accidens. In ista questione sic est procedendum . . . Primo ponendus est punctus questionis eum suis difficultatibus. Secundo removenda sunt quedam obiecta per aliquos socios. f. 19ra 2<sup>us</sup> articulus questionis est remove obiecciones replicatas contra predicta. Rand, Iste sunt rationes magistri Thome de Wylton. Explicit f. 19va: potest sibi advenire respectus talis. Et sic patet quod rationes et obiecciones iste non concludunt. <Cf. Quodl. q. 11>.



3. <Quaestio Thomae de Wylton> 19v—20v. Utrum habitus theologicus sit practicus vel speculativus. Rand: Wyltona. Dicit hic una opinio et est Aureoli quod est proprie practicus. Quod sic probat: Omnis habitus, qui non solum considerat veritates circa subiectum, sed eas facit, est practicus. Sed theologia est huiusmodi. Ergo etc. . . f. 20rb Dico igitur quod secundum viam Philosophi nec proprie potest poni quod theologia sit practica nec speculativa. Quid igitur ponam? Quod sit affectiva. Dico quod non potest illa via de affectiva inprobari.

4. Utrum accio differat a forma agendi tanquam res alia 20v. Quod non, quia modus rei non est alia res ab ista, cuius est modus. Oben Aureoli — <Cf. Quodl. q. 2.>.

5. Questio est utrum habitus practicus et speculativus distinguantur ab invicem per esse principium activum et non esse principium activum in ipso sciente 21r—v. Oben Aureoli <Cf. Quodl. q. 15>.

6. Utrum sola distincio rationis facta per intellectum sufficiat ad tollendam omnem contradiccione in divinis 21v. Oben Aureoli. <Cf. Quodl. q. 5>.

6a. Utrum ad visionem beatificam requiritur similitudo creata 21v. <Expl. filii et sit quaternitas. Require plus de ista materia in secundo. Cf. Quodl. q. 8.>.

7. Questio super principium sentenciarum. Quia supponitur in leccione quod Deus sit subiectum in hac sciencia, ideo quero de ratione formali, sub qua Deus habeat hic poni subiectum et est questio ista: Utrum Deus sit hic subiectum sub aliqua ratione magis speciali et magis contracta 22r—22v. — f. 22rb Non obstantibus istis resumo opinionem doctoris et confirmo eam aliquibus rationibus primo sic. Rand Confirmacio Egidii. Henricus XII quodlibet. f. 23v Intellectus posicionis Egidii.

8. <Quaestio eiusdem?> Utrum viator possit naturaliter pervenire ad cognoscendum omnia saluti necessaria 23ra.

9. <Leccio in librum Ecclesiasten anonymi> 23r—v. Vanitas vanitatum etc. Secundum quod dicit b. Augustinus in libro de doctrina christiana . . . Quorum consorcio nos coniungat rex omnium seculorum. Amen.

10. Questiones super primum sentenciarum cum determinacione magistri Petri Aureoli minoris 24r — Utrum finis per se sacre scripture in via sit amare Deum. Et arguitur quod non, quia in sciencia theologie est Deus subiectum sub absoluta ratione. Expl. ipsi non habent salvare unitatem sciencie ex fine. 24r—26r. <In einer Ecke steht der Name: fr. Dionysius de Burgo (O.E.S. Aug.)>. (Zitationem: f. 24r Opinio Henrici et Egidii. Contra Egidium, f. 24v Contra solucionem Hervei, f. 25r Rand: Herveus contra Scotum, contra Herveum, f. 25v Contra Alnewyc., Scotus f. 26r Instancia fratris Willelmi Alnewyc.)

11. Tituli questionum fratris Iohannis de Lana f. 27v 1<sup>o</sup> Quid est principium individuacionis. — 17. Utrum anima separata sit in loco 27v.

12. Conclusiones Aureoli de tempore. Primo dicit quod tempus potest dupliciter accipi: uno modo ut est quantitas indeterminata nec reducta ad aliquem numerum certum, 27vb.

13. <Questiones> Lana 28r—51v. 1<sup>o</sup> Questio est utrum anima humana coniuncta corpori ut forma sit principium individuacionis 28r. — 2<sup>o</sup> Utrum anima intellectiva extendatur ad extensionem corporis 28v—17<sup>o</sup> Septimodecimo queritur an actus quo intelligit anima essenciam suam sit idem realiter essencie sue 49r—v. — 18<sup>o</sup> Octavodecimo queritur an anima separata a corpore sit in loco 50r—51v. Expl.: ab illo modo quod dixi quod michi non satisfacit. Expliciunt questiones de anima fratris Iohannis de Bononia, qui dicitur de Lana, Baccellarii in sacra pagina ordinis fratrum Heremitatum sancti Augustini<sup>25</sup>.

14. Leccio in sentencias. 'Fluvius egrediebatur de loco uno ad irrigandum paradisum, qui medius dividitur in 4 capita. Gen. 2'. — Beatus Gregorius 18 Moraliū super illud Iob 28: 'Profunda quoque fluviorum et cetera sic dicit: Quid namque f. 51v. — Super 2<sup>m</sup> (Rand) Fluvius etc. B. Gregorius 26 Moraliū super illud Iob 35. Suspice celum et intueri ethera 51v.

15. Oben: Wylton. An intellectivam esse formam corporis humani possit ratione necessaria probari et convinci evidenter. Quod sic, quia homo experitur se intelligere 52r—53r. Expl. ab omni potencia. Similiter (unvollständig).

16. Bruchstück aus Aureoli l. 1 d. 33. Circa secundum vero considerandum quod aliqui dicere voluerunt quod proprietates et essencie sunt quidem secundum rem idem, sed differunt ratione 54v—56v. Expl. eiusdem in recto.

17. Recollecciones super secundum sentenciarum <Anonyme Fragen eines Augustiner-Eremiten> 57r—58r. 1<sup>o</sup> Utrum ex ordine encium in ultimum finem possit concludi productio eorum a Deo 57r. — 2<sup>o</sup> Utrum creatio esset possibilis, si non differet realiter esse ab essencia 57r. — Hic ponit doctor noster <Aegidius Romanus> duas conclusiones. — 3<sup>o</sup> Utrum creature possit communicari virtus creandi 58v. — Hic tenet Egidius. Letzte Frage: Utrum demon in eius inicio fuerit malus 60r.

18. Bruchstück eines Kommentars zum ersten Buch der Sentenzen 60r—66r. 1<sup>o</sup> Utrum Deus sub absoluta ratione deitatis est subiectum in theologia 60r. — 2<sup>o</sup> Utrum veritas qua scimus de Deo per theologiam continetur sub obiecto adequato nostri intellectus 60r. — 'Contra Scotum'. — 3<sup>o</sup> Utrum articuli fidei sint principia in theologia 60v. — Es werden zitiert f. 61r Durandus; f. 64r Godefredus, Egidius, Thomas; f. 65r Aureolus, Egidius. — Letzte Frage f. 65v Utrum sola persona filii sine aliis personis potuerit incarnari: 65v—66r. Expl. continet relacionem oppositam.

19. Bruchstück eines Kommentars zum ersten Buch der Sentenzen (wohl eines Augustiners). 67r—85v. 1<sup>o</sup> Utrum theologia sit propria sciencia 67r. — 2<sup>o</sup> Utrum theologia sit sciencia speculativa vel practica. Quod non speculativa, quia habet obiectum attingibile 67v: f. 67v Solucio ad instanciam Couton

<sup>25</sup> P. Glorieux, La Littérature Quodlibétique 2, 153 f. hat nach Cod. Vat. Chigi E VIII 147 die Titel von 2 Quodlibeta Lanas veröffentlicht. Sie sind aber nicht identisch mit diesen Quaestiones De anima. Falls die 2 Quodlibeta in Paris gehalten wurden, so war er damals Magister. Da er aber in der Unterschrift des ersten Quodlibet und ebenso jener der Quaestiones 'Bacellarius' genannt wird, so darf man vermuten, daß Lana dieselben in seinem Heimatskonvent Bologna verteidigt hat. Nach Notizen von Ehrle wird Lana von Michael de Massa O. E. S. A. zitiert.

<Roberti Cowton O. F. Min.> f. 68r *ratio* Scoti; f. 69r Ware, quod non affectiva, Bernardus <Lombardi?>, Aureolus, Scotus, Gandavus. — 3<sup>o</sup> Utrum theologia subalternetur theologie beatorum 69r, f. 69v Aureolus. — 4<sup>o</sup> Circa dist. primo querendum est de frui . . . et 3<sup>o</sup> queram de frui in ordine ad potentiam et est questio ista an voluntas de necessitate velit ultimum finem 72r. — f. 73r Egidius, Duns, Ware; f. 81r Houtton? <Couton?> f. 82r *Opinio* Scoti, Ware; f. 81v *Lincolniensis* De divinis nominibus. — Letzte Frage: Utrum relacio sit alia res a fundamento 84v—85v. Expl. est ad aliquid secundum dici.

20. Oben f. 86r Aureolus. 1<sup>o</sup> Utrum videns Deum videat omnia, que in ipso representantur 86r—v <Quodl. q. 10>. Quod sic videtur. Representans necessaria videt etc. Sed essentia divina. 2<sup>o</sup> Utrum ad visionem beatificam sit necessarium aliquod lumen supernaturale ultra lumen intellectus agentis 86v <Quodl. q. 9.> f. 86v. unten Gerardus <de Senis ord. Erem. S. Augustini> probat.

21. <Anonymi> Utrum gracia et caritas necessaria requiruntur ad actum meritorium tanquam duo distincti habitus. 87r—v.

22. Questio Gerardi <de Senis> O. E. S. A. in principio 3<sup>ei</sup>. Utrum una persona possit incarnari absque hoc quod alia incarnetur 87v.

23. Principium in 4 libros sententiarum 88v. Ecce 4 quadrige egredientes de medio duorum moncium Zach. 6. Sicut dicit glosa super epistolas Pauli.

24. Oben f. 89v Beverley <O. F. M.> 1<sup>o</sup> Utrum Deus sit trinus et unus. Quod non. Quoad unitatem, 89v. — 2<sup>o</sup> Utrum a quacunque creatura rationali solus Deus sit propter se finaliter diligendum 93r.

25. Unten Quaterni 5 fratris Willemi de Wodeford iunioris <auctoris an possessoris?> 100r—116r. 1<sup>o</sup> In secundo quolibet queruntur quedam de Deo et quedam de creaturis. Et erat questio utrum posset videri summa essentia, ita quod non videatur persona 100r. — 2<sup>o</sup> Utrum Deus posset facere multitudinem infinitam 101v. — 3<sup>o</sup> Utrum Deus posset facere subiectum existere sine propria sua passione. Letzte: Utrum in Christo sint due filiationes realis 116r. Expl.: non est proprietas.

26. Es folgen 2 Quodlibeta und 6 Quaestiones disputatae des späteren Erzbischofs Robert von Winchelsea 117r—167v. Da Dom Smith, Buckfast über dieselben ausführlich gehandelt hat und noch eine weitere Studie verspricht, so kann ich von der Beschreibung absehen.

Was ergibt sich nunmehr aus diesen und anderen Fragen über die Natur des Quodlibet Aureolis und sein Verhältnis zu anderen Autoren?

1. Das Quodlibet, wie es im Druck und in fast allen Hss sich findet, ist ein Editum, kein Reportatum. Das zeigt einmal das feierliche Vorwort: *Proposui in animo meo*; das zeigt ferner die sorgfältige, bis ins einzelne durchgeführte Disposition und die wohlgeordnete Ausführung der Fragen und der Unterabteilungen. Dafür haben wir auch das Zeugnis des Cod. 17485 der Nationalbibliothek Paris f. 84v: *Explicit quodlibet magistri Petri Aureoli ordinis fratrum minorum editum et completum anno gracie Millesimo trecentesimo vicesimo*. Es ist also eine

editio, die 1320 herausgegeben wurde. Man darf allerdings nicht schließen, daß Aureoli sein Quodlibet 1320 gehalten hat<sup>26</sup>. Zwischen Verteidigung und Herausgabe verstrich nicht selten geraume Zeit und unser Quodlibet hat einen bedeutenden Umfang, — in der Folioausgabe von 1605 155 Seiten — die Abschrift allein erforderte schon einige Zeit, ebenso die letzte Ausarbeitung. Aureoli erhielt die Lizenz nach dem 14. Juli 1318<sup>27</sup>, Datum des Schreibens Papst Johannes XXII. an den Kanzler der Universität mit der Aufforderung, Petrus sogleich die Lizenz zu geben. Am 13. November 1318 schwört er als neuer Magister regens mit einigen Magistri anderer Orden, daß sie die Statuten der Universität beobachten wollen<sup>28</sup>. Daß er nun unmittelbar schon im Advent 1318 ein Quodlibet gehalten, ist wenig wahrscheinlich. Man wird daher viel eher an die Fastenzeit oder vielleicht auch an den Advent 1319 denken<sup>29</sup>.

2. Sind die Fragen des Quodlibet in Cod. Balliol Auszüge aus der Editio oder Reportata? Sie sind, soweit mein Material reicht, Reportata und damit von größerem Werte. Dies deuten schon einzelne Titel der Quästionen an. Q. 2 (Balliol) *Utrum actus differat a forma agentis tanquam res alia.* — Assisi und Druck. *Utrum accio agentis differat realiter ab agente.* — Q. 15. B. *Utrum habitus practicus et speculativus distinguantur ab invicem per esse principium activum in ipso sciente.* — A Dr. *Utrum speculativa et practica distinguantur penes esse et non esse activum principium in ipso sciente.* — Q. 5. B. *Utrum sola distinctio rationis facta per intellectum sufficiat . . .* A Dr. *Utrum sola distinctio rationis sufficiat . . .* — Q. 10. B. *Utrum videns Deum videat omnia, que in ipso representantur . . .* A Dr. *Utrum videns divinam essenciam videt necessario quicquid representatur per eam.*

<sup>26</sup> Ein Datum allerdings des Quodlibet vor der Pariser Lehrzeit 1316, etwa aus Toulouse, an das man nach den Erfahrungen mit l. 1 der Sentenzen denken könnte, kommt nicht in Frage. Denn Aureoli sagt nach Cod. Assisi 136 f. 71ra (q. 3): *Hanc difficultatem ego ipse novi alias et solvi et contra solutionem bis vel ter replicavi nec oportet nunc repetere, que ibi dicta sunt.* Dazu am Rand 1 *questio de reportacione primi.* Ganz ähnlich schon f. 67rb: *Sicut alias dixi, quando novi difficultatem, dazu 'in prima questione de reportacione primi'.* Die Reportatio zum ersten Buch stammt aber sicher aus dem Jahre 1316/1317.

<sup>27</sup> Chart. Univ. Paris. 2, 225 n. 772.

<sup>28</sup> Chart. 2, 227 n. 776.

<sup>29</sup> Auch Advent 1319 bleibt möglich. Denn Aureoli wurde nicht 1319, wie die Chronica XXIV generalium sagt, sondern erst 1320 als Nachfolger des am 3. September 1320 zum Bischof von Salerno erhobenen Bertrand de la Tour zum Provinzial von Aquitanien gewählt. Vgl. C. Eubel, Hierarchia Ecclesiastica 1, München 1913, 429. Der annus quartus Iohannis XXII ging bis zum 5. September. Das von Teetaert (DThC 24, 1815) für die Erhebung Bertrands vorgeschlagene Datum 1321 ist nicht möglich, da man an der Kurie ausschließlich nach Krönungsjahren zählte.



So ist Q. 15 in A schärfer gefaßt; in Q. 5 ist das *facta per intellectum* von B in A ausgelassen; es ist überflüssig, da es sich um eine *distinctio rationis* handelt; in Q. 10 hat nur A das *necessario*. Dies geht eher auf den Autor zurück, der seiner Arbeit die letzte Feile gibt, als auf einen Abbeviator. Entscheidend dürfte Folgendes sein: In Q. 11 lautet die Einleitung nach B f. 19ra: In ista questione sic est incedendum: Primo ponendus est punctus questionis cum suis difficultatibus, secundo removenda sunt quedam obiecta per aliquos socios. Druck und Hss haben: ideo sic est procedendum: Primo punctus questionis in quo est difficultas inquiretur, Secundo ad questionem in puncto illo dicetur. Tertio tanguntur quedam replicata et dicetur ad ea. Aus 2 Punkten von B sind 3 geworden. Von den aliqui socii in B ist keine Rede. Im 2<sup>us</sup> articulus von B wird von den rationes replicatae gesagt: Iste sunt rationes magistri Thome de Wylton. Im Druck fehlt der Name; es ist nur im allgemeinen die Rede von replicata a quodam doctore. Wir haben also hier die Gelegenheit, die Entwicklung einer Frage von der Determinatio bis zur Editio zu studieren.

3. Das Verhältnis Aureolis zu Thomas Wilton (de Anglia). Nachdem A. Maier<sup>30</sup> eine teilweise ziemlich enge Verwandtschaft und Abhängigkeit Aureolis von Durandus nachgewiesen hat, finden wir im Quodlibet einen Kollegen aus den Pariser Magistern, den Engländer und Kanzler von St. Paul in London, Thomas von Wilton<sup>31</sup>, als Gegner. Ja, es ist wohl nicht zu viel gesagt, daß Thomas in vielen Fragen der Hauptgegner ist. Es ist dies um so wichtiger, als große Stücke offenbar fast wörtlich den Schriften des Thomas entnommen sind. Wir erhalten so eine we-

<sup>30</sup> Literarhistorische Notizen über P. Aureoli, Durandus und den Cancellarius nach der Hs Ripoll 77<sup>bis</sup> in Barcelona Greg 29 (1948) 216—223.

<sup>31</sup> Wilton, der mitten in den verschiedenen Strömungen des zweiten Jahrzehntes des 13. Jahrhunderts steht und damals häufig zitiert wurde, verdiente ein eigenes Studium, wobei die umfangreichen Zitate aus noch nicht gefundenen Fragen berücksichtigt werden müssen. Vgl. über ihn P. Glorieux, Répertoire des Maîtres en Théologie de Paris I, Paris 1933, 460 f. A. Maier, Das Quodlibet des Thomas von Wilton: Rech Théol Anc Méd 14 (1947) 102—110 (mit Ergänzungen und Korrekturen zu Glorieux, La Littérature Quodlibétique 2, Paris 1935, 278 f.) und vor allem dieselbe, Codices Burghesiani Bibliothecae Vaticanae, Città del Vaticano 1952, 37—39 (Cod. 36). Sichere Daten sind: Wilton ist am 1. Januar 1319 Magister regens in Paris und wird Kanzler von St. Paul in London. Am 20. August 1320 wird er von dem Eid dispensiert, nachdem er als Kanzler in London Theologie lehren mußte. Er bleibt in Paris, 1322 hat er auch ein Kanonikat in Wells. Da den Additiones Cancellarii — wie A. Maier bewiesen hat, Franz von Caraccioli, Kanzler von 1309–1316 — zufolge Thomas in der Frage: Utrum omnes rationes que dicuntur de Deo secundum substantiam sint eadem essencie divine et inter se omnibus modis ex parte rei (Worcester Cathedral Fol. 69 ff. 164v—166r) ad rationes Cancellarii (f. 165vb) antwortet, so war er schon vor 1316 Magister. Mehr läßt sich einstweilen mit Sicherheit nicht sagen.

sentliche Erweiterung seines recht unvollständigen Nachlasses. Im Text selbst wird sein Name nie genannt. Aber sehr bald eingefügte Überschriften und Randbemerkungen auch in den ältesten Hss, die zum Teil in den Druck übergegangen sind, lassen keinen Zweifel bestehen. Als ersten Wegweiser, dessen Angaben näher verfolgt werden müssen, gebe ich meine Notizen aus Cod. Balliol (B), Neapel (N) und Borghese (V) an.

In Quaestio 3 wird im Zusammenhang mit der Trinitätslehre zuerst das Problem behandelt, ob die Einheit nach ihrem formalen Charakter etwas Positives besage. Dafür werden 12 Gründe angeführt. Vor der Widerlegung in N f. 10ra und V f. 209vb: *Ad rationes Thome Anglici*. Im zweiten Artikel, wo der Druck nur hat (S. 20a): *Dicitur a quibusdam primo*, sagt V f. 207va: *Inquisicio an sc. ens et unum sic se habeant quod sine invicem non possunt intelligi. Et primo secundum Thomam Anglicum*. Im dritten Artikel V f. 208rb: *Inquisicio, an alia et alia unitas seu indivisio absoluta necessario preexigat unam ydempnitatem aliquam in substrato. Et <est> posicio secundum Thomam Anglicum*; Druck 22 hat keinen Namen, es folgen viele Argumente des Thomas. Im vierten Artikel V f. 210vb; N f. 111ra: 4a *inquisitio an sc. veritates convertibiles cum ente sumant distinccionem per aliam et aliam multitudinem primo secundum Thomam Anglicum*. Der Druck 27 hat keinen Namen. V f. 216va *Difficultas prima quam inducit Thomas de Anglica contra indivisiones absolutas*. Druck 39a—40b hat 8 Schwierigkeiten ohne Namen. — Q. 4 behandelt die Frage, ob eine identitas inconvertibilitatis die scheinbaren Schwierigkeiten in der Trinität genügend löse. Der erste Artikel V f. 221ra: *Articulus primus. Inprobacio dicti fundamenti Thome Anglici in ponendo distinccionem secundum quid in divinis*. Druck 45a ohne Namen. In den folgenden Quästionen 5 bis 10 taucht der Name des Thomas nicht auf. Anders Q. 11 art. 3 V f. 250vb: *Primo ponentur quedam obiecta per Thomam Anglicum*. Druck 113b hat hier gleichfalls den Namen und bringt drei ausführliche Beweise des Anglicus. Interessant ist hier auch B (*Determinacio fratris Aureoli*). Es geht um die Frage, ob die Tugend als solche ein ens per accidens sei. B sagt f. 19ra: *In ista questione sic est incedendum. Primo ponendus est punctus questionis cum suis difficultatibus, secundo removenda sunt quedam obiecta per aliquos socios*. Es sind also Gründe, die mit Aureoli lehrende Magistri — oder besser, nach dem Stil der Zeit — ein Magister vorgebracht hat. Wer ist dies? B f. 19rb: *Primo arguitur sic. Iste sunt rationes Thome de Wyltona*. Vgl. Druck 108 f. 10 Gründe. B f. 19rb 2<sup>us</sup> *articulus questionis est remove obiecciones replicatas contra*

predicta. Raciones contra Thomam de Wyltona. Vgl. Druck III—III. Antwort auf 10 Beweise Wyltons für die virtus als ens per accidens (ohne Namen).

In Quaestio 15 und in der Determinatio des Thomas Wilton sehen wir einen fortgesetzten Disput über die Frage, ob die Theologie spekulativ oder praktisch sei. Thomas sagt in seiner Frage B f. 19va—20r: *Utrum habitus theologie sit practicus vel speculativus. Dicit hic una opinio et est Aureoli quod est proprie practicus. Quod sic probat: Omnis habitus, qui non solum considerat veritates circa subiectum, sed ea facit, est practicus. Sed theologia est huiusmodi. Ergo etc. Maior patet per exemplum de rhetorica.* Er bezieht sich hier auf die Frage I. I q. 6 art. 4 (V f. 11vb) der zweiten Erklärung der Sentenzen Aureolis: *Quantum ad 4<sup>am</sup> questionem arguo primo quod habitus theologie nostre sit speculativus, dann f. 11vb Hic sunt XI opiniones. Sed ego ad hoc adduco talem rationem. Actus <l. actor> qui non solum considerat veritates circa subiectum unum sed agit eas, ille est activus. Sed theologicus est huiusmodi. Non enim solum considerat sustentacionem, defensiones, declarationes circa actum fidei, sed agit eas ad modum, quo actor non solum considerat circa oracionem, persuasivas condiciones et proprietates sed agit eam.* Der Vergleich des Beweisganges, des Wortlautes in vielen Punkten, des Beispiels zeigt klar, daß Wilton diese Stelle im Auge hat. Im Quodlibet nun q. 15 a. I V f. 261v (Druck 138 in der Überschrift) heißt es: *Ubi inducuntur difficultates secundum Thomam Anglicum, ut punctus pateat questionis.* Es folgen 10 Gründe aus Wilton, die er später widerlegt. Wir haben hier ein Beispiel, wie zu gleicher Zeit lehrende Magistri gegeneinander Stellung nahmen und der Disput sich durch mehrere Schriften hinzog. Zugleich liefert B ein festes Datum für die Quaestio Wiltons. Er nennt seinen Gegner Aureoli doctor B f. 20ra. Also ist die Frage nach 1318, in welchem Jahre Aureoli Magister wurde, entstanden. Sie gehört auch nicht zu jenen Fragen Wiltons, die als Quodlibet bezeichnet werden. Ob Wilton auch in der Frage B ff. 52r—53r, *An intellectivam esse formam corporis humani possit ratione necessaria probari et convinci evidenter* sich mit Aureoli auseinandersetzt, kann ich nicht sagen.

Es sind noch andere Magistri, die von Aureoli kritisiert werden, ohne daß man Gleichzeitigkeit annehmen müßte, vor allem Hervaeus Natalis. Im vierten Artikel der Q. 3 V f. 210vb (Dr. 27) wird Hervaeus Natalis als Gegner eingeführt. V f. 211va heißt es: *Arguunt igitur aliqui quod ea que in prefata posicionem dicta sunt de indivisione absoluta et indivisione relativa falsa et impossibilia sunt in se, dazu am Rand: Inpugnatio*

quam facit Arveus contra predictam posicionem, und später f. 214vb: Responsio ad ea, que supra inducta fuerunt per Arveum. Auch im Q. 4 art. 3 wird auf Herveus Bezug genommen V f. 222r (Druck 51a ohne Namen): Articulus 3<sup>us</sup> contra Arveum quod ydemptitas vel convertibilitas non sufficit ad tollendum contradiccionem. Es ist hier Quodl. 4 q. 7 (S. 98a des Druckes von 1513) gemeint. Von geringerer Bedeutung ist, daß im ersten Quodlibet V zu Circa primum sciendum quod fuit quorundam opinio hinzugefügt ist: Scoti in 1 Sent. d. 8. q. 4. Die ganze Quaestio über die Distinctio formalis ist offenbar gegen Scotus gerichtet. Auch in q. 10 art. 1 V f. 245ra (Druck 99a) ist Scotus der Gegner. Quod dico propter opinionem, que ponit quod videns divinam essenciam necessario videt de omnibus rebus quid sint, sed non necessario cognoscit an sint in effectu. Dazu: Contra opinionem Scoti.

Auch Thomas von Aquin wird in Q. 14 als Gegner eingeführt. Es handelt sich darum, ob die 4 Kardinaltugenden alle nicht göttlichen Tugenden umfassen und voneinander unterschieden sind. Im Text wird nur gesagt: Hic primo ponetur una opinio communis. Dagegen sagt V f. 257rb (Dr. 128b ohne Namen): Articulus primus. Opinio Thome prima secunde questione <61> articulo <4>. Zu beachten ist, daß 1319 die Ansicht von Thomas opinio communis genannt wird.

Endlich sei erwähnt, daß Quodl. 9 V f. 239v (Dr. 89) bei der Frage über die Notwendigkeit des lumen glorie es heißt: Articulus 2<sup>us</sup> contra opinionem Scoti et Thome. Et ostenditur primo quod omnis activitas circa intellectionem attribuenda est agenti et nulla possibilitati. N f. 240ra (Dr. 90a). Contra opinionem Godefredi, f. 242vb Contra opinionem Thome prima parte Summe. Als letzter tritt einmal Heinrich von Gent auf in Q. 10 N f. 245va (Druck 100a). Contra opinionem Henrici.

Man sieht aus all diesen Zitaten, daß Aureoli mitten in den theologischen Diskussionen stand und aktiv in sie eingriff. Eine wichtige Frage harrt noch der Lösung. Besteht im Quodlibet eine ähnliche Verwandtschaft zwischen Durandus und Aureoli, wie sie A. Maier für den Sentenzenkommentar nachgewiesen hat? Nach damals viel verbreitetem Brauch werden gleichgesinnte Autoren selten namentlich zitiert.

## 2. Zwei neue Quästionen Aureolis und eine zweite Redaktion des Traktates De usu paupere.

Wenn ich hier zwei weitere Fragen einführe, die wahrscheinlich oder sicher Aureoli gehören, so geschieht dies vorläufig noch mit einem gewissen Vorbehalt näherer Untersuchung.



Cod. 173 der Bibliothek von S. Antonio Padova [membr. ff. 103 33,5×24 cm (2 col.) saec. 14] ist eine interessante Mischhs, die leider noch auf eine versprochene genaue Beschreibung wartet. Sie hat f. 59r eine kurze Frage: *Utrum accidentia proprie diffinantur. Et dicitur primo hic quod distinguendum est in concreto . . .* Expl. *Ista posicio contradicit veritati. Sic patet hec questio Aureoli.* Vermutlich haben wir hier den Auszug einer Quaestio Aureolis.

Viel größere Bedeutung hat eine andere Quaestio. Nach dem Traktat *Scala fidei* des Albertus de Toscanella<sup>32</sup>. 'Funiculus triplex difficile rumpitur' ff. 37r—44v folgt f. 45v—47r die Quaestio: *Utrum ens dicat unum conceptum unius rationis, sub quo contineatur Deus et denarius predicamentorum. Et videtur quod tali ratione. Quod si est, est alia questio a questione quid sit. . .* Expl. f. 47rb *Preterea omne scibile est quid et ens et aliquid. Explicit quod hic est de omelia Petri Aureoli.* Der Ausdruck *omelia* ist völlig unpassend. Ich vermute, daß der Abschreiber den vorhergehenden Traktat, den man als *Homelie* bezeichnen kann, zugleich mit der Quaestio abgeschrieben und dabei den für die *Scala fidei* passenden Namen auf die Quaestio übertragen hat. Es wird daher gut sein, die Richtigkeit des Namens Aureoli als Verfasser der Quaestio in etwa zu bestätigen. Sie trägt durchaus den Charakter der Fragen Aureolis. Die Antwort wird eingeleitet: *Ad questionem respondendo hoc ordine proceditur. Primo declarabitur quid est articulus questionis et posicione <1. precise> punctus, in quo inquiram, 2<sup>o</sup> ponentur 2 oppiniones, 3<sup>o</sup> ponetur oppinio, quam credo veriozem esse . . . Circa primum ergo, ut videatur punctus questionis, consideranda sunt tria. Primo de hac dictione 'ens'.* In dieser Einleitung allein haben wir alle Elemente für einen vollgültigen Echtheitsbeweis. Schon das zweimal gebrauchte Wort 'punctus questionis' kehrt bei Aureoli ungezählte Male wieder. Ich habe es bis jetzt bei keinem anderen Autor in diesem Gebrauch gefunden. Die Formel *Ad questionem respondendo hoc ordine proceditur* stimmt wörtlich mit der Einleitung der Antwort im Quodl. q. 7 und 10 überein. — 2<sup>o</sup> ponentur 2 Opiniones. Vgl. Quodl. q. 1 *Primo ponetur una opinio.* — q. 5: *Secundo ponendae sunt propositiones negativae.* — q. 8: *Primo pono quandam propositionem negativam.* — q. 10: *Primo namque ponentur quaedam propositiones negativae.* — q. 11: *Nunc tertio ponenda sunt quaedam replicata.* — q. 12: *Primo ponetur una opinio communis. Ponere neben punctus ist ebenfalls Lieblingswort Aureolis. Desgleichen wird im Quodlibet*

<sup>32</sup> Vgl. über ihn Th. Käppeli, *La tradizione manoscritta delle opere di Aldobrandino da Toscanella* Arch Fr Praed 7 (1938) 165—172.

auch sonst zu Anfang der Responsio die Erörterung in 3 oder 4 Teile zerlegt. Auch der Ausdruck 'quam credo veriorum esse' kehrt wieder. All diese Übereinstimmungen dürfen als volle Bestätigung für Aureoli gelten. Die Frage selbst nimmt ebenso wie Q. 1 des Quodlibet Stellung gegen die *Distinctio formalis ex natura rei* des Scotus.

Endlich ist kurz der Beweis für eine frühere Behauptung betreffs einer zweiten Redaktion des Traktates *De usu paupere* zu führen.

Seit langem ist ein Traktat Aureolis *De usu paupere* bekannt. Er wurde schon 1512 in Paris von Bonifacius de Ceva veröffentlicht<sup>33</sup>. Der Traktat behandelt die gegen Ende des 13. und zu Anfang des 14. Jahrhunderts im Orden heiß disputierte Frage, ob der ärmliche Gebrauch der irdischen Güter unter das Armutsgelübde falle. Die strengere Richtung, zumal die Spiritualen, bejahte die Frage, während die Kommunität das Gegenteil vertrat<sup>34</sup>. Aureoli lehnt die rigorose Erklärung der Spiritualen ab, derzufolge der *usus pauper* unter das Gelübde der Armut falle. Er ist vielmehr Gegenstand anderer Tugenden, wie der Mäßigkeit, der Abtötung, Demut usw. Er kann unter das Gelübde des Gehorsams fallen, wenn kraft dieses Gelübdes ein bestimmter Gebrauch vorgeschrieben oder verboten wird. Es wird deutlich auf eine zu erwartende Entscheidung des Papstes hingewiesen. Diese ist am 6. Mai 1312 in der Konstitution 'Exivi de paradiso' Papst Clemens' V. erfolgt. Der Traktat ist also sehr wahrscheinlich 1311 oder vielleicht auch 1312 erschienen. Ob Aureoli damals schon in Bologna Lektor war, wo er für 1312 nachweislich ist, bleibt unentschieden.

Nun machte E. Longpré<sup>35</sup> in einem Aufsatz über Quästionen in Cod. Vat. lat. 869 darauf aufmerksam, daß dort auch eine Frage über den *Usus pauper* stehe, die er dem berühmten Exegeten Nikolaus von

<sup>33</sup> Firmamenta trium ordinum beatissimi Patris Nostri Francisci, Parisiis 1512, II 6r—II 9r.

<sup>34</sup> Aus der sehr reichen Literatur über den Armutsstreit seien genannt: Fr. Ehrle, Petrus Iohannes Olivi, sein Leben und seine Schriften: ArchLit-KirchGesch 3 (1887) 497—523. — Ders. Die Spiritualen, ihr Verhältnis zum Franziskanerorden und zu den Fraticellen: a. a. O. 553—614. — K. Balthasar, Geschichte des Armutstretes im Franziskanerorden bis zum Konzil von Vienne, Münster i. W. 1911 (Vorreformationsgeschichtliche Forschungen 6). — Gratien, Histoire de la Fondation et l'Evolution de l'Ordre des Frères Mineurs au XIII siècle, Paris 1928. — E. Müller, Das Konzil von Vienne 1311—1312, Münster i. W. 1934, 236—345 (Vorreformationsgeschichtliche Forschungen 12). Ausführliche, auf Quellen beruhende Behandlung. — F. Pelster, Nikolaus von Lyra und seine Quaestio De usu paupere: Arch Franc Hist 46 (1953) 219—225. Kurze Zusammenfassung.

<sup>35</sup> Le Quodlibet de Nicolas de Lyre, O. F. M. Arch Franc Hist 23 (1930) 42—56.

Lyra O. F. M. zuschreibt. In einer Besprechung<sup>36</sup> des Artikels von Longpré zeigte ich, daß sich die Zuteilung aller 14 Fragen ff. 130r—152v, die Longpré als *Quodlibet Nicolai de Lyra* bezeichnete, nicht aufrecht erhalten ließ, denn 5 von ihnen sind dem ersten und zweiten *Quodlibet* Richards von Meneville entnommen. Es müßte daher bei dem Mischcharakter der Hs die Echtheit jeder einzelnen Frage untersucht werden. Für die Zuteilung der Frage *De usu paupere* an Lyra fand ich einstweilen keinerlei Beweise. Später lehrte ein Vergleich mit dem gedruckten Traktat *Aureolis*, daß Aureoli auch Verfasser dieser Frage ist<sup>37</sup>.

Dies möchte ich jetzt beweisen. Inhaltlich ist die Stellung des Verfassers in beiden Schriften ganz die gleiche. Die *altissima paupertas*, die der Franziskaner gelobt, besteht in dem völligen Verzicht auf eigenen Besitz, sowohl des einzelnen als auch der Kommunität, nicht aber in dem ärmlichen Gebrauch, so daß dieser nicht unter das Gelübde fiele. Der ärmliche Gebrauch (*austeritas*) kann Gegenstand verschiedener Tugenden sein, z. B. der Mäßigkeit, der Demut. Der *usus pauper* kann in einzelnen Fällen, z. B. das Verbot, Geld zu gebrauchen, durch das Gehorsamsgelübde vorgeschrieben sein, aber an und für sich nicht durch das Gelübde der Armut. Dies legt schon den gleichen Verfasser wenigstens nahe. Dazu kommt die sachliche, hie und da auch wörtliche Übereinstimmung in den Einzelheiten. Nur ist die Fassung der *Quaestio* meistens kürzer. Es sind unter anderem die 7 vorgebrachten Einwände auch der Reihenfolge nach sachlich dieselben. Nur das eine oder andere Beispiel.

## Firmamentum f. 126vb

2<sup>o</sup> Sed arguitur sic: Paupertas apostolica non est paupertas mathematica.

3<sup>o</sup> sic: Vovens obedientiam vel castitatem tenetur essentialiter non solum ex condescendentia ad usus obedientie et castitatis. Ergo vovens paupertatem tenetur ad usus paupertatis essentialiter.

f. 127rb: Sed contra. Usus pauper in cibo . . . laxatur in evangelio cum dicitur: 'Edentes et bibentes que apud illos sunt . . .'

## Quaestio ed. Longpré 51

2<sup>o</sup> Item. Tunc ista paupertas esset paupertas mathematica.

3<sup>o</sup> Item. Vovens obedientiam et castitatem tenetur ad usum obedientie et castitatis. Ergo similiter de paupertate.

Ed. 52. Contra. 1. In evangelio et Regula fit laxatio in cibo et potu. Edentes et bibentes que apud illos sunt.

<sup>36</sup> Scholastik 6 (1931) 127 f.

<sup>37</sup> Vgl. die Bemerkung in dem erwähnten Aufsatz über Nikolaus von Lyra: Arch Franc Hist 46 (1953) 213 f.

Auch die Einteilungen stimmen sachlich und zum Teil wörtlich überein.

f. 127rb Ad questionem istam tria videnda sunt. Primum de altissima paupertate in se . . . An respiciat essentialiter pauperem usum . . .

Secundo videndum est utrum fratres minores, qui voverunt huiusmodi sanctam paupertatem ex hoc voto teneantur essentialiter ad quoslibet usus pauperes observandos.

Tertio videndum est, an fratres minores, etsi non ex voto paupertatis, tamen ex alio teneantur . . .

Editio 52. Respondeo: Primo utrum usus sit de essentia voti paupertatis.

Secundo utrum Minores paupertatem voverentes teneantur ad istum usum ex voto.

Tertio videndum est, si non ex voto, quomodo tenentur.

Aus vielen anderen Stellen seien noch zwei ausgewählt, die zugleich zeigen, daß der Text der Editio nicht eine Abkürzung durch irgendeinen anderen ist. Dafür ist, wie überall ersichtlich, die Übernahme viel zu frei und abweichend.

f. 127rb Circa primum considerandum quod circa eandem materiam possunt concurrere diverse virtutes: Unde circa rem possessam, quaecunque illa sit, quia vel cibus vel indumentum vel domus, que sunt naturales divitie secundum Aristotelem primo Politice vel pecunia vel numisma, que innaturales, ut ibidem dicitur, concurrent paupertas, temperantia, humanitas <l. humilitas>, sufficientia.

f. 128vb An frater minor ad usus pauperes teneatur et ad quos usus et ex qua vi voti paupertatis. Dicendum quod ex vi voti obedientie, quam beato Francisco promittit, tenetur ad servandum usus pauperes, quos in regula beatus Franciscus preceptorie vel inhibitorie indicit. Huiusmodi autem usus sunt. Non uti denariis vel pecunia, quia dicitur firmiter precipio etcetera et multa alia ad usum pauperem pertinentia, que forsitan cadunt sub precepto, licet hoc determinare ad dominum papam pertineat.

Ed. 52. Circa primum dicendum quod circa eandem rem possunt esse virtutes diverse secundum Philosophum 1. Politice. Ergo circa unam rem: paupertas, temperantia, humilitas, sufficientia. Paupertas circa divitias nature, que sunt cibi et potus secundum Philosophum 1. Politicorum, et circa divitias fortune, et innaturales, que sunt pecunie et numismata privat solum dominium.

Ed. 55. Tertio unde tenetur frater Minor ad talem usum? Dico quod non ex voto paupertatis, sed ex obedientia tenetur ad aliquos usus pauperes puta de receptione pecunie vel alicuius ibi expressi. Observantia etiam tota regulae non cadit sub votum, sed solum illa tria et alia secundum quod cadunt sub istis tribus secundum quod declarat nova et vetus Declaratio. Vide eam.

Die angeführten Stellen dürften zum Beweis genügen, daß die Frage nicht eine einfache Abkürzung irgendeines Interessenten ist, sondern



eine Neubearbeitung des Autors: überall große Ähnlichkeit, aber selbständige Formgebung. Wir sehen hieraus, daß die Streitfrage durch den Traktat nicht erledigt war, sondern auch nach seinem Erscheinen fortlebte. Auch die Zeit läßt sich annähernd bestimmen. Im Traktat erwartet Petrus, der Papst werde vielleicht bestimmen, was vom *Usus pauper* unter das Gelübde des Gehorsams falle. Der Papst Clemens V. hat dies in der Dekretale 'Exivi de Paradiso' vom 6. Mai 1312 getan. Also liegt der Traktat vor 1312, wahrscheinlich kurz vorher, da eine Entscheidung schon erhofft wird. Die Quaestio dagegen ist späteren Datums. Denn es wird dort (S. 55) gesagt: *Habetur hoc hodie in Declaratione nova domini Clementis papae quinti <d. h. in Exivi>*. Da die *Declaratio* augenscheinlich etwas Neues ist, so wird sie bald nachher gehalten sein. Die Quaestio ist ein schönes Zeugnis für die Klugheit und Mäßigung Aureolis. Er schafft eine klare Linie, auf der nichts Unmögliches verlangt wird; dabei aber hält er an einem hohen Armutsideal, das sich verwirklichen läßt, ohne der Laxheit Vorschub zu leisten, unentwegt fest.

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# HENRICI DE WERLA, O.F.M. TRACTATUS DE FORMALITATIBUS

## Textus\*

I Sicut ex multis granis unus panis conficitur, sic ex multis formalitatum dictis hic praesens tractatus conficietur, in quo panis rudi stilo studentibus tradetur suavis ad manducandum. Cuius forma talis est, nam primo *declarabuntur termini* et hoc dupliciter: primo *in communi* [IA; IIA] secundo *in speciali* [IB; IIB]; tertio *ponentur obiectiones et earum declarationes* [III]<sup>1</sup>.

A 1 Quantum ad primum videndum est primo de isto termino *distinctio*, qui communis est ad omnes distinctiones. Et dicitur, quod distinctio est relatio transcendens disquiperantiae intrinsecus adveniens. Et notanter dicitur ibi relatio ad differentiam absoluti, quia omne, quod dicitur ad aliud, est relatio. Distinctio dicitur ad aliud; ergo est relatio. Et notanter dicitur ibi transcendens, quia cum transcendens sit omne illud, quod circuit omne genus et non habet esse generis determinati et reperitur in Deo et in creatura. Cum igitur distinctio sit huiusmodi, sequitur quod distinctio est transcendens. Minor patet, quia in omni genere praedicamentorum est distinctio et sic circuit omne genus inter ens et eius passiones; est distinctio et in divinis, ut patet de se. Et notanter

\* Cf. the Introduction in *Franciscan Studies* 14 (1954) 310—322.

1-2 formalium] formalitatum *Se*; formalitatibus *Ve* 2 tractatus conficietur] c. tr. *St O* | conficietur] — *Ve* | panis suavis] *Se* | rudi] vidi *St* 3 est] erit *St* 4 et] potest *St* 5 secundo] primo *St* | tertio] secundo *Va Ve* 7 primo] — *St* 8 qui] quod *O* 10 ibi] — *St* 11 distinctio — relatio<sup>2</sup>] — *Se* 12 ibi dicitur] d. i. *O* | quia — transcendens<sup>2</sup>] — *St* | sit] sicut *St* 13 omne *O fol. 113vb* genus | esse] alicuius + *St* 14 et in creatura] — *Se Ve St O* 15 est] sit *Se* 17 eius] ens *St* | in divinis] in divinis + *Se* | ut — se] — *St*

<sup>1</sup> Franciscus de Maironis O. Min., Conflatus in I librum Sententiarum d. 8. q. 1 (Ed. M. Hibernia, Venetiis, ap. L. de Giunta, 1519, 43b): "Hic sunt quattuor videnda: Primum, quid est distinctio; secundo, quot modis capitur distinctio; tertio, quomodo investigari potest distinctio; quarto, utrum in divinis sit distinctio".

dicitur intrinsecus adveniens, quia relatio intrinsecus adveniens est illa, quae positis extremis necessario consurgit. Unde posita ratione formali hominis et asini, in quacumque distantia insurgit distinctio. 20 Et notanter dicitur disquiperantiae, quia inter illa quae sunt idem nunquam insurgit nisi identitas. Ergo oportet, quod sit alterius et alterius rationis, si distinctio debet eis inesse<sup>2</sup>.

2 *Distinctio dividitur* tanquam commune quoddam.

Omnis distinctio aut est rationis aut ex natura rei. Si est rationis, 25 hoc est dupliciter: aut obiective aut subiective. Si ex natura rei, hoc est dupliciter: aut est modalis aut est formalis. Si est modalis, hoc est dupliciter: aut est realis aut non realis. Si quidditiva, hoc est dupliciter: aut formalis aut essentialis. Ista distinctio sic patet, quoniam sicut quodlibet ens aut est rationis aut ex natura rei. Si rationis, 30 hoc est dupliciter: aut obiective aut subiective. Si est ex natura rei, hoc est dupliciter: aut ex natura rei simpliciter aut est reale simpliciter. Si est ex natura rei simpliciter, et hoc est dupliciter: aut est in esse essentiae aut in esse existentiae. Si in esse essentiae, sic est res sive realitas. Si in esse existentiae, sic est rei et non 35 realitas. Et potest esse dupliciter: vel est essentia vel est quidditas. Et hoc tantum de definitione distinctionis in generali et de divisione in speciali.

1 Nunc convenienter dicendum est de omnibus *distinctionibus in speciali*. Primo videndum est, quid sit *distinctio rationis*, quia dictum est, quod 40 duplex est distinctio rationis, scil. obiective et subiective.


18 adveniens] — *St* 20-22 insurgit — nunquam] — *St* 22 insurgit] consurgit *Se* | sit] sint *Ve St* 23 eis inesse] i. e. *O* | inesse] esse *Se*; praeesse *St* 25 Omnis] enim + *Se* | distinctio *Va fol. 137rb* aut | rei] etc. + *Va* 26 subiective. *Ve fol. 114rb* Si 27 dupliciter] duplex *Se* | est<sup>1, 2</sup>] — *Va* | modalis] formalis *Ve* | formalis] modalis *Ve* 29 sic patet] scil. *Va* | distinctio] divisio *St O* 31 obiective] subiective *Ve O* 32 reale] realis *Se*; realiter *O* | simpliciter *O fol. 113va* aut est<sup>2</sup>] — *Va* 33 ex natura] extra naturam *Ve* 32-33 aut — dupliciter] — *St* 33 Si — et] — *Va* | ex natura] extra naturam *Ve* | et] — *Ve St* 34 in<sup>1, 2, 3</sup>] — *Ve* | essentiae] existentiae *Se* 35 existentiae] essentiae *Se* | rei *Se fol. 255rb* et 36 realitas] realis *O* | vel est] — *Se Ve O* 37 definitione distinctionis] distinctione divisionis *Se* 37-38 et<sup>2</sup> — speciali] — *Se* 39 convenienter] consequenter *O* | dicendum] videndum *Ve* 40 videndum] dicendum *Ve* 39 omnibus] *desiit Cod. St. addendo divisionem sequentem*: ens dividitur: finitum, infinitum; ens: in anima, extra animam; ens: absolutum, respectivum; ens: substantia, accidens; ens: reale, rationis; ens: simpliciter, secundum quid; ens: actus, potentia; ens: simplex, compositum; ens: necessarium, contingens;

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Ib. a. 1. concl. 1-4 (43b) sec. sensum.

■ Primo videbitur, quid sit *ens rationis*; secundo, quid sit *distinctio rationis*. Dico, quod *ens rationis* sumitur dupliciter, scilicet *proprie* et *communiter*. *Ens rationis proprie* sumptum est omne illud, quod habet esse solum per intellectum et secluso omni operatione intellectus nullum<sup>42</sup> habet esse, sicut est creatio activa et passiva, quae dicit solum rationem sive ens rationis. Et sic est quaelibet alia ratio solum ab intellectu fabricata<sup>3</sup> sicut relatio, qua refertur Deus ad creaturas. *Ens vero rationis communiter sumptum* est ens quodlibet, quod habet esse cognitum ab intellectu, et seclusa quacumque operatione intellectus dicitur ens ex<sup>43</sup> natura rei; v. g. sicut universalis in esse cognito sive obiectivo. Item est notandum, quod ens rationis tripliciter sumitur: primo pro omni illo, quod non habet esse nisi per intellectum sive per operationem intellectus, ut dictum est; secundo accipitur ens rationis pro omni illo, quod habet esse per intellectum sive per fabricationem intellectus, cui<sup>44</sup> nihil correspondet ad extra, nec secundum se totum nec secundum aliquam partem sui, sicut sunt entia fictitia, quibus nullum significatum ad extra correspondet nec correspondere potest, sicut quod totus mundus sit una formica per imaginationem; tertio modo sumitur ens rationis pro omni ente fabricato ab intellectu, cui nihil correspondet ad extra<sup>45</sup> secundum se totum nec correspondere est possibile; potest tamen sibi aliquid correspondere ad extra secundum partem; exemplum de chimaera, cui nullum significatum secundum suum esse totale correspondet ad

ens: dependens, independens; ens: positivum, privativum; ens: quantitativum, non quantitativum

42-43 quia — rationis] — *Se* | dictum] dicendum *Ve* 42 videbitur] videndum est *O* | sumitur dupliciter] est duplex *Se O* 45 solum] suum *O* | operationem] opere *Se Ve O* | N. B. *In sequentibus lectiones variantes tantummodo selectae indicentur.* 48 ens *O fol. 113vb* vero 51 universalis *Ve fol. 114va* in | in marg. inferiori *Ve* addit schema:



54 accipitur] capitur *Ve*; causatur *O* 56 correspondet] ex parte rei sive + *Se* | ad] ab *Ve O* 57 partem *Va fol. 137va* sui | fictitia] fictiva *Se Ve O* 59 sumitur] accipitur *Se* 62 ad extra] — *Se Ve* 63 totale] totum *Ve*

<sup>3</sup> Cf. ib. a. 3 (44b): "intelligendo distinctionem ex natura rei non ab anima".



extra imaginando, quod chimaera sit ens compositum ex capite draconis et tibiis scorpionis et ex cauda simii et stercore anglici et tintinabulo 65 tauri et oculis scrapulatis et sparso ore etc., licet enim sibi nihil correspondet ad extra secundum totale suum esse; partes tamen sui habent significatum ad extra secundum totale suum esse; patet, quia sunt termini significativi per se. Ex quo sequitur correlative, quod aliquod est ens, cui repugnat simpliciter esse ad extra, cui tamen multa significa- 70 tiva correspondent.

b Viso quid sit ens rationis, videndum nunc est, quid sit *distinctio rationis*. Et dico, quod distinctio rationis est relatio rationis transcendens disquiperantiae et intrinsecus adveniens, cuius extrema sunt entia rationis. Et dicitur transcendens, quia in Deo reperitur, saltem obiective, 75 licet non subiective. E. g. sicut: Socrates est Socrates; inter subiectum et praedicatum huius propositionis nulla potest esse distinctio ex natura rei, cum a seipso non dividatur; ergo, si est aliqua distinctio ibi, non potest esse nisi rationis. Consequentia patet per hoc, quia solus intellectus est ille, qui potest fabricare talem distinctionem. Item, notandum 80 est, quod adhuc ens rationis sumitur dupliciter: quoddam est solum creatum ab intellectu et quoddam dicitur derelictum ab intellectu. Primum dicitur ens rationis purum, et tale nullo modo reperitur in Deo, quia nullum accidens potest reperiri in Deo. Quodlibet autem tale ens est accidens; ergo etc. Praeterea, nullum ens diminutum ponitur in Deo; 85 quodlibet autem tale ens est rationis et est ens diminutum; ergo etc. Secundo accipiendo ens rationis pro ente derelicto ab ipso intellectu, potest reperiri in Deo, sicut patet in determinatione voluntatis divinae respectu contingentium. Et hoc tantum de ente rationis.

2 Nunc videndum est *de ente ex natura rei*. Et dico, quod ens ex natura 90 rei est omne illud, quod habet esse seclusa quacumque operatione intellectus nostri, sive illud sit in actu, sive in potentia, sive sit totum, sive sit pars; sive absolutum, sive respectivum; exemplum primi ut

65-66 et tibiis scorp. et ex] — *Se* | simii] lupi *Se* | et stercore — ore] — *Se* | et tibiis — ore] — *Ve O* 67 ad extra] — *Ve* 68 suum esse<sup>2</sup>] — *Se Ve O* 69 significativi] — *Ve*; secundum *O* 71-72 correspondent. *O fol. 114ra* Viso 73 distinctio] diffinitio *O* 75 dicitur] dico *Se O*; — *Va* | Deo *Se fol. 255vb* reperitur 78 a seipso non] nihil ex natura rei *Se* | dividatur] distinguantur *Ve O* 79 per hoc] — *Se Ve* 80 est] — *Se Ve* 81 rationis *Ve fol. 114vb* sumitur 82 creatum ab intellectu] tantum ab i. *Va*; ab i. tantum *Ve* | dicitur] solum + *Se* 83 et tale reperitur] — *Va* | reperitur] reperiri potest *Ve O* 85 est<sup>1</sup>] — *Se Ve* | et] — *Se Ve* 86 est<sup>1</sup> — est<sup>2</sup>] — *O* 90 Nunc] autem + *Ve O* | ex natura<sup>1,2</sup>] extra naturam *Ve* 91 seclusa] exclusa *O*

Socrates vel Plato; exemplum secundi, scilicet in potentia, ut Antichristus; exemplum tertii et quarti, ut de toto et eius partibus; exemplum quinti et sexti, ut de ente et eius passionibus.

a Hoc viso dico, quod *distinctio ex natura rei* est relatio transcendens disquiperantiae intrinsecus adveniēns, cuius extrema sunt duo entia ex natura rei; exemplum de toto et eius partibus, nam seclusa quacumque operatione intellectus ita est, quod totum constituitur ex partibus et 100 pars non constituitur ex partibus, ergo totum et pars distinguuntur ex natura rei. Similiter subiectum et passio eius, omnis enim passio pullulat ex natura rei a suo subiecto, nullum autem subiectum pullulat a sua passione; ergo etc. Similiter est de fundamento et relatione dicendum.

b Sed *contra ista* arguitur primo, quia habitus dicuntur esse ex natura 105 rei, cum sint accidentia, et tamen non habent esse praeter operationem intellectus et distinctio eorum est ex natura rei.

Secundo omnis relatio voluntatis, sicut est obligatio, est ex natura rei, et tamen non habet esse praeter operationem intellectus; ergo etc.

Tertio ideae sunt ex natura rei in mente divina, sed non habent esse 110 praeter operationem intellectus divini.

c Ad primum *dico*, quod habitus non sunt effective ab intellectu, sed generantur ex actibus, et sic sunt ex natura rei, sed habent esse per operationem intellectus praecedentem et originantem.

Ad secundum dico, quod relatio voluntatis non habet esse ex natura 115 rei, sed habet esse per operationem intellectus praecedentem et originantem.

Ad tertium dico, quod ideae sunt idem quod Deus ex natura rei nec sunt causatae ab intellectu divino, sed sunt coaeternae ipsi intellectui.

Si vero accipiaturs ens rationis largo modo, sic non est inconveniēns, 120 quod sint entia rationis, non quidem fabricata ab intellectu, sed obiective intellecta.

Sed restat dubitatio, quia tunc videretur, quod nulla intentio et nullum dicere et nullum verbum esset ex natura rei. Dicitur, quod largo modo sunt entia rationis.

125

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95 tertii et quarti] de tertio et quarto *Se* 101 et pars — parti-  
bus] — *Ve* 102 et] propria + *Ve* 104 passione] *desiit Cod. O* | et] sua  
+ *Se* 107 est *Ve fol. 115ra* ex 110 Tertio] quia + *Se* 116 sunt *Va*  
*fol. 138ra* ex 116-117 sed — originantem] — *Se Ve* | rei *Se fol. 255vb* sed  
119 causatae] creatae *Ve* 120 modo] et + *Se Ve* 122 intellecta] in-  
telligentur *Se* 124 dicere] verum + *Se* | dicitur] dico *Se* 124-127 Dici-  
tur — rei] — *Ve*

Secunda difficultas est, si omnia artificialia, violentia, fortuita habent esse ex natura rei. Dicitur, quod sic, cum non sint entia rationis, quia tunc domus et archa erunt entia rationis, cum sint artificialia.

- 3 Nunc videndum est, quid sit *distinctio modalis* seu modi intrinseci.  
 a Et primo videndum est, quid sit modus intrinsecus. Et dicitur, quod 130  
 modus intrinsecus est ille, qui adveniens alicui non variat rationem  
 formalem eius<sup>4</sup>, hoc est, quia de se nullam dicit rationem formalem, sed  
 ex opposito distinguitur a quidditate et ultima ratione praecisa. Unum  
 non includit aliud, quod non variat rationem formalem. Probatur sic:  
 Nullum posterius variat rationem sui prioris; sed quilibet modus in- 135  
 trinsecus est posterior quidditate; ergo non variat rationem formalem  
 eius. Quod autem nulla quidditas includatur in modo intrinseco, pro-  
 batur sic, quia tunc sequitur, quod albedo intensa et albedo remissa  
 distinguerentur formaliter et quidditive. Consequens est falsum; ergo  
 etc. Consequentia probatur, quia albedo intensa et remissa distinguuntur 140  
 secundum modos, scilicet intensionis et remissionis; sed si modi includunt  
 quidditatem, sequitur, quod quidditive distinguuntur.  
 b Sed *contra hoc* arguitur: Primo, quia relatio adveniens fundamento  
 non variat rationem fundamenti, et tamen relatio non est modus in-  
 trinsecus, cum sit quidditas<sup>5</sup>. Secundo accidens non variat rationem 145  
 formalem subiecti, et tamen accidens non est modus intrinsecus<sup>6</sup>.  
 Tertio arguitur sic: Quaecumque habent definitionem et sunt definibilia,  
 illa distinguuntur quidditive et habent quidditatem; sed modi in-  
 trinseci habent definitionem et definiuntur; ergo habent quidditatem;  
 patet, quia definitio explicat quidditatem rei; sed modi intrinseci ha- 150  
 bent definitionem et definiuntur. Ergo habent quidditatem. Quarto:  
 Quaecumque habent praedicata primi modi, habent quidditatem; sed  
 modi intrinseci habent praedicata primi modi. Maior nota, minor pro-  
 batur, quia hoc est per se primi modi, finitas est quidditas, infinitas est  
 quidditas, realitas est entitas; ergo etc. Quinto arguitur sic: Omne illud, 155  
 quod suscipit interrogationem factam per quid, dicit quidditatem; sed

128 erunt] essent *Se Ve* 129 modi intrinseci] modus intrinse-  
 cus *Se* 133 ratione praecisa] praecisione *Ve*; id est ratione + *Se*  
 134 aliud] reliquum *Se* 136 rationem] formalem + *Se* 137 modo *Ve*  
*fol. 115vb intrinseco* 148 distinguuntur] differunt *Se*; debent *Ve* 148-151  
 sed — quidditatem<sup>4</sup>] — *Se* 148-149 sed — quidditatem<sup>2</sup>] — *Va* 154-  
 155 quidditas<sup>1, 2</sup>] quantitas *Se Ve* 156 quid, *Se fol. 256ra* dicit

<sup>4</sup> Ib. q. 5 concl. (49a): "modus intrinsecus est, qui adveniens alicui non variat rationem formalem eius vel recedens ab eo non variatur ratio".

<sup>5</sup> Cf. ib. (49a).

<sup>6</sup> Ib.: "accidens adveniens substantiae non variat rationem formalem eius, et tamen non dicitur esse modus intrinsecus substantiae".

modi intrinseci sunt huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior patet, minor probatur, nam ad interrogationem factam per quid est finitas, convenienter respondetur, quod est quantitas virtutis; ergo etc. Sexto arguitur: Quandocumque aliquid potest determinari ab aliquo ut passio eius, illud dicit quidditatem et habet quidditatem. Sed de modis intrinsecis possunt demonstrari multae passiones, sicut de realitate et contingentia possunt demonstrari, quod sunt corruptibiles, et de aeternitate et de necessitate, quod abstrahunt de demonstratione; ergo videtur, quod habeant quidditatem.

- c Ad primum *dicitur*, quod relatio variat rationem formalem, nam si non variaret rationem formalem, Pater non distingueretur formaliter a Filio. Licet ergo non variaret rationem formalem illius, cui advenit, variat tamen rationem formalem totius constituti<sup>7</sup>.

Ad secundum dicitur, quod accidens variat rationem formalem totius constituti, nam homo albus distinguitur realiter ab homine nigro, non tamen simpliciter, sed secundum quid<sup>8</sup>.

Ad tertium dico, quod nullus modus intrinsecus habet definitionem, licet habeat notificationem, per quam posset notificari, et licet notificetur per aliqua priora, non tamen notificatur per aliqua quidditiva, quae sunt de quidditate eius.

Ad quartum dicitur, quod modus non habet praedicamenta primi modi sicut nec primo diversa aliquid commune, in quo conveniunt quidditive, licet habeant praedicamenta multa, in quibus conveniunt denominative. Unde licet quantitas virtutis sit conceptus quidditivus de se, non tamen includit quidditive finitatem et infinitatem.

Ad quintum dico, quod suscipiunt interrogationem factam per quid non propter conceptus quidditivos, quos includunt, sed propter conceptus denominativos, qui sunt eis communes. Unde si quaeratur, quid est Deus, convenienter respondetur, quod est ens, et tamen non includitur ens quidditive in Deo.

Ad sextum dico, quod non oportet, quod semper fiat demonstratio per quidditatem, sed sufficit, quod fiat per passiones; potest enim una

158 finitas] infinitas *Se Ve* 162 realitate] validitate *Se* 163 de<sup>1. 2</sup>] — *Se Ve* 164 quod *Ve fol. 115va* abstrahunt | demonstratione] duratione *Se* 166 primum] illorum + *Se* 167 variaret] variat *Se Ve* 171 realiter] formaliter *Se Ve* 173 nullus *Va fol. 138va* modus 178 conveniunt] convenient *Se Ve* 179 habeant] convenient *Va* | quibus] quo *Va Ve* 181 de se] denominativus *Va* | finitatem] finitum *Se* | infinitatem] infinitum *Se* 187-188 demonstratio — fiat] — *Ve*

<sup>7</sup> Cf. ib. (49b).

<sup>8</sup> Cf. ib.



passio demonstrari per aliam sicut dicendo: Omne corruptibile est contingens; omne finitum est corruptibile; ergo omne finitum est con- 190  
tingens.

Sed hic oritur difficultas, quia quilibet modus aut est substantia aut accidens, et quilibet istorum est quidditas; ergo quilibet modus dicit quidditatem. — Dicitur, quod quilibet modus est reducibilis ad illud idem genus, cuius est sua quidditas, et sic quilibet modus vel est sub- 195  
stantia vel accidens vel quantitas. Et sic de aliis, licet non per se, sed reductive solum.

Secunda difficultas: Omne intrinsecum dicitur esse quidditivum; sed modus est intrinsecus; ergo est quidditivus. — Dicitur, quod modus est intrinsecus, non quod sit de intrinseca ratione quidditatis, sed quia 200  
semper sequitur quidditatem, cuius es modus, nec est sibi formaliter intrinsecum.

Ex hoc sequitur correlative, quod omnis distinctio aut est formalis aut est modalis, et intelligas de distinctione ex natura rei. Patet illa conclusio, quia omne quod est, aut est quidditas aut est modus quiddi- 205  
tatis, etc.

d Viso quid sit modus intrinsecus, videndum est, quot sunt *maneries modorum*. Pro cuius declaratione sciendum, quod ens quadrupliciter dividitur: primo per differentias, quarum una est positiva et altera privativa, sicut cum dividitur per unum et multa, per creatum et in- 210  
creatum. Aliquando per differentias dividitur, quarum utraque est positiva, sicut quando dividitur per absolutum et respectivum. Aliquando dividitur per differentias, quarum una est quidditiva et altera non est quidditiva, sicut quando dividitur per substantiam et accidens; licet enim accidens sit commune ad novem praedicamenta, est tamen 215  
posterius substantia. Aliquando dividitur per differentias, quarum neutra est quidditiva, sicut quando dividitur per finitum et infinitum, quae non variant rationem formalem, et hoc quadrupliciter: primo per finitum et infinitum; secundo per contingens et necessarium; tertio per actum et potentiam; quarto per ens reale et rationis. Ista autem vocatur 220  
distinctio modalis ipsius entis; secunda autem vocatur distinctio quidditiva.

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192 hic] — *Se Ve* | oritur] restat *Ve*      192-194 aut<sup>1</sup> — quod] — *Va* |  
quilibet *Ve fol. 115vb* modus      198 quidditivum *Se fol. 256vb* sed      201 nec  
est sibi] — *Ve*      203 formalis] modalis *Se*      204 modalis] formalis *Se*      206 etc.]  
Steyn frysset ein Beyn + *Va fol. 138vb*      207 intrinsecus] — *Se Ve*  
217 finitum] infinitum *Ve*      219 per<sup>1, 2</sup>] in *Se*      219-220 per — autem]  
— *Ve*      221 secunda] prima *Va Ve* | vocatur *Ve fol. 116ra* divisio (!)

e Istis visis dico, quod *distinctio modalis*<sup>9</sup> est relatio disquiperantiae intrinsecus adveniens, cuius extrema sunt modi vel modus et quidditas. Notanter dico: modus et quidditas, quia distinctio modalis aliquando est inter modum et modum et aliquando inter modum et quidditatem. Si sit inter modum et modum, hoc est dupliciter: aut est inter modum et modum eiusdem rationis, ut inter finitatem Socratis et inter finitatem Platonis; aut inter modum et modum alterius rationis, ut inter finitatem creaturae et finitatem Dei. Si est inter modum et quidditatem, hoc dupliciter; aut inter modum et quidditatem eius, ut inter infinitatem Dei et essentiam et finitatem creaturae et essentiam eius; aut inter modum et quidditatem non suam, ut inter finitatem et divinam essentiam.

Consequenter sciendum est, quod distinctio, qua distinguitur modus a sua quidditate est minor distinctione, qua distinguitur modus a quidditate non sua. Patet, quia modus et sua quidditas sunt magis unita. Item, maior est distinctio modorum oppositorum quam modorum eiusdem rationis. Patet hoc, quia magis distinguuntur finitum et infinitum, finitas et infinitas quam realitas et actualitas. Ex hoc sequitur correlative, quod una distinctio modalis est alia maior.

Sed restat adhuc una difficultas, quia cum omne illud, quod est per se cognoscibile ab intellectu, dicatur esse quidditas, et modus sit per se cognoscibilis ab intellectu, cum non conceditur, quod modus sit quidditas.

Dicitur, quod non est per se cognoscibilis ab intellectu, sed sola quidditate est cognoscibilis per se ab intellectu et potest per se terminare actum intelligendi. Modus autem non est cognoscibilis nec potest terminare actum intelligendi primo, licet secundo.

4 Videndum est de *distinctione reali*.

a Et primo, quid sit *realitas*. Et dico, quod realitas est modus intrinsecus formalitatis actualis, ut actualis, licet sit passio entis in actu. Et dico formaliter actualis et quia formalitates seu quidditates in esse obiectivo sive in potentia obiectiva non sunt realitates, licet sint ex natura rei.

228 inter finitatem<sup>1]</sup> — Se Ve | finitatem<sup>2]</sup> infinitatem Se; aeternitatem Ve 232 et<sup>2]</sup> inter + Se | aut Va fol. 256va inter 234 divinam essentiam] essentiam et differentiam Va 235 distinguitur] dividitur Se Ve 236 non] — Va 239 actualitas. Se fol. 256va Ex 241 difficultas] talis + Se Ve 245 ab Ve fol. 116rb intellectu 248 primo] modo + Ve | licet] possit + Se Ve 249 est] nunc + Ve 251-252 licet — actualis] — Se 252 et] est Se Ve

<sup>9</sup> Ib. q. 1. a. 2 (43c): "Quarta est distinctio quidditatis et quidditatis, sed quidditatis et modi intrinseci, sicut est inter quidditatem hominis et eius finitatem et quidditatem albedinis et eius remissionem et intensionem".

Ex quo sequitur correlative, quod non omne, quod est extra animam, est realitas. Sequitur secundario, quod realitas non est passio adaequata 255 enti. Primum patet, quia quidditates sunt ex natura rei, tamen non sunt realitates in potentia obiectiva. Secundum patet, quia ens vere praedicatur de entibus in potentia, tamen de ipsis non praedicatur realitas. Unde sciendum est, quod aliqui modi sequuntur ipsum ens secundum totam suam latitudinem, hoc est tam in actu quam in po- 260 tentia, sicut finitas. De quolibet enim ente, quod non est Deus, sive sit in actu sive sit in potentia, est verum dicere, quod est finitum; et sic finitum et infinitum distinctively sumptum evacuant totam latitudinem entis. Aliqui autem sunt modi, qui non consequuntur ipsum ens secundum totam suam latitudinem, sed tantum in esse actuali. Cuius- 265 modi sunt isti quattuor, videlicet actualitas, realitas et existentia et etiam quidditas, et contingens etiam, quia potest stare tanquam eius modus.

b Etiam sciendum, quod *res* possunt sumi quadrupliciter: primo modo pro omni illo, quod est extra nihil, sive illud sit ens ex natura rei sive 270 rationis; secundo modo potest sumi *res* pro omni illo, quod habet esse verum, sive in anima sive extra animam; tertio modo potest sumi *res* prout est passio entis, et sic omnia entia tam in actu quam in potentia dicuntur esse *res*; et sic entia rationis non dicuntur esse *res*, nisi sint entia rationis obiective; quarto modo sumitur *res* proprie pro omni 275 illo, quod habet esse actuale firmum et ratum, et sic est passio entis in actu.

α Sed *contra* arguitur sic: primo omne, quod est extra animam, videtur esse reale<sup>10</sup>; sed quidditates in potentia obiectiva sunt extra animam; ergo videntur esse reale. 280

Secundo quia rationalitas est modus intrinsecus entis rationis; sed modi intrinseci sunt ex natura rei et sunt *res*; ergo.

β Ad primum *dicitur*, quod quidditates sunt *res* in potentia obiectiva et omne, quod est extra animam, est *res*, licet non quidditive et quarto modo sumendo. 285

255-256 adaequata enti] entis adaequata *Se* 258 non] vere + *Ve* 260 suam  
*Va fol. 139rb* latitudinem 267 quidditas] aliquantitas *Ve* | contingens]  
 contingentia *Ve* 269 possunt sumi] capitur *Se*; potest sumi *Ve* 271 habet  
*Ve fol. 116va* esse 272 sive<sup>2</sup>] sit + *Ve* 279 reale; *Se fol. 256vb* sed  
 280 reale] realitates *Se*; realitas *Ve* 285 sumendo] *res* + *Ve*

<sup>10</sup> Ib.: "Secunda est realis eo modo, quo est distinctio inter patrem et filium. Unde distinctio realis est illa, quae est inter rem et rem".

Ad secundum dicitur, quod rationalitas est modus intrinsecus entis rationis ex natura rei; non tamen est res quarto modo sumendo.

- c Viso, quid est realitas, videndum est, quid est *distinctio realis*. Et dico, quod distinctio realis est relatio transcendens disquiperantiae intrinsecus adveniens, cuius extrema sunt duae realitates positivae. 290 Et notanter dico positivae, quia multa sunt, quae sunt realitates denominativae. Ex quo sequitur correlative, quod non omnis distinctio ex natura rei est realis. Patet hoc, quia non omne, quod est ex natura rei, est res quidditive<sup>11</sup>.

Sequitur secundo, quod non omne, quod est extra animam, est res. 295 Patet hoc, quia multa sunt ex natura rei, quae proprie non sunt res quidditive<sup>12</sup>.

- α Sed *contra haec* arguitur: Realitas dicitur passio entis extra animam; ergo distinctio realis est passio entis extra animam, et per consequens, quodlibet extra animam per distinctionem distinguitur realiter; sed 300 distinctio modalis est extra animam; ergo distinctio modalis est realitas.

Secundo sic: Distinctio realis est passio entis extra animam; sed omnis distinctio ex natura rei est distinctio extra animam; ergo distinctio ex natura rei est realis.

- β Ad primum *dicitur*, quod distinctio realis est distinctio modalis, quia 305 sicut dictum est superius realitas est modus entis in actu. Non tamen sequitur ex hoc, quod omnis distinctio modalis sit realis, nisi sit entis in actu.

Ad secundum dicitur, quod distinctio realis est passio entis extra animam, et quia non omne, quod est extra animam, est quidditive 310 res sive realitas, hinc est, quod non omnis distinctio ex natura rei est distinctio realis.

Sed restat difficultas, si distinctio realis potest esse distinctio formalis et e converso<sup>13</sup>. — Dicitur, quod sicut accidit quidditati, quod sit res, ita accidit distinctioni formali, quod sit distinctio realis. Et sicut reali- 315

287 sumendo] rem + Se      289 transcendens Va fol. 139va disquiperantiae  
295-297 Sequitur quidditive] — Ve      296 proprie] secundum se Se  
300 distinguitur] dividitur Se; — Ve      302 Distinctio Ve fol. 116vb realis |  
realis] modalis Ve      302-303 sed — distinctio] er per consequens quodlibet  
Ve | distinctio] per distinctionem Ve      304 est] erit Ve; distinctio + Se Ve  
306 dictum est] patuit Se Ve      313 restat] remanet Ve      314 e converso]  
econtra Ve      315 realis] formalis Se

<sup>11</sup> Ib. q. 5. concl. (50a): "Et quando dicitur, quod omne, quod est extra animam, est reale, dico, quod falsum est, nam quidditates in potentia obiectiva sunt extra animam et non sunt fabricatae ab anima".

<sup>12</sup> Ib.

<sup>13</sup> Ib. (50d).



tati accidit, quod sit formalitas, ita accidit distinctioni reali, quod sit distinctio formalis, nam Socrates et Plato distinguuntur realiter, et tamen non distinguuntur formaliter.

5 Nunc restat videndum de *distinctione formali*, et quid sit primo *formalitas*; secundo quid sit *distinctio formalis*. Et quia omnis formalitas 320 est quidditas, videndum est primo, quid est *quidditas*.

a Et dico, quod *quidditas* est omne illud, quod est intelligibile ab intellectu per se primo. Et notanter dico per se primo, quia modi intrinseci, licet sint cognoscibiles ab intellectu, non tamen per se nec primo, quia non intelliguntur nisi mediante quidditate. 325

α Sed *contra hoc* arguitur tripliciter: Primo quia relatio dicit quidditatem, et tamen non potest per se intelligi ab intellectu; ergo. Minor probatur, quia relatio non potest intelligi sine termino.

Secundo arguitur sic: Modus intrinsecus potest intelligi per se et primo ab intellectu; ergo est quidditas. Assumptum probatur, quia quidditas 330 per se intelligitur a mathematico.

Tertio haecceitates possunt intelligi ab intellectu, et tamen haecceitates non sunt quidditates.

β Ad primum *dico*, quod relatio est quidditas et potest per se intelligi ab intellectu sine termino, licet tamen terminus cointelligatur semper. 335

Ad secundum dico, quod duplex est quidditas, scilicet molis et virtutis. Prima potest per se concipi ab intellectu, cum sit quidditas, secunda vero non.

Ad tertium dico, quod haecceitates non sunt per se intelligibiles ab intellectu et per se primo, sed semper eius conceptio seu intellectio 340 terminatur ad naturam primam.

Sed hic est una difficultas, quia quidditas est obiectum adaequatum intellectus; ergo videtur, quod nihil potest concipi ab intellectu, nisi sit quidditas; sed modi intrinseci non sunt quidditates; ergo non poterunt concipi ab intellectu, quod est falsum. 345

Ad hoc dicitur, quod, licet quidditas sit obiectum intellectus, tamen multa alia quae non dicunt quidditatem de se possunt concipi ab intellectu.

b Viso quid est quidditas, videndum est, quid est *formalitas*. Et dico, quod formalitas est quidditas uniuscuiusque rei habentis quidditatem 350

319 Nunc] Item nunc *Ve* | restat videndum] videndum est *Ve* | videndum  
*Se fol. 257ra* de 320 formalis. *Va fol. 139vb* Et 322-323 Et — primo]  
— *Va Se* 324 sint] intelligibiles et + *Se* 326 tripliciter] multipliciter  
*Se*; — *Ve* 328 termino. *Ve fol. 117ra* 331 mathematico] metaphysico *Se*  
336 molis] moris *Ve* 341 primam] id est speciem + *Se*

definibilem sive non definibilem<sup>14</sup>. Et notanter dico, quod est quidditas ad differentiam modorum et privationum, quae nullam dicunt quidditatem. Et notanter dico definibilem sive non definibilem propter simpliciter simplicia<sup>15</sup> et propter divinam essentiam, quae nullam habent definitionem, sicut patet de ente et suis transcendentibus passionibus, 35 quae, licet dicant quidditatem, non tamen sunt definibiles.

- α Sed *contra hoc* arguitur dupliciter: Omnis ratio definitiva quidditiva videtur converti cum quidditate; ergo, si formalitas est quidditas, formalitas definitio quidditiva<sup>16</sup>.

Secundo sic: Omnis passio distinguitur formaliter a suo subiecto; 36 sed multae sunt passiones modales, sicut est finitas et infinitas, quae possunt demonstrari de suis subiectis, sicut est; ergo formaliter distinguuntur ab eis.

- β Ad primum *dicitur*, quod, licet omnis definitio quidditiva sit quidditas, tamen non omnis quidditas est definitio quidditiva; patet de quidditate 37 entis et suarum passionum.

Ad secundum dico, quod non omnis passio distinguitur formaliter a suo subiecto. Et dico, quod quaedam sunt passiones formales, quaedam vero modales. Passiones formales distinguuntur formaliter a suis subiectis, sicut risibilitas ab homine; passiones vero modales non distinguuntur 37 formaliter a suis subiectis, cuiusmodi sunt finitas et infinitas.

- c Viso quid sit formalitas, videndum est, quid sit *forma* et quid *formale*. Et dico, quod *forma* est perfectio, quae est apta nata dependere ab aliquo in genere causae materialis. Et notanter dico dependere ab aliquo in genere causae materialis propter ipsam materiam primam, quae a 37 nullo dependet in genere causae materialis. Ex quo sequitur correlative, quod illa opinio, quae dicit, quod forma est aptius cuiuslibet rei actuantis, est falsa; patet, nam compositum est actualius sua forma, et tamen non est forma.

353 Et *Va fol. 140ra* notanter 357 dupliciter] et *Se* 358 quiddi-  
tate; *Ve fol. 117rb* ergo 360 suo *Se fol. 257rb* subiecto 361 sicut  
est] — *Ve* 366 suarum passionum] suis passionibus *Ve* 370-371 sicut  
— subiectis] — *Va* 371 cuiusmodi] sicut *Se* 373 apta] acta *Ve*  
374-376 Et — materialis<sup>3</sup>] — *Se* 377 aptius] actus *Se Ve* | actuantis]  
actualitate *Va*

<sup>14</sup> Ib.: "Dico ergo, quod formalitas est quidditas uniuscuiusque habentis quidditatem sive definibilem sive non".

<sup>15</sup> Ib.: "Primo, quia praedicamenta non sunt definibilia, quia simpliciter simplicia, et tamen habent formalitates, per quas formaliter distinguuntur; secundo, quia ratio entis et ratio deitatis ponuntur formalitates, et tamen non possunt definiri".

<sup>16</sup> Ib. (48d): "dicunt alii, quod formalitates sunt rationes definitivae".

Sequitur secundo, quod opinio, quae dicit, quod forma est actus 380  
perficiens quodcumque perfectibile, est falsa; patet hoc, quia in divina  
essentia sunt multae perfectiones, et tamen ipsam non perficiunt.

Ex hoc apparet, quae sit differentia inter formam et formalitatem,  
nam forma distinguitur realiter ab eo, cuius est forma; formalitas vero  
non distinguitur realiter ab eo, cuius est formalitas. Primum patet, quia 385  
omne, quod dependet ab aliquo in genere causae materialis tanquam  
effectus, distinguitur realiter a sua causa, et sic est de forma, ergo etc.

Secunda differentia est, quod forma potest corrumpi remanente eo,  
cuius est forma, quod in essentialiter ordinatis realiter distinctis prius  
potest esse sine posteriori; sed sic est de forma; ergo. Formalitas vero 390  
non; ergo.

Ex quo sequitur, quod male intellexerunt Thomistae et eorum se-  
quaces, qui posuerunt formalitatem sumi a forma<sup>17</sup>, nam sicut patuit  
superius, duplici differentia differunt.

Sed *contra hoc* potest argui dupliciter: Primo quia anima intellectiva 395  
dicitur esse forma, et tamen nullo modo dicitur dependere ab aliquo in  
genere causae materialis; secundo divina essentia dicitur esse forma,  
et tamen nullo modo dicitur dependere ab aliquo.

Ad primum *dicitur*, quod forma sumitur duobus modis, scilicet proprie  
et aequivoce; anima vero intellectiva dicitur forma aequivoce, non 400  
tamen proprie.

Ad secundum dico, quod divina essentia proprie dicitur esse forma,  
sed quia formae magis convenit esse actum quam potentiam, ideo  
propter suam summam actualitatem essentia divina dicitur esse forma.  
Dico, quod forma est perfectio, quae est apta nata dependere ab aliquo 405  
in genere causae materialis, quae quidem dependentia dicitur inhaerentia.

Quid autem sit *formale* videndum est. Pro cuius declaratione sciendum,  
quod formaliter dicitur quattuor modis: Primo modo dicitur formaliter,

380 actus] aptus *Va* 381 perfectibile] perfectione *Se* 382 tamen  
*Ve fol. 117va* ipsam *Va fol. 140rb* non 383 apparet] patet *Ve*  
384 realiter] ab eo + *Se Ve* 392 sequitur] patet *Ve* | Thomistae]  
Ochamistae *Ve* 393 sumi] esse *Ve* 395 tamen] non *Ve* | nullo — de-  
pendere] — *Ve* 396-397 in — materialis] — *Se* | divina essentia]  
divinae essentiae *Ve* 400 anima — aequivoce] — *Va* 405 est] dicitur  
esse *Ve* | apta] acta *Ve* 407 videndum — declaratione] — *Ve*  
408 formaliter] formale *Se Ve*

<sup>17</sup> Ib. (48c): "Sicut aliqui, quod formalitas dicitur a forma sicut materialitas  
a materia . . . Ista est nimis grossa et asininis imaginatio".

ut distinguitur contra realiter<sup>18</sup>; et isto modo dicimus, quod divina essentia dicitur realiter proprietates divinae, licet non formaliter. Secundo modo dicitur formaliter, ut distinguitur contra omne illud, quod non est de quidditate alicuius, et isto modo dicimus quod, licet divina essentia sit intrinsece infinita, non tamen est formaliter infinita. Tertio modo dicitur formaliter, ut distinguitur contra virtualiter, et illo modo dicimus, quod sol est formaliter lucidus et virtualiter calidus, licet non formaliter. Quarto modo sumitur formaliter, ut distinguitur contra materialiter, et illo modo dicimus, quod homo est formaliter rationalis, materialiter corporeus.

Insuper est notandum, quod formalitates sunt in quintuplici differentia: Primo sunt formalitates, quae se habent sicut individua et dicuntur individuales formalitates, quia denominative non plurificabiles sicut est Deitas, quia de se non est plurificabilis et est summa et perfectissima formalitas. Secundo sunt formalitates, quae se habent sicut species specialissimae, sicut humanitas et asineitas. Tertio sunt quaedam formalitates subalternae, sicut est corpus vel corporeitas vel animalitas. Quarto quaedam sunt formalitates generalissimae, sicut sunt quidditates decem praedicamentorum. Quaedam sunt formalitates transcendentes, sicut est quidditas entis et suarum passionum. Etiam est notandum, quod in formalitatibus transcendentibus adhuc est ordo, quoniam quaedam sunt communiores ente, sicut sunt rationes perfectionis simpliciter et simpliciter simplicis, nam illa dicuntur de ente et eius passionibus, et sic sunt communiores ipso. Quaedam sunt aequales ipsi enti sicut formalitates passionum eius. Aliae sunt minus communes, sicut sunt prima dividenda ipsum ens formaliter, ut puta absolutum

409 realiter] reale *Ve* | quod] in + *Se* 409-410 divina *Ve fol. 117vb*  
 essentia | dicitur] distinguitur *Se Ve* | divinae] essentiae + *Ve* | formaliter]  
 formalitas *Ve* 413 formaliter] formale *Ve* | distinguitur *Va fol. 140va*  
 contra 414 modo] — *Ve* | virtualiter] virtuale *Ve* 417 ratio-  
 nalis] realis *Va* 419 est notandum] videndum est *Ve* | quintuplici]  
 duplici *Se* 420 Primo] Primae *Ve* 420-421 se — quia] — *Ve* 421 de-  
 nominativae] de se *Se Ve* 422 quia] quae *Ve* 422-423 sicut est Deitas,  
 quia de se non est plurificabilis et est summa et perfectissima formalitas] et  
 est summa et perfectissima formalitas, scilicet Deitas, quae de se non est  
 plurificabilis *Se* 423 Secundo] Et aliae *Va*; Secundae *Ve* 424 huma-  
 nitas et asineitas] risibilitas, humanitas *Se* | Tertio] Tertiae *Se Ve*  
 428 quidditas entis] entitas *Va Se*; entis *Ve*, cf. *supra p. 9.* 430 rationes]  
 ratio *Va Ve* 431 simpliciter<sup>2</sup>] sumptae *Se* 433 formalitates *Ve fol. 118ra*  
 passionum

<sup>18</sup> Ib. (50c) sec. sensum.



et respectivum. Et sic patet, quid sit formale et quot modis sumatur 435  
 formalitas.

e Videndum est modo, quid sit *distinctio formalis*<sup>19</sup>. Et dico, quod  
 distinctio formalis est relatio transcendens disquiperantiae intrinsecus  
 adveniens, cuius extrema sunt duae formalitates sive definibiles sive  
 non definibiles. Et notanter dico transcendens propter transcendentia, 440  
 quae formaliter distinguuntur, licet non omnia, etiam propter divina,  
 in quibus reperitur distinctio formalis. Et dico disquiperantiae propter  
 illa, quae sunt eiusdem rationis, inter quae non potest esse distinctio  
 formalis. Et dico intrinsecus adveniens, quia positus duabus formalitati-  
 bus quantumcumque ab invicem distantibus, semper insurgit formalis 445  
 distinctio inter illas formalitates alterius et alterius rationis positas.  
 Et notanter dico definibiles sive non definibiles propter formalitates  
 simpliciter simplices, quia, licet non possint definiri, non tollitur tamen,  
 quin possint formaliter distingui, si sint alterius et alterius rationis,  
 sicut est Deitas et entitas, quae formaliter distinguuntur, licet non 450  
 possunt definiri.

Est tamen advertendum diligenter, quod quaedam sunt, quae distin-  
 guuntur formaliter et non realiter, sicut homo et asinus in potentia  
 obiectiva, sapientia et essentia in divinis<sup>20</sup>, veritas et entitas in trans-  
 cendentibus, genus et differentia, intellectus et voluntas in creaturis 455  
 et angelis. Secundo vero sunt quaedam, quae distinguuntur realiter  
 et non formaliter, sicut duo individua realiter eiusdem speciei, ut So-  
 crates et Plato. Quaedam vero sunt, quae distinguuntur realiter et  
 formaliter, sicut duo individua diversarum specierum, ut puta hic homo  
 et hic asinus; ista enim duo individua realiter et formaliter distinguuntur 460  
 ab invicem. Quaedam vero sunt, quae nec realiter nec formaliter dis-  
 tinguntur, sicut existentia et haecceitas; sunt enim una res et duo  
 modi, quibus non convenit formalis distinctio. Ex quo patet evidenter,  
 quod inter distinctiones non est ordo essentialis, sed ordo quidam

437 modo] nunc *Se* | Et *Va fol. 140vb* dico 440 definibiles] — *Ve* |  
 transcendentia, *Se fol. 257vb* quae 444 dico] — *Va* 445 ab] ad *Va* | for-  
 malis] formaliter *Va* 449 quin] quodocumque *Ve* | et alterius<sup>2</sup>] — *Va*  
 454 veritas] unitas *Ve* 455 transcendentibus, *Ve fol. 118rb* genus | genus]  
 ergo *Va* 457 realiter] realia *Ve* | eiusdem] rationis + *Ve* 458 realiter]  
 formaliter *Se* 459 formaliter] realiter *Se* | diversarum] duarum *Ve*  
 461 ab invicem] — *Se* 463 convenit *Va fol. 141ra* formalis

<sup>19</sup> Ib. q. 1. a. 2. (43c): "Tertio est formalis, et ista est inter quidditatem  
 et quidditatem; sic dicimus, quod homo et asinus in potentia obiectiva distin-  
 guuntur".

<sup>20</sup> Cf. ib. q. 5 (48b).

accidentalis<sup>21</sup>. Et si dicatur, quod maior distinctio includit minorem et non e converso per commune dictum formalium, quod pro tanto distinctio maior includit minorem, quia illa quae pluribus distinguitur, est maior distinctione illa, quae paucioribus distinguitur, v. g. sicut aliqua distinguuntur formaliter et realiter et essentialiter, pluribus inter se distinguuntur quam illa, quae solum formaliter vel solum realiter<sup>22</sup>.

6 Nunc videndum est *de distinctione essentiali*, et primo quid est *essentia*; deinde, quid est *distinctio essentialis*.

a Quantum ad primum dico, quod *essentia* est ratio transcendens, quae unumquodque habet esse essentiae vel quia dicitur esse essentiae cuiuslibet rei essentiam habentis sive definibilis sive non definibilis. Et notanter dico, quod est ratio transcendens propter divinam essentiam et propter decem praedicamenta, quae dicuntur decem esse essentiae ita, quod ratio essentiae competit Deo et creaturis, et sic est transcendens. Et notanter dicitur definibilis sive non definibilis, quia quaedam est essentia definibilis, quaedam vero non definibilis sicut divina essentia et entis esse, quae quidem essentiae perfecte explicari non possunt secundum proprias rationes eorum essentiales. Essentia definibilis vero est illa, quae importatur per definitionem quidditivam cuiuslibet rei definibilis. Ex quo patet, quod illud dicitur esse de essentia alicuius, quod importatur per definitionem eius quidditivam.

Est tamen sciendum, quod ista quattuor sunt essentialiter ordinata: substantia, natura, essentia et quidditas. Unde omnis substantia est natura et non e converso; patet, quia natura dicitur de substantia et

466 per — formalium] — *Se*; dicitur + *Ve* 467 illa] quam + *Ve* | distinguitur] sicut + *Se* 469 et essentialiter] — *Se* 475 esse *Ve fol. 118va* essentiae 476 definibilis<sup>1, 2</sup>] definibile *Ve* 477 decem] etiam *Va* 479 est] disquiperantiae + *Ve* 480 definibilis<sup>1, 2</sup>] definibile *Va*; difficile *Ve* 481 essentia *Se fol. 258ra* definibilis | definibilis<sup>1, 2</sup>] difficilis *Ve* 482 esse] essentiae *Se* 483 secundum] sed *Va* 484 importatur] imponitur *Va* 484-486 per — importatur] — *Va* 486 quidditivam] definitivam *Se Ve* 488 et] — *Se* 489 natura] substantia + *Va*

<sup>21</sup> Ib. q. 1. a. 2(43c): "Istae distinctiones sunt essentialiter ordinatae, quia maxima est essentialis, et ideo quae essentialiter distinguuntur omnibus aliis distinctionibus distinguuntur. Secunda post essentialem maior est realis. Post illam est tertia, scilicet quidditiva vel formalis. Quarta est minor omnibus, scilicet quidditatis et modi intrinseci, nam minor omnibus est distinctio, ubi statueretur inter eandem rationem specificam et formalem quam ubi est exitus. Non est autem exitus a ratione formali per modum eius, quia ad rationem formalem et non ad aliam reducitur, quia modus adveniens non variat rationem formalem".

<sup>22</sup> Cf. ib. q. 5 (48b).

qualitate, substantia vero non. Similiter sequitur: Natura est, ergo <sup>490</sup> essentia est, tamen non econverso, nam essentia dicitur de omnibus praedicamentis, natura vero non nisi de duobus. Similiter: Essentia est, ergo quidditas est, et non econverso, nam in divinis sunt multae quidditates, et tamen ibi non est nisi unica essentia. Ex quo sequitur, quod essentia et quidditas non sunt idem adaequate. 495

**b** Sed restat dubitatio, quid sit *natura*. Et dico, quod natura est illud, quod potest esse principium nativitatis, quia omne, quod nascitur, ideo dicitur proprie nasci, quia a principio naturali. Ex quo patet, quod natura et essentia non sunt idem adaequate. Et si dicatur: Angelus et anima non possunt esse principia nativitatis nec possunt nasci, et <sup>500</sup> tamen sunt naturae, dicitur, quod natura sumitur aequivoce, et ita loquimur in praesenti, non enim loquimur hic nisi de natura ut est principium nativitatis. Ex quo sequitur, quod materia et forma possunt dici naturae, non autem relatio.

**c** Istis ergo visis patet, quid sit *distinctio essentialis*. Et dico, quod <sup>505</sup> distinctio essentialis est relatio transcendens disquiperantiae intrinsecus adveniens, cuius extrema sunt duae essentiae sive definibiles sive non definibiles. Et pro tanto dicitur transcendens, quia distinctio essentialis circuit omne genus. Et notanter dicitur definibiles propter distinctionem essentialem, quae est inter Deum et creaturam<sup>23</sup>, ubi una <sup>510</sup> essentia est definibilis, alia vero non definibilis, ut essentia Dei.

Unde notandum est, quod haec distinctio essentialis, licet fundetur super rationem essentiae, non tamen fundatur super rationem essentiae communem, sed super rationem extremorum singularium, quia omnes particulares essentiae conveniunt in ratione communis essentiae, secundum <sup>515</sup> quam definitur esse idem et non distincte. Et sic patet quantum ad primam partem principalem, in qua erant termini declarandi.

**II** Quantum ad secundum partem principalem, in qua videndi sunt *modi investigandi distinctionem*, est sciendum, quod primo videbitur,

490 qualitate] quidditate *Se* | est] — *Se* 491 essentia] esse *Ve* |  
non] — *Va Ve* 492 nisi] — *Ve* | duobus. *Va fol. 141rb* Similiter 493 non]  
tamen + *Se Ve* 494 nisi] — *Ve* 497 quod *Ve fol. 118rb* potest 499 An-  
gelus] Angeli *Se* 504 naturae] natura *Se Ve* 511 Dei] divina *Ve*  
512 haec] — *Ve* 513 rationem essentiae] esse *Va* 514 extremorum  
singularium] essentiarum particularium *Ve* 515 communis] — *Va*  
516 quam] quas *Se* | definitur] dicimus *Se*; dicuntur *Ve* 518 videndi  
*Ve fol. 119ra* sunt | modi *Va fol. 141va* investigandi

<sup>23</sup> Ib. q. 1. a. 2 (43c): "Prima est distinctio essentialis eo modo, quo distinguitur Deus a creatura, et ista proprie accipiendo; est quando quidditas cum sua existentia est distincta ab alia quidditate cum sua existentia".

quomodo *distinctio in communi* investigatur; secundo quomodo *distinctio rationis*; tertio quomodo *distinctio ex natura rei*; quarto quomodo *modalis*; quinto quomodo *distinctio realis*; sexto quomodo *distinctio formalis*; septimo quomodo *distinctio essentialis* investigatur.

**A a** Quantum ad primum dico, quod *distinctio in communi* investigatur multis modis:

525

1. Primo quidem per viam diversae considerationis. Unde quandocumque aliquae res possunt concipi distincte et indistincte, complexe et incomplexo sicut de definitione et definito, nam una et eadem res potest concipi distincte et indistincte, complexe et incomplexo; primo modo ponitur *distinctio* inter definitionem et definitum.

530

2. Secunda via est per viam definitionis vel per viam descriptionis. Unde quando aliquae res sunt, quae habent diversas definitiones vel descriptiones, tales res dicuntur distinctae.

3. Tertio per viam divisionis. Unde quandocumque aliquae res cadunt sub diversis differentiis dividendis aliquod commune, tales res dicuntur esse distinctae, sicut homo et asinus, qui cadunt sub differentiis.

4. Quarto per viam remotionis sive negationis. Unde quandocumque aliquae res sic se habent, quod una removetur ab alia, sicut rationalitas ab asino, tales res dicuntur distinctae.

5. Quinto per viam generationis vel corruptionis. Unde quandocumque aliqua duo sic se habent, quod unum potest generari alio non generato vel corrupto, illa dicuntur distincta, sicut anima et corpus. Corpus generatur et corrumpitur, anima remanet ingenerata et incorrupta.

6. Sexto per viam separationis. Quandocumque aliqua duo sic se habent, quod unum potest ab alio separari, illa dicuntur distincta, sicut quantitas in sacramento altaris, nam separatur ibi quantitas a substantia.

7. Septima via dicitur dependentiae, sicut inter Deum et creaturam, inter causam et effectum.

520 quomodo *Se fol. 258rb distinctio* 525 multis modis] pluribus  
m. *Se*; multipliciter *Ve* 527 res] diversae + *Se*; diversimode *Ve*  
527-528 distincte — incomplexo] — *Ve* 528-530 sicut — definitum] isto  
modo ponitur *distinctio* inter definitionem et definitum, nam una et  
eadem res potest concipi distincte et indistincte, complexe et incom-  
plexe *Se* | nam] unde *Ve* | primo] et isto *Ve* 533 dicuntur] sunt *Se*; distin-  
guuntur *Ve* 538-539 rationalitas *Ve 119rb* ab 543 remanet] manet  
*Se Ve* 546 quantitas<sup>1</sup>] qualitas *Ve* | sa- *Va fol. 141rb* cramento | quanti-  
tas<sup>2</sup>] qualitas *Va*



8. Octava via est emanationis sive productionis, sicut inter personas 550 divinas investigat distinctionem realem Augustinus<sup>24</sup>.

9. Nona via est privationis et habitus, quae nullo modo possunt verificari de eodem secundum idem.

10. Decima via est via convertibilitatis. Unde quodcumque aliqua duo sic se habent, quod unum potest inveniri sine reliquo, sicut animali- 555 tas sine ratione vel substantia sine corporeitate, vel quando unum in plus se habet quam aliud, tunc ibi dicitur esse distinctio.

b Sed restat *una dubitatio*, si distinctio sic accepta in communi, inquantum reperitur in ente et in simpliciter simplicibus et in primo diversis, sit passio ipsius entis adaequata et etiam, ut abstrahit a distinctione 560 formali et reali, et dicitur, quod non, scilicet quod non est passio adaequata ipsi enti, sed est quoddam transcendens et commune omnibus transcendens transcendentia. Quod patet sic: Nam simpliciter simplicia et primo diversa distinguuntur, et tamen de ipsis non praedicatur ens, ut patet alias, nisi forte solum denominative. 565

Sed *contra hoc* arguitur dupliciter: Primo, quia sequitur, quod aliqua passio sit sine subiecto; patet, quia distinctio est passio et non est passio entis; ergo etc. Secundo sic: Quia sequitur, quod aliqua passio sit communior omni subiecto, et per consequens erit communior omni ente. 570

Ad primum *dico*, quod non est inconveniens dare unam passionem non habentem subiectum adaequatum, et sic distinctio est communior ente, licet sit passio sua non adaequata, sed communior eo.

Ad secundum *dico*, quod non est inconveniens dare unam passionem communiorem subiecto suo. 575

c *Secunda dubitatio* est, si non-identitas et distinctio sunt idem. Et dicitur, quod non, sed in plus se habet non-identitas quam distinctio; sequitur enim: Ista sunt distincta; ergo sunt non idem, et non e converso. Patet, quia Socrates non est idem chimaerae, et tamen non distinguitur a chimaera. 580

551 investigat] Augustinus + *Ve* | Augustinus] — *Se Ve* 554 via convertibilitatis] inconvertibilitatis *Se Ve* 556 ratione] rationabilitate *Se* 557 aliud] alterum *Se* 560-561 distinctione *Se fol. 258va* formali 561 et reali] — *Se* | scilicet — non] — *Ve* 562 transcendens] commune *Ve* | commune] transcendens *Ve* 563 simplicia *Ve fol. 119va* et 568 et — passio] — *Va*; Nota, quod distinctio est communior ente + *Ve in margine* 569 erit] et *Se* 576 Secunda] Alia *Ve* 577 habet *Va fol. 142va* non-identitas

<sup>24</sup> De fide ad Petrum c. 1, n. 5 (PL 40, 755).

Pro quo est diligenter attendendum, quod quattuor sunt ponenda in quidditatibus et bene intelligenda: Primum signum est, in quo ponitur ipsa quidditas. In secundo signo ponuntur negationes, quia omnis affirmatio prior est negatione. In tertio signo ponuntur per se passiones demonstrabiles de ipsa quidditate. In quarto signo ponuntur ea, quae sunt 585 per accidens. E. g. albedo et nigredo in primo signo sunt albedo et nigredo. In secundo signo sunt non idem. In tertio signo dicuntur esse distinctae, nam quando aliqua passio inest alicui subiecto, per prius intelligitur ipsum subiectum sine tali passione quam cum ipsa. In quarto signo adveniunt, quae eis insunt per accidens, sicut haecceitas, 590 inhaerentia et existentia. Ex quo patet, quod non-identitas prior est distinctione.

**B 1** Secundo videndum est, *quomodo investigatur distinctio rationis*, et nota, quod hic loquimur de distinctione rationis proprie dicta. Pro cuius declaratione sciendum est, quod triplex est actus intellectus, scilicet 595 apprehendendi, componendi et dividendi. Eodem modo triplici via potest investigari distinctio rationis. Prima via est per actum apprehendendi, quando intellectus potest apprehendere unum sine reliquo vel concipere. Ibi ponitur distinctio rationis, sicut quando intellectus concipit definitionem sine definito vel subiectum sine passione. Secunda 600 est per viam compositionis. Unde quandocumque aliquae compositiones duae ita se habent, quod solum fabricantur ab intellectu et una prior altera fabricatur, illa sunt distincta ratione, v. g. quando intellectus componit aliqua circa subiectum et non circa passionem, talis vocatur distinctio rationis. Tertio per viam divisionis sive per actum dividendi. 605 Unde quandocumque sunt aliqua ita idem ex natura rei, quod inter illa nulla potest esse distinctio ex natura rei, sed solus intellectus ponit ibi divisionem sive distinctionem, talia non possunt distingui nisi distinctione rationis, v. g. cum dicitur Socrates est Socrates, homo est homo, solus intellectus est ille, qui per actum suum dividendi facit distinctionem 610 subiecti et praedicati, quia ut patet nulla potest esse distinctio ibi ex natura rei, cum idem a seipso non possit ex natura rei distingui. De distinctione vero rationis obiectiva eodem modo dicendum est, quod debet investigari, quemadmodum distinctio ex natura rei investigatur.

581 attendendum] advertendum *Se*; Nota, quod quattuor signa ponuntur in quidditatibus + *Ve* 584 per se] proprie *Se* 586 sunt] insunt *Se Ve* 587 sunt] tantum + *Se Ve* 593 videndum] veniendum *Se* | rationis, *Ve fol. 119vb* et 596 componendi] comprehendendi *Va* 598 apprehendere] apprehendendi *Ve* 599-600 intellectus *Se fol. 258vb* concipit 604 circa *Va fol. 142rb* subiectum | passionem] compositionem *Se* 610 est ille] — *Va* 612-614 cum — investigatur] — *Ve*

2 Tertio videndum est, *quomodo investigatur distinctio ex natura rei.* 615  
 Et dico, quod quattuor viis potest investigari, secundum quod sunt  
 quattuor viae oppositionum: Prima via est relativorum oppositorum<sup>25</sup>.  
 Unde impossibile est, quod idem referatur ad seipsum relatione opposita.  
 Unde agens inquantum agens non est passum, nec passum inquantum pas-  
 sum est agens, nec produciens inquantum produciens dicitur esse productum. 620  
 Et isto modo intellectus agens et possibilis distinguuntur ex natura rei.  
 Secunda via est oppositio contrariorum<sup>26</sup>. Impossibile enim est con-  
 traria de eodem et secundum idem verificari. Et isto modo genus et  
 differentia distinguuntur quam maxime in simplicibus nec sunt omnino  
 idem. Tertia via est secundum viam oppositionis privativae<sup>27</sup>. Impossibile 625  
 est opposita privativa eidem secundum idem convenire et verificari.  
 Et isto modo inter essentiam et relationem ponitur distinctio ex natura  
 rei, nam essentia inquantum essentia est communicabilis, relatio vero  
 incommunicabilis. Quarta est per viam contradictionis<sup>28</sup>. Impossibile  
 enim est contradictoria de eodem et secundum idem verificari. Et isto 630  
 modo ponitur distinctio inter essentiam divinam et attributa<sup>29</sup>, nam  
 intellectus est principium productivum Verbi, et essentia non est princi-  
 pium productivum Verbi; similiter inter intellectum et voluntatem, nam

616 viis] modis *Se*; investigatur seu + *Ve* | investigari *Ve* fol. 120ra  
 secundum | sunt] — *Ve* 619 non] — *Se Ve* 624 omnino] secundum  
 omnia *Se* 625 privativae] relativa *Ve* 628 vero] — *Ve* 629 incom-  
 municabilis] non *Se* 629-630 Impossibile *Va* fol. 142va enim

<sup>25</sup> Francisc. de Maironis, Conflatus in I Sent. d. 8. q. 1. a 3 (44b): "Dico, quod intelligendo distinctionem ex natura rei non ab anima fabricata ipsa est communis istis [scilicet distinctioni formali, reali, modali, essentiali], nam quaelibet istarum est distinctio ex natura rei, quia nulla est ab anima fabricata. Sed potestne ista investigari? Dico, quod sic quadrupliciter secundum quattuor vias oppositionum: Primo per viam relative oppositorum, quia impossibile est idem referri ad se, et per istam viam, quae infra declarabitur magis, probatur, quod intellectus agens distinguitur a possibili, quia agens est movens et possibilis est motus".

<sup>26</sup> Ib.: "Secundo per oppositionem contrariorum sic: Impossibile est contraria eidem secundum idem convenire. Diversitas et identitas sunt contraria. Conveniunt alicui eidem. Ergo oportet, quod non secundum idem, isto enim modo investigatur distinctio generis et differentiae in simplicibus, quia simplicia specie distincta conveniunt et differunt, non autem omnino secundum idem".

<sup>27</sup> Ib.: "Tertio modo per viam oppositionis privative oppositorum, impossibile enim est privative opposita eidem convenire. Isto modo investigamus distinctionem inter essentiam et proprietatem, quia essentia est communicabilis, Paternitas incommunicabilis".

<sup>28</sup> Ib.: "Quarto modo per viam contradictionis sic: Impossibile est, quod extrema contradictionis verificentur de eodem omnino. Isto modo investigamus distinctionem attributorum, ut statim inferius patebit".

<sup>29</sup> Cf. ib. q. 3 (47c).

voluntas est principium productivum Spiritus sancti, intellectus vero non; ergo distinguuntur ex natura rei<sup>30</sup>.

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- 3 Quarto videndum est, *quomodo investigatur distinctio realis*, et dico quattuor viis: Primo per viam originis. Unde quandocumque aliqua duo sic se habent, quod unum originatur ab alio, illa distinguuntur realiter. Isto modo investigat Augustinus<sup>31</sup> distinctionem realem inter personas divinas, nam Pater originat Filium et Spiritum sanctum, et Filius non originat Patrem; impossibile enim est, quod idem originatur a seipso, quia per beatum Augustinum nulla res seipsam gignit. Secundo per viam generationis<sup>32</sup>. Unde quandocumque aliqua duo sic se habent, quod unum generatur ab alio sive producitur, illa distinguuntur inter se realiter. Tertio per viam corruptionis<sup>33</sup>. Quandocumque aliqua sic se habent, quod unum corrumpi potest alio manente, illa distinguuntur realiter inter se. Et isto modo est distinctio realis inter relationem et fundamentum. Quarto per viam separationis<sup>34</sup>. Unde quandocumque

635 rei. *Se fol. 259ra* 636 Quarto] Quare *Va* 639 realiter. *Ve fol. 120rb* Isto 640 et Spiritum sanctum] — *Se* 641 originat Patrem] — *Se* 644—646 illa — manente] — *Ve* | manente] remanente *Se* 647 inter se] — *Se*

<sup>30</sup> Ab Henrico Werlio hic praetermittitur *distinctio modalis* secus ac Francisc. de Maironis, l. c. q. 1. a. 33 (44a) dicente: "Quantum ad distinctionem modi intrinseci sciendum, quod quadruplex distinctio per istos modos reperitur. Quaedam, qua distinguitur modus a quidditate, cuius est modus, sicut humanitas et finitas humanitatis. Alia est, quae est modorum oppositorum sicut finitum et infinitum in Deo et creatura. Alia per modos eiusdem rationis sicut haecceitas et differentia, quae est numeralis per differentias individuales. Quarto per modos alterius rationis sicut necessitas et infinitas, quae sunt modi intrinseci essentiae divinae. Nunc ad propositum de investigatione distinctionis istorum modorum dico, quod eodem modo investigatur distinctio quo et modi, et de hoc inferius".

<sup>31</sup> De Trin. I c. 1, n. 1 (PL 42, 820); cf. Francisc. de Maironis, Conflatus in I Sent. d. 8. q. 1. a. 3 (44a): "Secundo videndum est, quomodo possit realis distinctio investigari, et dico hic, quod quadrupliciter investigatur: Primo per viam originis, et hoc modo investigat Augustinus I De Trinitate distinctionem personarum per hoc, quod nihil gignit se; oportet ergo, quod gignens sit realiter distinctum a genito, ubicumque enim est hoc ab hoc, ibi est realis distinctio".

<sup>32</sup> Ib.: "Secunda via est via generationis. Quandocumque aliqua res potest generari alia non genita, illa necessario distinguuntur realiter; isto modo probatur, quod materia et forma distinguuntur realiter, quia formantur genera materia existente ingenerabili et incorruptibili".

<sup>33</sup> Ib.: "Tertio per viam corruptionis, quia quandocumque unum non corrumpitur alio corrupto, inter illa est realis distinctio. Isto modo investigatur, quod relatio distinguitur a fundamento, quia fundamentum manet relatione corrupta".

<sup>34</sup> Ib.: "Quarto per viam separationis, quia quaecumque separata possunt manere, illa distinguuntur realiter. Isto enim modo probantur accidentia distingui in altari a subiecto, et anima a corpore, quia unum ab alio separatur".



aliqua duo sic se habent, quod unum potest realiter ab alio separari, illa distinguuntur realiter. Isto modo anima et corpus distinguuntur 650 realiter, accidens et substantia in sacramento altaris.

- 4 Quinto videndum est, *quomodo investigatur distinctio formalis*<sup>35</sup>. Et dico, quod distinctio formalis quinque viis investigatur: Prima est per viam definitionis<sup>36</sup>. Quandocumque aliqua sic se habent, quod aliquid ponitur in definitione unius, quod non ponitur in definitione alterius 655 vel quod definitio unius non est definitio alterius, illa distinguuntur formaliter, e. g. de homine et asino. Secundo per viam descriptionis<sup>37</sup>. Unde quandocumque aliqua duo sic se habent, quod unum ponitur in descriptione unius, quod non ponitur in descriptione alterius, illa distinguuntur formaliter, vel quod descriptio unius non est descriptio alterius; 660 isto modo distinguuntur partes orationis formaliter. — Est tamen advertendum, quod propria descriptio est illa, quae constat ex genere et propria passione, et per hoc differt a definitione quidditiva, quae constat ex genere et differentia. Tertio per viam divisionis<sup>38</sup>. Unde quandocumque aliquod commune dividitur per duas differentias oppositas, 665 quidquid cadit sub una differentia divisiva vel sub uno dividendum, distinguuntur formaliter a quocumque cadente sub alia differentia

652 videndum] inveniendum *Se* 652-653 Et — formalis] — *Ve*  
654 definitionis.] Unde + *Se* 655 unius — definitione<sup>2</sup>] — *Va* 657 asino.  
*Va fol. 142vb* Secundo 661 isto — formaliter] — *Ve* 662 propria]  
differentia *Se* 664-665 quandocumque *Ve fol. 120va* aliquod

<sup>35</sup> Ib. q. 1. a. 3 (44a): "Primum est ostendere modum investigandi distinctionem formalem, et quantum ad hoc dico, quod quattuor sunt modi evidentes, per quos investigatur formalis sive quidditiva distinctio: Prima est via definitionis; secunda via divisionis; tertia via descriptionis; quarta via demonstrationis".

<sup>36</sup> Ib.: "Quandocumque aliqua sic se habent, quod aliquid ponitur in definitione unius et non alterius, illa differunt formaliter, quae enim definitive differunt, quidditive differunt et formaliter. Sed talia, quorum unum non recipit aliud in sua definitione, sic se habent, scil. quod differunt definitive; ergo quidditive et formaliter".

<sup>37</sup> Ib.: "Tertio per viam descriptionis sic: Quorumcumque descriptiones sunt diversae, eorum definitiones sunt diversae. Hanc probo, quia quaecumque habent eandem definitionem, habent idem genus. Hoc patet, et per consequens eandem passionem vel aptitudinem consequentem ipsam, quia ex definitione passio sive aptitudo demonstratur. Sed descriptio constat ex genere et passione sive aptitudine. Ergo quorumcumque descriptiones sunt diversae, eorum definitiones sunt diversae".

<sup>38</sup> Ib.: "Secundo per viam divisionis. Quandocumque aliquod dividitur per differentias oppositas, quidquid cadit sub uno dividendum, differt formaliter a quocumque cadente sub alio, quia cadunt sub membris oppositis, nam ex dividente et diviso constituitur illud, quod habet quidditatem. Licet enim divisum utrique contento sub eo conveniat quidditive, tamen impossibile est, quod unum dividendum coincadat cum alio ad constituendum tertium".

seu alio dividendium; exemplum de angelo et homine, qui cadunt sub corporeo et incorporeo. Quarto per viam demonstrationis<sup>39</sup>. Unde quodcumque aliqua duo sic se habent, quod unum potest demonstrari 670 de alio, quod non potest demonstrari de alio, illa distinguuntur formaliter; exemplum de homine et asino, quia de homine potest demonstrari risibilitas et non de asino, ut patet. Quinto per viam reduplicationis<sup>40</sup>. Unde quodcumque aliqua duo sic se habent, quod aliquid competit uni inquantum tale, quod non competit alteri inquantum tale, illa 675 distinguuntur formaliter. Isto modo investigatur distinctio formalis in transcendentibus. Isto modo distinguitur ens a divina essentia, quia aliquid competit enti inquantum ens, quod non competit divinae essentiae. Quod patet sic, nam ens inquantum ens potest trahi ad finitatem et decem praedicamenta, quae omnia repugnant divinae essentiae. Isto 680 modo etiam investigatur distinctio formalis in simpliciter simplicibus et primo diversis, ut patet intuenti.

- 5 Sexto videndum est, *quomodo investigatur distinctio essentialis*. Et dico, quod quinque viis: Primo viam generationis dependentis<sup>41</sup>. Unde quodcumque aliqua duo sic se habent, quod unum potest generari 685 alio non generato dependente, illa distinguuntur essentialiter. Et notanter dico dependente propter generationem divinam, quae nullam facit dependentiam, sed solum in creaturis facit distinctionem essen-

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670 unum] aliud *Se*; aliquid *Ve* 671 alio, *Se fol. 259vb* quod 671-672 de — demonstrari] — *Va* | illa] — *Se* 677 ens] formaliter + *Se* | a] ad *Va* | essentia] formaliter + *Ve* 679 inquantum ens] — *Ve* | finitatem] definitatem *Ve* 683 essentialis. *Va fol. 143rb* Et 688 sed solum] et ideo *Se* | solum *Ve fol. 120vb* in | creaturis] et ideo in creaturis + *Ve*

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<sup>39</sup> Ib.: "Quarto per viam demonstrationis sic: Quando aliquod est demonstrabile propter quod de uno et non de altero illa, de quibus alia et alia demonstrantur, habent aliam et aliam definitionem, quia cum definitio sit medium, si omnino eandem definitionem haberent, omnino eadem passio per eam demonstraretur. Si ergo demonstrantur alia et alia passio, necessario habent aliam et aliam definitionem, et per consequens formaliter distinguuntur".

<sup>40</sup> Ib.: "Istis quattuor viis satis evidentibus additur una satis peregrina, sed tamen necessaria, scilicet via reduplicationis, et haec deducitur sic: Quodcumque aliquid convenit alicui inquantum tale, quod non convenit alteri, necessario illa formaliter distinguuntur, quia reduplicatio cadit super rationem formalem. Ergo est eadem ratio formalis, necessario idem praedicatum praedicabitur apposita eadem reduplicatione".

<sup>41</sup> Ib. (44ab): "Quantum ad essentialem distinctionem dico, quod quattuor modis investigatur: Primo per viam generationis et corruptionis, quaecumque enim sic se habent, quod uno genito vel corrupto aliud non generatur nec corrumpitur, distinguuntur essentialiter. Secundo per viam separationis, quaecumque enim sic se habent, quod unum separatur ab alio, essentialiter distinguuntur".

tialem. Secundo per viam corruptionis. Quandocumque aliqua duo sic se habent, quod unum potest corrumpi alio non corrupto, illa distinguuntur essentialiter, vel quando unum potest separari ab alio essentialiter, illa distinguuntur essentialiter. Tertio per viam dependentiae<sup>42</sup>. Unde quandocumque aliqua duo sic se habent, quod unum dependet ab alio, illa distinguuntur essentialiter, sicut Deus et creatura, substantia et accidens. Quarto per viam diversorum generum<sup>43</sup>. Unde quandocumque aliqua duo sic se habent, quod proprie et per se sunt diversorum generum, illa distinguuntur essentialiter; et isto modo decem praedicamenta distinguuntur essentialiter. Et notanter dico proprie et per se propter materiam et formam de genere substantiae, quae non distinguuntur essentialiter, licet materia non sit proprie et per se in praedicamento substantiae. Si enim proprie et per se esset alterius praedicamenti a forma substantiali, tunc distingueretur essentialiter ab ipsa forma, et ideo ut sic non distinguitur essentialiter ab ea. Quinto diversarum specierum. Unde quandocumque aliqua sunt diversarum specierum, illa distinguuntur essentialiter, e. g. de homine et asino. — Est tamen sciendum, quod omnis distinctio essentialis non includit distinctionem realem semper, nam decem praedicamenta distinguuntur essentialiter in suo esse quidditivo, ut abstrahunt a suis speciebus, et tamen ut sic non distinguuntur realiter. Ubi cumque ergo reperiuntur distinctae essentiae cum distinctis realitatibus, tales distinguuntur essentialiter et realiter; si autem reperiuntur distinctae essentiae abstractae a realitate, tunc distinguuntur solum essentialiter et non realiter. Exemplum de homine et asino in potentia obiectiva, qui cum sint diversarum specierum, distinguuntur inter se essentialiter et non realiter.

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691 quando] quandocumque *Se Ve* 692-694 Tertio — essentialiter] — *Va* 695 Unde] — *Se*; ut *Ve* 697-698 et — essentialiter] — *Ve* 702 ab ipsa forma] — *Se* 703 ab ea] a substantia *Se* 706 sciendum] generaliter + *Ve* 707-708 in suo esse quidditivo] seu quidditive *Ve* | quidditivo, *Se fol. 259va* ut 709 reperiuntur] diversae + *Se* 710-712 essentialiter — solum] — *Va* 714 inter se] — *Ve*

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<sup>42</sup> Ib. (44b): "Tertius modus est magis proprius, scilicet per viam dependentiae, nam via prima non valet sine ista, quia generatio est in diversis, non tamen distinctio essentialis. Unde per viam dependentiae probatur sic: Quaecumque se habent sic, quod unum dependet ab alio, necessario unum ab alio distinguitur essentialiter. Infra enim eandem essentiam non potest esse proprie dependentia, quae in essentia fundatur, quia nihil refertur ad se".

<sup>43</sup> Ib.: "Quartus modus in creaturis per viam generum et specierum, quia quaecumque sunt diversarum generum et specierum, necessario essentialiter distinguuntur".

III Quantum ad tertiam partem principalem, in qua *declarandae sunt* 715  
*aliquae difficultates* et aliqui termini facientes difficultatem in illa materia.

I Quaeritur primo, *si distinctio suscipit magis et minus.*

α Et videtur quod sic. Primo, quia duo alba sunt magis similia quam album et nigrum, etc. Item, duae quantitates bipedales sunt magis aequales quam sunt bipedalis et tripedalis quantitates; ergo videtur, 720  
 quod relatio vel distinctio suscipit magis et minus. Sed distinctio est relatio, ut superius patuit; ergo distinctio suscipit magis et minus. Item, si distinctio non susciperet magis et minus, sequeretur, quod homo non magis distingueretur a lapide quam ab asino; consequens est falsum; ergo etc. Item, si distinctio non susciperet magis et minus, 725  
 pariformiter nec identitas, et sic sequeretur, quod illa quae sunt idem numero non essent magis idem quam illa, quae sunt idem specie; consequens est falsum; ergo.

β *In oppositum* arguitur sic: Nihil potest suscipere magis et minus, nisi dicat quantitatem virtutis; sed relatio nullam dicit quantitatem 730  
 virtutis; ergo.

Praeterea illud, quod de se non est perfectum nec imperfectum nec perfectionem nec imperfectionem dicit, non potest suscipere magis et minus; sed relatio de se nec dicit perfectionem nec imperfectionem; ergo nec intenditur nec remittitur. — Ad hoc dicitur, quod relatio for- 735  
 maliter de sua ratione formali nec dicit perfectionem nec imperfectionem, et per consequens non suscipit magis et minus, cum non dicat quantitatem virtutis. Si enim diceret perfectionem, tunc sequitur, quod aliqua perfectio esset in Patre, quae non esset in Filio, et econverso. Patet, quia paternitas non esset formaliter in Filio nec filiatio esset in Patre, 740  
 et sic aliqua perfectio esset in una persona, quae non esset in alia.

*Ad argumenta in oppositum dico*, quod aliqua dicuntur esse magis similia, quae pluribus similitudinibus conveniunt.

Ad aliud de quantitate dicitur, quod ideo dicuntur magis aequalia, quia magis appropinquant ad eandem quantitatem. 745

716 termini *Ve fol. 121ra* facientes | illa] hac *Se* 717 Quaeritur]  
 Quare *Va* | si] an *Ve* 721 distinctio<sup>1</sup>] relatio *Se* 721-724 distinctio<sup>2</sup>  
 — asino] — *Ve* 723-725 sequeretur — minus] — *Se* 729-730 Nihil  
 — virtutis] Illa, quae non dicunt quantitatem virtutis, non possunt suscipere  
 magis et minus *Ve* | dicat] — *Se* | virtutis] — *Ve* 732 est — imperfectum]  
 — *Ve* | nec imperfectum] — *Va* 733 perfectionem] perfectum *Se* | im-  
 perfectionem] imperfectum *Se* 735 ergo] relatio + *Ve* 735-736 for-  
 maliter] et + *Ve* 738 tunc] — *Se*; enim + *Ve* 739 Filio *Va fol. 143va* et  
 742 dico] Ad primum dicitur *Se* 744 magis *Ve fol. 121rb* aequalia



Ad tertium dico, quod homo magis differt a lapide quam ab asino et non aliter.

Ad ultimum dico, quod illa, quae sunt idem numero, ideo dicuntur magis esse idem, quia pluribus identitatibus conveniunt quam illa, quae sunt idem specie. Et sic patet, quid dicendum. 750

2 Secundo quaeritur, *utrum distinctio in divinis arguat compositionem.*

x Et videtur quod sic, quia compositio dicitur graece a con, quod est simul, et positio, quod est simul positio. Sed ubi sunt aliqua simul posita, ibi est compositio; sed in divinis est huiusmodi; ergo ibi est compositio. 755

Secundo arguitur sic: Ubi est distinctio, ibi est pluralitas; ubi est pluralitas, ibi est compositio; ergo ubi est distinctio, ibi est compositio.

Tertio arguitur sic: Ubicumque est distinctio, ibi est pluralitas; ubicumque est pluralitas, ibi est numerus; ubicumque est numerus, ibi est compositio; ergo a primo ad ultimum, ubi est distinctio, ibi est com- 760 positio.

Quarto arguitur sic: Ubicumque est distinctio, ibi est resolutio; sed ubicumque est resolutio, ibi est compositio. Patet hoc, quia omne, quod componitur, resolvitur in illis, ex quibus componitur.

3 In oppositum arguitur sic: Ubi est purus actus, ibi non est compositio; 765 sed in divinis est purus actus; ergo ibi non potest esse compositio.

Secundo arguitur sic: Ubicumque reperiuntur plura, quorum unum non est in potentia alterius vel in potentia ad aliud, ibi nulla potest esse compositio; sed in divinis nihil est, quod sit in potentia ad aliud; ergo in divinis nulla potest esse compositio. 770

Ad hoc *respondetur*, quod compositio est mutua unio componentium, quorum unum est in potentia ad aliud et neutrum eorum est purus actus. Ex definitione compositionis patet, quod licet in divinis sit unio, quia tamen ibi nihil est potentiale nec in potentia ad aliud, per quod potest reduci ad actum, sed omnia sunt ibi purus actus seclusa quacumque 775 mixtione potentiae, hinc est, quod in divinis non potest esse compositio.

Pro responsione ad argumenta facta est notandum, quod ista sunt essentialiter ordinata, scilicet resolutio, compositio, unio et distinctio ita, quod infima dicitur esse ipsa resolutio, suprema vero abstracta dicitur esse

748 sunt *Se fol. 259vb* idem [ideo] non *Ve* 750 quid dicendum] responsio  
*Se* 752 graece] grammaticae *Ve* 753 quod — positio<sup>2</sup>] — *Se* 758-  
 761 Tertio — compositio<sup>2</sup>] — *Ve* 760 a — ultimum] — *Se* 766 potest  
 esse] est *Se* 768 alterius — potentia<sup>2</sup>] — *Ve* [aliud] reliquum *Ve* [nul-  
*Va fol. 143vb* la 771 componentium] compositorum *Ve* 774 nec *Ve*  
*fol. 121va* in 775 seclusa quacumque] sine aliqua *Se*

ipsa distinctio. Unde bene sequitur: Est resolutio, ergo compositio, et 78  
non econverso, nam caelum dicitur esse compositum et non resolvable.  
Item sequitur: Est compositio, ergo unio, et non econverso, nam humana  
natura et divina sunt unita, tamen non composita. Item sequitur: Est  
unio, ergo distinctio, nam idem non potest uniri sibi ipsi, et tamen non  
sequitur: Est distinctio, ergo unio, ut patet de se, sicut Socrates et Plato 78  
sunt distincti, et tamen non uniti. Ex istis patet, quid sit dicendum ad  
rationes in oppositum.

Ad primum Dei gratia dicitur, quod licet ibi sint plura simul unita,  
non tamen ibi sequitur compositio, quia omnia sunt ibi actus purus nec  
unum est in potentia ad aliud. 79

Ad secundum dico, quod pluralitas transcendens abstrahit a numero  
proprie sumpto. Unde licet persona divina constituetur ex essentia et  
relatione, non tamen dicitur componi ex pluribus unitatibus.

Ad tertium patet, nam compositio et pluralitas ab invicem sunt  
abstrahentia, sequitur enim: Est compositio, ergo pluralitas, et non 79  
econverso, et ideo argumentum non valet.

Ad quartum negatur assumptum pro maiori, non enim sequitur:  
Est distinctio, ergo resolutio; prius enim potest esse sine suo posteriori.  
Distinctio enim est prior, ut patuit in resolutione et compositione. Et  
sic patet quaestio. 80

3 Tertio quaeritur, *utrum cum summa simplicitate divinae essentiae  
possit stare pluralitas distinctionum formalium ex natura rei.*

α Et arguitur quod non, quia ubicumque est pluralitas, ibi est compositio  
vel alicuius vel unio aliquorum<sup>44</sup>; sed in divinis reperitur pluralitas,  
ergo ibi est compositio vel alicuius vel unio aliquorum. Sed omnia illa 80  
repugnant summae divinae simplicitati, ergo etc.

Secundo sic: Ubicumque est distinctio ex natura rei, ibi est resolutio  
ex natura rei; sed ubicumque est resolutio ex natura rei, ibi non potest  
esse summa simplicitas.

Tertio arguitur sic: Quandocumque aliqua duo ex suis rationibus 81  
formalibus opponuntur, illa non possunt simul stare; sed sic est, quod  
simplicitas summa et pluralitas rationum formalium ex suis rationibus

781 caelum] totum *Ve*      782 unio] una *Ve*      788 Dei gratia] — *Se*; de  
gratia *Ve*      791 Ad *Se* fol. 260ra secundum      795 abstrahentia] abstrac-  
tiva *Ve* | sequitur] sicut *Se*      797 pro maiori] — *Se* *Ve*      798-799 poste-  
riori. *Ve* fol. 121rb Distinctio *Va* fol. 144ra enim      804 alicuius vel] actus seu  
*Ve* | sed] si + *Se* | reperitur] esset *Se*      808 ubicumque — rei<sup>2</sup>] — *Ve*  
812 pluralitas] simplicitas *Va*

<sup>44</sup> Cf. ib. inst. 2 (47c).

formalium opponuntur; ergo non possunt simul stare in eodem. Minor probatur, nam ratio summae simplicitatis omnem pluralitatem excludit, quia eo summe simplex quod simpliciter solum est sine quacumque aggregatione sive mixtione.

β *In oppositum* arguitur sic: Cum summa simplicitate stat pluralitas realitatum; ergo a fortiori pluralitas formalitatum. Consequentia probatur, quia magis videtur repugnare summae simplicitati pluralitas realitatum quam pluralitas formalitatum, nam multae formalitates possunt stare cum una realitate, non tamen plures realitates cum una formalitate; ergo etc. Patet hoc de subiecto et passione, nam est una realitas subiecti et passionis, et tamen non est una formalitas, cum distinguuntur formaliter.

γ *Respondeo* ad istam quaestionem:

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Notandum primo, quod differentia est inter simplex, simpliciter simplex et summe simplex. Simplex est illud, quod caret compositione ita<sup>45</sup>, quod eius ratio formalis non est ratio absoluta nec positiva, sed privativa et respectiva. Simpliciter simplex est illud, quod est irresolubile, licet alteri sit componibile, sicut ens, ad quod est ultimata resolutio omnium<sup>46</sup>. Summe simplex est illud, quod non est compositum nec alteri componibile, sed est purus actus<sup>47</sup>, sicut ipse Deus. Ex istis sequuntur duo:

Primum est, quod in creaturis potest reperiri aliquod simpliciter simplex<sup>48</sup>; patet hoc, quoniam in resolutionibus essentialiter ordinatis est devenire ad primam quidditatem, quae de se dicitur esse omnino irresolubilis, et ista est quidditas entis, quae de se nihil prius includit, et per consequens non potest in aliud prius resolvi.

813 formalium] — *Se Ve* | Minor] Maior *Ve* 818-819 probatur] patet *Se*  
820 quam — formalitatum] — *Ve* 824 formaliter. *Ve fol. 122va* Respondeo  
826 simplex] — *Va Ve* 827 illud *Va fol. 144rb* quod 829 respectiva]  
creativa *Ve* 830 componibile] compossibile *Se* 830-831 ultimata  
resolutio omnium] in resolutione *Ve* 831 compositum *Se fol. 260rb* nec  
832 Deus] benedictus + *Ve* 836 primam] illam *Ve*

<sup>45</sup> Ib. q. 7. a. 1 (51b): "cuius definitio est privativa, ipsum est privativum, definitio autem simplicitatis est huiusmodi, quia definitur per eius irresolubilitatem, quae est passiva".

<sup>46</sup> Ib.: "Simpliciter simplex est, quod non est resolubile in aliqua ipsum componentia vel constitutiva, sed resolutio ultima stat ad ipsum".

<sup>47</sup> Ib.: "Summe autem simplex est, quod non est in se aliquo modo compositum nec aliquid sibi componibile nec ipsum alicui".

<sup>48</sup> Ib.: "in creaturis invenitur aliquod simpliciter simplex, quia in resolutionibus compositorum aut est procedere in infinitum sicut in divisione continui, quod non potest esse in essentialiter ordinatis, vel est devenire ad aliquod irresolubile".

Sequitur secundum, quod in creaturis non potest reperiri aliquod summe simplex, licet inveniatur simplex<sup>49</sup>. Probatur, nam nihil est in creaturis, quod sit purus actus nec quod sit non compositum vel alteri componibile.

Sequitur tertio, quod solus Deus est summe simplex.

Uterius est notandum, quod simplex uno modo dicitur per carentiam substantialis compositionis, et isto modo materia dicitur simplex. Alio modo dicitur simplex per carentiam accidentalis aggregationis, et isto modo accidens dicitur formaliter simplex. Alio modo dicitur simplex per carentiam commixtionis, et isto modo elementa dicuntur simplicia. Alio modo dicitur simplex per carentiam quantitative divisionis, et isto modo punctus et instans dicuntur esse simplicia. Ex istis concluditur, quod illud dicitur simpliciter simplex, quod omni genere compositionis caret.

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*M.-Gladbach*

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839 reperiri] inveniri | *Se* 840 nam] quia *Se* 844 simplex] multipliciter sumitur + *Se* | dicitur] — *Se* 845 substantialis] substantialem *Ve* 848 elementa *Ve fol. 122rb* dicuntur 850 esse simplicia] quidditiva *Ve* 851 simpliciter simplex] simplex omnino *Se* 852 caret] Deo gratias. Gaude felix Colonia semper. Expliciunt formalitates egregiae doctoris de Colonia, scl. Fratris Henrici de Werla necnon Ministri dignissimi. + *Va*; Et finis est. Laudetur Deus et sanctus Anthe[r]rus. Amen. + *Ve*; Expliciunt formalitates phantasticae. Nota, quod aliquod [potest] esse obiectum intellectus: primum potest intelligi quadrupliciter, videlicet primate generationis, primate adaequationis, primate perfectionis et primate exclusionis: Primo modo possumus dicere, quod singulare est primum obiectum intellectus accipiendo ly primum negative ita, quod dicatur primum, quod nullum est prius eo, non quia ipsum sit prius quocumque alio; unde quodlibet singulare immutans primo fortiter sensum est primum obiectum primate generationis; secundo modo possumus dicere, quod ens est primum obiectum intellectus accipiendo ens in sua maxima communitate et ut habet hanc passionem, scl. intelligibile, cum ipso convertibilem, et sic dicitur ens de omni intelligibili; tertio possumus dicere, quod Deus est primum obiectum intellectus; quarto possumus dicere, quod universale est primum obiectum intellectus, quia in quo obiecto cognito excludit alias potentias et in quo cognoscendo excedit alias potentias, quia nulla alia potentia cognoscit universale. + *Si*.

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<sup>49</sup> Ib.: "in creaturis non invenitur aliquod summe simplex".



## BOOK REVIEWS

*Patrology* by J. Quasten. Vol. II *The Ante-Nicene Literature After Irenaeus*, Westminster-Utrecht-Brussels, 1953. Pp. XI—450.

In *Franciscan Studies* XI (1951) 111—115, we have expressed our views on the first volume of this monumental work. This second volume, which comprises literature from Irenaeus till the Council of Nicea, impresses us more favorable. The descriptions given of the various works are excellent; the bibliography trustworthy; and no bizarre theory is expounded. Presently, however, we would like to give fuller expressions to two objections against this work, which objections were implied in our review of the first volume.

First the style, at least in many instances, is too emphatic for a historical work. For example, in describing the allegorical exegesis of the Bible of the Alexandrian School, Prof. Quasten affirms: "Neither theology nor scriptural exegesis would have taken such magnificent initial strides without it" (i. e. allegorism), Vol. II p. 3; the fact that theology and Christian biblical exegesis did start with allegorism does not prove that theology and exegesis had to start there. Speaking about Clement of Alexandria, Prof. Quasten claims that "his knowledge of early Christian literature, of the Bible as well as of all post-apostolic and heretical works, is complete", Vol. II p. 6. If that were true, all the subsequent works on the Bible for instance, would have been superfluous. Concerning Clement of Alexandria the author also says: "We owe it above all to him if scholarly thinking and research are recognized in the Church", Vol. II p. 7. Recognition of research and scholarly thinking in the Church has its ups and downs. We do not think that Clement of Alexandria played any particular role, for example in the Carolingian revival, in High Scholasticism, in the counter-Reformation, etc. Such sweeping statements of the author like those just mentioned bear witness no doubt to Prof. Quasten's great love for the Fathers. But do they really correspond to the facts?

Our second chief objection is that the descriptions of the doctrines of the Fathers lack unity. By this we mean that certain sections are written with the idea of doctrinal development in mind, others not.

In conclusion, we highly recommend this book for its bibliographies and for its descriptions and analyses of the patristic writings, which latter are admirably worked out from the literary standpoint. We would abstain from such recommendation, however, when description and analysis of doctrines are involved. In doctrinal matters, the reader will find much useful material in the book, among others, the excerpts from the Fathers quoted in English. But in the end, the reader will have to make up his mind by other means, one of them being a wide reading of the Fathers themselves.

E. M. BUYTAERT, O.F.M.

Petrus Ioannis Olivi, O.F.M., *Quaestiones quatuor de Domina*, edit. Dionysius Pacetti, O.F.M. (Bibliotheca franciscana ascetica Medii Aevi, VIII), Quaracchi, 1954. Pp. 60\*—89.

Fr. Pacetti, one of the main collaborators of the new edition of the *Opera omnia* of St. Bernardine, makes his contribution to the Marian Year festivities by editing, for the first time, four questions on the Blessed Virgin by the controversial Olivi.

In the scholarly Introduction (pp. 5\*—59\*), written in Italian, Fr. Pacetti describes the career of Olivi and enumerates the writings of this famous Friar (pp. 7\*—29\*); in a second section he studies the work of Olivi as a source of the sermons of St. Bernardine (pp. 30\*—41\*); finally, he introduces the four *quaestiones* (pp. 41\*—59\*).

In the list given of Olivi's works, references are added along with each individual writing to the editions and the manuscripts, or at least to such modern studies where the codices are indicated. At first sight, we may be surprised to find in Pacetti's Introduction a study as to the influence of Olivi on St. Bernardine. One would rather expect to find such a study in an edition of the works of St. Bernardine. Yet Pacetti was perfectly justified in publishing these pages in this edition, because it appears that the four *quaestiones* have been preserved by only two manuscripts: one is a copy made by St. Bernardine himself; the other was among the books of Bernardine and had been annotated by the Saint.

The copy made by St. Bernardine, now Sienna Comunale U. V. 5, contains the first three questions edited by Pacetti. The other manuscripts, presently Sienna Comunale U. V. 7, has the second and fourth questions only. From a comparative study of the text of the second question, "De duodecim victoriis B. Virginis", it follows that St. Bernardine had slightly altered the text of Olivi, chiefly by omitting some Scholastic formalisms, such as the *pro's* and the *contra's* at the beginning of the question, and the answer to the objections at the end. Apparently in copying the questions, St. Bernardine had a practical purpose in mind and thus limited himself to the more essential parts of the writings. As a consequence, we are morally certain that the text of the first and third questions does not fully represent what had been written by Olivi.

Pacetti's proofs for the authenticity of the questions are satisfactory. The time of redaction seems to be 1274—1279, because during those years Olivi was accused of expounding some theological novelties in his *quaestiones de Domina*. On the other hand, it is uncertain whether the four questions published by Pacetti are the only questions written by Olivi on the Blessed Virgin.

The questions are entitled respectively "De consensu virginali pro Annuntiatione", "De duodecim victoriis beatae Virginis habitis in duodecim praeliis tentationum", "De excellentia et perfectione Virginis gloriosae", and "De dolore beatae Virginis in passione Christi". The edition of the first and third questions is based only upon the autograph of St. Bernardine; the edition of the fourth, only upon Sienna Comunale U. V. 7; whereas for the second, Pacetti rightly decided to follow U. V. 7, since St. Bernardine is responsible for some omissions and changes in the questions.

In the critical apparatus there are given the annotations made by St. Bernardine. Except for an occasional reference to other works of Olivi, Pacetti does not give references to Scholastic writings of the Twelfth or Thirteenth Centuries. This means that the problem of Olivi's sources is not treated.

E. M. BUYTAERT, O.F.M.

*Ens et unum convertuntur. Stellung und Gehalt des Grundsatzes in der Philosophie des hl. Thomas von Aquin*, by Dr. Ludger Oeing-Hanhoff (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Bd. XXXVII, Heft 3), Münster, 1953. Pp. XIII u. 194 pp.

The professed aim of this doctoral dissertation is the determination of the meaning and function of proposition "Omne ens est unum" in the metaphysical system of Aquinas. Actually the monograph covers a great deal more material than one would suspect from its title. Apparently directed to readers who have little or no acquaintance with St. Thomas, over half the book (some one hundred and ten pages) is concerned with presenting some of the more fundamental notions of his metaphysics. The first chapter is devoted determining the nature of this science and for most part summarizes without further explanation the saint's observations in his commentary on the *De Trinitate* of Boethius on this subject. Chapter two, entitled "Being and its formal principles", begins with an explanation of the starting point of Aquinas' metaphysics (where the influence of Maréchal's thought is evident), discusses at some length such fundamental metaphysical conceptions as being, its relation to essence and existence, matter and form, the *esse commune*, substance and accident, and concludes with a short comment on the goal of Aquinas' metaphysics, a "philosophical theology". It is not until the relatively short chapter three, entitled "The basis of the convertibility of being and one and the place [of the principle] in the doctrine of the transcendentals", that the author finally takes up the real subject of his thesis. Here, among other things, he claims that Thomas did not regard the principle so much as an analytic statement derived from the simple analysis of the terms as the result of a synthetic survey of his fundamental metaphysical doctrines. This somewhat questionable interpretation — which opens the way to the discussion of a great deal of otherwise irrelevant material — is developed or rather expanded in the subsequent chapter, captioned "The 'one' and the kinds of unity". Here the author treats not only transcendental unity, but also unity as the *principium numeri*, the unity of God, the unity of the principles of being (essence and existence, act and potency, matter and form), the *unum per se* and *per accidens* as well as the unity of order (*unum secundum quid*). To the mind of the reviewer the work would have been better titled "Die Metaphysik der Einheit des hl. Thomas von Aquin", since there is relatively little discussion of what is properly speaking unity as an attribute of being. Unlike Krempel's excellent study of relation, the present monograph makes no attempt to put the Thomistic teaching in its proper historical setting with the inevitable result that even the systematic presentation suffers no little beginning with the opening chapter, where the author misses the whole significance of Thomas' solution to the problem of the unity of Aristotle's metaphysics, to the final one regarding the relation

of the one and the good. Incidentally, the author seems totally unaware of J. Hirschberger's brief but important article of the companion principle "Omne ens est bonum" (*Phil. Jahr.*, LIII, 292 ff.), to say nothing of a number of other pertinent Thomistic studies (Cf. V. Bourke's *Thomistic Bibliography*). Even a goodly number of those listed in the bibliography, e. g. Gickler's *Die Einheit im Weltbild des hl. Thomas v. Aq.*, Rüther's *Von der Einheit*, etc. seem to have been unduly ignored throughout the work. The indiscriminate use of doubtful and spurious works, even though they be Thomistic in tone, e. g. *De pluralitate formarum*, and the unconventional abbreviations used for the authentic writings does not enhance the work. Despite these shortcomings, however, the reader unacquainted with Aquinas will find a rather extensive summary of Thomistic metaphysics with a helpful topical index.

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*The Goad of Love*, Translated by Walter Hilton and Now Edited from Manuscripts by Clare Kirchberger, New York, 1951. Pp. 223.

In the margin of an ancient copy of *Stimulus Amoris*, a short treatise on the interior life of which the work under discussion is a translation, an unknown reader has left this note: "Iste liber, meo iudicio, potest vocari liber vitae et compendium compendiorum doctrinae totius beatitudinis." The exceptionally large number of manuscript copies of the work still extant indicate the degree of popularity it enjoyed during the late medieval period. This popularity was well merited, for the profundity of doctrine and clarity of expression which characterize this little book are of such a superior quality that its authorship was long attributed to the Seraphic Doctor. The Quaracchi editors, whose critical text of *Stimulus Amoris* was originally published in 1905, and reprinted in 1949, express the opinion that some sections of the work may be favorably compared with the best exemplars of medieval mystical literature. As for Walter Hilton's translation, in her introduction Miss Kirchberger tells us that in it "there are passages of such beauty of literary expression as to merit inclusion in any anthology of English medieval prose". But the book has more than literary value. Such masters of the spiritual life as St. Francis de Sales and Luis de Granada warmly recommended it to their disciples as a potent aid to spiritual progress.

*The Goad of Love* in the form in which it is presented by Miss Kirchberger is a composite work of singular interest to the student of the history and literature of mysticism. Its basis, of course, is *Stimulus Amoris*, the thirteenth-century work by James of Milan, a Friar Minor about whom very little is known. The merit of the original Latin treatise has been greatly enhanced by Walter Hilton, the celebrated fifteenth-century English mystic who not only translated it, but edited, revised and emended it with all the freedom characteristic of an age which knew naught of copyright restrictions. What we have then, in the present version of *The Goad of Love* is a recognized masterpiece of spiritual literature enlarged and enriched by a renowned master of the spiritual



life. The historical and literary background material which the editor presents in her lengthy introduction doubles the value of the book for the serious student.

A comparison of Walter Hilton's *Goad of Love* with James of Milan's *Stimulus Amoris* will immediately lead to confusion. Miss Kirchberger's edition of the former has thirty-seven chapters, while the Quaracchi version of the latter has but twenty-three. The explanation of this significant discrepancy is found in the fact that the Quaracchi text is based on the earliest thirteenth-century copies of the *Stimulus* while Hilton employed a late fourteenth-century text as the basis of his translation. Almost two centuries passed between the original composition of the Latin work and its translation into English. During this period the text went through numerous transcriptions and in the process assimilated many substantial accretions at the hands of a host of anonymous authors. The original *Stimulus* consisted of a short, but not too well integrated treatment of the interior life and contemplation. This little treatise has remained the core of the work in all its subsequent forms. In the text as received by Hilton, however, the original work of James of Milan was preceded by one series of meditations on the Passion and followed by another on the Our Father, the Hail Mary, and the Hail Holy Queen. These meditations did not come from the pen of the Milanese Franciscan and are not found in the early manuscript copies of the *Stimulus*.

In the course of his translation, Walter Hilton still further modified and amplified this already much-amended work. The innumerable changes which he introduced are clearly indicated in Miss Kirchberger's text by the use of continental quotes to enclose all passages added by Hilton. Whole paragraphs and even chapters were dropped from the meditations, and although almost half of the central core section is original Hilton, the simple beauty of James of Milan's work has not been totally eclipsed. The fifteenth-century editor-translator did not hesitate to amplify the thought of the original author whenever he judged it underdeveloped, or to eliminate from the text anything he considered diffuse or repetitious. Very often the reader will find the sober English Canon tempering the devotional exclamations of the exuberant Italian Friar. In general, it may be said that Hilton's changes do not disfigure the *Stimulus*, but rather enrich it.

The medium of Middle English into which Walter Hilton has rendered the Latin text of the *Stimulus* is rather difficult for the average modern reader. For this reason the editor has provided an extensive glossary of archaic words at the end of the volume.

Miss Kirchberger is to be complemented on this fine edition of *The Goad of Love*. The work shows all the signs of exact scholarship and careful editing, and fully measures up to the high standards set in previous volumes of Harper Brothers' *Classics of the Contemplative Life*, the series to which it belongs.

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DUQUESNE STUDIES, Philosophical Series, edited by Andrew G. Van Melsen, D. Sc., and Henry J. Koren, C. S. Sp., S. T. D., Pittsburgh, Duquesne University Press. Volume One, *From Atomos to Atom. The History of the Concept 'Atom'*, by A. G. Van Melsen, translated by H. J. Koren, S. C. Sp., 1952. Pp. XII, 240, with index. Volume Two, *The Philosophy of Nature*, by A. G. Van Melsen, 1953. Pp. XII, 250, with index. Volume Three, *Philosophico-Scientific Problems*, by P. Henry Van Laer, D. Sc., translated by J. H. Koren, C. S. Sp., 1953. Pp. X, 168, with index.

The philosophical series of Duquesne Studies, now little more than three years old, represents a happy addition to the somewhat limited number of significant philosophical contributions of Catholic authorship in the field of natural philosophy that have appeared in this country. Under the able editorship of Father Koren of the faculty of Duquesne University and Dr. Van Melsen, professor of natural philosophy and the philosophy of science at Charlemagne University of Nijmegen and visiting lecturer at Duquesne, four volumes have appeared to date with the promise of two more in the near future. Of these six, all but one — a welcome and useful translation of *Cajetan's Analogy of Names and The Concept of Being*, by Father E. A. Bushinski, C. S. Sp. (1953) — are concerned with problems of the philosophy of nature and of science. The first of these is Father Koren's translation of Van Melsen's *Van atomos naar atoom*, which appeared in 1949 as the second volume of *Wetenschappelijk-wijsgerige bibliotheek*, edited by A. de Froe, W. Helinga and H. Groot. This work in turn was an outgrowth and development of the author's earlier dissertation *Het wijsgerig verleden der atoomtheorie* (Amsterdam, 1941) in which he sought to dispel some common historical misconceptions concerning the origins of the atomism of seventeenth century science which owed as much to the Aristotelian theory of the *minima* as it did to the philosophy of Democritus. *From Atomos to Atom*, while summarizing the conclusions of the earlier study, is of course broader in scope and represents a fairly complete history of the most important stages in the atomic theory from its origins in the philosophy of Democritus to twentieth century quantum mechanics. Since its author is a philosopher as well as a chemist, his account unlike too many other histories of science or of a scientific conception might be expected to reveal an appreciation of the philosophical inspiration and implications of the various versions of "atomism" treated. Nor in the main is the reader disappointed in this regard, though he may regret the rapidity with which the author passes over certain periods or question at times the appropriateness of designating as a school of thought the opinions of a few or even a single individuals who are not always the most representative. Particularly well done to the mind of this reviewer is the concluding chapter in which Van Melsen essays the delicate task of delimiting the precise task of a philosophy of nature in terms of its relationship to the natural sciences and philosophy in general. Both scientist and philosopher can profit from his careful and cautiously worded conclusions. A representative and briefly annotated bibliography which Father Koren has wisely modified with an eye towards the English-speaking reader adds to the value of the work.

The second volume, *The Philosophy of Nature*, is the outcome of Dr. Van Melsen's lectures at Duquesne during the academic year of 1951—1952. Unlike the preceding, which is primarily a reference work, the present volume has been planned for use as a textbook. There may be considerable difference of opinion, however, concerning its suitability in this regard especially at the college level, at any rate in view of the book's intended character, it is not surprising that the material it treats overlaps to some extent the contents of both the first and third volume of the series. Thus for instance, the first three chapters entitled respectively "Preliminary characterization of the philosophy of nature", "A survey of the history of the study of nature", and "The proper relationship between science and the philosophy of nature" either augment or summarize material found in *From Atomos to Atom*. The remaining four chapters are devoted to filling in the positive content of a philosophy of nature. In chapter four, "The essence of material being", Van Melsen rightly rejects the controversial notion of substantial change as a suitable starting point for a philosophy of nature. In its stead, he substitutes what he calls the "species-individual structure of matter" for he believes that the non-simplicity this implies can be used not only to arrive at what is substantially Aristotelian hylomorphism, but also to explain the possibility of all change. "Quantity", as chapter five is captioned, treats among other things some problems posed by the simultaneity and space-time of relativity. Chapter six is concerned with "Quality", while chapter seven, under the heading "Activity in matter", devotes considerable discussion to determinism, causality and free will in the light of quantum mechanics.

Though Van Melsen's reflections are always thought-provoking and frequently extremely stimulating, the various portions of his work are of uneven value. In the closing section of *From Atomos to Atom* he wrote: "Natural science limits itself to the creation of an intelligible connection between certain facts which can be verified by the senses. It does this more or less spontaneously. There are many questions which are not raised by the science of nature, for the simple reason that it does not have to raise them in order to reach its goal. For example, questions like: What exactly is an intelligible connection? What is a *fact*? What is the value in reality of such entities as are indicated by the physical concepts atom, molecule, and their properties? Nevertheless these and other similar questions exist, and they are raised explicitly in philosophy, specifically in the philosophy of nature" (p. 215). At this point the translator adds the note: "The author is presently engaged in the writing of an English philosophy of nature." In view of this, we might expect to find an *ex professo* or detailed treatment of these questions in present work, yet they are conspicuous by their absence. Perhaps they are being reserved for Dr. Van Laer's promised *Philosophy of Science* where they more properly belong. However, in view of Van Melsen's explanation that while the two disciplines are theoretically distinct, a philosophy of nature as he conceives it must in practice include a philosophy of science, we should expect more than a few *obiter dicta* on these fundamental problems. From the standpoint of a textbook the book has additional drawbacks, not the least of which is the blurring at times of the fine distinctions drawn between philosophy and the sciences in the earlier work, the inexact substitution of precise terms for



instance, "science" for "scientist" throughout the section on pp. 14—15, the occasional obscurity of expression or the apparent conflict of statements which is resolved only by careful rereading (e. g. pp. 97, 99, 107, 109). More information on the author's own idea of the precise scope of the various branches of philosophy also would be of help in evaluating statements such as "Epistemology is much more in need of the philosophy of nature than the philosophy of nature is of epistemology" (p. 19). But these are minor points compared to a more serious defect, the author's contention that the "species-individual structure of matter" be taken as the starting point of a philosophy of nature. Assuming that matter rather than  $\Phi\acute{o}\sigma\iota\varsigma$  or the *ens mobile* is the subject of the philosophy of nature, for this in the last analysis is a matter of choice, can we assert that the species-individual is a characteristic of all matter? If "characteristic" be understood as Webster defines and Van Melsen accepts it, it should be a trait that is proper to matter and distinguish the latter from all that is not matter. Yet the "species-individual" structure is anything but that. For as Van Melsen explains it, "species" is not equated with the substantial essence nor opposed to accident. Neither is it contrasted with genus but only to the individual. No matter how we describe any material thing, phenomena, property or event, our description or definition or determination of *what it is* never yields anything that is intrinsically individual, only what is potentially universal. Unless we are greatly mistaken, Van Melsen's "species" is nothing else than what Aquinas and Scotus, following Avicenna (*Met.* V, c. 1) called *natura absolute considerata* (*De ente et essentia*, c. 3) and *natura communis* respectively. This is not actual universality or *communitas*, for as Van Melsen correctly points out "species-individual structure does not suppose the actual existence of more than one individual of a species" (p. 113). It is rather what has been called *universale in re*. If species-individual structure argues to hylomorphic composition as Van Melsen suggests, must we not postulate a more widespread hylomorphism than did any of the historical advocates of this doctrine? For not only do we discover this "structure" in material phenomena, but even in our most spiritual aspirations, thoughts and volitions. In fact, it is a universal characteristic of any thought object (be it *ens reale* or *ens rationis*) that is subjected to analysis in answer to the question: "What is this?" For any answer to that question must be given in terms of what we perceive this to have in common with something else. And that is why the attempt to analyze any individual event or object can never be completely successful. For the individual can never be fully accounted for in terms of what is not individual, the unique in terms of what is common, or the particular in terms of the universal. An unanalyzed residue, known only confusedly and defying expression in the form of what scholastics called *cognitio distincta*, will always remain. Here, indeed, we find the real, albeit psychological reason why the principle of individuation has always been a philosophical problem and why the ultimate determinant of the species (be it the *materia* of the Thomists or the *haecceitas* of the Scotists) is in principle unintelligible to man in this life.

This of course raises the further question. To what extent does this "species-individual" character imply a real non-simplicity in the object? Here we recognize the perennial problem of the objective basis of universals. And the



scholastic answers have ranged anywhere from exaggerated realism to realistic conceptualism. To the reviewer, it would seem that Van Melsen's solution savors of the former extreme. For if this non-simplicity with its corresponding structure is real to the extent that it makes change possible, as the author contends, then we have existing in reality, albeit not in actual separation, a real entity, the form, which is not as such individual. The identification between species-individual and form-matter, then, described on p. 117 could be questioned on a number of counts such as the equivocation latent in the designation "no separate existence", "relation of species with form" or the statement that species with reference to individual is determinative (actual) rather than determinable (potential), etc.

There are many other points that deserve a more extensive comment than I can give here. Thus for instance, the question of whether schematization is so radically different from abstraction as the author maintains, or to approach the same problem from a different angle, whether "construction" rather than "abstraction" might not be a better term to explain the origin of the generality of our concepts on all three so-called "levels of abstraction", or whether the theory of the three degrees of abstraction, for that matter, is meaningful today in terms of what we know of ideogenesis. Or from a more positive and constructive point of view, we could call attention to the interesting potentialities of some of Van Melsen's observations regarding substance, unity — especially the idea of using our total self or the human individual as we experience it in its oneness with, yet apartness from the rest of the universe as a practical norm of a *per se* unity or substance. An explanation of the implications of man as functional unit (a notion incidentally not too far removed from what Aristotle meant by nature as substance) might also lead to the discovery of a more acceptable starting point than the questionable "species-individual" structure. We might even "arrive at the same conclusions as Aristotle did" (p. 110), or at least justify some of his more valid insights, if it is of some importance or useful to do so. The starting point in short is unfortunate in that it vitiates what might otherwise have been a very good book. Even in its errors the work remains true to the proper method of a philosophy of nature, so much so that, despite its shortcomings, the reviewer is almost tempted to recommend it to a discerning teacher or for a more advanced or graduate course in preference to any comparable English text.

The third volume of the series, *Philosophico-Scientific Problems*, by Dr. Van Laer of the State University of Leyden is a compilation in translation of articles previously published by the author in Dutch or French. A simple enumeration of the chapter headings gives some idea of the contents. They are: 1. the value of Thomistic philosophy in the study of physical science, 2. extension as a criterion of matter, 3. the principle of verification, 4. the possibility of action at a distance, 5. causality, determinism, previsibility and modern science, 6. causality and finality with respect to physical science, 7. on the difference between mathematics and science.

The first of these essays is introductory in character, stressing the need of a realistic interpretation of the philosophy of nature and of science rather than an attempt to defend the validity of Thomistic philosophy as such. The second seeks to prove the thesis that everything material has extension and

everything without extension is immaterial or spiritual. We agree with the author that it is difficult to define extension, we are not so sure as he that it is "sufficiently clear". A more thorough acquaintance with what the scholastics understood by extension and in what sense some of them regarded the life principle of the higher animals at least as material yet inextended would have helped the author considerably in this section. The third chapter contains an enlightening analysis and critique of the neo-positivist principle of verifiability. Chapter four reviews the arguments against the possibility of action at a distance and concludes that no *a priori* or metaphysical argument disproves it. While the physical arguments are not conclusive they do enable us to conclude "with a high degree of certainty not only that action at a distance *does not exist* in nature, but also that the nature of matter makes such an action *impossible*". In view of some of the interesting characteristics of the *psi*-phenomena (Cf. Rhine, *Journ. of Parapsychology*, XVII (1954), 184 ff.) as they concern material objects, the author's judgment, to the mind of this reviewer seems somewhat premature. Incidentally, a more positive metaphysical argument for the possibility of action at a distance might be drawn from an analysis of the implications of the axiom *actio est in passo*. At any rate the very mystery in which all causality is shrouded, especially that of the First and therefore most proper cause, makes it difficult to make any kind of categorical statements on this subject. Chapters five and six treat of other aspects of causality. In the former, Dr. Van Laer attempts to remove some of the objections to causality that have their origin in the theory of quantum mechanics through the medium of a clearer terminology. Wisely he does not attempt a final solution to the problem. One need only read some current literature on this subject (e. g. H. Margenau's "Advantages and disadvantages of various interpretations of the quantum theory" *Physics Today*, VII [October, 1954], 6—13) to see that still other distinctions than those cited by Van Laer may be needed to cope with these difficulties. As a whole, however, the work is well done. Primarily a reference work, it should prove a boon for both teacher and student of philosophy of science or cosmology. We look forward with some expectation to the author's forthcoming text on Philosophy of Science.

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*La preuve réelle de Dieu. Étude critique*, by Joseph Defever, S. J., Bruxelles-Paris, 1953. Pp. 145.

In introducing this small but interesting volume, Father Defever informs us modestly that his critical study in large measure owes not only its inspiration but also the substance of its doctrine to the late Maréchal. In view of the sometime stigma of idealism attached to the latter's teaching — a charge, incidentally, which Father Defever refutes in a special appendix devoted to Maréchal's understanding of intuition and the finality of intellection — the author significantly styles this essay in natural theology a "real proof". Such a proof, he explains, not only begins with the real but keeps in contact with

reality throughout the course of its development and terminates only when it has reached the existence of a real God.

The fivefold way of Aquinas, he believes, actually fulfills this requirement, yet critical and contemporary thought first questioned, then rejected many of its basic assumptions such as the reality of the finite world, the meaningfulness or value of causality as extended to the transphenomenal realm, or the very possibility of the human mind ever reaching the essence of God by conceptual or discursive thought. There is need then not so much of a new proof as a critical justification of old assumptions. Just this the author aims to do, not indeed by analyzing the *quinque viae* in detail for they are but variants of one basic approach, one traditional proof, which in essence comes down to this. It begins with the existence of the finite, discovers the latter's dependence upon some cause, which dependence terminates with an uncaused cause, a supreme Being whose very nature is "to be".

In the course of his work, Defever submits each of these essentials to critical evaluation. Actually his justification of the *preuve traditionnelle* consists in reconstructing or reformulating it in a way he believes will meet both Kantian criticism and the just demands of existentialism. Yet, despite all appearances to the contrary, the author protests that his is not a new species, not even a new variety, of the traditional proof, and at every step of the way points out his substantial conformity with the teaching of St. Thomas.

In addition to the appendix devoted to the defense of Maréchal, Defever divides his book into six chapters which bear the following titles: the starting point of the proof, the principle of causality, the discursive method, the proof of God, the analogical knowledge of God, the existence of God. A real proof, he points out, must begin with the experience of reality. But what kind of experience? Subjective or objective, psychological or external? With the existentialist, he replies, it must be a "total experience". And such is both subjective and objective, it involves both sensible perception and intellectual awareness. For it is only in and through its awareness of some sensible object that the ego becomes conscious of itself and of its very consciousness. This "total reflection" is a spiritual or intellectual activity even though it remains enmeshed, as it were, in the sensible perception in and through which it came to be. It is precisely here that the knowing mind finds the means of transcending the sensible and material without losing contact with the real immediately experienced. *Ego cognosco cognitum sensibile*. This is the primitive experience, the initial reality, the incontrovertibly certain fact, the *esse primum quoad nos*, that must serve as the starting point of the real proof.

Total reflection not only reveals the *point de départ*, it also provides rational justification for causality, even though this metaphysical principle can be established neither by inductive nor deductive reasoning, nor is it properly speaking analytical in character. The causality in question, however, is not that of efficiency but finalty. In our conscious reflection we perceive the presence and opposition of the object to the active awareness of the subject. And it is here that we actually experience the actual influence of the object's final causality upon our knowing self. Similar analysis reveals that the use of concepts or discursive reasoning does not of itself destroy the existential value of a proof or make it necessarily unreal.



In the proof proper, Defever uses both reflection and deduction to make explicit the far reaching implications of the real object which is the final cause of the knowing subject. He analyzes in phenomenological fashion the living continuous experience expressed by the proposition *Ego cognosco cognitum sensibile*, arguing that this very affirmation itself involves a recognition and affirmation of a unique transcendent object, distinct from the multiplicity of immediate objects. This alone can guarantee the experienced fact that the knowing self continues to affirm its own proper identity despite the difference and variety of the mode of expression. Now the very being or existence of all conscious activity, of every act of knowing depends upon the object as its actual final cause. Through each act of self-knowledge, however, the mind or self not only asserts its intentional identity with the real, sensible object it now knows but also its own identity with its previous self. This affirmation or recognition of its substantial identity, its quasi-eternal character despite the vicissitudes of time and space, implies a dependence on some one unique final cause, and consequently is also an affirmation and recognition of the latter's existence as distinct from and other than the present sensible object. Since other knowing or conscious subjects exist for me only as objects known, they too are referred by me to this unique existence which is my ultimate end and which I may call God.

Now I discover further, Defever declares, that the nature of this real being, my final cause, excludes all possible multiplicity. It is being, it is intuitive knowledge, it is love. For as the ultimate final cause of my knowing self, it must be in itself the actuality and fulness of that perfection towards which the latter strives in its activity of knowing. Now all knowledge, objectively, identifies the intelligible with the real, for the immanent intelligible in its intentional existence is not *id quod*, *sed id quo cognoscitur ipsa res* (*Sum. th. I, 85, 2*). Hence, this final cause of my knowledge is subsistent intellection, therefore a real being, a real existence. Furthermore, since subjectively all knowledge identifies the intelligible with the knowing subject, this final cause, this God, is also an intuition of himself. He is also love, for in and through an act of knowledge the being of the subject is conferred upon the object. The subject is identified with the object as lovable *en soi*. This union of benevolent love pertains to the will. Not that it is an elicited act but rather *voluntas ut natura*. And finally, because the final cause of any activity necessarily contains all that is of perfection in this activity, this unique existence we call God is an *active* identity of being, intuition and love; active, not in the fashion of something that begins to be or that produces itself, but after the manner of a final cause which possesses what it communicates.

Defever goes on to argue that this being transcends and is really distinct from the multiplicity of immediate objects of our knowledge and is infinite in relation to them. But it is also infinite in an absolute sense, for it transcends all possible or conceivable limits. And since this is so, there can be but one God.

Having completed his proof, Defever pauses in the fifth chapter to review it pointing out the analogous character of our knowledge. In addition to his interpretation of Aquinas' doctrine on this subject, he also has some interesting observation regarding the saint's theory of signification. In the sixth and final chapter the author is intent on proving how his proof meets the require-



ments of existentialism, for it terminates with the existence of the real God. Consequently, neither Brunschvicg's "Theodicy is atheism!" nor Marcel's "Theodicy must be condemned!" are true.

In many ways this is an admirable book. As a reinterpretation of many medieval philosophical concepts and maxims in a phenomenological or existential setting, it represents a new and living form of Thomism, which though it might not always be recognized by Aquinas as just what he had in mind, is for all that a genuine development of what is contained at least potentially and in germ in his philosophy. Furthermore, it embodies many interesting observations and insights that are of great value to one who would wish to incorporate the better elements of existentialism into his philosophy or effect some kind of rapprochement between medieval scholasticism and contemporary French philosophy. In this regard the sixth chapter deserves special attention.

As for the proof proper, however, to this reviewer at least not every step of the argument seems logically convincing and many of the keyterms, which are admittedly analogous, could do with clarification. While "total reflection" may justify the existence of final causality to the extent that it is really experienced and its meaning defined precisely in terms of this experience, it does not appear to justify it as a "principle" or in reference to something which is neither the knowing self nor the immediate object of its intuition. The proof for the fact that God is love and *voluntas* seems particularly weak, for the "love" whose existence can be established in this way would seem to bear little or no resemblance to what the theologian or philosopher ordinarily means when he declares with St. John that "God is love". Similar difficulties arise with regard to the proof for God's infinity and unicity. If the "inferences" in question are logically valid, they would seem to be so only because of tacit assumptions which should be made explicit.

Perhaps it is unfair, however, to subject Father Defever's "rational justification" to any rigorous logical analysis since he would decry the equation or equivalence of "rational" and "logical" and has pointed his proof primarily to the existentialist with whom it should find a more sympathetic reception. One brought up in a milieu where the scientific tradition and the philosophy of logical analysis hold sway, however, might be tempted to observe with Kant that interesting and thought provoking though it be, this proof too „bedarf *Gunst* um den Mangel seiner Rechtsansprüche zu ersetzen“ (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*).

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
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